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Abstract 
 
 
On 21 December 1988 a civil airliner, Pan Am 103, blew apart over the town 
of Lockerbie, Scotland. This was a major terrorist attack against civil 
aviation, which shocked billions of people and gained worldwide media 
attention. This thesis examines the Lockerbie case in its political and legal 
dimension as a heinous and spectacular example of international aviation 
terrorism. First, it discusses the very idea of terrorism and the inherent 
definitional problems. Then, it focuses on the disaster and its aftermath. 
The thesis approaches the numerous issues this complex case raised as 
years went by. In particular, it portrays the long-standing diplomatic and 
political wrangle between the United Kingdom and the United States on one 
side and Libya on the other side. 
 
The International Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council 
were both involved in this case. The thesis tries to depict the inextricable 
link between law and politics within the United Nations framework and the 
difficult balance the judicial and the political powers need striking for a 
correct and fruitful functioning of the whole system. The Lockerbie case 
turned out to be a testing-gown for the inherent consistency of the United 
Nations set-up. Extradition of the alleged perpetrators of the bombing was 
the issue at stake. For the first time ever, the Security Council imposed 
sanctions on a sovereign state in order to secure to justice the alleged 
perpetrators of a terrorist attack. And this raised another pivotal issue that 
this thesis explores: the adequacy of sanctions as a means for inducing a 
country’s leadership to adopt a certain course of action. 
 
The Lockerbie case is also a story of unofficial diplomacy where mediation of 
enlightened leaders such as Nelson Mandela proved pivotal. The stance that 
so-called emerging powers took was also crucial to determine the course of 
the following events.  Ultimately, a criminal trial took place and somebody 
was convicted for the heinous onslaught. This thesis tries to analyse the 
Lockerbie trial in its peculiarity: for the first time ever, a national Court sat 
in a foreign country in order to deal with a criminal case. If the parties to 
the dispute had not compromised on the idea of a neutral venue where to 
stage the trial, the latter would have probably never come about. 
 
Yet, the criminal trial was not the closing chapter of the lengthy Lockerbie 
saga. Of course, for the grieving families of the victims, the fact that 
somebody was held accountable was better than nothing. Yet, the said 
families also tried to advocate their own cause and get something more than 
a criminal verdict convicting one single person. Restitution being 
impossible, there was still room for monetary compensation. This thesis 
focuses on the lengthy and painful battle the families of the Lockerbie 
victims engaged in. It was a double battle, actually: one against the airline 
 iii
that had somehow let one of its aircraft crash and one against the Libyan 
Government, which might be held responsible for the deeds of its agents. 
None of the two was an easy battle to win and yet it was pivotal to fight 
both, if justice was to be achieved.   
 
In the event, the Lockerbie case came to an end. Somebody was convicted for 
Pan Am 103 bombing and the families of the victims got some money in 
compensation, both from the airline and the Libyan Government. In the 
meantime, the world geopolitics has been changing. The relationship 
between the West and Libya is no longer as tense as it was. The African 
state is back to the international fold. This took a long time to be achieved 
but it happened through the use of legal tools. In the aftermath of the 
disaster, striking back by military means might have been an option but it 
was ruled out. In this respect, this thesis tries to show that law and politics 
can interact in a fruitful way, thus preventing escalations of violence. 
Whether they also achieve substantial justice might however be 
questionable.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the global challenges for the 21st century seems to be aviation 
security. It is unquestionable that aviation terrorism is a frightening feature 
of the world of today and a major concern for governments worldwide. As a 
matter of fact, the international community has been experiencing an 
epidemic growth of unlawful acts of interference with civil aviation, which 
began in the late sixties and early seventies and still threatens to this day 
the safety of billions passengers. Undeniably, civil aviation provides 
terrorists with highly visibility targets and, due to the great media attention 
paid to attacks on aviation targets, provides terrorists with great 
propaganda opportunities as well as a noteworthy leverage in the 
achievement of their aims. This is why civil aviation is often an optimal 
target for terrorists. Air transport is certainly a vital factor for global 
economic growth, communication and social development. Blowing up an 
aircraft and killing all passengers and crew on the spot is something 
dramatically spectacular and an effective way to spread fear and 
uncertainty.  
Without a shred of doubt, this is an “easy” manner to grab the media’s 
attention and therefore prompt an immediate reaction all over the world. 
For one crash, billions passengers feel threatened. Thus, there is no need to 
stress that one of the imperative tasks, faced by the international 
community, is the safeguarding of air transport against acts of unlawful 
interference. A 100% risk free environment seems quite unrealistic though, 
as today’s action is just the reply to yesterday’s threat, whereas what might 
happen tomorrow is no more than the subject matter of mere speculation. 
Nevertheless, a few elements seem indispensable, whatever the possible 
forthcoming threat, if terrorism is to be effectively fought: states’ willingness 
to co-operate, adequate rules, implementation of the said rules.  
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Unfortunately, none of these elements is easy to ensure. It is sometimes 
extremely difficult to reconcile law and politics, implementation of rules and 
willingness of states to abide by internationally acknowledged legal 
standards. What is terrorism for somebody may be interpreted as heroism 
for others. Points of views and interpretations about the same phenomenon 
may differ widely and elaborating a clear and concise definition of terrorism 
is almost impossible. The word terrorism is per se a highly emotional and 
derogatory term that inevitably evokes deep-seated political beliefs. Thus, it 
is extremely difficult to study terrorism objectively. A major obstacle to a 
definition that commands broad acceptability is that, in many contexts, 
terrorism involves an issue of morality. Moral judgements may be made on 
the assumption that some forms of violence are justifiable whereas others 
are not. The one who is labelled a terrorist from a certain angle may also be 
considered a “freedom fighter,” if re-thought in a different perspective.  Yet, 
all terrorists claim to be freedom fighters since they do need to justify their 
endeavours, at least to their own satisfaction. Every warrior for every cause 
must be able to substantiate the use of violence and terrorists are no 
exception.  
It is therefore difficult to stick to a neutral perspective. This is why so 
much literature on terrorism tends to get lost in ideology, which is of very 
little help when it comes to promote safety and curb international aviation 
terrorism by working out effective and sensible responses. Ideological 
assumptions always bear a strong emotional charge and tend to prompt 
heated political debates. Thus, the meaning of the word terrorism is rarely 
agreed upon, although analysts have produced a variety of definitions and 
developed a number of typologies. Yet, trying to understand the 
phenomenon as it is and possibly frame it into a definition, which is likely to 
be agreed upon, seems important if a successful reaction to terrorist attacks 
is to be fashioned. If a major concern is to be seriously addressed through 
international co-operation, the problem in itself has to be understood and 
somehow framed in a way that may bring about the maximum consensus 
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ever. No effective way of coming to grips with terrorism may be worked out 
if there is no homogeneous understanding of the problem. However, the 
outburst of terrorist attacks on civil aviation since the 1970s has attained a 
substantial response from the international community that has started co-
operating in order to achieve an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism.  
This endeavour has generated several international conventions that have 
been providing a common ground for fighting terrorism and 
internationalising those offences consisting of unlawful acts against civil 
aviation. Interestingly, what is stigmatised is not terrorism per se, but 
specific unlawful activities, which are labelled as criminal. Yet, 
international aviation terrorism is a complex phenomenon, in constant state 
of change. What has been done hitherto is certainly insufficient, since major 
terrorist threats still lie ahead. Besides, international terrorism, whenever 
groups or individuals are somehow under the direction of a sovereign state, 
may also sound like an act of war, or at least a surrogate of conventional 
warfare. It may look like a cost-effective act of war,  which smaller states 
may also afford. Or maybe the only act of war that makes the wealthiest 
and most powerful nations also vulnerable. There are states which cannot 
easily be affected from a military or economic point of view. Yet, those states 
can be shattered and severely hurt through terrorist attacks.  
This is why the world of today is experiencing a dreadful escalation of 
terrorist attacks. The selective atrocity of terrorism, which aims at specific 
targets, seems to be replacing the impartial brutality of traditional warfare, 
where the enemy is properly identified and altogether addressed. Terrorism 
singles out its victims amongst innocent bystanders: the passengers flying 
on a specific aircraft, for example, or unaware people circulating in an 
airport at a certain time, on a specific date. The fact that the victims of 
terrorism are innocent civilians seems to be a major feature of terrorism, 
whatever definition one wants to choose for this complex phenomenon. This 
is why terrorism can certainly be viewed as a type of criminal behaviour, 
pure violence aiming at guiltless targets, whatever motivation this violence 
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underlines. Obviously, if terrorism is seen as a form of criminal behaviour, 
counter-terrorism is a matter of law enforcement. Nonetheless, setting rules 
and implementing them in the international arena largely rely upon the 
willingness of states of co-operating and addressing the same problem on a 
common ground.  
Both political efforts and legal endeavours seem to be necessary in order to 
promote safety and curb international aviation terrorism, both seem to have 
equal “dignity” in the set-up of the global order. Political action may prove 
pivotal in securing the interests of justice, whereas a juxtaposition of law 
and politics may undermine the global struggle against terrorism and give 
terrorists more power. Unfortunately, reconciling law and politics can prove 
difficult. Politics may allow for shared advantages, whereas law creates 
winners and losers. One of the cases that highlights how complex and 
arduous reconciliation between law and politics may happen to be is the 
Lockerbie affair, which nonetheless shows the inextricable link between the 
two and the necessity for both to contribute whenever international 
terrorism has to be dealt with.  
On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am flight 
103 killing all 259 passengers and crew, as well as 11 residents of the town 
of Lockerbie, Scotland, where the wreckage of the aircraft crashed.  This 
was one of the major challenges civil aviation had ever faced hitherto 
inasmuch as a spectacular act of aviation terrorism, which was paid 
enormous attention by the media all over the world. It took years of 
negotiations and diplomatic activity for those who were accused for the 
disaster to be surrendered for trial, which began on 3 May, 2000 and came 
to an end on 14 March, 2002, when the appeal judgment was delivered. This 
trial may certainly be considered one of the most fascinating in recent 
history, since politics and diplomacy were necessarily interwoven in this 
case from start. In the Lockerbie case, there has been a place for political 
action in securing the interests of justice, whereas diplomacy was absolutely 
crucial in paving the way for both the investigation and the prosecution and 
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in securing international co-operation. Yet, there were moments when the 
interaction between law and politics was far from being fruitful and looked 
more like a form of nasty juxtaposition than an example of productive 
coalition. In those times, it seemed that a legal understanding of the case as 
well as a legal response were bound to form an antithetical pair with 
political reasoning and tools. And that was the time when both political and 
legal efforts led to a dead end. It was only when the realm of law and that of 
politics were somehow reconciled that the investigation started being 
successful and the case was brought to an end. 
Thus, the entire story is to be told, since the investigation is finished and 
the trial is over, before they are both “filed away” in the public conscience. It 
is through the lesson of the past that the future becomes less nebulous and 
frightening, after all. Why choosing Lockerbie as a case study though, 
amongst the many aviation disasters which may also be labelled as 
“terrorist deeds”? Mainly, because the Lockerbie affair is a very fascinating 
intrigue, which encompasses a number of remarkable issues: this is why it 
seems worthy to tell it all. Universal jurisdiction is certainly one of those 
issues. The transformation in the nature, pattern and extent of crime in the 
post World War II years, coupled with a recognition that some such activity 
is injurious to the international community as a whole, has produced a 
corresponding transformation in legal attitudes and approaches. The 
prevention and control of crime and the development of the criminal justice 
system are increasingly perceived as global exercises. The Lockerbie trial 
certainly shows how far criminal law has come, in responding to the world of 
today, by advancing from its old limitation to the jurisdiction of the place 
where the criminal acts occurred to a trans-national dimension. With 
Lockerbie in particular, something crucial to international relations seems 
to have been established: that, where countries are prepared to be flexible in 
their criminal justice system and where there is international co-operation, 
justice can be achieved. Quite a lesson to be inferred for the development of 
more productive international relations!  
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In Lockerbie, there was also a new, different way of dealing with 
extradition. It is undeniable that the well-established principle of aut dedere 
aut iudicare may serve for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility. Domestic amnesties and sham trials might be 
designed to avoid the prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes, 
which may be of political expedience. Hereby, extradition, which is a topical 
legal matter, may turn out to be a political concern. This is exactly what 
happened in Lockerbie, where extradition was considered a legal issue by 
Libya, whereas it became a matter of political concern for the United 
Kingdom and the United States and an issue for the United Nations 
political organ par excellence, the Security Council. The Lockerbie affair 
also raised the political question of international security and became a case 
of two states against another, paving the way for the use of the United 
Nations Charter. It also turned out to be a testing-gown for the inherent 
consistency of the United Nations system and thereby raised the issue of the 
importance of checks and balances for the functioning of that system, since 
both the political and the judicial organs of the United Nations were 
involved and problems of overlapping jurisdictions between the two seemed 
to arise.  
Besides, state-sponsored terrorism became one of the key concepts to the 
Lockerbie case and the scope of the latter reached far beyond the mere 
question of treaty-based extradition. In a way, Lockerbie implicated a totally 
new dimension into international criminal law, which has been transformed 
into political international criminal law. Before the events at Lockerbie, 
political crime in context with international connections had been treated in 
terms of criminal procedures. From the Lockerbie disaster on, there is a 
situation where international law is considered inextricably linked with 
political reasoning, although the Lockerbie affair shows how difficult it is to 
draw a line between law and politics. This case provides a number of useful 
hints for an analysis of the said issue and also allows a possible comparison 
between traditional warfare and terrorism. Undeniably, war is 
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quintessential terror, yet, it is not criminal in pure legal terms. Killing in 
war is deemed justifiable or at least acceptable. Nonetheless, some conducts 
such as manslaughter of non-combatants, even within war, and, a fortiori, 
during times of relative peace, are neither justifiable nor acceptable.  
Terrorism, instead, may be deemed criminal because its victims are 
innocent individuals. Quid iuris, then? 
Obviously, the Lockerbie case not only drew the attention of diplomacy 
and politics but also of the media, which gave it unprecedented publicity, 
including widespread dissemination of photographs of the accused even 
before the trial started. The question, then, is whether it is possible to 
achieve justice notwithstanding the emotional response that pre-trial 
publicity may generate. It is actually difficult to find another international 
case were the concept of due and fair process might have been more at 
stake. The presumption of innocence as the cornerstone of a fair trial and 
the freedom of press as one of the fundamental ingredients for the 
maintenance of democracy need sometimes being reconciled. Media 
portrayals may actually serve as projective devices that isolate acts and 
people from meaningful contexts and set them up to be victimized or 
stigmatised, while providing terrorists with a huge audience and enormous 
attention. The Lockerbie affair certainly raised this sort of issues and the 
story of the trial highlights major theoretical concerns, such as the 
“spectacularization” of crime and the necessity of feeding the audience with 
immediate answers, which might prove groundless or simply insufficient, as 
if the right of getting to know might overwhelm the duty of duly inform.  
In Lockerbie, it seemed almost impossible to ensure an acceptable degree 
of fairness and impartiality if the trial was to be held in the country where 
the atrocity had occurred. Yet, that degree of fairness and impartiality 
seemed also hard to achieve in the country where the accused belong. There 
it came the idea of a trial to be held in a third country. The Netherlands was 
agreed upon as the best possible option. This is quite unique in 
international jurisprudence: courts have of course sat in foreign countries 
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for the purpose of taking evidence. The Lockerbie trial was the first one, 
though, where the court sat wholly within the territory of another state and 
exercised jurisdiction within it. Obviously, the decision to go for a trial in 
the Netherlands was not without its critics: for some, politics had interfered 
with the due process of law. Two people accused of the most serious of 
crimes had been protected by their government to the point their fears about 
inability to receive a fair trial needed being accommodated. Otherwise, there 
would have been no trial at all.  Despite the apparent success of the trial, 
this remains on the face of it a potent criticism and deserves an answer. 
Once again, politics and law turned out to be inextricable and law was 
ostensibly submitted to political reasons.  
For all the above mentioned, the Lockerbie affair seems worth being 
explored in its multifaceted nature. Besides, this case seems particularly up-
to-date, given the current interest for state-sponsored terrorism and 
aviation disasters. After the atrocities which took place in the United States 
in September 2001, the interest in the Lockerbie affair seems more alive 
than ever before, even though any comparison between the two kinds of 
attacks seem inappropriate, at least because of the magnitude of the attack 
against the World Trade Center. Nonetheless, the topical question “what 
lesson from Lockerbie” is still unanswered and sounds particularly up-to-
date. Undeniably, the international infrastructure of terrorism is becoming 
better organized and more efficient. The terrorists own sights seem being 
raised by their success. That power can only be destroyed when there is 
international recognition of its immense gravity and effective international 
action by the united forces of civilization to bring it under control.  
More willingness to co-operate is certainly fostered by a wider knowledge 
of the past. Major events do not come about overnight. Aviation terrorism is 
a chain of frightful happenings. Hence, the only way of addressing the 
problem of security in the sky is looking at the “big picture” and trying to 
understand it thoroughly. Pan Am 103 crash is one event. Civil aviation 
security is the global challenge. If one element all the terrorist attacks 
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against civil aviation do have in common, that is the fact that they bring 
about, together with fear, grief and outrage, more willingness to co-operate 
and some determination not to be intimidated. Thus, what major crisis can 
bring forward is more “teamwork.” Nothing perhaps activates more 
international co-operation than a universally shared sense of danger.  
In a way, what happened at Lockerbie can be deemed a precedent for the 
more recent terrorist attacks. Time has gone by, but the world is still facing 
the same sense of fear and insecurity that arose in the aftermath of the Pan 
Am 103 bombing and even more. Civil aviation is still proving an optimal 
target for terrorists and security in the sky is far from being accomplished. 
Obviously, there is no need to emphasize the enormity of the task that lies 
ahead when it comes to safeguarding air transport against possible acts of 
unlawful interference. Legal rules in themselves cannot possibly suffice in 
curbing the wave of violence that has been unleashed against civil aviation 
in the last decades and maybe will not be capable of doing more than they 
have already done: providing the legal tools to cope with terrorism. 
Certainly, the legal solution is never likely to eliminate terrorism, which, by 
its very nature, disdains the rules of a law-abiding international game. 
However, law may help the international community overcome a number of 
dangerous conceptual controversies pertaining to the idea of justifiable 
violence. Assessing that terrorism is criminal per se and must be condemned 
as such may prove important, if the international community does not want 
terrorist activities to remain not only un-punished but also un-punishable. 
International relations cannot be left free of any trammel whatsoever. Legal 
rules, however weak and ineffective, do introduce a bit of humanity and 
order into a world of chaos where utterly inhuman conduct is quite likely to 
come true. As the great French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in 
“The Social Contract,” “nothing that is lawful has any force when the laws 
cease to have any.” 
Unfortunately, international law has not been particularly successful in 
addressing terrorism. The international community has hitherto failed to 
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respond adequately to the terrorist threat. Politics and diplomacy have not 
proved very effective either. Still, they all have a crucial role to play in the 
struggle against aviation terrorism. Law, politics and diplomacy may all be 
used as weapons in the arsenal to be set up in order to fight terrorist attacks 
on civil aviation worldwide. However, the ultimate defence against the 
continuing threat of man-made acts of unlawful interference with civil 
aviation seems to rest in the collective political will and effective co-
operation in the community of states. Terrorism not only violates the law 
since it consists of conducts that in no civilized legal system whatsoever may 
be deemed lawful, but also challenges politics. Better, it seems to embody 
the rejection of politics as a civilized means of addressing problems or 
solving conflicts. It appears cold-blooded exaltation of violence over all forms 
of political activity since terrorists seem to use violence as a desirable form 
of action. Politics, instead, is exactly what makes violence both unnecessary 
and unnatural to civilized men. This is why it is an essential part of the 
basic machinery of civilization. In defeating the rule of law and rejecting 
politics, terrorism seeks to make civilization unworkable. It is therefore the 
fruitful interaction between law and politics that may turn out to be the 
decisive factor in the struggle against international terrorism and an 
overriding element in the promotion of justice.  
Further terrorist attacks on civil aviation are likely to lie ahead and have 
to be prevented, not only because of the innocent blood they can shed but 
also because of the escalation of violence and terror they may prompt. A 
single act of terrorism may lead to military actions, which, in turn, could 
lead to general war. The more the terrorist threat seems likely to come true, 
the more the possibility to strike back hard seems unavoidable. Yet, violence 
only seems to lead to more violence. Undeniably, military operations may 
bring short-range results and satisfaction to public expectations and 
internal political pressures. But, in addition to being ineffective in the long-
term, they have the tendency to degenerate into an uncivilized response. 
Addressing the symptoms of a malady may bring temporary relief, but the 
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cause of sickness would not be eradicated and remains intact. This is why 
re-thinking what happened in the recent past may prove of some help for 
the forthcoming future. The more the combination of legal, political and 
diplomatic tools proves effective, the less the idea of striking back through 
violent means sounds tempting and viable.  
Terrorism can transform our world into a nightmare of fear and violence. 
If, in meeting the terrorist threat, a society must arm itself, this society 
gives up all of those standards and decencies that have made it civilized. It 
is instead through the triumph of law that terrorism may be banned and 
through the re-establishment of the primacy of politics, as the only viable 
means of addressing conflicts, that it may become unnecessary once and 
forever. Fortunately, there is unanimity in the necessity of combating 
terrorism. Ostensibly, there is not one single country to dispute this 
necessity. Terrorism is widely considered as a method that law-abiding 
people and law-abiding countries in the world deem unacceptable since it is 
a massive violation of basic human rights, such as life, physical integrity 
and freedom of movement. The problem is to understand what conduct 
amounts to terrorism and may be deemed as a crime that needs being 
sanctioned. Here, opinions may differ. However, there is a big fault line 
between those who believe that terrorism is a legitimate and acceptable 
means of fighting and those who argue that it is unacceptable as a method 
and must be eradicated, since it is no less than a major threat or brutal 
violation of fundamental human rights. Besides, the question that also 
needs being answered is what sort of means may counter terrorism in an 
effective and civilized way.  
In Lockerbie, justice was achieved through lawful means and without 
further blood being shed. Both politics and law contributed to bringing the 
case to a successful end and both helped the course of justice. All of the 
terrorist threats against civil aviation should be dealt with in the same way. 
The triumph of law and politics over crazed violence against innocents is the 
only civilized response that a civilized world can produce as a reaction 
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against the unacceptable consequences terrorism entails. If the events at 
Lockerbie may help understand the importance of fighting terrorism 
through peaceful means and of re-establishing the rule of law as the 
supreme value, it seems worthwhile to tell the entire story even though the 
case has come to an end and time has gone by since 21 December 1988. 
Trying to understand the past means getting ready and well equipped for 
challenges that still lie ahead and might need being addressed in the 
forthcoming future. As Sun-Tzu said in “The Art of war,” “Being prepared 
and awaiting the unprepared is victory.”  
 13
Chapter 1 
 
TERRORISM AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
 
 
1.1 The importance of a “neutral” approach 
 
The meaning of the word terrorism is rarely agreed upon, although 
analysts have produced a variety of definitions and elaborated a number of 
possible typologies. Some believe that terrorism should be tackled as a 
military problem whereas others see it as an issue for criminal justice. 
Many have argued for a legal definition of terrorism while others have been 
stressing the sociological aspect, by assuming that terrorism is some sort of 
socially unacceptable violence aimed at innocent, symbolic targets in order 
to achieve a psychological effect. Ostensibly, there are almost as many 
definitions of the subject as there are opinions on it.1 Whatever the answer, 
a single definition cannot possibly account for all of the potential uses of the 
term and the complexity of the subject. Sometimes, it seems more useful to 
talk about single acts of terrorism than to offer one definition that 
supposedly encompasses all of its possible guises. As a matter of fact, 
terrorism is not a specific and singly defined action, but rather it comprises 
a variety of violent activities, which are somehow designed to influence the 
behaviour of a potential audience through the use of violence. Terrorism 
actually ranges from individual acts of wild criminality to sophisticated 
operations enjoying support from highly organized political systems. 
Besides, the process of terrorism seems to be in a continuous state of 
development and fluctuates according to cultural and geographic variables.  
Thus, there is no true or correct definition, because terrorism appears as 
an abstract concept with no real essence. Models and typologies are only 
capable of describing patterns among events and serve as mere 
generalizations, whereas each terrorist act must be understood in its 
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specific social, historical and political circumstances. Still, there are a 
number of elements common to the leading definitions and most definitions 
seem to involve two pivotal points: someone is terrorized and the act’s 
meaning is derived from its targets and victims. Most authors appear to 
agree that terrorism involves the use or threat of violence as a method or 
strategy to achieve certain goals and that, as a major part of this coercive 
process, terrorism seeks to induce fear in its victims, which are innocent. 
Roughly speaking, terrorism may be considered as the instrumental use of 
violence against inoffensive sufferers in order to create fear and therefore 
achieve political ends. Justice Albie Sachs, for example, says that terrorism 
can be defined – not in legal but in political terms – as “forms of violence 
intended to create terror and alarm directed at non-military and non-
political targets.”2 
Yet, a broadly accepted definition of terrorism is difficult to work out also 
because the term, per se, is extremely pejorative. What is terrorism for 
somebody may be deemed as heroism by somebody else. Justice Sachs, for 
instance, points out the freedom with which those in authority and power 
may use the term terrorism in order to denounce and quash those struggling 
against them and actually recalls the times when the ANC was considered a 
terrorist organization and even those ANC members which were very close 
to be pacifists, like himself, were denied access to the United States because 
they were called terrorists. As Jan Van Eck says, “it mainly depends on 
whose side you are on.”3 Different countries, according to Van Eck, may 
actually have a “vested and biased interest in having their perceived 
enemies or opponents declared as terrorists since they then feel they can 
ignore the grievances and complaints of terrorists.”  Van Eck feels strongly 
about this and depicts the said mechanism in the following terms:  “If you do 
not want to deal with something you are doing wrong, you merely define 
those who demand changes to be terrorists, i.e. deligimise the grievance by 
deligitimising the people.”  
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Thus, it seems always very difficult to study terrorism objectively. 
However, it is extremely important to stick to some sort of neutral approach, 
one that might be applicable to every group or nation, regardless of ideology. 
This seems to be the only way not to lace the analysis to one’s political 
opinions. It seems also indispensable if a consistent global policy towards 
terrorism is to be worked out and maintained on the global scale. Otherwise, 
no policy is likely to meet with overall political consensus and the 
endeavours aimed at curbing this phenomenon are bound to fail. It is 
therefore important to acknowledge the existence of a common core of values 
that condemns some forms of readily identifiable violence.4 A consistent 
policy that condemns this common core of violence seems what the 
international community should look for, as the only ground where 
international co-operation is likely to be achieved, although, as Justice 
Sachs says, “any regime of international law has to have an even-ended 
approach and has to have principles that are powerful and resilient and 
concrete” in order to deal fairly with all different situations.  
Justice Sachs actually acknowledges that there is no universal moral 
order, if the term “universal” is supposed to include everybody, but he also 
suggests that there is something that has to be acknowledged as 
“overwhelming,” since it is what the majority of organised humanity 
supports and shares as a common core of moral values. Obviously, “it is 
something that is always in struggle, it is not something that is just there 
and under the given. But, it is more than an aspiration, is a working 
hypothesis, it is a guide to the functioning of this society.”5 As David Hume 
wrote, “morality is something more easily felt than judged of.”6 Hereby, the 
question that rises is whether terrorism may be considered as a 
condemnable activity “as such,” by excluding that it might somehow be 
justified or if sometimes terrorist violence may be accepted because there 
are justifications that explain it. According to Justice Sachs, the 
fundamental question then pertains to “the circumstances in which the use 
of force can be regarded as legitimate and if every kind of violence can be 
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simply repudiated or denounced as terrorism.” Van Eck also suggests that 
the main question is whether people who resort to the use of force “have had 
any substantive ability to raise their concerns through peaceful means. If 
not, the use of force is justified.”7  
Be it as it may, the debate is particularly heated and the issue extremely 
sensitive. Nonetheless, one thing seems undeniable: terrorist activities 
generally violate or at least endanger the most basic human rights, such as 
life, physical integrity and freedom of movement. Analysts seem to agree 
upon the fact that the victims of terrorist attacks are innocent bystanders 
and this is the one trait that those attacks all feature. Peace, tolerance, 
mutual respect and the rule of law are also amongst the casualties of 
terrorist deeds. The theoretical conflict, then, arises between those who 
consider terrorism in general and aviation terrorism in particular as a 
legitimate means of fighting in order to achieve political or otherwise 
ideological ends and those who would argue that it is totally unacceptable 
and certainly criminal as a method, since it threatens and violates the most 
fundamental human rights of guiltless targets. Obviously, the former try to 
address the motives, which the specific terrorist activity may underline, 
whereas the latter focus on the activity for what it turns out to be, 
notwithstanding its inherent reasons. Nonetheless, even those who take 
motives into consideration generally disagree about terrorism as a means of 
struggle, since it basically creates victims and perpetuates the cycle of 
victimization, if any, by hitting ordinary and innocent people.8 
As far as the domestic level is concerned, national legislators can as well 
define terrorism in different ways for the specific purposes of the municipal 
legal orders in which they have authority. Yet, the problem is with cases 
that cross national boundaries, cases in which separate municipal legal 
orders must be coordinated if the criminals defined in one legal order are to 
be apprehended or punished by the others. If terrorism is not even defined, 
it may prove very difficult, both at domestic and international level, to 
outlaw it as such. The focus is definitely less nebulous if one tries to address 
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specific acts of terrorism. The question, then, becomes one of finding 
whether certain acts in certain circumstances are “criminal” regardless of 
human discretion and should be punished as such, or whether all crimes are 
crimes only because defined so by human institutions empowered with 
appropriate authority. The scenario is quite complex and a proper definition 
of the word “terrorism” is still to come. As Justice Goldstone says, however, 
it is not really necessary to accomplish it.9 One can do without and address 
terrorist deeds that amount to specific crimes anyway. This is certainly one 
way not to mix up a political concept with legal concepts and to prevent 
political opinions from hindering a neutral analysis to come about.  
The only way to stick to a neutral framework and avoid possible political 
biases is then to focus on the illegality of the specific actions terrorism may 
consist of and treat them as specific criminal acts, notwithstanding their 
underlying political motivation. In other words, one way of overcoming the 
impasse is addressing specific actions and considering them as criminal. As 
Justice Richard Goldstone says, “terrorists commit criminal offences. There 
is no such things as a terrorist act that is not a crime under international 
law or under the domestic law of virtually every country.” Hereby, Justice 
Goldstone thinks that adding a self-standing offence of terrorism does not 
add anything, since what terrorists do – murdering, hijacking, kidnapping 
and so forth – are all criminal offences under international and domestic 
law. In fact, he considers the word “terrorism” as the “political description of 
crime under the domestic law of most countries.”  
If the said premise is accepted, that terrorism does not need to amount to 
a self-standing offence whereas single activities it consists of may amount to 
specific crimes, then the logical conclusion is that the appropriate means to 
curb terrorism is countering those activities through the criminal process. 
What then needs being assessed is whether those conducts terrorism 
consists of are both a domestic offence in virtually all nations as well as 
international crimes. It can be easily ascertained that, whatever the means 
and however employed, acts of terror-violence, such as murder, serious 
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bodily harm, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, hijacking of aircraft, are 
common crimes in every civilized society on earth and are perceived as evil 
and condemnable. Or at least, all decent people seem to deem them as such. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the legal process is the natural ground where to 
fight and sanction terrorist activities, which sounds quite obvious on the 
domestic level, is not all that obvious in the international playground. 
Undeniably, all states would rely on criminal law and use legal tools to 
suppress domestic terrorism, whereas they may not agree to label as 
criminal a certain action when it does not affect their own interests and may 
even serve their own cause. As above stressed, one man’s terrorist is often 
deemed another man’s freedom fighter, which makes a generalized 
condemnation of the same behaviour quite unlikely.  
“Moral qualities lack a precise mode of measurement,” as Jean Jacques 
Rousseau wrote in “The social contract,”10 and what is utterly immoral and 
despicable for somebody can be acceptable for others. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that some freedom fighters may be deemed terrorists whereas 
others don’t. Be it as it may, focusing on a legal definition is quite popular 
amongst governments, since specific actions can be taken against a terrorist 
inasmuch as against anyone who violates the law,11 his reasons being 
utterly immaterial. Obviously, a legal approach does not account for the 
political and sociological meaning of this complex phenomenon but it 
provides a functional framework to be used in an investigation. A legal 
approach tends by definition to be neutral, whereas other approaches seem 
far more questionable from the outset. The reason why, at first glance, it 
appears that a legal approach to terrorism would not be too controversial is 
that laws are generally passed in legislative assemblies in keeping with 
democratic traditions. For the most part, concepts of constitutional rights 
and basic freedoms can be emphasized if terrorism is to be considered as a 
threat or violation thereof.  
Hence, terrorism treated as a criminal act rather than a political 
behaviour seems compatible with the democratic process, or at least less 
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incompatible. This is why the present work will be discussed in terms of the 
conceptual scaffolding that legal reasoning provides. A legal perspective 
certainly has its inherent limitations, but at least it tends to be free of 
emotional charges and political biases. Thus, aviation terrorism will be 
considered as a criminal phenomenon whose inherent nature does not 
change simply because of the addition of ideology it is supposed to bear. This 
is in keep with what Justice Goldstone suggests when he says that it is not 
utterly necessary to think of terrorism as a self-standing crime. Focusing on 
the single activities it consists of is actually sufficient to prosecute them on 
a legal basis and try to counter them through legal tools. If this also suffices 
to address terrorism as a political phenomenon, it is obviously a different 
question, which will be raised in due course.  
 
 
1.2 Terrorism and warfare 
 
If terrorism is to be seen as a form of criminal behaviour, counter-
terrorism seems to be a matter of law enforcement, in the first place. Yet, 
dealing with international terrorism and fashioning an effective response is 
not always that simple, especially when it is necessary to come to grips with 
the so-called state-sponsored type. The latter seems to call for different 
responses from those that law enforcement authorities use in handling 
criminal offenders, since it might as well resemble an act of war. That is the 
case whenever international terrorists are somehow under the direction of a 
state. This is quite a complicated situation, since terrorist organizations are 
not officially part of the state apparatus but the sponsoring state may use 
them to achieve its own objectives. Does this sort of situation amount to a 
method of warfare if the sponsoring sovereign state uses “surrogates” to 
disrupt and create political and economic instability in another country? Is 
it to be seen as an enemy policy designed to attack one or more states by 
means of terror?  
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Obviously, the use of surrogates to fight wars is nothing new. Yet, the idea 
of terrorism as a cost-effective sort of war that smaller or weaker states may 
also afford seems quite interesting and certainly worth exploring. If 
compared to traditional warfare, terrorism can be immensely cheaper and 
may prove far more effective: undeniably, it is capable of harming even 
those states that cannot be easily affected by military or economic 
aggression. The “great advantage” terrorism also brings about is that the 
sponsoring state can remain anonymous, since evidence of state-sponsored 
terrorism is usually only circumstantial and therefore can be easily hidden 
or denied. Thus, considering terrorism as an expression of the changing 
nature of warfare or even a new form of warfare does not seem to be totally 
groundless. Nonetheless, labelling terrorism as a form of warfare is not all 
that easy. The word “war” may lend itself to numerous uses but, once again, 
it is to be understood in pure legal terms if moral and political biases are to 
be kept at bay. Besides, there is no binding definition of war. What one may 
find instead is a number of scholarly attempts to depict the practice of states 
in order to encompass a very nebulous and complex idea in a few words. 
However, scholars do generally agree about some basic requirements that 
need being fulfilled for a certain course of action to be labelled as war.  
In all definitions pertaining to international law, war is seen as a contest 
between states. Also intra-state wars are acknowledged but they are 
basically a matter for domestic legislation.12  As Carl von Clausewitz wrote 
in “On war,” “war is nothing else but a mutual process of destruction,”13 
whereas terrorism is normally seen as unilateral attack which stands by 
itself and totally lacks the feature of mutuality. As Justice Goldstone says, 
“it is a fundamental mistake to regard terrorism as war” and anyway, 
“legally speaking, it is not correct. Wars happen between nations, not 
private groups.”14 Words can often be misleading. According to Justice 
Goldstone, talking about “war on terrorism” is pretty much the same than 
talking in terms of war on drugs. It is no more than a metaphorical use of 
the said word.   
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Be that as it may, the fact remains that terrorism appears as a very 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon, and one of difficult definition. War, 
in the technical sense, begins with a declaration of war and is terminated 
with a peace treaty or some other formal steps indicating it being over. De 
facto, the armed forces of the parties may not engage in fighting even once 
in the interval. A state of war may nonetheless exist without acts of 
hostilities inasmuch as hostilities may occur without a state of war. In other 
circumstances, actually, it is the de facto situation that matters. In any such 
case, war in the material sense unfolds regardless of any formal steps. The 
overriding factor is therefore deeds rather than declarations. However, the 
employment of an armed force seems to be necessary. Whenever the use of 
force occurs, it is important to establish whether it is comprehensive enough 
for the fighting to qualify as war. Incidents involving the use of force, 
without reaching the threshold of war, occur quite often in relations 
between states.15 For war to be established, a use of force must be 
comprehensive, spatially, temporally, quantitatively, even qualitatively, for 
the destruction it inflicts. Besides, hostilities must be launched with animus 
belligerandi, that is to say a specific intention of waging war.  
Roughly, war may be considered as the hostile interaction between two or 
more states, either in a technical or in a material sense. War in a technical 
sense is a formal status produced by a declaration of war. War in material 
sense is generated by actual use of force, which must be comprehensive on 
the part of at least one party to the conflict. Does terrorism meet these 
conventional requirements? If so, it should be labelled as material war, 
certainly not involving formal steps. Yet, in most cases, it does not seem to 
meet the requirements of material war either. Undeniably, terrorist attacks 
never consist of clashes between two organized and responsible military 
establishments. Besides, even though terrorists might be controlled by 
sovereign states, the sponsorship is not all that obvious. Certainly, the 
alleged sponsor state, for the very fact of choosing “the terrorist way,” will 
deny its involvement and will never express the so-called animus 
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belligerandi. Moreover, even though terrorist attacks may embody the most 
appalling examples of cold-blooded violence, they cannot be seen as 
comprehensive use of force. Undeniably, terrorist attacks aim at specific 
targets and very seldom strike wide stretches of territory. Nor they last 
long. They are quick, by definition. Also a massive use of “personnel,” or at 
least an open massive use, is quite unlikely. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
assume that terrorism is a form of warfare. Moreover, terrorists do not 
abide by the law of warfare, which is the standard onto which the 
lawfulness of insurgencies is to be appraised.  
Under international law,16 it is “just cause” (jus ad bellum) and “just 
means” (jus in bello) the ultimate criteria which distinguish permissible 
from impermissible insurgencies. Thus, if a resort to force is justified by 
both just cause and just means, the use of force should be recognized as 
permissible. Hence, from the standpoint of international law, if the use of 
force lacks just cause or just means, the use of force should be recognized as 
illegitimate and opposed. The two criteria actually need being applied both, 
for the bellum legale to occur.17 The reason why it is important to re-call 
these few basic principles in international law is one of avoiding considering 
permissible form of insurgencies as terrorism.18 The law of warfare, 
therefore, comes into picture. The bulk of traditional law was either restated 
and codified or developed at the Brussels Conference of 1874 and at The 
Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907. The first international 
convention on the laws of war had already been formulated in Geneva in 
1864. There were then further conventions that go under the name of law of 
Geneva.  
Realistically, the law of warfare does not even aim at banning violence but 
at introducing a measure of “fair-play” and a bit of rightfulness on the 
battleground, by drawing a clear-cut line between lawful and unlawful 
behaviours. Above all, it is important because it distinguishes between 
combatants and civilians and tries to shield the latter as much as possible 
from violence. According to the law of warfare, war is therefore conceived in 
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terms of clashes between states’ armies. The concept of lawful combatants is 
also legally defined: regular armies, plus militia and volunteer corps, 
provided the latter are commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; they wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
they carry arms openly; they conduct their operations in accordance with 
the law and customs of war. In addition, traditional law of warfare allows 
the civilian population to take up arms on the approach of the enemy, 
provided it carries arms openly and respects the laws and customs of war.  
There are also international regulations of means and methods of warfare 
and a few general principles are established: it is forbidden to employ arms, 
projectiles and material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, to kill or 
wound the enemies who have laid down their arms, no longer having means 
of defence. Besides, belligerents must not attack undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings and all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far 
as possible, churches, works of arts, hospitals and historic monuments. 
These rules are meant to introduce a minimum of correctness into the 
conduct of hostilities and actually serve the interests of all parties in 
mitigating the most brutal aspects of warfare. Obviously, rules aimed at 
protecting war victims, namely prisoners of war, the wounded, the sick and 
the shipwrecked, are also established. In this area in particular, The Hague 
codification made great headway, for it was clearly in the interest of all 
states, irrespective of their status and military strength, to lay down rules 
protecting those who no longer take part in armed hostilities.  
Back to terrorism, no doubt it does not abide by the said standards. Nor it 
has ever been recognised as conventional warfare, not even later on, when 
some historical development needed being taken into account by the law of 
warfare. In the period following The Hague codification, a series of events 
actually occurred which rendered it inadequate or ineffective in many 
respects. In the first place, new classes of combatants emerged, such as 
partisans and resistance movements and then the form of guerrilla also 
spread. Partisans or guerrilla fighters, obviously, would not carry arms 
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openly or wear distinctive signs recognizable at a distance. They would 
rather conceal themselves amongst civilians. All these developments 
prompted states to revise and update the traditional rules on warfare.19 
Hence, all those fighters were upgraded to the status of lawful combatants, 
if linked to a party to a conflict, if under a responsible command and if 
behaving in compliance with the laws of war. Instead, terrorists were not, 
since they do not meet the requirements that are necessary for partisans or 
guerrilla fighters to be acknowledged as lawful combatants.  
The legislative process of reform started in 1949, when four Conventions 
on war victims20 were adopted by a diplomatic conference in Geneva. In 
1977, another diplomatic conference adopted two protocols, one on 
international armed conflicts, the other on internal armed conflicts.21 The 
above-mentioned four conventions and two protocols go under the name of 
Law of Geneva. The 1949 conventions are accepted by many states and are 
generally considered to embody customary international law that relates to 
war. At present, the laws of warfare still consists of the above-mentioned 
two sets of international legislation, the so-called Hague Regulations and 
the Law of Geneva, plus a number of customary rules. It is easy to infer that 
the new law, which emerged after the Second World War, neither destroyed 
nor supplanted the old law; rather, it has generally elaborated and 
supplemented it, or leant it greater precision. To our ends, what matters is 
that even the new body of rules has not abandoned the basic principle that a 
distinction must always be drawn between combatants and persons who do 
not take part (or no longer take part) in hostilities, and also between 
military and civilian objectives. It is on this basis that killing in war may be 
deemed lawful or unlawful, depending on whether it is carried out in 
compliance with the said, well established principles or not.  
Terrorists, instead, deliberately violate all of these principles. Terrorists 
are not linked to a party to a conflict, they are not under a recognizable, 
responsible command and, above all, they do not behave in compliance with 
the law of warfare. Quite the opposite, rather! Thus, their conduct cannot be 
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acknowledged in terms of lawful war. If terrorism is war, a new form of war, 
with utterly different features from those of traditional warfare, it is above 
all unlawful. Better, it is criminal. As stressed above, terrorism actually 
strikes at innocent targets. Thus, it always consists of an act of aggression 
aiming at impacting on guiltless victims. Therefore, if it has to be considered 
in terms of the norms and the principles that the international community 
has established as far as aggression is concerned, aggression can be seen as 
a crime. Not just a crime, but the supreme crime under international law. 
No less an institution than the United Nations General Assembly, in 1970, 
in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation amongst States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, proclaimed that “war of aggression constitutes a 
crime against peace, for which there is responsibility under international 
law.”22 And, in 1974, the General Assembly produced a consensus Definition 
of Aggression, which prescribes that “war of aggression is a crime against 
international peace.”23 Thus, the criminality of the war of aggression is 
positively established, notwithstanding the fact that the full consequences of 
this criminality are not always agreed upon. Thus, if terrorism is a new 
form of war, it is an unlawful one and above all one of a criminal species. It 
therefore calls for the principles of substantive criminal law to apply. 
 
 
1.3 Terrorism as a crime 
 
As already stressed, the one feature all analysts seem to agree upon is the 
fact that the victims of terrorism are innocent bystanders, who are 
victimized precisely because they are innocent and this sounds like the core 
of the problem. Whatever legal system is taken into consideration, it cannot 
possibly tolerate violence against innocents unless a legal justification 
occurs. All law is actually rooted in natural law and natural law can never 
consider brutality against guiltless civilians as permissible per se. Thus, the 
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emphasis can be put on the condemnation of the means used by terrorists in 
order to achieve their goals, no matter what those goals are. In other words, 
the pursuit of any goal by violence directed against non-combatants or by 
creating a public danger as well as a state of terror is what international 
law, inasmuch as the domestic laws of virtually all nations, condemns. 
Hence, the condemnation of terrorism does not refer to the goals of an 
activity or an organisation, which might be debatable, but to the means by 
which those goals are pursued. A neutral approach to terrorism, then, 
should focus on the de facto aspects pertaining to the nature of both the 
victims and the means being used.  
The ends terrorists try to achieve, such as creating a public danger or a 
state of terror as well as the ultimate goal of influencing an audience and 
serving ideological ends, must be deemed totally immaterial when it comes 
to label terrorism as a crime. However, to label it as a crime, a terrorist 
activity has to be characterized as criminal in terms of substantive law. As a 
matter of fact, if terrorist acts are to be considered as crimes, they must fit 
all of the elements of criminal law, that is to say all of these elements that 
developed and civilized legal systems do require for a crime to be 
acknowledged as such. The first step to be taken is therefore establishing 
what conducts amount to criminal terrorism, what mental elements are 
required for one to be guilty of committing a terrorist act and whether there 
are possible justifications or excuses.  
To be condemnable in criminal law terms, a conduct must include the 
basic elements of crime, that is to say actus rea and mens rea, which 
combine to cause a prescribed social harm. It is actually a general principle 
of criminal law that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the 
prosecution have proved that he has caused a certain event or that 
responsibility is to be attributed to him for the existence of a certain state of 
affairs, which is forbidden by criminal law, and that he had a defined state 
of mind in relation to the causing of the event or the existence of a state of 
affair. A man is not liable for his conduct unless the prescribed state of mind 
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is also present: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. No justification or 
excuse must occur.24  Actually, a violent conduct is not per se sufficient, 
because law may allow violence in specific circumstances. Thus, it is very 
important to draw a clear-cut line between “justifiable” or excusable and 
“unjustifiable” or inexcusable violence. This is also to be assessed in pure 
legal terms, as no moral or political judgment can be allowed if the analysis 
is to be kept objective and neutral. 
Thus, when actus rea and mens rea combine to cause a prohibited result 
and when there are no justifications or excuses, terrorist acts qualify as 
crimes, since the conduct fits all of the elements that substantive criminal 
law requires for a criminal sanction to apply. The basic idea is avoiding the 
suggestion that some guises of terrorism may be justified and therefore 
accepted as law-abiding. Political or ideological ends that terrorists pursue 
do not make any difference. As Justice Sachs suggests, “the fact that it is 
political does not exempt it. War crimes are political, genocide is political, so 
the introduction of a political ingredient does not remove it from the scope of 
prosecution. On the contrary, it intensifies. The political dimension can 
make it difficult to give appropriate definitions, but law is always dealing 
with border line cases – some are so clearly spectacular – but they should be 
dealt with and not removed simply because they are border line cases.”  
Nonetheless, political, moral, religious ends certainly characterise 
terrorism as important features. In fact, they make the activities it consists 
of somehow diverge from common crimes. Not all violence against innocent 
victims is terrorist violence and distinctions must be made between 
terrorism and different phenomena, such as common crimes. Murder, for 
example, cannot always be labelled as a form of terrorism. Generally, it is a 
common crime and it has nothing to do with terrorism. The latter is 
therefore characterized by the goals violence is instrumental to. These goals, 
though, do not change the inherent criminal nature of terrorism in the sense 
that a political, military, religious or ideological motive is not needed for 
rendering the conduct criminal. On the contrary, terrorist means may 
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undermine the legitimacy and rightfulness of any struggle. As Justice Sachs 
suggests, terrorism “is to be condemned because it undermines the basic 
morality of the struggle and the legitimacy of the struggle itself, if it is a 
struggle for freedom, for dignity, for human rights, for respect of 
personality, for cultural rights, then it is destroying itself from within by the 
randomness of the targets, by the inhumanity of the means that are being 
used.”25 He also believes that the aim does not justify the means since “if 
you have a virtuous aim, it is all the more important to reflect about and be 
very disciplined about your means.” He actually stresses that pursuing one’s 
goals through inappropriate means entails destroying the aims, the hope 
and eventually the goals themselves. In the event, this leads to what Justice 
Goldstone underlines: “some people do bad things for good motives and some 
people do good things for bad motives, but you must judge the act and not 
the reason that is attached to it.”26  
Thus, terrorist activities do result in “pure” crimes, whenever they consist 
of unjustifiable violence wantonly impacting innocents and violating basic 
human rights.  What makes terrorism special and different from common 
crimes is the capability of instilling fear for the purpose of coercing or 
intimidating an enemy or otherwise accomplishing some political or 
ideological ends. An important feature, which does not alter its inherent 
criminal nature, is therefore its psychological impact, since terrorists try to 
create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the victims 
directly attacked or threatened. Yet, a conduct, in order to substantiate a 
crime, needs being depicted by a substantive norm as such. Nullum poena 
sine lege. Does this well-established criterion apply to terrorism as well? Or 
terrorism can be condemned as such? Not an easy question. The problem is 
finding a possible legal framework in order to condemn international 
terrorism on the global scale. The domestic legislation of specific countries 
does not help, since its scope cannot go beyond the national boundaries of 
the country it refers to. Thus, it seems useful to have a closer look at the 
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United Nations system if a common ground for a blank condemnation of 
international terrorism is to be found. 
 
 
1.4 Terrorism and the United Nations 
 
What shows immediately in considering the international legal efforts that 
have been endured from the Second World War on, is the fact that the 
international community has been pursuing two different aims: on the one 
hand, there has been a major attempt aimed at working out a number of 
specific criminal acts as examples of terrorism, thus drawing an open-ended 
legal framework to be subsequently expanded with more possible cases. On 
the other hand, there has been an effort of countering terrorism per se,27 
and possibly coming to grips with the definitional issue raised above.28 
Hence, as far as international aviation terrorism is concerned, it seems 
worthwhile to have a look at the multilateral instruments that have been 
concluded in the last 40 years, by means of which a number of acts have 
been first outlawed and then labelled as criminal. Interestingly, civil 
aviation is the very domain where the first attempts of addressing criminal 
acts of terrorism and setting appropriate standards aimed at countering 
them were made.  
For example, the Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, done in Tokyo on 14 September 1963, applies 
to offences against penal law29 as well as acts which, whether or not they 
are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or 
property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board. The 
main purpose of the Tokyo Convention is therefore to protect the safety of 
the aircraft and its passengers and to maintain good order and discipline on 
board. This Convention is mainly concerned with the establishment of the 
jurisdiction of the state of registry over the offences and other acts which 
are prejudicial to good order and discipline on board an aircraft, as well as 
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the granting of important police powers to the aircraft commander. For 
instance, the aircraft commander may disembark the offender or, if the 
offence is serious, deliver him to the competent authorities of a contracting 
state when the aircraft lands. The Convention protects the aircraft 
commander and any crewmember or passenger assisting him in imposing 
the measures he finds necessary from any proceedings in respect of actions 
taken by them.  
As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the state of registration of the aircraft 
is competent to try the alleged perpetrators of offences and acts committed 
on board. Each contracting state is obliged to take the necessary measures 
to establish its jurisdiction as the state of registration. The Convention does 
not eliminate existing or future jurisdiction in states other than the state of 
registration. A contracting state which is not the state of registration may 
not interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over an offence committed on board except in certain cases; for 
instance, when the offence has been effected in the territory of the state over 
flown, the offence has been committed by or against a national or 
permanent resident of that state, and the offence is against the security of 
that state. Interestingly, this Convention neither mentions the word 
“terrorism” nor attempts to define the broad range of penal offences to which 
it applies. It rather makes it clear that it concerns even acts that are not 
penal offences.  
Yet, it does include a specific provision on unlawful seizure of aircraft.30 
Article 11 deals specifically with the consequences of an act of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft and reaffirms the duty of states, under general 
international law, to restore the control of the aircraft to its lawful 
commander and to permit the speedy departure of the aircraft, its crew, 
passengers and cargo. In a nutshell, the Tokyo Convention is the first 
noteworthy attempt of addressing acts of terrorism - as far as they threaten 
safety on board an aircraft - and of approaching the complex issue of 
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jurisdiction, that is to say one of the most controversial topics international 
aviation terrorism would henceforth involve. 
In the 1970s, further steps were taken. The Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, was agreed upon in The Hague 
on 16 December 1970. This Convention defines the act of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft, and the contracting states have undertaken to make such an 
offence punishable by severe penalties. It applies to any person who, on 
board an aircraft in flight, unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any 
other form of intimidation, seizes or exercises control of that aircraft or 
attempts to perform any such act or is an accomplice of a person who 
performs or attempts to perform any such act. In so doing, this person 
commits an offence.31 Under the provisions of The Hague Convention a state 
is obliged, whether or not it is the state of registration, to take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence 
in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does 
not extradite him. If there is no extradition treaty between the states 
concerned and the offender is in the territory of a contracting state and that 
state refuses to extradite the offender, then it must submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution under its criminal law. 
The said Convention also requires any contracting state in which the 
aircraft or its passengers or crew are present to facilitate the continuation of 
the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as possible and to return the 
aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession without 
delay.  
Hence, this Convention has definitely made the unlawful seizure of an 
aircraft an international offence, punishable by severe penalties, by 
establishing essentially universal jurisdiction and providing for either 
extradition or prosecution of the alleged offender. It has thereby created a 
legal situation under which the hijacker should not be able to find a safe 
haven anywhere in the world and thus cannot expect to remain unpunished. 
The Hague Convention is therefore important because it starts considering 
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the unlawful interference with international civil aviation as something that 
hurts the international community as a whole and calls for universal 
jurisdiction to apply. Thus, aviation terrorism starts being perceived as a 
global challenge, which reaches far beyond the interests of the state where 
the targeted aircraft is registered. Besides, The Hague Convention 
established the “extradite-or-prosecute” requirement that was to become the 
cornerstone of all further international legal efforts pertaining to various 
categories of offences. Yet, The Hague Convention is restricted to the single 
offence of unlawful seizure of aircraft and this is why it was immediately 
deemed far too narrow if aviation terrorism was to be countered effectively.  
Even though there was no consensus whatsoever as far as a possible 
definition of terrorism was concerned, one thing was unquestionable: 
aviation terrorism could consist of the most varied activities and the 
unlawful seizure of aircraft was but one of them. 
A further major step was therefore taken with the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
completed in Montreal on 23 September 1971, which provides severe 
penalties for any such acts and contains essentially identical provisions on 
jurisdiction, extradition or prosecution of the alleged offender as The Hague 
Convention. Nonetheless, the Montreal Convention deals with acts other 
than those covered by the Tokyo and The Hague Conventions. It actually 
defines a wide spectrum of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, 
labelled as offences that the contracting states have undertaken to make 
punishable by severe penalties. Inasmuch as the Tokyo and The Hague 
Conventions, the Montreal Convention does not apply to aircraft used in 
military, customs or police services. The Hague and the Montreal 
Conventions deal comprehensively with the subject of unlawful interference 
with civil aviation.  
The Montreal Convention, inasmuch as The Hague Convention, actually 
defines the offences constituting unlawful interference with civil aviation to 
the extent that they are included within the Convention; encourages 
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contracting states to apply severe penalties to the offenders; 
internationalises the offences included in the Convention by providing for 
universal jurisdiction of states with a view to facilitating apprehension of 
the suspected offender; depoliticises the offence by requiring states either to 
extradite the suspected offender or submit the case to the authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution, such authorities being required to take their 
decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
serious nature; enhances the extradition relationships among states; 
requires states, in accordance with international and national law, to 
endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the 
offences included in the Convention; requires states to facilitate 
continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as 
practicable and to return unlawfully seized aircraft and property thereon to 
the persons lawfully entitled to possession; requires states to afford one 
another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought in respect of the offences; and requires states to report 
ICAO32 the circumstances of the offences, the action taken with respect to 
the aircraft, property and passengers and measures taken against the 
suspected offender.  
With regards to the pivotal question of proper implementation, both The 
Hague and Montreal Conventions have placed an obligation on the parties 
to enact the necessary domestic legislation for carrying out their 
responsibilities hereunder. In particular, all contracting states are called 
upon to include, in their national criminal laws, provisions for the severe 
punishment of persons committing unlawful acts. Basically, the main 
difference between The Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention is 
to be found in the width of their scope, since the Montreal Convention 
stipulates that a number of unlawful activities may occur and that 
interference with civil aviation goes far beyond the single species of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft. The underlying philosophy is one of outlawing, 
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both in the domestic and international arena, a certain number of activities, 
notwithstanding their possible characterization as terrorist acts. 
Since the Montreal Convention is crucial as far as the subject matter of 
the present work is concerned, it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at 
the acts it outlaws and labels as offences. In accordance to Article 1, 
paragraph I, of the Montreal Convention, any persons commits an offence if 
he unlawfully and intentionally: (a) performs an act of violence against a 
person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the 
safety of that aircraft; or (b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage 
to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to 
endanger its safety in flight; or (c) places or causes to be placed on an 
aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is 
likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which is likely to 
endanger its safety in flight; or (d) destroys or damages air navigation 
facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to 
endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or (e) communicates information 
which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in 
flight. 
Interestingly, this provision neither gives a specific name to the offence, 
nor it defines the offence and certainly it does not even mention the word 
terrorism. It merely describes the elements of the offence. The first element 
to be highlighted is actus reus:33 acts of violence against people on board, 
destruction of, or causing damage to, an aircraft, endangering the safety of 
aircraft by giving false information. The second element is that the aircraft 
must be in flight and however in service. Article 2 of the Montreal 
Convention defines these concepts as follows: (a) an aircraft is considered to 
be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are 
closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is 
opened for disembarkation; in the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be 
deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the 
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board; (b) an 
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aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the pre-flight 
until twenty-four hours after any landing; the period of service shall, in any 
event, extend for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight as 
defined in paragraph (a) of this same article.  
The third element is that the acts of violence, the false information, the 
destruction of an aircraft, or the causing of damage to it, must be intentional 
and unlawful, in order to fall within the scope of the Montreal Convention. 
This is the mens rea of the offence.34 Besides, the Montreal Convention 
applies, irrespective of whether the aircraft is engaged in international or 
domestic flight, only as provided in Article 4(2) of the Convention, namely, if 
the place of take-off or landing, actual or intended, of the aircraft is situated 
outside the territory of the state of registration of the aircraft; or the offence 
is committed in the territory of a state other than the state of registration of 
the aircraft. Therefore, what the Montreal Convention deals with is a 
number of acts – characterised by an international element – that may 
endanger the safety of aircraft in service, acts which are not labelled as 
terrorist but certainly identified as offences in pure legal terms.35 This 
seems to be an important achievement if compared to the structure of the 
above-mentioned Tokyo Convention. Certain acts of interference with civil 
aviation are definitely deemed criminal and not only unlawful.  
This approach, working from the ground up, has therefore concentrated on 
achieving international agreement on the designation of various acts as 
criminal offences of international significance. However, it is not until the 
1990s that the word terrorism starts being used in multilateral instruments 
done within the United Nations framework.36 A comprehensive definition 
still lacking, yet the concept of terrorism started being less nebulous. That is 
why it appears in more than one convention, although its ultimate 
significance is still questionable. For example, the term “terrorism” as well 
as the expression “terrorist acts” do both appear in the preamble of the 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, done in Montreal on 1 March 1991.37 In a way, terrorism is 
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something public opinion is finally, though unfortunately, acquainted to, 
although no attempt of definition is to be found in the Convention thereof. It 
is as if the phenomenon of terrorism had become sadly “familiar” and could 
be understood as such, being implicit or maybe latent in the very fact of a 
convention pertaining to the marking of plastic explosives being adopted.  
The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection requires each state party to prohibit and prevent the manufacture 
in its territory of unmarked plastic explosives. Plastic explosives will be 
marked by introducing, during the manufacturing process, any one of the 
detection agents defined in the Technical Annex to the Convention. The 
Convention also requires each state party to prohibit and prevent the 
movement into or out of its territory of unmarked explosives and to exercise 
strict and effective control over the possession of any existing stocks of 
unmarked explosives. Stocks of plastic explosives not held by authorities 
performing military and police functions are to be destroyed or consumed for 
purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of the Convention, marked or 
rendered permanently ineffective, within a period of three years from the 
entry into force of the Convention in respect of the state concerned. This 
Convention also establishes an International Explosives Technical 
Commission, expert in the field of manufacture or detection of, or research 
in, explosives. The Commission evaluates technical developments relating to 
the manufacture, marking and detection of explosives, reports its findings, 
through the Council of ICAO, to all states parties and international 
organizations concerned, and proposes amendments to the Technical Annex 
to the Convention, as required. Thus, this multilateral instrument mainly 
relates to a certain kind of terrorist acts, better to the means of performing 
those acts and assume as implicit, even latent, the concept of terrorism. Yet, 
it refrains from defining it.  
A certain amount of attention is however paid to terrorist acts consisting 
of explosions and an appropriate multilateral instrument is therefore agreed 
upon. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
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Bombings concluded in New York, on 15 January 1997, explicitly refers to 
the escalation of “acts of terrorism” as well as “terrorist attacks” by means of 
explosives and other lethal devices in its preamble, but does not make any 
attempt at defining these concepts. It however stresses the importance of 
international co-operation between states in devising and adopting effective 
and practical measures for the prevention of acts of terrorism. This 
Convention applies to the offence of intentional and unlawful delivery, 
placement, discharge or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device, 
whether attempted or actual, in, into or against a place of public use, a state 
or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure 
facility, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or extensive 
destruction likely to or actually resulting in major economic loss. This 
Convention does not apply where an act of this nature does not involve any 
international elements as defined by the Convention.38  
States parties are required to establish jurisdiction over and make 
punishable, under their domestic laws, the offences described, to extradite 
or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing or aiding in the 
commission of the offences, and to assist each other in connection with 
criminal proceedings under the Convention. The offences referred to in the 
Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences between states parties 
under existing extradition treaties, and under the Convention itself. Once 
again, there is no definition whatsoever of the term “terrorism,” but the 
offence within the meaning of the Convention thereof is identified by 
depicting a specific actus reus and combining it with the indispensable 
requirement of mens rea. The latter occurs if the perpetrator performs the 
actus reus intentionally, either with the purpose to cause death or serious 
bodily injury or with the intent to cause extensive destruction, where the 
destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.  
Hereby, acts of terrorism are definitely identified as offences in pure legal 
terms. Yet, the approach is one of focusing on specific activities without 
drawing conclusions about the concept of terrorism per se. Step by step, 
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however, a remarkable legal framework has been set up, in the sense that a 
number of different activities are considered criminal at the United Nations 
level. Quite an achievement, if compared to the starting point of the present 
analysis, where infringement of the penal law stood together with other acts 
that were not even labelled as offences, both categories only sharing the fact 
that they could threaten the safety in flight or good order and discipline on 
board.39  This open-ended legal framework seems important because it 
comes to terms with two of the most noteworthy and delicate issues 
international aviation terrorism does involve: universal jurisdiction and 
extradition of the perpetrators. In a way, even though aviation terrorism is 
capable of coming about in a number of different outlooks, the major 
question is always the same: how to handle it, when events have already 
occurred, and how to counter it, in the first place. Thus, as time goes by, the 
United Nations approaches terrorism in more a straightforward way, which 
makes it possible to try to come to terms with it, as a global phenomenon.  
A multilateral instrument that seems particularly interesting as far as the 
purpose of the present analysis is concerned, is the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, concluded in 
New York on 9 December 1999. The said Convention applies to the offence 
of direct involvement or complicity in the intentional and unlawful provision 
or collection of funds, whether attempted or actual, with the intention or 
knowledge that any part of the funds may be used to carry out any of the 
offences described in the conventions listed in the Annex,40 or an act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person not actively 
involved in armed conflict in order to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any 
act. The provision or collection of funds therefore is an offence whether or 
not the funds are actually used to carry out the proscribed acts.  
The said Convention does not apply where an act of this nature does not 
involve any international elements as defined by the Convention.41 It also 
requires each state party to take appropriate measures, in accordance with 
 39
its domestic legal principles, for the detection and freezing, seizure or 
forfeiture of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing the 
offences described. The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to 
be extraditable offences and states parties have obligations to establish 
their jurisdiction over the offences described, make the offences punishable 
by appropriate penalties, take alleged offenders into custody, prosecute or 
extradite alleged offenders, cooperate in preventive measures and 
countermeasures, and exchange information and evidence needed in related 
criminal proceedings. The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed 
to be extraditable offences between states parties under existing extradition 
treaties, and under the Convention itself. 
This Convention, which explicitly refers to the “financing of terrorism,” 
“acts of international terrorism” and “financing that terrorists may obtain,” 
marks a noteworthy step forward since it provides, although stealthily, a 
possible definition of terrorism. Art. 2 of this Convention reads as follows: 
“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if 
that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, 
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry 
out: (a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) any other act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”  
In art.2 (b), it seems possible to find a current, broad, flexible definition of 
terrorism. If the acts ruled by those international conventions art. 2 (a) 
refers to are acts of terrorism, other acts, that are also intended to cause 
death or serious body injury to a civilian or any non-combatant, whenever 
their purpose is intimidating a population or forcing a government or an 
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international organization to do something or to refrain from doing 
something, are also acts of terrorism. Thus, terrorism is violence aiming at 
innocent targets for the purpose of intimidation or coercion. This brings 
back to the beginning of the analysis. As stressed above, there is an 
appreciatively broad consensus about the fact that terrorism involves the 
use or threat of violence as a method or strategy to achieve certain goals and 
that, as a major part of this coercive process, terrorism seeks to induce fear 
in its victims, which are innocent.42 The idea that terrorism wantonly 
impacts inoffensive bystanders in order to create fear and therefore achieve 
further ends, which go beyond the physical effect, seems widely accepted. 
From the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism on, it seems to be shared by the United Nations too. 
Undeniably, this is a remarkable achievement. The step by step process so 
far described, which consists of identifying specific terrorist acts and 
labelling them as criminal, has finally led to a conceptual definition that is 
quite likely to encompass them all as well as many more, even those which 
have not been performed yet and not even planned. Certainly, this definition 
needs being inferred from this Convention, which seems to provide it 
“underhand.” De facto, a comprehensive convention about terrorism has not 
been agreed upon hitherto and the definitional problem is far from solved, at 
least in an “official” way. However, it is undeniable that the Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism provides definitional and 
conceptual bedrock that can be used in further and more comprehensive 
multilateral instruments. Does a definitional problem really exist, though?  
Basically, the main reason why a definition of terrorism seems important 
is that a legal framework must be comprehensive enough not to allow safe 
havens to terrorists that could well exploit the loopholes of the legal system 
in order to shield themselves and escape responsibilities. Hence, if the 
concept provided by art. 2 (b) of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is used extensively, not only 
within but also beyond the scope and the purpose of the said Convention, 
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part of the problem can be solved. Whatever the connotation of a single act, 
if it fits this concept, it may be deemed as a terrorist act. And the 
perpetrator must face the inherent consequences. Then, it comes the 
problem of identifying those consequences and implementing them, but this 
is another issue that goes far beyond the definitional dilemma.  
This brief overview on the most relevant multilateral instruments 
somehow pertaining to international aviation terrorism does not account for 
the entire and huge effort the United Nations have been enduring so far, but 
allows to draw a first important conclusion. One can certainly infer an 
explicit condemnation of terrorism, based on a solid framework that 
portrays terrorism as a set of categories of particularly heinous crimes 
specified in a number of international conventions. This framework 
continues to offer remarkable possibilities for further creative development, 
since it is open-ended and likely to be expanded and adjusted as more 
terrorist attacks come true or can be predicted. On the domestic level, the 
conclusion to be inferred is that no government today can credibly claim a 
lack of legal basis to apprehend, prosecute or extradite those who commit 
acts of terrorism, if the state it belongs to is a signatory to the above-
mentioned conventions. Since the latter have been widely signed, such legal 
basis is undisputable. At least as far as those categories of international 
terrorist acts that have been specifically addressed are concerned, 
governments have a positive duty to apply the appropriate law enforcement 
measures. Hence, the fact that governments fall sometimes short of this 
standard is not to be interpreted as a lack of legal tools aimed at addressing 
terrorist activities, but rather as a failure to use them properly on the 
domestic level. 
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1.5 The United Nations and the global approach 
 
In the abstract, the international community has not found it difficult to 
record a broad consensus on the illegitimacy of terrorism. For instance, the 
1970 “United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration on Principle of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations includes the 
following statement: “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory 
directed toward the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in 
the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.”43 This statement, in 
turn, was tied to the fundamental principle stated somewhere else in the 
Declaration, derived directly from Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, that “States shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.”  
Nonetheless, if the principle requiring states to refrain from terrorism was 
easy enough for the United Nations to agree upon, its exact meaning and 
application turned out to be a totally different matter. Fair enough, 
terrorism was deemed wrong and unacceptable; but what was terrorism? It 
seemed extremely difficult, for example, to describe terrorism without 
involving national liberation movements. However, in the late seventies, 
some more steps were taken. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
34/145 (1979) contained a clear condemnation of terrorism per se, by 
appealing to all states to become parties to the existing international 
conventions relating to international terrorism issues and inviting those 
states to take appropriate domestic measures in order to pursue the speedy 
and final elimination of the problem of international terrorism. 
Harmonization of domestic legislation with international conventions and 
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the implementation of assumed international obligations are obviously 
appropriate measures. The United Nations also urged all states to cooperate 
with one another more closely, especially through the exchange of relevant 
information concerning the prevention and combating of international 
terrorism, the conclusion of special treaties and/or the incorporation into 
appropriate bilateral treaties of special clauses, in particular as to the 
extradition or prosecution of international terrorists.  
Thus, the straightforward term “terrorism” was eventually used and the 
inherent issue was addressed as such, in a global perspective. Nonetheless, 
the problem of defining terrorism was still far from being solved. However, 
what seems noteworthy is the fact that, while the international community 
was busy identifying specific categories of terrorist violence, the United 
Nations kept also focusing on “the big picture,” in order to deal with 
terrorism comprehensively and de-legitimising it as such. Everybody was 
aware of the fact that, given specific terrorist activities, which could be 
easily condemned by ad hoc multilateral instruments, terrorism was also 
something else, an idea or concept, possibly a state of mind that needed 
being addressed homogeneously. As stressed above, the inherent limit of 
those treaties addressing specific acts of terrorism is that they are limited in 
scope. New acts can always be performed that do not fit in any of the 
categories existing treaties do depict. Hereby, in a number of United 
Nations documents, terrorism is addressed per se and statements are made 
with regards to the global phenomenon, notwithstanding the many, varied 
ways it is likely to come about.  It seems therefore worthwhile to have a 
closer look at some of those documents, in order to highlight the strenuous 
effort the United Nations have been enduring in order to come to terms with 
terrorism as a global challenge.  
At the 72nd plenary meeting held on 4 December 1989, for example, the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 44/29, headed “Measures to prevent 
international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or 
jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of 
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those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, 
grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human 
lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.” This 
Resolution is important because it contains an open and blanket 
condemnation of “all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and 
by whomever committed,” which are expressly labelled as “criminal and 
unjustifiable.” Interestingly, the said Resolution stresses the importance of 
establishing a generally agreed definition of international terrorism in order 
to enhance the “effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism,” although it 
unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism.  
Ostensibly, terrorism is perceived as a phenomenon that deserves 
unequivocal condemnation per se, even though there is no overall consensus 
about its exact meaning. In a way, the United Nations acknowledge the 
importance of defining international terrorism in order to counter it 
effectively but not in order to condemn it, for it is perceived as wrong and 
unacceptable as such. Condemnation comes in the first place, not only 
chronologically but also logically before the identification of viable counter-
measures. Another remarkable statement to be found in the said Resolution 
is that “effective measures should be taken in accordance with international 
law” and that “emphasis is placed on the need to pursue efforts aiming at 
eliminating definitively all acts of terrorism by…. [the] progressive 
development of international law.” Thus, the more the international 
community reacts to acts and practices of terrorism, the more it finds it 
necessary to restore the rule of law and possibly strengthen it. Civilized 
means versus the anarchy of terror, then, whatever the possible outcome of 
this major confrontation. The United Nations General Assembly will often 
stress this concept and in more than an occasion will find the way to express 
trust in the international legal system.  
As far as international law is concerned, the same very concept, in fact the 
same words, are to be found in Resolution 49/60, headed “Measures to 
eliminate terrorism,” which was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 
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December 1994. This Resolution reaffirms the unequivocal condemnation of 
“all acts, practices and methods of terrorism wherever and by whomever 
committed, as criminal and unjustifiable” and explicitly label them as “a 
grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which 
may pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly 
relations among states, hinder international cooperation and aim at the 
destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic 
bases of society.” This statement seems to mark an important step forward. 
Why does the United Nations condemn terrorist acts and practices? Because 
they constitute a severe violation of its purposes and the principles that 
inspire the United Nations set-up. In a nutshell, the United Nations raison 
d’etre is challenged by international terrorism, which aims at the 
destruction of basic freedoms, fundamental human rights, peaceful co-
existence and cooperation amongst states. This is why terrorism is criminal.  
Thus, albeit an agreement on the meaning of the word terrorism is not 
established yet, the reason why it is perceived as criminal is laid down. It is 
criminal for the common core of values it violates. What is more important 
than fundamental human rights such as the one to life or more precious 
than basic freedoms like the freedom of movement? And what is criminal 
law for, whatever the legal system, if not for protecting fundamental human 
rights and freedoms? Hence, the United Nations not only have assessed that 
specific terrorist acts are more than unlawful, in fact they are criminal if 
there are legal sources that label them as such. The United Nations have 
also assessed that terrorism is criminal per se, for the nature of the values it 
violates.  
Remarkable seems also the statement that “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked 
to justify them.” No excuses, then, in the sense that the underlying motives 
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do not alter the inherent criminal nature of terrorist acts. Crime is crime, 
whatever the possible explanations in the realm of politics, religion, or 
moral.  This statement is also important because it highlights the 
connotation of fear, which is quite a normal feature of terrorist activities. 
The United Nations starts therefore acknowledging the fact that 
intimidation is part of the terrorist strategy, actually a connotation to be 
considered if terrorism is to be addressed as a global phenomenon. 
On 17 December 1996, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 51/210 
and once again strongly condemned “all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever 
committed” and stressed the importance of ensuring a “comprehensive legal 
framework covering all aspects of the matter.“ Thus, the United Nations 
keeps reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of terrorism per se, 
whatever its forms, while relying upon the effectiveness of a legal response 
as a civilized means of addressing the strategy of violence and terror. Once 
again, the United Nations stresses that no considerations of “a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature” may be 
used to justify terrorist acts, methods and practices. In a way, the fact of 
reiterating the same concepts helps strengthening them. Nonetheless, the 
concepts that need being reiterated as time goes by are those that have not 
proved very effective and certainly have not been abided by.  
In the above-mentioned Resolution, however, there is at least a statement 
that does not duplicate concepts already laid down before. In re-affirming 
that the states members deem acts, methods and practices of terrorism 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it also 
stipulates “knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” This is to be 
considered a remarkable step forward when it comes to assessing 
responsibilities. Terrorists are not only those who perform specific criminal 
activities. Apart from the very perpetrators of specific acts and practices, 
there are a number of hidden supporters, which help the terrorist cause by 
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devising their schemes or financing them. Even inciting them is a challenge 
to the United Nations purposes. Terrorism is a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon and the inherent responsibility is also multifaceted since it 
may reach far beyond the perpetrators of the specific acts. It can also 
involve governments, although this Resolution does not say it. Nevertheless, 
it does not exclude it either, which sounds quite significant if 
accountabilities need being assessed. 
In fact, the United Nations soon assesses this principle too.  In Resolution 
53/108, adopted by the General Assembly on 26 January 1999, also headed 
“Measures to eliminate international terrorism,” the General Assembly calls 
upon states “to refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for 
or otherwise supporting terrorist activities.” Thus, terrorists are not only 
those who perpetrate specific terrorist acts or practices but also those who 
help them in any possible way. And states can well appear amongst the 
possible, though hidden, sponsors. In a way, the United Nations 
acknowledge the fact that behind a terrorist enterprise may stand a 
governmental policy and that terrorism may well be conceived as a 
substitute of politics in the international scenario. Nonetheless, the 
response must be one of legal nature. The above-mentioned Resolution 
clearly states “international cooperation as well as actions by States to 
combat terrorism should be conducted in conformity with the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, international law and relevant 
international Conventions.” This means that the United Nations, though 
concerned because of the escalation of terrorist activities, are also worried 
that violence may lead to some more violence. 
What is brutal and uncivilized in its inherent nature must be countered 
through the means that have made the international community civilized 
and developed: law and politics, as viable alternatives to any violent 
confrontation whatsoever. Hence, many statements pertaining to terrorism 
have been made hitherto and undeniable conceptual progress has been 
accomplished, but what the word terrorism means the United Nations has 
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not explicitly and officially established yet. However, whenever the General 
Assembly deals with this subject matter, it drops a few hints that could well 
be used if the definitional issue is to be addressed once and forever.  
Resolution 54/164, headed “Human rights and terrorism,” which was 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 February 2000, does provide a few 
clues that can be used in order to devise a comprehensive definition of 
terrorism. The said Resolution stipulates “terrorism creates an environment 
that destroys the right of people to live in freedom from fear.” Besides, it 
reiterates an unequivocal condemnation of the “acts, methods and practices 
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as activities aimed at the 
destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, 
threatening the territorial integrity and security of states, destabilizing 
legitimately constituted governments, undermining pluralistic civil society 
and having adverse consequences for the economic and social development 
of States.” Interestingly, this Resolution also underlines that “the essential 
and most basic human right is the right to life” and that “all States have an 
obligation to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” It also stipulates “every individual should strive to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance.”  
Besides, the Resolution stresses “the need to protect the human rights of 
and guarantees for the individual in accordance with the relevant human 
rights principles and instruments, in particular the right to life” and 
therefore includes an explicit condemnation of “the violations of the right to 
live free from fear and of the right to life, liberty and security.” Thus, what 
this Resolution seems to suggest is that terrorism always involve a certain 
degree of fear, meaning that its strategy normally rely upon the power of 
intimidation. Thus, the element of fear to be induced in the victims is 
certainly a major feature that might be included in a definition of terrorism, 
if the United Nations were finally to establish one. The said Resolution also 
stresses that the reason why terrorism is unlawful and criminal, whatever 
its forms and underlying reasons, is that it violates basic human rights: life, 
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freedom and security, that is to say those rights that are perceived as 
inherent to mankind by law of nature, at least in the United Nations 
perspective.  
Hence, the efforts that the United Nations has been making in order to 
approach terrorism as a global phenomenon, are certainly remarkable.44 An 
unequivocal and blanket condemnation of terrorism per se has definitely 
been achieved and enough light has been shed on what the phenomenon of 
terrorism entails. Besides, the fact that terrorism is labelled as criminal at 
the United Nations level is extremely relevant because it means that this 
sort of legal frame is accepted and acknowledged at the broadest 
international level ever. Moreover, the fact that terrorism underlying 
motives, whatever their inherent nature, are not accepted as justifications is 
also an important step forward. The United Nations, by stressing the fact 
that those motivations are totally immaterial, have highlighted that, even 
though terrorism might be deemed different from ordinary crimes because of 
its ideological connotation, it is still crime. Thus, it has to be countered as 
such. In the United Nations framework, therefore, there is no room for the 
concept of acceptable or justifiable terrorist violence. Terrorism is criminal 
per se and utterly unacceptable, whatever its ideological foundation.  
 
 
1.6 International terrorism and customary law 
 
The question, then, becomes one of finding whether some acts in certain 
circumstances are “criminal” even in the absence of a treaty labelling them 
as such, or whether all crimes are crimes only because defined so by human 
institutions empowered with specific authority.45 As shown above, there is a 
number of terrorist acts and practices that have been individually addressed 
in multilateral instruments but also sources which condemn terrorism per 
se, whatever the specific activities it may consist of. Therefore, a general 
principle condemning terrorism seems to exist and it is one of pivotal 
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importance when acts may occur that have not been specifically ruled yet. 
As shown above, the international legal framework that multilateral 
instruments do set up is open-ended. It cannot possibly account for all of the 
terrorist initiatives, especially the ones which have never been performed 
hitherto. Nonetheless, if a general principle condemning terrorism per se 
exists, and it actually seems to exist, it is more difficult for terrorists to find 
safe havens and for states to claim that they lack a legal basis to secure 
terrorists to justice.  
The fact that here and there terrorism is addressed and condemned as 
such, however, does not automatically mean that terrorism has entirely 
turned into a crime under international customary law (in the sense of 
crimina juris gentium).46 Nevertheless, it may be suggested that, although 
not all acts that may amount to a crime of terrorism under national or 
treaty law are also covered by customary norms, at least some of them may 
have turned into customary law. For example, it seems that, because of 
their inherent magnitude and their dreadful consequences for the life and 
assets of innocent civilians, such acts as aircraft bombing or aircraft 
hijacking may be seen as crimes covered by customary law, particularly 
when they take on large-scale proportions. Such terrorist acts have actually 
prompted strong condemnation by the international community as a whole, 
as it may be inferred by a number of resolutions from both the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. But what is customary 
international law? In a nutshell, custom as a source of law needs meeting 
two requirements: state practice and opinio juris. The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice describes custom as “evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.”47 State practice refers to general and consistent 
practice by states.48 If this practice is followed out of a belief of a legal 
obligation, then there is opinio juris as well.  
Obviously, opinio juris concerns statements of belief rather than actual 
beliefs, since it seems far too difficult to determine what states believe as 
opposed to what they say. The reduced focus on state practice seems 
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unavoidable because it is almost impossible to analyse the practice of nearly 
two hundred states. Besides, reliance on statements accelerates the 
formation of custom, which allows it to approach global, as opposed to 
regional or national, issues in a timely manner. Thus, custom nowadays 
seems more the outcome of statements of rule than actions, which allows 
considering opinio juris more an overriding factor than practice when it 
comes to establish what custom is. Modern custom actually seems a new 
species of universal declaratory law because it is based on authoritative 
statements about practice rather than recognizable regularities of 
behaviour. This is why the official documents adopted by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council are so important: they actually declare 
existing costumes or generate new ones. As far as terrorism is concerned, 
the said United Nations organs have often highlighted the fact that it is a 
crime of concern for the international community as a whole, which 
endangers international peace and security;49 besides, they have also 
insisted on the persistent need for international co-operation to effectively 
fight against it. 
Thus, it does not seem groundless to assess that single terrorist acts and 
practices are crimes by law of treaty whereas terrorism per se can be 
considered criminal under international customary law. But what sort of 
crime is it? This is a complex question to handle, since a comprehensive 
definition of terrorism has not been agreed upon yet, although it is 
indisputable that terrorism is broadly perceived as a major offence that 
threatens the peace of nations and causes mass killing and suffering of 
human beings. This is why it has to be assessed whether it is possible to 
place terrorism within the category of crimes against humanity or crimes 
erga omnes. Roughly speaking, we can identify those crimes as they consist 
of gross abuses of the rights of human beings. The focus can be put on the 
sort of rights they do threaten or violate. Such are the right to life, to 
physical integrity, to freedom and safety of movement, that is to say basic 
and fundamental human rights, and, above all, inalienable ones, which 
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reach far beyond the “social contract” between the individual and the state 
since they are nature-endowed ones. The rights and freedoms thereof 
substantiate an entire body of laws, which is called jus cogens,50 that is to 
say the peremptory norms from which no derogation is allowed. Hence, jus 
cogens cannot be undermined by treaty arrangement or inconsistent state 
practice. There are those who assess that custom is a suitable source for 
peremptory norms, because it serves as a vehicle for generally binding 
international law on important moral issues. Thus, peremptory norms are 
part of customary international law.  
But if terrorism affects basic human rights, is it possible to define it as a 
crime against humanity? So far, it is not even mentioned in the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, the judicial permanent institution, which 
has been established in order to try people allegedly responsible for the most 
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in the Statute itself. 
According to the Statute, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole, that is to say: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the crime of aggression.51 Terrorism is not even mentioned 
and can hardly fall within the definition of “crimes against humanity” that 
article 7 sets out.  
The said article reads as follows: ”For the purpose of this Statute, "crime 
against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) 
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that 
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are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The 
crime of apartheid;(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health.” 
Thus, terrorism is not even there, although many states insisted for 
empowering the International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over 
terrorist acts as well. Yet, many other states opposed this stance on the 
basis that the offence is not even defined properly and including it would 
have “politicized” the Court. Besides, they suggested that not every possible 
act of terrorism was to consider as heinous as to shock the conscience of 
mankind. Some states also insisted on the fact that terrorism must be 
defined and distinguished by national liberation movements before 
empowering any institution whatsoever with jurisdiction. On top of that, 
many states are prone to consider domestic tribunals far more effective than 
international courts and this is also why the International Criminal Court 
has met with limited success hitherto. However, given, amongst others, the 
atrocities that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001, 
considering terrorism as a crime against humanity does not seem as far-
reaching any more. Those atrocities seem to show all of the hallmarks of 
crimes against humanity, such as the magnitude and extreme gravity of the 
attack as well as the fact that the victims were civilians and the possibility 
that the initiative was part of a widespread or systematic practice. 
Justice Goldstone actually says that many international lawyers have 
labeled the attack on the World Trade Center as “crime against humanity,” 
although he does not think this is really an issue, since crime is such under 
the domestic law of most countries and international law can certainly cope 
with it.52 In this respect, William Schabas53 also thinks that terrorism can 
be addressed as simple murder, or specific crime, which makes it even 
easier to prosecute those who are responsible for the atrocities. Whether the 
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latter fit in the general concept of international terrorism or not does not 
really make any difference. Even in cases of so-called state sponsored 
terrorist acts, it is necessary to get hold of those who have ordered the acts 
inasmuch as those who have committed them and prosecute them all 
accordingly, although a question of immunity for the Head of State may 
arise. Yet, immunity does not have to entail impunity. In Schabas’ view, 
though, terrorism does not fit in the category of crimes against humanity 
because such category is necessary to prosecute internationally those crimes 
that happen in the territory of one state and the government of that state 
condones. In his opinion, all mankind has to do is prosecuting at domestic 
level those who are responsible for specific crimes. In this respect, there are 
enough legal tools. It is all about using them. 
Thus, the question whether terrorism may fit in the category of crimes 
against humanity or not is still unanswered. Opinions, in this respect, may 
vary.  In the long run, though, it may happen that states no longer object to 
the characterization of terrorism or at least its most atrocious incarnations 
in terms of crimes against humanity, under the subcategories of murder or 
extermination or other inhuman acts. And eventually one or more judicial 
institutions can be empowered with jurisdiction over acts of international 
terrorism. This would prove a remarkable step forward. Nonetheless, 
judiciary institutions empowered with jurisdiction over terrorist activities 
would bear an enormous responsibility. They should have maximum 
international legitimacy if they are to be deemed credible, which means, as 
Justice Sachs says, that “they are not to be seen as the instrument of this 
power or that power, this group or that group and they are not there to 
simply extend the hegemony or domination or control of any particular 
power or to be seen as doing that. Perceptions, in these areas, are extremely 
important and any international body functioning in these areas has to have 
the maximum across the board legitimacy.”54  
Once again, the issue is one of remarkable sensitivity. Problems of 
prosecution and implementation of laws also fall into picture. Nonetheless, 
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the idea of considering terrorist activities as crimes against humanity and 
have them prosecuted by a specific and specialized body seems fascinating 
and worth exploring. It may actually help to counter international terrorism 
because its perpetrators might be isolated. Religion, politics, philosophy, 
ethics cannot possibly justify something that shocks the conscience of 
mankind. Besides, empowering an international court with jurisdiction may 
foster a cohesive global response – mankind versus those venturous few who 
dare challenging it whole – instead of prompting unilateral actions that 
could lead to more violence. If terrorism challenges humanity by 
threatening the core values of its civilization, then humanity must stand 
united against it in order to ensure that the global neighborhood of the 
future is going to be characterized by law and not by anarchy. The rule of 
law has been a critical civilizing influence in every free society, after all. It 
actually distinguishes a democratic from a tyrannical society and secures 
freedom and justice against repression; it ranks equality above the brutal 
logic of power and empowers the weak against the unjust claims of the 
strong. Its restraints, no less than the moral precepts it highlights, are 
essential to the well being of a society, both collectively and to individuals 
within it. Respect for the rule of law is thus a basic neighbourhood value. 
And one that is certainly needed in the emerging global neighbourhood. 
That is why considering terrorism as a crime against humanity and 
empowering an international institution with jurisdiction over it seems 
tempting. Or, at least, worth trying. It would be a way of strengthening the 
rule of law and finding a legal response to the inherent unlawfulness of 
terrorism. And an attempt to work together against something that affects 
mankind as a whole. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
 
Summing-up the present chapter, a few conclusions may be inferred that 
are likely to prove helpful in the following analysis. The one thing that 
seems undeniable is the immense difficulty that the international 
community meets with, when it tries to define terrorism once and forever. 
Roughly speaking, terrorism may be considered as the instrumental use of 
violence against inoffensive bystanders in order to spread fear and achieve 
some political, ideological or religious ends. Those seem to be the few 
general features everybody agrees upon. Then, any attempt to depict 
terrorism in more a specific way does not appear to have met with any 
success whatsoever. The main reason is to be found in the emotional and 
political burden the very idea of terrorism inevitably evokes. Those who are 
labelled as terrorists may as well be considered as heroes, which inevitably 
trigger deep-seated political, ideological, moral or religious beliefs. Yet, any 
practical analysis seems to require some degree of objectivity and neutrality. 
One way to ensure them both consists of embracing a legal perspective. The 
latter is certainly limited, for it cannot possibly account for all the many 
facets terrorism entails, but at least it ensures some acceptable degree of 
neutrality and objectivity and helps keeping political bias at bay. Besides, it 
seems to be free of emotional burdens.  
Thus, aviation terrorism can be approached as a criminal phenomenon, 
whose inherent criminal nature does not change simply because of the 
ideological trait it normally features. Nonetheless, terrorism as such is not a 
self-standing crime. What most laws do address, both at domestic and 
international level, are specific acts, which amount to specific crimes. 
Whether they are terrorist or not, they are prosecuted anyway. The fact that 
they bear an ideological or political trait does not make any real difference 
as far as prosecution is concerned. Specific terrorist activities are widely 
outlawed and prosecuted. The inherent series of crime species makes an 
open-ended framework, which can include more cases, if any. To this extent, 
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the existing legal scaffolding can cope. Yet, those specific acts that are ruled 
as crimes somehow differ from common crimes. The behavioural aspect may 
be the same – murder is murder, hijacking is hijacking – but the difference 
lies in the underlying motives. The latter certainly need being addressed, 
although they do not make any real difference as far as prosecution is 
concerned. And they certainly do not exempt the deeds they characterise 
from being criminal. Yet, causes are important and this is where politics 
come into picture. A successful fight against terrorism should be coupled 
with the search for sustainable solutions for human and political dramas 
that constitutes factors of instability and feed extremism as well as 
terrorists groups. 
So far, the international community has also been trying to address 
terrorism as a whole, whatever shapes it may embody. This has proved a 
noteworthy effort that has led to the blanket condemnation of terrorism as a 
global phenomenon. Thus, a general principle condemning terrorism per se 
now seems to exist, which makes it more difficult for terrorists to find safe 
havens and for states to claim that they do not have a legal foundation to 
secure terrorists to justice. As a matter of fact, the international conventions 
outlawing specific categories of activities inasmuch as those addressing and 
condemning terrorism per se have been widely signed and ratified. 
Therefore, most governments cannot possibly claim a lack of legal basis to 
apprehend, prosecute or extradite those who have allegedly perpetrated 
terrorist activities. Obviously, universal accession to those multilateral 
instruments is essential but is still far from being accomplished. 
Nonetheless, terrorism is now perceived as a major global threat and one 
that keeps the entire international community well aware of the danger that 
lies ahead.  
There is a shared feeling of danger that prompts the will for a global 
response. This is why so much effort is being put both at domestic and 
international level in order to counter terrorism, even though it is 
sometimes a controversial topic, especially when it comes to defining it. Yet, 
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everybody seems to agree about the fact that there is no sustainable 
development without peace and security. And everybody seems to agree that 
freedom from fear is a fundamental human right that needs being secured 
in a sustainable world of development. Hence, the struggle against 
terrorism in general and aviation terrorism in particular is one that may 
bring all law-abiding nations together. Obviously, no healthy partnership is 
without strain and headways may prove slow and erratic. Yet, a concerted 
international action can make the tasks of terrorists much more difficult to 
accomplish. A global response is needed to root out this major scourge, 
which anyway will take time and cannot do without universal commitment 
to the fight. Many forms of across the boundary cooperation already exist 
and can be strengthened: judicial cooperation, preventive measures, 
exchange of information, to name just but a few. Yet, the most important 
thing seems to consist of the integration of all countries into a fair world 
system of security, prosperity and improved development. The struggle 
against terrorism will be all the more effective if it is based on an in-depth 
political dialogue with all countries of the world. No co-operation can prove 
utterly successful if it does not filter out unilateralism and prejudices.  
It is clearly far beyond the scope of the present work to investigate what 
can be possibly done in order to fight terrorism in general and aviation 
terrorism in particular. It is also beyond this work’s reach to explore such a 
complex phenomenon as terrorism in its very many facets and implications.  
Nonetheless, a few general points about terrorism have been made hitherto 
in order to provide the case study which is the subject matter of the present 
work with some conceptual scaffolding. The Lockerbie affair is an example 
of international aviation terrorism and a complex one, that entails a number 
of different aspects and raises numerous remarkable questions. Above all, it 
is a story of successful international co-operation where a cold-blooded 
terrorist onslaught has been countered through civilized and peaceful 
means. In the event, the interaction of law, politics and diplomacy has 
proved successful. The possibility of striking back hard has not been an 
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option, as it is going to be shown in the following chapters. It is therefore 
about time to try to investigate the Lockerbie affair as one of those stories 
from the recent past that can offer a good lesson for the forthcoming future. 
Looking backward seems the right way to move forward, if the challenges 
that still lie ahead are to be properly and successfully addressed inasmuch 
as the events at Lockerbie have been. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60
                                               
Notes 
 
1Ex multis, see Vetter, H.J. and Perlstein, G.R., “Perspectives on terrorism,” Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, California, 1991. See also White, J.R.,  “Terrorism: an 
introduction,” Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, California, 1991. For an 
analysis of jurisprudential elaborations pertaining to terrorism, see Beres, L.R., “The 
meaning of terrorism – Jurisprudential and definitional clarifications,” 28, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 239-249, 1995. For a thorough analysis of the notion of 
terrorism, its development and the problems it raises, see Chaliand, G.  and Blin, A. (eds.), 
“Histoire de terrorisme. De l’antiquité a Al Qaida,” Bayard, Paris, 2004, especially at pp. 
23-55.  
 
2 I had the privilege of interviewing Albie Sachs, Justice of the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, in Johannesburg, on 8 April 2003. Justice Albie Sachs has been a prominent 
leader in the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa and a member of the African 
National Congress. 
 
3 I interviewed Jan Van Eck via e-mail and he kindly sent me his reply on 13 March 2003. 
Van Eck is an internationally respected analyst from the South Africa based Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (University of Pretoria) and a former backbencher for the African 
National Congress. 
 
4 See Blakesley, C.L., “ Terrorism, law and our constitutional order,” 60, University of 
Colorado Law Review, 471-531, 1989. 
 
5 See supra, note 2. 
 
6 Hume, D., “A treatise on human nature,” Penguin Classics, London, 1985, p.522. 
 
7 See supra, note 3. 
 
8 See Sachs, A., “The South African Truth Commission,” 63, 1, Montana Law review, 25-37, 
(2002), especially at 27.  
 
9 I had the privilege of interviewing Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, at the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg, on 5 March 2003. Justice 
Goldstone has also served as Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and as Chairperson of the Independent 
International Inquiry in Kosovo. Since December 2001, he has been appointed as the 
Chairperson of the International Task Force on Terrorism established by the International 
Bar Association.  He also holds the chair of Chancellor at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
 
10 Rousseau, J. J., “The social contract,” Wordsworth Ed. Ltd., Ware, Hertfordshire, 1998, 
p.84. 
 
11 For instance, in the British Prevention of Terrorism Act, section 20(1), terrorism is 
defined as follows: “The use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for 
the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.” According to US Law 
100-204 of 1987, section 901, “The term terrorist activity means the organizing or 
participating in a wanton or indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the 
risk of causing death or serious bodily harm to individuals not taking part in armed 
hostilities.” Additionally, according to US Law 104 302 of 1996, a “federal crime of 
 61
                                                                                                                                          
terrorism” is a crime “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct” and to other crimes 
mentioned in US law, such as unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes 
against internationally protected persons, etc. According to the French Law of 1986, 
terrorist acts are crimes “en relation avec une enterprise individuelle ou collective ayant 
pour but de troubler l'ordre public par l'intimidation ou la terreur.” See Walker, C., “The 
prevention of terrorism in British law,” Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, 
pp. 1-46. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, (US Public Law 104-172; 104th 
Congress), section 14, defines an Act of international terrorism as such: “As used in this 
Act: (1) Act of international terrorism. The term “act of international terrorism” means an 
act (A) which is violent or dangerous to human life and that is a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State or that would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State; and (B) which appears to be 
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
assassination or kidnapping.”                      
 
12 See Dinstein, Y., “War, aggression and self-defence,” Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1994, pp. 3-172. 
 
13  See Von Clausewitz, C., “On war,” Wordsworth Editions Ltd., Ware Hertfordshire, 1997, 
p.216. 
 
14 I had the great privilege of interviewing Justice Richard Goldstone for the second time at 
the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg on 6 May 2003. 
 
15 For example: border patrols of neighbouring countries may exchange fire; interceptor 
planes may shoot down aircrafts belonging to another state; and so forth. 
 
16 In view of the supremacy of international law over national domestic law, these elements 
are relevant whichever realm of law is under consideration. 
17 For example, if the use of force is indiscriminate, disproportionate or beyond the codified 
boundary of military necessity, the insurgency is unlawful, whatever the cause. Just means 
needs co-existing with just cause if an insurgency is to be deemed lawful. 
 
18  See Cassese, A. , “International law in a divided world,” Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 
pp. 253-286. 
 
19 See Cassese, A., “International criminal law,” Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 
pp.47-48 and pp.325-348.  
 
20 Conventions on the wounded and sick in the field; on the wounded, sick and   
shipwrecked at sea; on prisoners of war; on civilians. 
 
21 The First Protocol of 1977 supplements the 1949 Conventions, extending   protection to 
wider groups of civilians, regulating the law of bombing, and enlarging the category of wars 
subject to the 1949 Conventions (to include, for example, civil wars). They extensively 
revised and updated both The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions. 
 
22 General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (1970). 
 
23 General Assembly Resolution No. 3314 (1974). 
 62
                                                                                                                                          
24 An act is “justified” when the legal system approves of it. It is merely excused when it 
disapproves of it but think it is not right to treat it as a crime. Justifications may occur that 
make violence lawful and therefore acceptable. This is the case, for instance, of the public 
hangman who carries out a sentence of the court, in those legal systems where death 
penalty still exists. Sometimes, violence against innocents is not justified but certainly 
excused; that is the case, for instance, of killing by misadventure without culpable 
negligence. For the “positive” and “negative” elements of a crime, see, ex multis, Smith, J. 
and Hogan, B., “Criminal law,” Butterworths, London 1996, pp.16-21; pp.31-93. 
 
25 Interview with Justice Albie Sachs, 8 April 2003. See supra, note 2. 
 
26 Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, 6 May 2003. See supra, note 14. 
 
27 The one approach – from the ground up – has been called “incremental or practical,” 
whereas the other one – from the top down – has been deemed “global or conceptual.” For a 
comprehensive overview, see Levitt, G.M., “The international legal response to terrorism: a 
re-evaluation,” 60, University of Colorado Law Review, 533-551, (1989). 
 
28 See supra, par.1.1. 
 
29 As far as jurisdiction over the offences it relates to is concerned, the Tokyo Convention 
aims at ensuring that at least the state of registration of the aircraft will have jurisdiction 
over the suspected offender, without, however, excluding the jurisdiction of other states. 
 
30 Popularly called hijacking. Art. 11: “When a person on board has unlawfully committed 
by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure or other wrongful exercise of control 
of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, contracting States 
shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful 
commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.” 
 
31 Art. 1, Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 1970. 
 
32 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency in 
relationship with the United Nations, whose constituent instrument is the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944). 
 
33 See supra, par. 1.3. 
 
34 For the concept of mens rea, see supra, par.1.3. 
 
35 More specific criminal acts of interference with civil aviation are provided by the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airport Serving International Civil 
Aviation – concluded at Montreal on 22 December 1990 – supplementary to the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Art. 2 of the said 
Protocol reads as follows: “In article 1 of the Convention, the following shall be added as 
new paragraph 1 bis: “1 bis. Any person commits an offence if unlawfully and intentionally, 
using any device, substance or weapon: (a) performs an act of violence against a person at 
an airport serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious 
injury or death; or (b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving 
international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts the services 
of the airport if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at the airport.” Once 
again, specific acts of interference are labelled as criminal but the term terrorism is not 
even mentioned. The Protocol adds to the definition of “offence” given in the Montreal 
Convention of 1971 unlawful and intentional acts of violence against persons at an airport 
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serving international civil aviation which cause or are likely to cause serious injury or 
death and such acts which destroy or seriously damage the facilities of such an airport or 
aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupt the services of the airport; the qualifying 
element of these offences is the fact that such an act endangers or is likely to endanger 
safety at that airport. These offences are punishable by severe penalties, and Contracting 
States are obliged to establish jurisdiction over the offences not only in the case where the 
offence was committed in their territory but also in the case where the alleged offender is 
present in their territory and they do not extradite him to the State where the offence took 
place. 
 
36 Other multilateral instruments, however, had already familiarized with the term 
“terrorism” and had started using it explicitly long before, although they would not provide 
a definition either. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, concluded 
in Strasbourg on 27 January 1977, for instance, refers to the increase in acts of terrorism in 
its preamble. 
 
37 The preamble of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection reads as follows: “The States parties to this Convention, conscious of the 
implications of acts of terrorism for international security; expressing deep concern 
regarding terrorist acts aimed at destruction of aircraft, other means of transportation and 
other targets; concerned that plastic explosives have been used for such terrorist acts;…..” 
 
38 Article 3 reads as follows: “This Convention shall not apply where the offence is 
committed within a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that 
State, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State and no other State has a 
basis under article 6, paragraph 1, or article 6, paragraph 2, of this Convention to exercise 
jurisdiction, except that the provisions of article 10 to 15 shall, as appropriate, apply in 
those cases. ” 
 
39 See the Tokyo Convention, supra, par.1.4. 
 
40 This Annex lists, amongst the others, the Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
- The Hague, 1970 – the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation – Montreal 1971 – the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts of Violence at Airport Serving International Civil Aviation – Montreal, December 
1988, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings  –New York, 
1997.  
  
41 Article 3 reads as follows: “This Convention shall not apply where the offence is 
committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State and no 
other State has a basis under Article 7, paragraph 1, or Article 7, paragraph 2, to exercise 
jurisdiction, except that the provision of articles 12 to 18 shall, as appropriate, apply in 
those cases.” 
42 Not all definitions of terrorism explicitly make reference to civilians or non-combatants in 
order to stress the fact that the victims of terrorist attacks are innocent bystanders. 
However, this requirement seems implicit in those definitions. See, for example, the one 
provided by the Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism, concluded in Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999. Art. 1 of the said 
Convention reads as follows: “….Terrorism means any act of violence or threat thereof 
notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or 
collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or 
imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or 
any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or 
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endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, 
territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.” If the potential 
victims were not to be implicitly considered innocent, the whole of this provision would not 
make sense. 
43 General Assembly Resolution No. 2625(1970). See supra, note 22. 
 
44  The debate about the problems of defining terrorism historically centred on the General 
Assembly. Nonetheless, since 1985, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a 
number of measures addressing terrorist threats to peace and security, thus revealing its 
own understanding of the concept of terrorism. This understanding, though, can hardly be 
considered widely agreed upon, given the fact that the Security Council is often criticised 
for not being representative of the community of nations, in fact for being the expression of 
an elite. See Saul, B., “Definition of terrorism in the UN Security Council: 1985-2004,” 4, 
no.1, Chinese Journal of International Law, 141-166, (2005).  
 
45 This is a fundamental principle in criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege. 
 
46 In fact, there are those who believe that terrorism actually amounts to a customary 
international law crime. See Cassese, A., op. cit. (supra, note 21), pp. 121-125.  
 
47 Statute of the World Court, art.38 (1)(b). 
48 State practice is obviously open textured and capable of being interpreted in various 
ways. For example, contrary state practice can be analysed as a breach of an old rule or as 
the seed of a new rule. For this reason, conflicting state practice should never be discounted 
as irrelevant to interpretation, because it may contain the seeds for a new custom. It also 
clarifies how customs change over time in light of new state practice, opinio juris and moral 
considerations. However, as far as the identification of existing customary law is concerned, 
the international community discounts the importance of dissenting states and contrary 
state practice because it is not prepared to recognize exceptions to the maintenance of 
certain fundamental values. Recognizing exceptions to such rules would shock the 
conscience of mankind whereas custom acknowledges universally shared values or a 
common core of values whose foundation is a broad consensus on the global scale. Modern 
custom evinces a desire to create general international laws that can bind all states on 
important moral issues.  
 
49 See, supra, par. 5. 
 
50 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens norms as laws 
“accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole… from which 
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.” See Cassese, A.,  “International law,” Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2001, pp.138-148. 
 
51 See Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5. 
 
52 Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, 6 May 2003. See supra, note 14. 
 
53  I had the privilege of interviewing Professor William A. Schabas in Yerevan on 20 April 
2005. William Schabas is the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National 
University of Ireland, Galway. 
 
54 Interview with Justice Albie Sachs, 8 April 2003. See supra, note 2. 
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Chapter 2 
 
PAN AM 103 CRASH AND THE UN RESPONSE 
 
 
2.1 Pan Am 103 bombing 
 
The question that comes next is whether law has ever successfully come to 
terms with terrorist attacks. Apparently, it has. This happened in the 
Lockerbie case, where law and politics were interwoven from start and 
eventually both contributed to pave the way to some sort of justice. Yet, this 
merger has not worked smoothly all the way through. There have been 
times when the realm of politics and that of law seemed irreconcilable. In 
those times, dealing with the issues involved at Lockerbie turned out to be 
almost impossible. Yet, the Lockerbie affair has proved that the potential, 
inherent conflict between a legal and a political approach can be solved 
since law and politics may work together to fight terrorism. The facts at 
Lockerbie may be described as follows: at 19.03 hours, on 21 December 
1988, Pan Am flight 103 fell out of the sky. The 259 passengers and 
crewmembers that were on board as well as 11 residents of the town of 
Lockerbie - where the debris fell - were killed. The cause of the disaster was 
that an explosive device had been introduced into the hold of the aircraft 
and exploded when the aircraft was in the Scottish air space, thus causing 
the aircraft to disintegrate. In a nutshell, those are the facts as reported in 
the verdict delivered by the High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist,1 where 
the alleged perpetrators were eventually tried. These facts have not even 
been disputed by the accused and have however been proved,2 at least to the 
extent which was deemed necessary for the said Court to be satisfied with, 
in order to deliver its verdict.  
Who were the victims of Pan Am 103 crash, then? Most of them were 
Americans, flying home for Christmas. They included servicemen and 
thirty-eight students from Syracuse University in New York state. The 
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latter being the victims, Pan Am 103 bombing immediately appeared as a 
heinous onslaught impacting innocent civilians.3 Who were the perpetrators 
of the bombing, though? On 14 November 1991, Washington announced that 
two Libyan nationals were to be charged with complicity in the bombing of 
Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.4 The two suspects were Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed 
Al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. On the same day, the Lord 
Advocate of Scotland announced that he had issued warrants for the arrest 
of the said Libyan nationals.5 This was the result of major investigations 
and enquiries, on the basis of which the two Libyans  were accused of 
placing a suitcase containing a bomb on board an aircraft at Malta’s Luqa 
airport on 21 December 1988. The suitcase was then allegedly carried to 
Frankfurt and placed on a Pan Am flight for London Heathrow for transfer 
to Pan Am flight 103 to New York. Megrahi and Fhimah were believed to be 
responsible for causing the bomb to be placed aboard Pan Am flight 103. 
Thus, the United Kingdom and the United States started claiming that the 
two men were handed over for trial.  
The option of striking back by means of military action was neither taken 
into account nor completely ruled out. There it stood, like a threatening 
possibility. At this stage, though, the United Kingdom and the United 
States demanded that Colonel Gaddafi accept full criminal and financial 
liability for the Lockerbie bombing. If Libya failed to do so, it would soon 
face economic sanctions. Ostensibly, the United States and the United 
Kingdom were ready to call a worldwide trade embargo on Libya, if Colonel 
Gaddafi refused to comply. If a trade embargo was to be started, an 
approach to the United Nations appeared as the best way to secure the 
widest possible support for this initiative against Libya. A number of 
documents were therefore lodged with the United Nations  Secretary-
General. In a nutshell, the said documents recorded the charges against the 
identified Libyan nationals and drew attention to the demands made on 
Libya, in particular that the Government of Libya was required to: 
surrender for trial all those being charged with the crime; accept full 
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responsibility for the actions of the Libyan officials; disclose all it knew 
about the crime; pay appropriate compensation. The documents referenced 
concluded: “We expect Libya to comply promptly and in full.”6  
In the meantime, the Libyan authorities had appointed a judge to 
investigate the western allegations. They actually arrested the two accused 
men, declaring that a Libyan investigation would be carried out into the 
Lockerbie disaster. Nonetheless, the United States and the United Kingdom 
were utterly unimpressed and continued to threaten sanctions without 
excluding the possibility of military action. As far as the two suspects were 
concerned, they soon denied their complicity in Pan Am 103 bombing. On 
his part, the Libyan leader - Colonel Gaddafi - refused to hand over the two 
men and suggested that the two Libyans would not get a fair trial abroad.7 
The said stance did not appear totally groundless. Libya had been required 
to accept full responsibility for Pan Am 103 bombing even before a trial was 
started. It is therefore not difficult to see how the Libyan Government might 
be inclined to doubt the objectivity – in this matter – of western courts. 
What is a trial for, if the responsibility has to be accepted in advance? 
Besides, Colonel Gaddafi could rely upon some legal grounds in order to 
refuse to surrender the two Libyan nationals. Under the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done in 
Montreal in 1971,8 unless there is an extradition treaty in force, Libya was 
entitled to try the offenders under its own domestic law and before its 
domestic judicial institutions.  
As a matter of fact, there was no extradition treaty between the United 
Kingdom or the United States and Libya. Therefore, Article 7 of the 
Montreal Convention applied. The said Article reads as follows: “The 
Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found 
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever 
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of 
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any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.” The 
United States, the United Kingdom and Libya were all signatories to the 
Montreal Convention and were therefore supposed to comply with the 
principle of “aut dedere aut judicare,” as set out by Article 7.  
If a dispute pertaining to the interpretation of the said Article arose, the 
Convention stipulated a course of action. Article 14(1) reads as follows: “Any 
dispute between two or more contracting States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled 
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to 
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration 
the Parties are unable to agree on the organisation of the arbitration, any 
one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.” Hence, 
Libya seemed to have acted in accordance with international law by 
appointing a High Court Judge in order to carry out the charges raised 
against the two Libyan citizens. If somebody were to debate its policy, Libya 
would have recourse to the World Court. 
Hereby, in the absence of an extradition treaty with Libya, it is hard to 
figure out why the United States and the United Kingdom expected Libya to 
hand over its citizens and renounce its sovereign power to exercise the 
judicial function. According to the Montreal Convention, Libya had a right 
to refuse the extradition of the two suspects. The American and British 
demands for the surrender of the two Libyan nationals – instead – appeared 
to be at variance with international procedures on extradition. In a way, if 
Libya accepted to surrender the two alleged perpetrators of Pan Am 103 
bombing by handing them over for trial, it would renounce an important 
part of its sovereignty, that is to say its judicial power over its nationals. 
Whatever Libyan involvement in Pan Am 103 crash, its policy seemed so far 
totally legitimate in pure legal terms. This does not necessarily mean, 
though, that the rule set out by Article 7 of the Montreal Convention would 
achieve an acceptable degree of fairness, if ever applied. Yet, all of the 
 69
signatories to the Convention were supposed to comply with it. At first 
sight, then, the stand taken by the United States and the United Kingdom 
looked feebler than the Libyan response. But the reasons of politics were far 
too strong for the case to be rested on a pure legal ground. Thus, the 
Lockerbie case did not stop at the dead end of Libya’s extradition denial. In 
fact, no lesser a body than the United Nations Security Council got involved 
and the focus shifted on its course of action as a collective body,9 as it will be 
shown below. 
 
 
2.2 The Security Council and the package of sanctions  
 
The United Kingdom and the United States kept demanding that Libya 
hand over the two suspects for trial whereas Libya kept refusing and 
insisting that they had no right whatsoever to demand the extradition. The 
situation seemed to be stuck into an impasse. But the United Kingdom and 
the United States succeeded in involving the United Nations, thus giving a 
broader dimension to their confrontation with Libya. On 20 January 1992, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 731 that criticised 
Libya for failing to respond effectively to the extradition requests made by 
the United States and the United Kingdom and “urge[d] Libya to provide a 
full and effective response to those requests.”  However, the legal flaw in the 
American and British approach had not been healed by the Security 
Council’s support for the demands of the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The Security Council does not seem to be the right forum where to 
make retrospective decisions of a legal nature. And Resolution 731 looked 
like a recommendation adopted under Chapter VI of the United Nations 
Charter, which pertains to the “pacific settlement of disputes.” However, the 
passing of the said resolution represented a significant step in the escalation 
of pressure on Libya.  
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Resolution 731 reads as follows: “The Security Council …. Deeply 
concerned over results of investigations which implicate officials of the 
Libyan Government and which are contained in the Security Council 
documents that include the requests addressed to the Libyan authorities by 
…, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America in connection with the legal procedures related to 
the attack[s] carried out against Pan Am flight 103 and … (…. S/23307; 
S/23308; … S/23317); Determined to eliminate international terrorism; 1. 
Condemns the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 …. and the resultant loss of 
hundreds of lives; 2. Strongly deplores the fact that the Libyan Government 
has not yet responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully in 
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts referred to above against 
Pan Am flight 103 and… ; Urges the Libyan Government immediately to 
provide a full and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to 
the elimination of international terrorism; Requests the Secretary-General 
to seek the cooperation of the Libyan Government to provide a full and 
effective response to those requests; Urges all States individually and 
collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully and 
effectively to those requests; Decides to remain seized of the matter.”10  
In response, Libya explained its failure to extradite by noting that “Libyan 
law, which had been in force for more than 30 years, does not permit the 
extradition of Libyan nationals.” Libya argued that such a law “cannot be 
altered by a decision of the Security Council, whether a recommendation or 
a binding resolution.” It also stressed that “the Libyan authorities cannot 
bypass this legal obstacle or violate the rights of citizens protected by the 
law.”11 Besides, Libya filed a request to the International Court of Justice in 
order to obtain an emergency ruling to halt any possible British or American 
action. On 6 March, the International Court of Justice scheduled hearings 
for 26 March on Libya’s request. Nonetheless, the Security Council moved 
inexorably towards the imposition of mandatory sanctions. Yet, Libya kept 
refusing to extradite the two suspected perpetrators of Pan Am 103 bombing 
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both to the United Kingdom and the United States. It also highlighted that 
it was far too premature to discuss the question of compensation, since the 
latter can result only from a civil court decision based on a criminal 
judgement.  
Furthermore, Libya stressed that the United Kingdom and the United 
States had not responded to Libya’s legitimate request to provide it with the 
dossiers of the investigation on the basis of which they had made charges 
against the two suspects, which showed an utmost lack of cooperation on 
their part.12 Libya also labelled Resolution 731 as incompatible with its 
national legislation, international agreements, the principle of sovereignty 
and the Charter of the United Nations. However, it would not oppose the 
hand-over of the two suspects to a third party if the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations would be convinced - on the basis of a comprehensive 
inquiry - that the charges were well-founded. Libya also asked the United 
Nations Secretary-General to provide all judicial and legal guarantees for 
the conduct of a just and fair trial based on the International Bill of Human 
Rights and the principles of international law. 
At this stage, Libya did not look isolated in the international scenario. A 
number of countries seemed supportive of its politics and however against 
mandatory sanctions. The Arab League – for instance – issued a resolution 
calling on the Security Council to avoid adopting economic, military or 
diplomatic measures against Libya and to resolve the conflict between that 
country and the United States and the United Kingdom by negotiation and 
mediation. The Arab League also called on the Security Council to wait until 
the International Court of Justice ruled upon the issue raised by Libya.13 
Quite obviously, neighbouring countries might be reluctant to cut air links 
or withdraw their diplomats from Tripoli, if this sort of sanctions was to be 
adopted. As far as a possible ban on Libyan oil was concerned, some 
countries, which were particularly dependant on this precious natural 
resource and used to import it massively from Libya,14 would not be in 
favour.  
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Nonetheless, on 31 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 748 
which gave Colonel Gaddafi until the end of Ramadan - on 15 April - to 
comply with paragraph 3 of Resolution 731, that required Libya to hand 
over the two suspects. Resolution 748, unlike Resolution 731, expressly 
invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.15 Stating that Libya’s 
failure to renounce terrorism constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, it laid down that Libya must comply with the earlier resolution. 
Resolution 748 was passed by a vote of ten in favour with none against and 
five abstentions.16  As of 15 April, all states were required to cut air links 
with Libya, except those based on humanitarian needs; prohibit the supply 
of parts or servicing to Libyan aircraft; prohibit the provision of arms-
related material, advice or assistance to that country; significantly reduce 
the level of Libyan diplomatic representation in their territory; prevent the 
operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices; and deny entry or expel Libyan 
nationals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. The Security 
Council also required the Libyan Government to commit itself definitively to 
cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups and 
to demonstrate promptly, by means of actions, its renunciation of terrorism.  
Colonel Gaddafi immediately threatened to halt oil sales and severe 
business ties with all countries that imposed sanctions against Libya. It was 
easy to discount such attitude though; nothing, short of military action, 
would damage Libya more than a curtailment of its oil sales. Nonetheless, 
those sanctions, as specified in Resolution 748, would not easily achieve 
their objectives. Ostensibly, a ban on civilian air travel would turn out to be 
more a nuisance than a serious problem; a ban on arms sales would have 
little effect on a trade that was in any case often clandestine; besides, Libya 
was already massively armed and such ban would have very little effect in 
the short run; a scaling down of diplomatic activity would involve political 
isolation without necessarily forcing Libya’s compliance with the United 
Nations demands. However, Resolution 748 looked like the first stage of an 
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escalating process, a planned strategy that was designed to cripple the 
Libyan economy and possibly topple Colonel Gaddafi.  
On 15 April 1992, as expected, the mandatory sanctions came into effect 
and states started to comply with them. Italian fighter aircraft were used to 
turn back a Libyan passenger aircraft, and Tunisia and Egypt refused to 
grant permission for Libyan planes to land. Libyan diplomatic missions 
were downsized in a number of countries such as the United States, France, 
Sweden, and Japan. Switzerland announced that it would curb arms sales 
whereas Russia informed that it would withdraw hundreds of its military 
experts training the Libyan armed forces. Libya immediately threatened to 
take reciprocal measures against any country that would expel Libyan 
diplomats. 17 
Article 13 of Resolution 748 established that the Security Council would, 
every 120 days or sooner - should the situation so require - review the 
measures imposed. On 12 August, the Security Council decided to retain the 
sanctions imposed on Libya. The scene was therefore set for a long-lasting 
confrontation between the Gaddafi regime and the United Nations political 
organ par excellence, the Security Council. The first tranche of United 
Nations sanctions against Libya had been set up. Unless the Libyan 
Government handed over the two suspects for trial, the sanctions would 
remain in place. Nevertheless, the Libyan authorities continued to maintain 
that they were under no legal obligation to surrender the two suspects. On 
the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom would not 
negotiate or compromise and insisted on the two suspects being extradited.  
In mid-August, the United States and the United Kingdom gave Libya 
fresh deadline of 1 October: the suspects would be handed over by that date 
or Libya would face additional sanctions. In further effort to undermine 
support for sanctions, Gaddafi was now taking further initiatives: offering to 
pay compensation to Libyan Jews whose properties had been confiscated; 
offering compensation to the Lockerbie families (while still disclaiming any 
responsibility for the bombing); and even hinting that he might surrender 
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the two Libyans for trial in Scotland or the United States if the West were 
prepared to offer diplomatic recognition to Tripoli. None of these initiatives 
bore fruit. The deadline of 1 October remained in place. On 1 October, the 
United States and the United Kingdom formally introduced their new 
sanctions package to the Security Council. Thus, while Tripoli seemed to 
play for time, the noose around the Libyan regime was going to be 
tightened.  
The fresh package of sanctions, as specified in Resolution 883, achieved an 
adequate majority vote in the Security Council: eleven voted in favour and 
none against.18 This new resolution, passed on 11 November 1993, 
represented a further blow against the Libyan economy. Paragraph 3 
required all states in which there were funds or other financial resources - 
owned or controlled by the Government or public authorities of Libya or any 
Libyan undertaking - to freeze the said funds and financial resources and 
made them unavailable to the owners or those who somehow controlled 
them. As far as Libyan oil sales were concerned, they were not blocked-up, 
although Resolution 883 was clearly intended to hit Libyan oil refining and 
exports. Paragraph 5 of the resolution prohibited the exporting to Libya of a 
wide range of equipment: pumps of medium or large capacity, gas turbines 
and electric motors, loading buoys, single point moorings, flexible hoses, 
anchor chains, and many more. This meant that Libya’s revenue from oil 
sales would not be immediately blocked but Libya’s capacity to produce and 
export oil products would be gradually crippled.  
It seems noteworthy that Paragraph III of the appended Annex to 
Resolution 883 bans the export to Libya of equipment not specifically 
designed for use in the oil industry but “which can be used for this purpose.” 
This meant that a wide range of equipment that Libya might wish to import 
for non-oil sectors of its economy would fall within the scope of Resolution 
883. Thus, the block concerned also equipment for Libya’s agricultural, 
industrial and other projects. It therefore seemed that those sanctions would 
also hit Libya’s agricultural development. Hence, in one plausible long term 
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scenario, Libya would be progressively less able to import food, because an 
oil industry starved of vital new equipment would necessarily yield 
diminishing revenues; and less able to achieve food self-sufficiency because 
of the unavailability of equipment essential for large agricultural 
development projects. In a nutshell, those sanctions would result in more 
poverty and shortage of food. Ostensibly, the aim was causing the collapse of 
Libya’s economy and possibly achieving the overthrow of the Gaddafi 
regime. However, those measures would become effective, if ever, only in the 
long run. Actually, many European states were heavily dependant on 
Libyan oil and an oil embargo would have affected their economies. Thus, 
the reasons of diplomacy did not allow for sterner measures. 
 
 
2.3 Libya’ request for interim measures 
 
Meanwhile, Libya had tried to react by legal means. On 3 March 1992, it 
had actually filed - in the Registry of the International Court of Justice - an 
application19 instituting proceedings against the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of a “dispute 
between Libya and the United Kingdom concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.” 
Simultaneously, Libya also sued the United States and filed its application 
in the Registry of the Court on that very day. Both applications invoked 
Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention as the basis for the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Therefore, two separate proceedings, instituted by two different 
applications, took place but the position of the applicant in each case was 
exactly the same. Libya actually asked the Court to adjudge and declare: 
that Libya had fully complied with all of its obligations under the Montreal 
Convention; that the United Kingdom inasmuch as the United States had 
breached, and were continuing to breach, their legal obligations to Libya 
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under Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(2) and 11 of the Montreal Convention; that 
both the United Kingdom and the United States were under a legal 
obligation immediately to cease and desist from such breaches and from the 
use of any and all force or threats against Libya, including the threat of 
force, and from all violations of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the 
political independence of Libya. 
On 3 March 1992, immediately after the filing of its application, Libya also 
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures under 
Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.20 As already reported, Libya sought 
an order provisionally restraining the United Kingdom and the United 
States from taking any further step against Libya, such as the imposition of 
sanctions. More precisely, Libya requested the Court to enjoin the United 
Kingdom and the United States from taking any action against Libya 
intended to coerce or to compel Libya to surrender the accused individuals 
to any jurisdiction outside of Libya; and to ensure that no steps were taken 
that would prejudice in any way the rights of Libya with respect to the legal 
proceedings that were the subject of Libya’s application.  
The Court - in its Orders of 14 April 1992 - declined the indication of 
provisional measures and ruled that: all members of the United Nations 
were obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; the Court, at the stage of 
proceedings on provisional measures, considered that prima facie, the said 
obligation extended to the decision contained in Resolution 748; in 
accordance with Article 103 of the United Nations Charter,21 the obligations 
of the Parties in that respect would prevail over their obligations under any 
other international agreement, including the Montreal Convention; 
nonetheless, the Court was not called upon to determine definitively the 
legal effects of Security Council Resolution 748. All the above considered, 
the Court essentially assessed that, whatever the situation previous to the 
adoption of Resolution 748, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal 
Convention could no longer be regarded as appropriate for protection by the 
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indication of provisional measures, since an indication of the measures 
requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights which appeared 
prima facie to be enjoyed by the counterparts pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 748. Thus, Libya’s request for interim relief was rejected.  
This was a very important determination that was to be relied upon by the 
United Kingdom and the United States in the following stages of the 
proceedings. Interestingly, the vote ruled on the competence of the Court to 
issue the protective injunction and the outcome thereof was that the Court 
could rule on the application for the indication of provisional measures 
without deciding whether it had jurisdiction on the merits. For its part, 
Libya, with the request for provisional measures, had somehow challenged 
the Security Council22 by asking the International Court of Justice to rule 
against it. This was actually the core of Libya’s claims. As a matter of fact, it 
was a Security Council resolution to ask Libya to surrender the two alleged 
perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing and to set forth sanctions. The 
United Kingdom and the United States had certainly put forward drafts 
but, at that stage, the resolutions had to be regarded as Council’s decisions. 
Hence, was Libya’s request too far-reaching and beyond the Court’s power 
or was it consistent with the United Nations set-up? Ostensibly, the Court 
had been put in a very difficult position. Whatever the inherent justice of 
the Libyan case, it was hard to imagine that the Court would rule against 
the Security Council. It is not so difficult to speculate that, if Resolution 748 
was scheduled for a vote but not yet passed, then the Court ruling might 
have been different.23  Instead, in the given circumstances, the Court had to 
rule pursuant to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, that the 
demands of a Security Council resolution should take precedence over the 
requirement of the Montreal Convention.  
Yet, it seems that Libya’s application had left the Court with more than 
one option: the Court could have held that the sanctions ordered by 
Resolution 748 should be suspended until the Court ascertained, at the 
merits stage, that Libya’s claim was groundless; it could have decided that, 
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since no sufficient case of mala fides or ultra vires had been established, 
there was no ground upon which the Court could possibly order interim 
relief; or, it could have held that no relief would be allowed at any stage of 
the proceedings if granting it required the Court to make a finding that a 
Chapter VII decision of the Security Council exceeded its lawful authority. 
Two of the above mentioned options postulate an implicit right of judicial 
review, albeit leading to opposite results, whereas the third assumes judicial 
restraint or abdication. The Court’s choice was the second possible option, 
which it elected in a soft manner. The Court actually rejected Libya’s 
request for interim protection, since, under Article 25 of the Charter,24 
member states are obliged to carry out decisions of the Security Council. 
The Court therefore considered that, prima facie, this obligation extended to 
the decision contained in Resolution 748.  
Hence, the Court simply relied on the Council’s resolution without 
explicitly addressing whether it might be ultra vires or not. The Security 
Council’s action in imposing sanctions was deemed intra vires precisely 
because the majority of judges seemed to agree that, for purposes of interim 
measures, Article 103 of the Charter “trumped” any rights Libya might have 
under the Montreal Convention and thus freed the Council to apply 
sanctions as a suitable remedy in exercise of its powers under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. In a nutshell, the Court presumed the validity of Resolution 
748 and therefore held that Libya’s rights were no longer suitable for 
protection by the indication of provisional measures. The Court did not 
enquire into whether the said resolution was valid or invalid. It simply 
assumed the validity of the resolution and proceeded accordingly.  
Thus, the Court rejected Libya’s application for provisional relief and 
apparently acceded to the broad discretionary power of the Security Council. 
It seems however noteworthy that the Court acceded to that power not by 
refusing to decide, but by exercising its power of decision. As a matter of 
fact, both the Order and the Opinions attached therein seem to suggest that 
the exercise of the Security Council’s power is no bar to the Court’s making 
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its pronouncements. It was actually the particular circumstances of the case 
that led to a dismissal. Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar, 
in a joint declaration attached to the Court’s Order de quo, actually 
expressed their complete agreement with the decision of the Court, but 
stressed that, before the Security Council became involved in the case, the 
United States and the United Kingdom were entitled to request Libya to 
surrender its nationals inasmuch as Libya was entitled to refuse extradition 
and to recall its domestic law prohibiting it. But then the said Justices 
pointed out that the situation was not considered satisfactory by the 
Security Council, which was acting, with a view to fighting international 
terrorism, within the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. The Council accordingly decided that Libya should surrender the 
two accused to the countries that had requested their extradition. 
 Thus, Resolution 748 had changed the legal scenario that existed prior to 
its adoption. The Court was therefore fully justified in rejecting Libya’s 
request for interim measures, which was intended to preserve the legal 
situation existing prior to the adoption of the resolution thereof. The said 
Justices therefore assessed that the Court was justified in holding that the 
circumstances of the case were not such as to require the exercise of its 
power to indicate such measures.  
 Acting President Oda, for its part, appended a declaration concurring 
with the Court’s decision but expressing his view that the Court’s decision 
should not have been based exclusively on the consequences of 
Security Council Resolution 748, since this suggested the possibility that, 
prior to the adoption of the said resolution, the Court could have reached 
legal conclusions with effects incompatible with the Council’s actions, and 
the Court might in that case be blamed for not having acted sooner. 
However, President Oda highlighted that the essential right of which the 
interim protection was claimed - that of not being forced to extradite one’s 
own nationals - was a sovereign right under general international law, 
whereas the subject-matter of Libya’s application consisted of specific rights 
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claimed under the Montreal Convention. Given the principle that the rights 
sought to be protected in proceedings for provisional measures must relate 
to the subject matter of the case, this meant that the Court would in any 
case have had to decline to indicate the measures requested. Such a 
mismatch between the object of the application and the rights sought to be 
protected ought, in the view of Acting President Oda, to have been the main 
reason for taking a negative decision, which would have been appropriate no 
less before than after the adoption of Resolution 748. 
There were some dissenting opinions, though. Judge Bedjaoui, for 
instance, highlighted that there existed two altogether distinct disputes, one 
legal, and the other practical. The former concerned the extradition of two 
nationals and was dealt with, as a legal matter, before the World Court at 
the request of Libya, whereas the latter concerned the wider question of 
state sponsored terrorism as well as the international responsibility of 
Libya, which, for its part, was being dealt with, politically, before the 
Security Council at the request of the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Judge Bedjaoui considered that Libya was fully within its 
rights in bringing before the Court, with a view to its judicial settlement, 
the dispute concerning the extradition, just as the United Kingdom and the 
United States were fully within their rights in bringing before the Security 
Council, with a view to its political settlement, the dispute on the 
international responsibility of Libya.  
The situation should, in the opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, be summarized as 
follows: on the one hand, the rights claimed by Libya existed prima facie 
and all of the conditions normally required by the Court for the indication of 
provisional measures were fulfilled in this case, so that these rights might 
be preserved in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. And 
it is on this point that Judge Bedjaoui expressed reservations with regard to 
the two Orders of the Court. But it should also be noted that Security 
Council Resolution 748 had annihilated these rights of Libya, without it 
being possible, at that stage of provisional measures, for the Court to take it 
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upon itself to decide prematurely the substantive question of the 
constitutional validity of that resolution, for which reason, the resolution 
enjoyed a presumption of validity. He was therefore in agreement with the 
Court as to this second point. At that stage of the proceedings such a 
“conflict,” governed by Article 103 of the Charter, resulted in any indication 
of provisional measures being ineffectual.  
Judge Bedjaoui therefore arrived, concretely, at the same result as the 
Court, via an entirely different route but also with the important nuance 
mentioned, as a result of which he did not reject the request for interim 
measures but, rather, declared that its effects had disappeared. The Court, 
then, could have decided to indicate provisional measures in the very 
general terms of an exhortation to all the parties not to aggravate or extend 
the dispute. Judge Bedjaoui therefore regretted that the Court was unable 
to indicate neither specific provisional measures of the kind sought by 
Libya, nor, proprio motu, general measures, a way that would have enabled 
it to make its own positive contribution to the settlement of the dispute.  
Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, drew attention to the 
unique nature of the Lockerbie case in that it was the first time that the 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council had been 
approached by opposite parties to the same dispute. He underlined that the 
Security Council, in discharging its duties, was required to act in accordance 
with the principles of international law. In regard to matters properly before 
it, the Court’s function was to make judicial decisions according to the law 
and it would not be deflected from this course by the fact that the same 
matter had been considered by the Security Council. However, decisions 
made by the Security Council under Chapter VII are prima facie binding on 
all members of the United Nations and would not be the subject of 
examination by the Court. Judge Weeramantry concluded that 
Resolution 731 was only recommendatory but that Resolution 748 was - 
prima facie - binding. He concluded that provisional measures could be 
indicated in such a manner as not to conflict with Resolution 748 and 
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indicated such measures proprio motu against both parties preventing an 
aggravation or extension of the dispute.  
Judge Ajibola, in his dissenting opinion, also regretted that the Court, by a 
majority decision, declined to indicate provisional measures even though 
Libya had established sufficient warrant for its doing so under the 
applicable provisions of the Court’s Statute and Rules. He strongly assessed 
that, even if the Court concluded that such measures should be declined 
because of the possible effect of Resolution 748, the latter did not raise any 
absolute bar to the Court’s making pronouncements not in conflict with it. 
He went on to stress the Court’s powers, especially under Article 75 of its 
Rules, to indicate provisional measures proprio motu, quite independently of 
the applicant’s request, for the purpose of ensuring peace and security 
among nations, and in particular the parties to the case. Thus, the Court, 
pendente lite, should have indicated provisional measures, with a view to 
preventing any aggravation or extension of the dispute which might result 
in the use of force by either party or by both parties.  
Finally, Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri, in his dissenting opinion, focused mainly 
on the legal reasons which led him to maintain that paragraph 1 of Security 
Council Resolution 748 should not be considered having any legal effect on 
the jurisdiction of the Court, even on prima facie basis, and accordingly the 
Libyan request for provisional measures had to be evaluated in conformity 
with habitual pattern as reflected in the established jurisprudence of the 
Court. Then, he also came to the conclusion that the Court should have 
acted proprio motu to indicate measures having for effect that the two 
suspects whose names were identified in the proceedings should be placed 
under the custody of the governmental authorities in another state that 
could ultimately provide a mutually agreed upon convenient forum for their 
trial; moreover, the Court could have indicated that the parties ensured that 
no action of any kind would be taken which might aggravate or extend the 
dispute submitted to the Court or likely to impede the proper 
administration of justice. 
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All the above-mentioned opinions allow a better understanding of the 
Court’s ruling, which was to prove an extremely remarkable one, since it 
reached far beyond the inherent legality of the suit brought before the 
International Court of Justice. It was actually the first time that a 
significant portion of the International Court of Justice suggested that it 
could exercise a power of judicial review over the Security Council’s 
decisions in contentious cases - albeit expressing this view in separate 
opinions - and the majority of judges implicitly assumed to be entrusted 
with such a power.25 They certainly assessed that the fact that a certain 
matter had been considered by the Security Council was no bar to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. However, if the Court impliedly recognized a power of 
judicial review, it did not seem to be prepared to adopt a very stringent 
standard. Many of the opinions expressed by the judges are based on the 
“presumption of validity” of the action of the Security Council, which sounds 
like a very deferential standard of review.  
More importantly, the Court did not go so far as to endorse a doctrine of 
judicial supremacy. While it suggested it might review the validity of the 
acts of other organs in a particular case, it did not hold that its 
interpretation of the Charter would be final and binding on all states and all 
United Nations organs in the future. This means that the Court may 
consider it wise to apply a presumption of validity when examining Security 
Council’s actions but it must, when cases involving such questions come 
before it, make up its own mind on the matter, having recourse to principles 
and standards of law. Therefore, in so far as the questions before the Court 
are legal and the Court has jurisdiction,26 it has a duty to decide the matter 
even though it needs examining whether another principal organ - such as 
the Security Council - has exceeded its powers.   
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2.4 Libya’s case 
 
The International Court of Justice fixed a time limit for the filing by Libya 
of a memorial and by the United Kingdom and the United States of counter-
memorials. Meanwhile, no negotiated settlement seemed likely to take 
place. In both its applications, Libya had reported that – on 17 January 
1992 – the Secretary of the People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and 
International Co-operation, had addressed letters to the Foreign Secretary 
of the United Kingdom and to the Secretary of State of the United States. 
Those letters referred to the fact that Libya had undertaken the necessary 
measures provided for in the Montreal Convention, whereas, despite 
requests to the competent British and American authorities to provide 
assistance to the Libyan judicial authorities, those requests had not met 
with any response. Thus, he had invited the United Kingdom and the 
United States to agree to arbitration in accordance with Article 14(1) of the 
Montreal Convention. Both the United Kingdom and the United States had 
failed to respond formally to that letter. Thus, Libya inferred that, despite 
its efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, 
including the Montreal Convention, the United Kingdom and the United 
States had rejected this approach and continued to try to coerce Libya into 
surrendering the accused.27 Therefore, it seemed there was no overture 
whatsoever for a negotiated settlement.  
Libya had claimed that the Montreal Convention was the only appropriate 
convention in force between the parties dealing with the offences listed in 
Article 1,28 that is to say the offences the two Libyan suspects had been 
indicted with. Thus, Libya always maintained that the Montreal Convention 
was the only instrument applicable to the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft 
over Lockerbie, for the following reasons: the respondents and Libya were 
all bound by the Montreal Convention which was definitely in force between 
the parties; the Montreal Convention is actually specifically aimed at 
preventing that type of action; the actions ascribed to the Libyan nationals 
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fell within the scope of Article 1 of the Montreal Convention; the system of 
the Montreal Convention, as compared to the system of the United Nations 
Charter, is both a lex posterior and a lex specialis; consequently, for matters 
covered by that Convention, it must a priori take precedence over the 
systems for which the Charter provides; and there was no other convention 
concerning international criminal law in force which was applicable to the 
issues at stake in the relations between Libya, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, as far as the incident occurred over Lockerbie was concerned.  
Libya therefore contended that the United Kingdom and the United States 
were bound to adhere to the provisions of the Montreal Convention relating 
to the incident. Libya’s case basically relied on the codified principle of aut 
dedere aut iudicare, which Article 7 of the Montreal Convention sets out. 
Besides, Libya submitted that, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the said 
Convention,29 it was entitled to take such measures as might be necessary 
to establish its own jurisdiction over the above mentioned offences whenever 
the alleged offenders were present in its territory and were not extradited 
pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, Libya argued that the United 
Kingdom and the United States, by their actions and threats, were 
attempting to preclude Libya from establishing its legitimate jurisdiction 
and, in so doing, they were violating Article 5(2) of the Convention. 
Pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Convention, Libya was instead entitled to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over the matter de quo in accordance with its 
national law. Moreover, Libya contended that, under Article 7 of the 
Convention,30 it was bound to submit the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution, which it had already done.  
The United Kingdom and the United States were therefore attempting to 
prevent Libya from fulfilling its obligations in this respect by trying to force 
it to surrender the two Libyan suspects. Besides, under Article 8(2) of the 
Convention,31 extradition is subject to the laws of the state from which 
extradition is requested. Under Article 493(A) of the Libyan Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Libyan law actually prohibits the extradition of Libya’s 
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nationals. It follows therefore, that there was no basis in either Libyan law 
or under the Montreal Convention for the extradition of the accused from 
the territory of Libya. Besides, under Article 11(1) of the Convention,32 the 
United Kingdom and the United States were under an obligation to provide 
Libya with the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought by Libya in respect of the offences listed in Article 1. 
Libya therefore concluded that, by failing to provide such assistance, the 
United Kingdom and the United States had breached their obligations 
under the Montreal Convention.  
This was pretty much Libya’s case, which was entirely based on treaty 
law. Were there other options, though? Maybe, Libya might have asserted 
its rights under general international law. Yet, it seems doubtful that the 
non-extradition of nationals is a peremptory norm of international law. 
Nonetheless, Libya might have argued that the widespread practice of 
refusing to extradite nationals, while not a peremptory norm of 
international law, was nonetheless a rule of customary law - important 
enough to override a command under the Charter. The Court might have 
viewed certain aspects of customary law, especially those dealing with the 
fundamental attributes of sovereignty, such as territorial integrity and 
disposition of state’s nationals, as more fundamental than rules not directly 
related to state sovereignty. Should this be the case, the Security Council 
might actually be prevented from altering expectations built up over years 
of state practice.  
Thus, Libya might have set-up its case and refuse to extradite its 
nationals by pointing to state practice on extradition. Why did it rely on the 
Montreal Convention instead? Perhaps, because it would seem paradoxical 
to rely on ordinary customary law, but not treaty law, since the latter is 
easier to find: it is actually written down for all to see, whereas customary 
law exists in the often unascertainable practice of states. It therefore seems 
that resort to the Montreal Convention was the wisest course of action that 
Libya’s counsels could take. Whether this sets up a sound legal case or not, 
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this is a totally different question. The issue at stake was the Security 
Council’s involvement. The United Nations political organ had not 
challenged the validity of the extradition system based on treaty law but 
had somehow “supplemented” it,33 given the exceptional circumstances that 
constituted, in the Council’s view, a threat to the peace. And what Libya 
ended up doing, was actually challenging the Security Council’s authority.  
Yet, the latter was strenuously defended by the United Kingdom and the 
United States in their cases, as it is to be shown below. 
 
2.5 Preliminary objections by the United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom filed Preliminary Objections and presented them at 
the hearings held at the Peace Palace in The Hague between 13 and 20 
October 1997.34 In the Preliminary Objections, the United Kingdom asked 
the Court to dismiss the Libyan action at the preliminary stage. Its 
submissions were the following: that the Court should adjudge and declare 
that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims brought by Libya against the 
United Kingdom and that those claims were however inadmissible.  
There are therefore two main stances in the United Kingdom’s case: one 
addressing the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 14(1) of the Montreal 
Convention and actually claiming total lack of jurisdiction; the other, on 
much wider grounds of admissibility, based on the existence of overriding 
legal obligations under binding resolutions of the Security Council. It seems 
worthwhile to sum up the Preliminary Objections that the United Kingdom 
put forward, since they entail a number of noteworthy arguments. In 
respect to the Court’s jurisdiction, the United Kingdom basically argued 
that there was no substantive dispute in any recognized sense of the term 
between Libya and the United Kingdom relating to the interpretation or to 
the application of the Montreal Convention since Libya had not been able to 
point to any conduct of the United Kingdom which could plausibly be 
considered as a violation of the said Convention; the conduct Libya 
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complained of was either not that of the United Kingdom at all or a conduct 
for which the United Kingdom carried no legal responsibility. The United 
Kingdom suggested that Libya was rather attempting to frustrate the 
exercise by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the United 
Nations Charter, which could hardly be depicted as a Montreal Convention 
matter.  
Nonetheless, Libya had asked for a declaration that the United Kingdom 
had violated its legal obligations towards Libya under certain specified 
Articles of the Montreal Convention.35 On its part, the United Kingdom 
argued not to be bound by any of those provisions, which rather set out 
obligations that, within the context of the Lockerbie case, utterly rested on 
Libya. With respect to Article 5(2), the United Kingdom argued that the said 
provision requires each party to the Convention to take whatever measures 
are necessary within its own legal system to ensure that its courts have 
jurisdiction to deal with an offender who is brought before them, whenever 
the circumstances described in the provision occur. In the United Kingdom’s 
view, though, this does not mean that a state has to try an alleged offender. 
It only has to put in place the mechanism that would enable it to do so, if 
ever the case. Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, instead, requires a state 
which does not extradite an alleged offender “to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution” and then provides that 
those authorities “shall take their decision in the same manner as in the 
case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.”  
The United Kingdom argued that the said provision would be redundant if 
the requirement in Article 5(2) to establish jurisdiction was interpreted as a 
duty to exercise jurisdiction. Thus, the United Kingdom argued that the 
logical conclusion was that Article 5(2) is concerned with the creation of 
jurisdiction and Article 7 with the exercise of that jurisdiction. But then the 
United Kingdom never suggested that Libya did not establish its 
jurisdiction. And anyway it did not have the power of hindering Libya from 
doing so. Anyway, even if Article 5(2) should be interpreted as requiring the 
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exercise of jurisdiction, it would impose obligations only upon Libya, not 
upon the United Kingdom or other states. The United Kingdom submitted 
that a similar argument also applied to Article 5(3), which sets out that 
nothing in the Convention operates to restrict the exercise of existing 
criminal jurisdiction under national law. But then again, such a provision 
would not impose obligations upon the United Kingdom.  
Moreover, the United Kingdom pointed out that Article 7 of the Montreal 
Convention requires a state in whose territory an alleged offender is found 
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution if it does not extradite the alleged offender. Libya had done so, 
which the United Kingdom did not even question. Again, no dispute existed 
under Article 7, which only sets out obligations on the state in which the 
alleged offender is found. So, whatever Libya objected about the United 
Kingdom’s request for surrender of the two accused, this could not possibly 
embody a dispute under Article 7 of the Montreal Convention. Libya also 
relied upon Article 8(3), which specifies that the Montreal Convention 
requires a state, which does not make extradition dependent upon the 
existence of an extradition treaty, to treat offences falling within the 
Convention as extraditable offences. It does not, however, require a state to 
extradite an alleged offender in circumstances that would be contrary to the 
domestic law of that state. The United Kingdom maintained that it had 
never suggested that Article 8(3) placed Libya under an obligation to 
extradite the two suspects. And of course the said provision did not impose 
any obligation upon the United Kingdom either. Therefore, no legal dispute 
existed between the United Kingdom and Libya regarding the application of 
Article 8(3).  
That left out Article 11(1) as the last provision invoked by Libya to prove 
that there was a dispute between the United Kingdom and Libya. Article 
11(1) requires contracting states to afford one another the greatest measure 
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of 
the offences and that the law of the state apply in all cases. The basis for 
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Libya’s claim regarding Article 11(1) appeared to be related to the fact that 
Libya had requested the United Kingdom to supply information relating to 
the charges against the accused. The United Kingdom objected that it had 
provided Libya with copies of the Scottish charges, the warrant for the 
arrest of the accused and the Statement of Facts prepared by the Lord 
Advocate. It had certainly declined to provide Libya with more information 
but there were sound reasons why Libya was not regarded as an 
appropriate forum where to try the two accused. The latter were actually 
charged with having committed offences as members of the Libyan 
Intelligence Service and in furtherance of the objectives of that service. 
Besides, once the Security Council adopted Resolution 731, there was a 
unanimous expression of view by the Security Council, that Libya was not 
an appropriate forum in which to try the two accused. Then, Resolution 748 
was adopted and Libya found itself under a binding obligation to surrender 
the accused for trial. Once that obligation came into being, there was no 
question of a trial taking place in Libya. Thus, any obligation that the 
United Kingdom might have had to provide evidence to Libya was clearly 
superseded by the provisions of the said resolution.  
Hereby, once the Security Council took action, the legal scenario changed 
completely as the United Kingdom maintained. The latter therefore asked 
the International Court of Justice to find that, whatever the position under 
the Montreal Convention might have been, the point at issue was 
determined by resolutions of the Security Council which bound both parties 
and had overriding force, from the very moment they had been adopted. 
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter actually provides: “In the event of 
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.” The United Kingdom therefore argued that Article 103 creates a 
hierarchy of treaties and sets the Charter apart from the application of the 
ordinary principles regarding lex posterior or lex specialis. The United 
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Kingdom stressed its argument by referring to Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which makes provision for priority 
between different treaties but opens with the statement that its provisions 
are in any case “subject to Article 103 of the Charter.”  
Besides, the United Kingdom maintained that in so far as Libya’s 
complaint was that the sanctions imposed upon it were unfair or unlawful 
and that the United Kingdom had enforced sanctions against Libya, this 
complaint was beyond the scope of Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention. 
As a matter of fact, once a situation has been duly referred to the Security 
Council, the subsequent handling of that matter in the Council becomes the 
responsibility of the Council itself as a collective body. Therefore, decisions 
taken by the Council cannot give rise to a course of action against an 
individual state, whatever may have been the role of that state in the 
proceedings of the Council. Thus, if Libya had a dispute regarding the 
adoption and application of measures by the Security Council, the said 
dispute was with the Council itself and not with specific members.  
In this respect, the United Kingdom maintained that Libya’s argument 
seemed to ignore the special position of the United Nations Charter in the 
international legal order and the role which the Charter entrusts the 
Security Council with as far as the maintenance of international peace and 
security is concerned. Thus, the United Kingdom stressed that the decisions 
of the Council were a well thought-out response to a situation the members 
of the Council assessed to be a threat to international peace and security; 
that situation did not stem from the Lockerbie case only, but arose from a 
much wider range of Libyan deplorable conducts; the Council was therefore 
simply acting within its powers in response to international terrorism 
against civil aviation, the latter being a subject that was well within its 
established field of concern. The United Kingdom actually pointed out that 
its approach to the Council, in the light of its criminal investigation of the 
Lockerbie case and of the unsatisfactory Libyan response to its requests, 
was very clearly made in the broader context of Libya’s demonstrated past 
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record as a sponsor and supporter of international terrorism. It therefore 
reached far beyond the alleged responsibility of two Libyan nationals for 
placing a bomb aboard Pan Am flight 103.  
The United Kingdom’s case also addressed the possibility of judicial review 
over the Council’s resolutions and the possibility that a conflict between the 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council might arise in this 
respect. But then it stressed that what the Charter actually envisages is 
that the actions of the Council and the Court, each in its own sphere, should 
reinforce the aim of preserving, maintaining and restoring peace and 
security in the world. The pivotal question, then, was whether the 
International Court of Justice is entitled to review the determinations which 
the Council adopts under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter,36 which 
the United Kingdom denied, because the Council’s assessment under 
Article 39 is an act of discretion that cannot be judged by legal standards. 
Thus, it is a matter for the Security Council alone. The United Kingdom 
therefore took the view that Libya’s invitation to the Court to review the 
substance of the Council’s resolutions amounted to an invitation to the 
Court to substitute its own judgment on the matters in question for that of 
the Council. The United Kingdom stressed that it is for the Council to decide 
on the measures that are an appropriate response to a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression. Article 39 actually speaks in terms 
of the responsibility to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression inasmuch as the responsibility to 
“make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”  
The United Kingdom therefore maintained that there was no foundation 
in the Charter for Libya’s stance that there is a power of judicial review of 
the measures ordered by the Security Council. If such a jurisdiction existed, 
it would have been explicitly set out. The United Kingdom argued that it is 
for the Council to assess whether a threat to or a breach of the peace occurs 
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and to adopt the necessary measures thereby. It is also for the Council to 
assess whether the terms of its resolutions have been met or not. Libya 
however did not debate that these powers are vested in the 
Security Council, but then argued that the Council’s powers are not without 
limits and cannot infringe the principles of international law. In this 
respect, the United Kingdom maintained that the existence of limits to the 
Council’s power does not necessarily entail the possibility of judicial control. 
Those limits actually exist but they belong in the political rather than the 
legal sphere. One such control is the membership of the Council, which is 
designed to be representative of the membership of the United Nations at 
large. Another control is the partial rotation of the Council’s membership 
every year. A third control consists of the responsibility that the Council 
owes to the membership of the United Nations at large, as is reflected, for 
example, in its annual reports to the General Assembly pursuant to 
Article 24(3) of the Charter. These are forms of control but they have 
nothing to do with judicial review. Thus, the United Kingdom took a strong 
stance in excluding any power of judicial review over the Council’s decisions 
and in highlighting the difference between the legal and the political sphere.  
For all the above, the United Kingdom insisted that Libya was under 
obligation of complying with the requirements that the Security Council had 
set out in its resolutions. As a matter of fact, Resolutions 731, 748, 883 
required the surrender of the accused for trial either in Scotland or the 
United States. The United Kingdom specified that, unlike the subsequent 
Resolutions 748 and 883, which were adopted under Chapter VII,37 
Resolution 731 was not. Nonetheless, although the text did not say so 
expressly, the United Kingdom assumed that Resolution 731 was adopted 
under Chapter VI of the Charter, which empowers the Security Council to 
make recommendations for dealing with situations whose continuation is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Resolution 731 was actually designed to allow Libya a reasonable 
opportunity to respond to the call made on behalf of the international 
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community; it was Libya’s inadequate response to these requirements that 
prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 748 and 883.  
The latter were adopted by the Council expressly under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, following determinations that the circumstances constituted a 
threat to international peace and security, and they specifically declared 
that the obligations which they imposed on states were for the purpose of 
implementing the Council’s decisions. The said resolutions thus fell within 
the undertaking by each member state in Article 25 to “accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the [present] 
Charter.” This may be considered the very core of the United Kingdom’s 
case: Article 103 of the Charter had to be read in context with other crucial 
provisions.  
In Article 24,38 member states actually confer upon the Security Council 
pivotal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In Article 25, the member states agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council. Chapter VII gives the Council powers of 
decision extending even to the use of armed force. The syllogism easily 
follows: member states are under a legal obligation to “accept and carry out” 
the binding decisions of the Council; that obligation is an “obligation under 
the Charter;” therefore that obligation prevails over “Member States 
obligations under any other international agreement.” Libya was therefore 
bound to comply with the Council’s resolutions whatever its rights and 
duties arising under the Montreal Convention. Thus, even though the Court 
accepted Libya’s contention that a dispute between Libya and the United 
Kingdom falling within the terms of Article 14 of the Montreal Convention 
existed, Libya’s claim would however be inadmissible.  This is why the 
United Kingdom requested the International Court of Justice to dismiss the 
case at the preliminary stage. 
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2.6 Preliminary objections by the United States 
The United States also filed Preliminary Objections to the Court’s 
jurisdiction and to the admissibility of Libya’s claim. In a nutshell, the said 
Preliminary Objections were pretty much the following: that the Court did 
not have jurisdiction to entertain Libya’s claims under Article 14 of the 
Montreal Convention since Libya had not raised any valid claim whatsoever 
pertaining to the application or the interpretation of the Convention itself; 
that, even if Libya could make such a claim, any such claims were 
superseded by the relevant decisions of the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, imposing different obligations. Thus, 
Libya’s claims had rather to be seen as a challenge to the lawfulness of the 
Council’s actions under the Charter, which could not be considered as a 
dispute with the United States over the interpretation or application of the 
Montreal Convention.  
Acceptance of Libya’s claims would otherwise require the Court to 
overturn binding decisions of the Security Council that were adopted in the 
exercise of its functions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, even if 
the Court had jurisdiction to consider those claims and considered them to 
be admissible, it should decline to grant the relief requested by Libya 
because the latter’s claims had been rendered moot by the Council’s 
resolutions. Under the United Nations Charter, the obligations created by 
the Council’s decisions under Chapter VII actually take precedence over 
inconsistent obligations that might otherwise apply. Thus, should the Court 
decide that it had and should exercise jurisdiction, and that Libya’s claims 
were admissible, it should resolve the case in substance at the preliminary 
objections stage and decide, as a preliminary matter, that the decisions of 
the Security Council preclude the relief sought by Libya.39 
In submitting its Preliminary Objections, the United States stressed the 
fact that Libya was allegedly one of the states that sponsored international 
terrorism and actually underlined that the Lockerbie bombing was not the 
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first time that agents or officials of the Government of Libya had been 
involved in acts of international terrorism followed by denial of 
responsibility by the Libyan regime. The United States actually mentioned 
the bombing of La Belle discotheque in Berlin in 1986 as an example of 
Libya’s involvement in international terrorism,40 according to the 
indictments issued by competent judicial authorities in Germany. The 
United States also mentioned the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772 over 
Niger, which killed 171 people. Libya had denied responsibility but 
competent judicial authorities in France had concluded that there was 
compelling evidence to recommend prosecution of six Libyan intelligence 
operatives for the attack.41  
Briefly, the United States started up their case depicting Libya as one of 
the states that widely sponsored international terrorism. Thus, the bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 was just one out of many episodes of crazed violence 
that served Libya’s terrorist policy. The United States therefore pointed out 
that the Security Council kept in mind the above-mentioned scenario when 
requiring Libya to cease terrorist action and surrender the alleged 
perpetrators of Pan Am 103 bombing for trial either in the United States or 
the United Kingdom. But what happened in turn, were mob attacks in 
Tripoli on the Embassies of Security Council Members that had voted in 
favour of Resolution 748.42 In the United States’ view, the latter occurrence 
strengthened the fact that Libya was sponsoring international terrorism 
and that the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was just one episode out of 
many.  
The United States also pointed out that the Council, in Resolution 883, 
had basically reaffirmed Resolutions 731 and 748. Altogether, these 
resolutions established legal requirements that the Government of Libya 
was required to meet in order to resolve the Lockerbie impasse, which Libya 
had hitherto failed to do. In the United States’ view, Libya’s case looked like 
an effort to undo the Security Council’s actions. Libya tried to portray itself 
as an aggrieved state that had been deprived of its rights under the 
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Montreal Convention and under general international law by the actions of 
the Security Council. And in so doing, it expected the Court to validate its 
case. The United States therefore objected that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain Libya’s claims. Undeniably, the Court had 
jurisdiction over a dispute involving the interpretation or application of the 
Montreal Convention, but Libya had not raised any valid claim under the 
said Convention.  
The United States considered the specific allegations Libya had submitted. 
Libya had alleged that the United States had violated five provisions of the 
Montreal Convention: Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(3), and 11. Libya basically 
contended that the Montreal Convention is the exclusive means by which 
one state may pursue criminal jurisdiction over a suspect located in another 
state, at least where the two states are signatories to the Convention. On 
this ground, Libya actually argued that the United States did not pursue 
criminal jurisdiction with respect to the two suspects in the Lockerbie 
incident through resort to the Montreal Convention.  Hence, Libya inferred 
that the United States had violated Libya’s rights under the Convention. On 
its part, the United States refused Libya’s underlying assumption that the 
Montreal Convention is the exclusive means for addressing acts of aircraft 
sabotage. It rather maintained that the Convention is just one of many 
international instruments designed to create various opportunities to bring 
accused terrorists to justice.  
And anyway, the Montreal Convention did not eliminate the United 
States’ right to promote - through peaceful, diplomatic means - Libya’s 
hand-over of people charged with a hideous crime. None of the provisions of 
the Montreal Convention actually identified by Libya prohibits, expressly or 
implicitly, a party from pursuing through peaceful, diplomatic means the 
surrender of an offender for trial. Thus, the fact that the United States had 
been pursuing opportunities outside the Convention in order to bring the 
alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing to justice could not be said to 
violate any rights Libya might enjoy under the Montreal Convention. Thus, 
 98
this did not seem to give rise to a dispute under Article 14 in order to found 
the Court’s jurisdiction in this case.  
The United States further contended that they had not violated any of the 
provisions relied upon by Libya in order to found the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Not Article 5(2), under which, the United States and Libya were obligated to 
take steps to ensure that their courts, respectively, had jurisdiction over 
persons covered by the Convention that were either in one country or the 
other. The United States had actually taken such steps. Libya claimed that 
it had also taken such steps, but then nothing gave rise to a dispute between 
the United States and Libya under Article 5(2). Article 5(3) does not impose 
any obligation on states but simply clarifies that the Convention does not 
exclude criminal jurisdiction that otherwise exists in contracting states. In 
the United States’ view, such provision was by no means violated, which 
gave no rise to any dispute whatsoever.  
Libya had also invoked Article 7 of the Convention, which obligates a 
contracting state to submit for prosecution an alleged offender found within 
its territory or to extradite him. In this respect, the United States was fully 
prepared to prosecute the alleged Libyan offenders, should they be 
surrendered to the United States for trial. Once again, Libya had not 
pointed to any action by the United States that could be regarded as 
violating Article 7. In the United States’ view, Article 8(3) was not 
applicable either. The latter actually required certain contracting states to 
recognize the offences set forth in the Convention as extraditable offences. 
Libya had stressed that it was not obligated to extradite the two suspects 
under Article 8(3) but the United States had never argued that Libya was 
required to do so under the said provision. The “prosecute or extradite” 
formula was designed to ensure that one of many possible fora would 
exercise authority to prosecute, but it did not establish a priority for doing 
so.  
In short, in the United States’ case, the only dispute between the United 
States and Libya seemed to concern the United States’ right to promote - 
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through diplomatic means - Libya’s hand-over of the two alleged 
perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing. The Montreal Convention does not 
deny any such right. The said right has actually nothing to do with profiles 
of interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention, and therefore 
was not properly brought before the International Court of Justice under 
Article 14 of the said Convention. In its pleadings, Libya also claimed that 
the United States had violated Article 11 of the Montreal Convention, which 
provides that contracting states shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings. Yet, Article 
11 does not specify the sort of assistance that needs being afforded. In this 
respect, the United States submitted that it had satisfied the general 
obligation imposed under Article 11 by transmitting to Libya copies of the 
indictment of the two Libyans, which provided detailed information 
regarding the facts underlying the charges and the United States laws that 
had been violated. The United States added, though, that Article 11 could 
not be viewed as obligating the United States to provide further information 
and disclose more evidence.  
Hence, the United States’ conclusion was that no dispute existed between 
the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Montreal 
Convention. On their part, the United States had simply sought to exercise 
its own national criminal jurisdiction without reference to the Montreal 
Convention, as Article 5(3) of the Convention makes clear it is permitted to 
do. Undeniably, the United States had criminal jurisdiction to prosecute the 
two Libyans involved in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
because of the nationality of the aircraft and the nationality of many of the 
victims of the onslaught. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the United 
States was certainly entitled to seek custody of the two alleged offenders. 
Hereby, the core issue in the Lockerbie case had nothing to do with Libya’s 
rights under the Montreal Convention. It rather concerned the right of the 
United States under general principles of international law to pursue a 
diplomatic initiative for the surrender of the suspects for trial. 
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 And obviously, the United States had the right, under the United Nations 
Charter, to bring situations, which might lead to international friction, to 
the attention of the Security Council and of the General Assembly pursuant 
to Article 35(1) of the United Nations Charter. The United States stressed 
the fact that their ability to seek surrender for trial was not affected by the 
Montreal Convention, which simply imposes an obligation on contracting 
states to surrender for trial or submit to national prosecution alleged 
offenders who are in their territory.  
The core of the United States’ case was that the Montreal Convention 
represents one important means to be used in the struggle against 
international aviation terrorism but not the only one. Libya’s antithetical 
theory, if correct, would preclude resort to other sources of law for 
addressing this problem, as well as preclude resort to international fora 
where the issue could as well be discussed, a result that not only sounded 
inconsistent with the language of the Montreal Convention, but also looked 
at variance with its fundamental object and purpose.  
Anyway, even if Libya had a valid claim under the Montreal Convention at 
the outset, any such claim had been superseded by the binding decisions of 
the Security Council. The latter were taken under Chapter VII of the 
Charter in response to Libya’s support for terrorism and its suspected 
involvement in the Pan Am 103 onslaught. The United States stressed that 
those resolutions were adopted by a proper majority of the Council and were 
legally binding on all members of the United Nations under the Charter. As 
such, they prevailed over any allegedly inconsistent obligations under the 
Montreal Convention. Therefore, in the United States’ view, the Court could 
accept Libya’s claims only if it was prepared to second-guess and overturn 
the Security Council decisions. Yet, the Court had no authority to overturn 
or modify the said decisions, and certainly had no authority to overturn the 
Council’s determination under Chapter VII that a threat to the peace had 
occurred, or its choice of measures to deal with that threat.  
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In any event, the Council’s decisions in the present case were clearly 
lawful and were abundantly justified by the circumstances. Therefore, the 
relief requested by Libya would be incompatible with the role of the Court, 
and in any event Libya had no standing to make such a request. 
Accordingly, Libya’s claims were labelled by the United States invalid and 
inadmissible.  What the Council did when adopting the above-mentioned 
resolutions was well within its powers under the Charter. And the Court, 
when faced with a challenge to Security Council decisions adopted under 
Chapter VII, can do nothing else but acknowledging the Council’s authority 
to adopt such decisions. Accordingly, the United States submitted that the 
Court should find Libya’s claims to be inadmissible or in any event should 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over them.  
The United States further contended that any judgment by the Court in 
favour of the rights asserted under the Montreal Convention could have no 
lawful effect on the rights and obligations of the parties in light of the 
Council’s binding decisions, and would, therefore, not be within the Court’s 
proper judicial function. Besides, the validity of Security Council actions can 
only be addressed in the context of a proper request for an advisory 
proceeding, not by way of a contentious proceeding between two states. The 
questions posed by Libya’s claims actually involved fundamental ones 
regarding the allocation of powers under the United Nations Charter. As 
such, they could not be viewed as incidental to the Court’s limited 
jurisdiction relating to the interpretation or application of the Montreal 
Convention. And certainly Libya lacked the capacity to contest the validity 
of the Council’s resolutions.  
Besides, Libya could not show that it had any legal right or interest 
infringed by the United States as the result of the Security Council’s 
adoption of those resolutions. Libya was legally bound to comply with the 
latter, rather, under Article 25 of the Charter. Thus, no claim of rights or 
obligations under the Montreal Convention could relieve Libya of its duty to 
carry out the Council’s decisions. The United States also addressed Libya’s 
 102
argument that the said resolutions went beyond the scope of the Council’s 
powers under the Charter. But then, the Charter gives the members of the 
Security Council the responsibility for determining which measures are 
required to maintain or restore international peace and security. Once the 
Council has made a decision under Chapter VII, an individual member of 
the United Nations cannot refuse to comply because it claims to disagree 
with the decision. The obligation to comply with Security Council decisions 
applies equally to decisions affecting the rights and to those affecting the 
obligations of states.  
The United States also stressed that Libya attempted to depict the 
Security Council’s actions as procedurally flawed. It actually contended that 
Article 33 of the Charter required the parties to a dispute to seek peaceful 
settlement through the various means listed in that Article. Only after such 
means are attempted and exhausted can the Security Council act. The 
United States argued that Libya’s reading of the Charter was unacceptably 
narrow. The Council adopted Resolutions 748 and 883 under Chapter VII. 
In so doing, the Council was acting to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Now, the Charter does not require in such a situation 
that the parties to the dispute work their way through the steps of Chapter 
VI before the Council can act. In the United States’ view, it would actually 
cripple the Council’s ability to carry out its Chapter VII responsibilities to 
protect peace and security if, each time it faced a threat to or breach of the 
peace, it had to wait for the parties to exhaust the means of peaceful 
settlement beforehand. Libya’s other claim was that the Council could only 
act on the basis of fully demonstrated facts, which was not the case as far as 
the Lockerbie affair was concerned. In this respect, the United States 
submitted that this is not what the Charter requires. Given its functions 
and powers, the Security Council must make vital decisions in evolving and 
complex disputes and often needs acting rapidly.  
Libya also complained that it was wrong for the United Kingdom and the 
United States to take part in the Council’s voting on these matters. Libya 
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contended that none of these countries should have voted when Resolution 
731 was unanimously adopted, and that doing so somehow invalidated 
Resolution 731 and the subsequent Chapter VII resolutions. But then, in the 
United States’ view, the attack on Resolution 731 inexorably failed. The 
language of Resolution 731 and the circumstances of its adoption showed 
that the Council sought to address a situation within Articles 34 and 35 of 
the Charter, not a dispute under Article 27(3).43 The Council was actually 
concerned by the broad problems of terrorism and of attacks on aircraft. 
Libya’s suspected involvement in aircraft sabotage was therefore addressed 
as part of a broader situation. In any case, Libya’s claim would not entail 
legal consequences, since questions regarding voting on Resolution 731 
could not affect the validity of the Council’s subsequent actions under 
Chapter VII. In adopting Resolutions 748 and 883, the Security Council had 
concluded that Libya’s alleged involvement in acts of terrorism inasmuch as 
its unsatisfactory responses constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. Besides, in the United States’ view, Libya’s complaint that the 
Security Council itself had acted unlawfully was not a claim under the 
Montreal Convention and could therefore not fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  
This left out Libya’s assertion that Resolution 748 was invalid and its 
request that the Court reviewed and overturned that decision. The United 
States’ stance in this respect was quite clear: should such second-guessing 
occur, the existing relationship between the Court and the Council would be 
dramatically altered, to the detriment of both institutions. If the Council’s 
decisions under Chapter VII concerning the existence of a threat to peace, 
and the measures to be adopted to deal with such a threat were subject to 
review and reversal by the Court, then the work of both the Court and the 
Council could be seriously compromised. The viability of the Council’s 
decisions under Chapter VII actually rests in very large part on their 
acceptance by states as binding decisions of the United Nations which must 
be promptly complied with. In particular, review of such decisions by the 
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Court could be expected to take years, during which period the validity and 
effectiveness of Council decisions would be crippled. In practice, the United 
States reached to the core of the relationship between the Court and the 
Security Council by highlighting that the decisions made by the Council 
under Chapter VII are essentially political in character and not reviewable 
pursuant to judicial standards.44 For all the above mentioned, the United 
States asked the International Court of Justice to dismiss the case at the 
preliminary stage.  
 
2.7 The World Court addresses Preliminary Objections 
It was not before 1998 that the International Court of Justice eventually 
addressed the Preliminary Objections filed by the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The Court adopted its ruling after hearing the parties’ 
presentations and Libya’s response. Its judgment was delivered on 27 
February 1998. In a nutshell, the United Kingdom and the United States 
had both contended that the Court did not entertain jurisdiction under 
Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention since no dispute between the 
parties had ever arisen under the said Convention. They also argued that, 
even if the Montreal Convention did confer on Libya the rights it claimed, 
those rights were superseded by Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883. 
The latter, by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter, 
had priority over all rights and obligations arising out of the Montreal 
Convention or any other treaty. The United Kingdom and the United States 
had therefore argued that the only dispute which existed from the very 
moment the said resolutions had been adopted was between Libya and the 
Security Council; quite obviously, this was not a dispute falling within the 
terms of Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention.  
They further contended that it was not for the Court to review the 
Council’s decisions. On this basis, the United Kingdom and the United 
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States maintained that the Court should exercise its power to declare that it 
lacked jurisdiction and that Libya’s application was however inadmissible. 
Both the United Kingdom and the United States sought to obtain from the 
Court a decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits, which would 
immediately terminate the proceedings. However, by requesting such a 
decision, the Court was requested to assess something more: on the 
one hand, it was requested to deliver a decision establishing that the rights 
claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention were incompatible with its 
obligations under the Security Council resolutions; on the other hand, it was 
requested to deliver a decision that those obligations prevailed over those 
rights by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter. This is what the 
decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits would actually postulate. 
Yet, the Court upheld Libya’s submission arguing that the only relevant 
date for determining whether it had jurisdiction or not was that of 
3 March 1992, that is to say the very date when Libya filed its application. 
In accordance with its jurisprudence,45 if the Court had jurisdiction on that 
date, it would continue to do so, no matter what happened afterwards. The 
Court actually assessed that the coming into being of Resolutions 748 and 
883 could not affect its jurisdiction, once established. In fact, the said 
resolutions could not affect the admissibility of the application either. Once 
again, the only relevant date was that of 3 March 1992. As to 
Resolution 731, adopted before the filing of the application, it could not form 
a legal impediment to the admissibility of Libya’s claim because it was a 
mere recommendation without binding effect. Consequently, the Court 
declared that Libya’s application could not be held inadmissible on these 
grounds, as both the United States and the United Kingdom had sought in 
their Preliminary Objections. Nor the line that there was no dispute 
between the parties was attenable.  
As already reported, both the United Kingdom and the United States had 
maintained that the destruction of Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie did not 
give rise to any dispute whatsoever between the parties regarding the 
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interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention, and that, for that 
reason, the Court did not entertain jurisdiction under the said Convention. 
Yet, the Court did not uphold the line of argument thus formulated and 
assumed that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article 14(1) of the Montreal 
Convention, on the lawfulness of the actions criticized by Libya, in so far as 
those actions would be at variance with the provisions of the said 
Convention. The parties actually differed on the question whether the 
destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie was ruled by the Montreal 
Convention or not. In the view of the Court, this embodied a proper 
dispute46 between the Parties as to the legal régime applicable to the event 
at issue. Such a dispute actually concerned the interpretation and 
application of the Montreal Convention and, in accordance with Article 14(1) 
of the Convention, fell to be decided by the Court. More precisely, the Court 
assessed that several disputes existed: first, on the Convention’s 
applicability to the Lockerbie case; secondly, on the alleged right of Libya 
itself to prosecute its nationals, according to Article 7 of the said 
Convention; thirdly, on the alleged lack of assistance by the respondents to 
the Libyan prosecution, in terms of Article 11 of the Convention.  
There remained the claim that the Security Council resolutions would 
have rendered the case without object and therefore the Court was required 
not to proceed in the merits. The Court rather determined that the 
argument that the decisions of the Security Council could not form the 
subject of any contentious proceedings before the Court would not preclude 
any consideration by the Court of the claims submitted by the applicant, for 
the very simple reason that Libya’s rights on the merits would not only be 
affected by a decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits but 
constituted, in many respects, the very subject matter of that decision. In 
fact the Court accepted Libya’s argument that the fact that the Council’s 
resolutions had rendered the case without object was not exclusively 
preliminary in character. Thus, the Court assessed that it would consider it 
at a different stage of the proceedings pertaining to the merits of the case. 
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Libya had actually argued that the above-mentioned objection entailed the 
pivotal question pertaining to the possibility of judicial review over the 
political organ’s decisions.  
Thus, the Court rejected the Preliminary Objections to its jurisdiction and 
the admissibility of Libya’s application as set forth by the United Kingdom 
and the United States and found that it had jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 
14(1) of the Montreal Convention, to hear disputes pertaining to the 
interpretation or application of the said Convention. It then found Libya’s 
application admissible. The Court therefore upheld its jurisdiction and 
deemed the relationship between the Montreal Convention and the 
Council’s resolutions as a matter which utterly fell within its jurisdiction. In 
so doing, it therefore interpreted its jurisdiction broadly, as to encompass 
not only the rights and duties of the parties pursuant to the Montreal 
Convention, but also the relationship between the Convention and 
subsequent Security Council’s resolutions. Once again, the International 
Court of Justice held that the determinations of the Council were no bar to 
its jurisdiction.47 The simple fact that the Council was a political organ per 
se did not entail a limitation of the Court’s power. Though cautiously, the 
Court kept assessing its power inasmuch as it had done in its Order of 14 
October 1992 rejecting Libya’s request for interim protection. At the 
preliminary stage, the Court therefore assessed that it entertained 
jurisdiction and that the Council’s action could fall under the Court’s 
scrutiny if a case was properly brought before the Court. This actually 
seemed to be the case in Lockerbie. 
 
 
2.8 The Court  and the Council within the U.N. system 
 
Hence, the Court refused to hold the view taken by the United Kingdom 
and the United States that no judicial scrutiny was allowed over the 
political organs’ acts. The Court’s stance sounds reasonable. In most states’ 
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legal systems, a mechanism of judicial review resolves disputes about the 
scope of legislative acts and underlies a philosophy of checks and balances 
that should enlighten the relation between the highest institutions, which 
are in charge of the state’s powers. In the United Nations system, the fact 
that Article 92 of the Charter labels the International Court of Justice as 
the  “principal judicial organ” seems to vest it with a power of judicial 
review. Nonetheless, the Charter does not explicitly authorize its principal 
judicial organ to review the validity of acts by other branches of the United 
Nations. Quid iuris, then, if the Court has to deal with a Council’s decision 
which is not consistent, for some reasons, with the Charter? Is the Court 
entitled to declare a Council’s decision illegal in a specific case?  
Judicial review of a Council’s action by the Court, in the sense of the Court 
expressly declaring a Council’s decision to be beyond the Council’s powers, 
would be very far-reaching. In fact, it would be a declaration as to how far 
the Security Council can go, in taking action for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In a sense, the legal constraints would be 
opposed to the political aims, in the exercise of power by the Council. 
Obviously, the possibility of judicial review would imply acceptance of 
certain higher norms and values, which the international system should 
recognise as constraining international institutional action. Possibility of 
judicial review by the Court would indicate an institutional mechanism 
through which aggrieved states can obtain an objective determination of 
when those values and norms are threatened by the main organ that the 
international community has entrusted with maintaining peace. Thus, 
judicial review would turn out to be crucial to a United Nations system that 
strives for universal adherence to agreed principles of international law. 
Can those principles shape the reasons of politics, though?   
The Lockerbie case actually raised the question whether the United 
Nations Charter and the World Court’s Statute support any form of judicial 
review over political decisions adopted by the Security Council.48 In a way, 
the core of the issue is whether law can limit politics and if there are legal 
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standards that have to drive political actions. Should the Court rule in 
favour of Libya’s application, it would actually outlaw the Council’s 
resolutions. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Charter empowers the 
Security Council to make decisions which are binding on all states. Article 
24(2) specifies that this power is limited by the “purposes and principles of 
the United Nations,” which certainly do include compliance with 
international law. Yet, it does not clarify whether the International Court of 
Justice can review Council’s decisions for conformity to these “purposes and 
principles.”  
However, Chapter VI, which contemplates recommendations (as opposed 
to binding decisions) by the Council and the Assembly for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, does envision some role for the Court. Actually, 
Article 36(3) provides that, in making recommendations, the Security 
Council “should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a 
general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice 
in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.” The said 
provision, however, falls far short of an explicit power of judicial review over 
Security Council and General Assembly recommendations for peaceful 
settlement of disputes. It mainly points out the fact that the Security 
Council and the Court should deal with different issues, the former being a 
political organ and the latter a judicial one. Chapter VII, which empowers 
the Security Council to either make recommendations or decide on measures 
necessary to maintain peace and security, says nothing about any role for 
the Court in reviewing Council’s resolutions. Indeed, it does not mention the 
International Court of Justice at all. 
The only part of the United Nations Charter that deals with the Court in 
any detail is Chapter XIV, entitled the “International Court of Justice,”49 
but once again no provision whatsoever addresses judicial review. Thus, the 
fact that the International Court of Justice is considered the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations simply does not resolve the issue one 
way or another.50 In sum, neither the Charter nor the Court’s Statute 
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clearly indicate whether the Court has the power of judicial review and 
certainly do not indicate how thorough such review might be. Thus, it might 
be inferred that the Court lacks any power of judicial review. Equally, 
however, there is nothing that expressly prohibits such review. In this 
perspective, Libya’s application was rather challenging. It was actually the 
first time ever that a state had requested the Court to rule against the 
Security Council. Yet, Libya did not challenge the United Nations’ political 
organ par excellence directly. It rather sued the United Kingdom and the 
United States. And this turned out to be an element of weakness in Libya’s 
case. 
 However, it is undeniable that the Court’s jurisdiction extends to any 
question of international law, while its advisory jurisdiction covers any legal 
question. It is clear from Article 36 of the Court’s Statute that the Court is 
empowered to consider any question of international law, in so far as it has 
jurisdiction to decide the case before it. Thus, if there are questions in law 
as to the competence of the Security Council to act in a particular manner, 
or as to its competence to affect the rights of a state in a particular case, 
those questions are not excluded from the legitimate consideration of the 
Court, when occasions arise to determine what those rights are. And this 
was actually the stance that the Court took in Lockerbie, at the preliminary 
stage.  
Quite obviously, the legitimacy of the Council’s resolutions turns out to be 
a fundamental issue. Actually, the applicant state might argue that the 
Council’s resolutions are outside its powers and not in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter, which would make Article 103, 
according to which the Charter always prevails on treaties, inapplicable. 
This was actually one of the issues at stake in the Lockerbie case and 
obviously one of remarkable sensitivity. The discussion of limitations on the 
Security Council’s ability to intervene, of the possible invalidity of Security 
Council’s resolutions, and of judicial review, reaches to the very core of the 
functioning of the United Nations system: the obligations of member states 
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to comply with Security Council’s resolutions under Article 25 of the 
Charter. If the Court deems that compliance with a Security Council’s 
resolution violates international law, such a decision may invite or oblige 
non-compliance. Of course, it may be argued that any behaviour sanctioned 
by a Security Council resolution enjoys a presumption of legality and this 
was the way the Court ruled when rejecting Libya’s request for interim 
protection. It actually presumed the Council’s decisions to be intra vires. 
Yet, this presumption should not prevent a member state from invoking the 
manifest illegality of a resolution and concurrently the Court to be able to 
charge the Security Council with having abused its power in a manner 
sufficiently gross and evident to defeat the obligation of obedience mandated 
under Article 25.  
Hereby, the question that arises is whether the Council is competent to 
affect the rights of a state in the way that it has sought to do in the 
Lockerbie case. This is a pivotal question of international law, the answer to 
which may be determinative of the rights of a state in any particular case 
before the Court. Thus, it seems very important to determine whether the 
Security Council is subject to international law, as Libya tried to submit. In 
fact, the question proves broader and involves a wider issue: whether 
international politics and the action of political bodies within the United 
Nations system are bound by international law. If this is the case, questions 
about the validity of the Council’s decisions are clearly legal questions and 
accordingly subject to review, provided that the other requirements of the 
World Court’s Statute are satisfied. If this is the case, Libya’s case does not 
look that far-reaching any more. It was in Libya’s own right to seize the 
Court and also to implicitly challenge the Security Council’s policy as 
subsequent to Pan Am 103 bombing.  
Speculating about the legitimacy of the course of action taken by the 
Security Council in the Lockerbie case makes it necessary to identify the 
scope of the Council’s power within the United Nations framework. The 
purposes of the United Nations, as set out in Article 1 of the Charter,51 are 
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to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations 
among nations, achieve international cooperation in solving problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, in promoting human 
rights, and in being a centre for harmonising the actions of states in 
attaining these ends. Of these many purposes, which are certainly 
interrelated, the maintenance of international peace and security occupies a 
pivotal place. As a matter of fact, peaceful settlement may be achieved 
through litigation inasmuch as through political tools. This is certainly a 
pivotal role for the Security Council, as set out by Chapter VI of the 
Charter, which is wholly concerned with the pacific settlement of disputes.  
Under Article 34 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may 
investigate “any dispute or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute,” while consultations through bilateral 
arrangements or regional institutions provide a way of avoiding disputes 
which do not need to reach the judicial stage. The specialised role of the 
Security Council receives further emphasis in Article 33(1), which provides 
that the parties to a dispute shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation 
or some other peaceful means of their own choice, and Article 52(2), which 
provides that members of regional arrangements or agencies “shall make 
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes” through such 
arrangements or agencies, before referring them to the Security Council. In 
a sense, just disputes which have become “serious” are the subject matter of 
the Council’s concern. However, it is worth noting that, despite these 
priorities, the Council has the right to recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment - under Article 36(1)- at any time.52  
Furthermore, the Council can consider a matter at the request of the 
General Assembly, a member state or the Secretary-General, whether or not 
the states involved consent to its doing so. The Council’s authority to 
consider a dispute, unlike that of the International Court of Justice, does 
not depend on the consent of the state concerned. Actually, the Security 
Council, on its own initiative, may investigate any dispute or situation that 
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might lead to international friction, or give rise to a dispute, to determine 
whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Besides, Article 35(1) of the Charter 
enables any member of the United Nations, not only the parties to the 
dispute concerned, to bring to the Council’s attention any dispute or 
situation referred to in Article 34. It seems noteworthy that, in deciding 
whether it should take a matter up, the Council is free to adopt a broader 
conception of an international dispute than might be acceptable in a judicial 
forum. When this is combined with the authority under Article 34 to act in 
“any situation which might lead to international friction,” as well as in 
disputes, it can be seen that the Council’s jurisdiction can be extended to 
virtually all matters of international competence. 
Finally, if the provisions of Chapter VII are read alongside those of 
Chapter VI, it is evident that a dispute or situation which leads to an actual 
“threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,” activates the 
provisions of the Charter concerned with political and military sanctions. As 
a result, the Council’s authority in the field of dispute settlement, unlike 
that of the International Court of Justice, is complemented by powers of 
enforcement in the very circumstances in which they are most likely to be 
needed. This makes the Council’s potential particularly significant and its 
action more likely to achieve the ends it is designed for. Thus, the 
involvement of the Security Council is the most relevant way of achieving a 
possible settlement at a political level, whenever an international crisis 
occurs.  
This is why the United States and the United Kingdom looked for the 
Council’s support and involved the United Nations. And then they were able 
to claim that even though they had proposed drafts, it was the Security 
Council, as a collective body, that had adopted the resolutions applying 
sanctions. In so doing, the Council had actually addressed an issue that 
reached beyond Pan Am flight 103 downing and pertained to Libya 
sponsoring international terrorism. Thus, the United Kingdom and the 
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United States maintained that they did not carry any specific responsibility 
whatsoever. Indeed, when they had started applying economic and 
diplomatic sanctions and tightening the noose around Libya, all they were 
doing was “just” complying with the Council’s resolutions,53 as all United 
Nations member states are bound to do under Article 25 of the Charter. Yet, 
the question remained whether what the Council had decided might be 
reviewed and possibly quashed by the judicial organ or if the Council’s say 
was to be final and undisputable.  
 
 
2.9 The International Court of Justice and judicial review 
 
Both the United Kingdom and the United States maintained that the 
political organ should deal with political matters and the International 
Court of Justice with legal ones, their respective jurisdiction being different 
and separated. The Court’s function is to decide disputes in accordance with 
international law54 and its proceedings are legal ones, whereas the Security 
Council does not need to apply international law in recommending “such 
terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate;”55 and certainly it is not 
bound by judicial proceedings. Yet, drawing a line between what is political 
and what is legal may turn out to be extremely difficult, if ever possible.56 
As a matter of fact, most international disputes are complex and 
multifaceted. Thus, they do often raise both political and legal issues. That 
is why the International Court and the Security Council may well face 
problems of overlapping jurisdictions.  
Therefore, it is important to assess whether, when a case is properly 
before the Court, the latter may exercise judicial control by holding the 
action of the Security Council to be illegitimate. This is what Libya expected 
the International Court of Justice to do, in the Lockerbie case. It is also 
important to assess whether the Court’s competence is affected, if the 
Council is dealing or has already dealt with a given dispute. The Court 
 115
certainly has jurisdiction only with respect to disputes that are legal in 
nature. Moreover, in exercising its advisory function, as well as in deciding 
contentious cases, the Court has to deal only with the legal questions 
actually put before it and may not, without necessity, express its views on 
wider issues. The function of the International Court of Justice, like that of 
other judicial bodies, is not to prevent disagreements from escalating, nor to 
alleviate situations of on-going tension, but to intervene only when called 
upon to resolve a particular crisis in the parties’ relations, which may be 
deemed legal in nature. Thus, whenever international disputes do not raise 
legal issues, they do lie outside the Court’s formal competence.  
In the Lockerbie case, Libya raised an issue that it deemed legal in nature. 
As a matter of fact, it called for the Court to interpret the scope of the 
Montreal Convention and ascertain Libya’s rights thereunder. The 
respondents, on the other hand, considered the dispute to be political in 
nature and assumed that the Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever. As 
already reported, the core question was whether there are any legal limits to 
the power of the Security Council, especially when it is acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, as it explicitly did when adopting Resolutions 
748 and 883. The key, then, is to distinguish determinations calling for 
political appreciation from those involving legal standards. For Libya, the 
issue before the Security Council was a purely legal dispute arising over a 
conflict of jurisdiction and a request for extradition. The United Kingdom 
and the United States instead contended that, if indeed there was a dispute, 
it could not be reduced to a legal dispute involving a bilateral question of 
treaty interpretation. On the contrary, it was a fundamental political 
controversy over terrorism and hence it raised a multilateral problem 
involving the maintenance of peace.57 The United Kingdom and the United 
States argued that a decision by the Council under Article 39 that a 
situation constitutes “a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression” is not reviewable and that the same holds true of a decision as 
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to whether a certain measure is likely or necessary to restore or maintain 
peace.  
As a matter of mere common sense, though, there must certainly be some 
legal limits to the power of the Security Council, even in the area of 
maintaining international peace and security. Actually, the Security Council 
is not a sovereign authority. The Security Council is an organ of limited 
membership and the members of the United Nations through the Charter 
confer its powers on it.58 Yet, for the Court to be able to cast doubt on the 
validity of Council’s decisions, there must be legal standards that the Court 
can apply. The United States and the United Kingdom maintained that the 
limits that bind the Security Council’s action are political in nature. It 
would actually be detrimental if the Council were bound by legal standards. 
Nonetheless, it seems unconceivable that the Council is not bound to legal 
limits, although identifying such limits is not an easy task. Chapter VII of 
the Charter confers very broad powers on the Council. Article 39 gives the 
Council the discretion to make determinations as to whether an act or 
situation constitutes a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. Once that determination is made, the door is then open to the 
Council to take decisions, for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security. However, the Charter seems to support 
the contention that the power of the Security Council is not unlimited.  
As already recalled, the main limitation on the powers of the Security 
Council is the duty to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations Charter. Nonetheless, the purposes of the United 
Nations are very broad goals that the organization is set up to achieve and 
the principles to be observed in achieving those goals are, for the most part, 
directed at the conduct of member states and not the Organisation. 
Nevertheless, there are specific limitations in the provisions of Articles 1 
and 2 of the Charter that circumscribe the powers of the whole Organisation 
and the Security Council’s powers are no exception.  
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The first possible limit on the power of the Council under these provisions 
is a duty on the part of the Council not to violate general international law, 
unless the Charter specifically allows it do so. Article 1(1) of the Charter 
provides, as one of the purposes of the United Nations, that international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, may be 
settled or adjusted in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law. The contention, then, is that, in exercising its 
responsibilities, the Security Council is bound to act in accordance with 
international law and may not disregard or derogate from it, unless the 
Charter specifically allows it to do so. Actually, it would be unacceptable 
that sovereign states had set up an organization equipped with broad power 
of control and sanction over themselves, being it exempted from the duty to 
comply with the Charter through which it was created and to respect 
international law.  
Yet, it might be argued that the Security Council is capable of affecting the 
rights of the states under international law when it is acting under Chapter 
VII, because Article 103 of the Charter provides that, when the obligations 
of member states under the Charter are in conflict with a treaty, the 
Charter obligation is to prevail. This was actually the case in Lockerbie, 
where any possible rights Libya could have claimed under the Montreal 
Convention seemed to be trumped by its duty to comply with the Council’s 
resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, the pivotal question for 
consideration that arose in the Lockerbie case was whether the Court might 
second-guess the decision of the Security Council under Article 39, that a 
particular situation constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression. This is the determination that opens the way to the 
Council’s power under Chapter VII. In the Lockerbie case, Chapter VII was 
actually invoked as the very basis of Resolution 748 and 883.  
The United Kingdom and the United States maintained that the 
determination under Article 39 is one entirely within the discretion of the 
Council. The philosophy behind the said stance is that the Charter gives the 
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discretion to make the determination of the existence of a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression to the Security Council 
and that no one else is allowed to second-guess the Council’s understanding 
of a certain situation. It can be contended that the question whether a 
certain state of affairs is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act 
of aggression cannot be answered by recourse to legal reasoning, as there 
are no legal standards by which to reach such decision. The latter inevitably 
entails a political decision as to factual matters and apparently is in no way 
constrained by legal considerations. 
 Nonetheless, the Security Council is bound to the observance of jus cogens 
norms. These norms are peremptory norms of international law and by 
definition they cannot be derogated from. They are overriding norms of the 
international legal order and they supersede all other norms. Any Security 
Council’s decision in conflict with a norm of jus cogens is necessarily to be 
without effect.59 Thus, the powers of the Security Council are not to be 
deemed unlimited in legal terms. The question that arises is exploring what 
might happen, should the Council exceed its powers. As a matter of fact, to 
say that there are limitations on the power of the Council does not 
necessarily entail that the question whether those limits have been 
exceeded can be judicially determined. This was a crucial issue in the 
Lockerbie case. Had the Council exceeded its inherent limits, was the 
International Court of Justice entitled to check it? And how?  
 The problem is then considering the effects of the Court’s possible 
assessment of invalidity of the Council’s decisions. Is an invalidated act void 
ab initio - as though it had never been passed - or instead it does not 
produce effects for the parties to that suit, but no one else is bound? In other 
words: should the international community accept a doctrine of judicial 
supremacy under which the holdings of the Court are binding on all other 
organs of the United Nations in all future cases? Or should it accept a 
doctrine of concurrent review, that no organ of the United Nations has the 
final say on the interpretation of the Charter and that a decision of the 
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Court must be respected in the case that it resolves, but not necessarily in 
future cases? Advisory opinions are of course advisory only, and do not have 
binding effects. Therefore, any determination in an advisory opinion that a 
Security Council decision is ultra vires and invalid would not be binding 
neither on the organ concerned nor on states. Such a decision in a 
contentious case, however, raises an important issue. Actually, Article 59 of 
the Statute of the World Court states that the decision of the Court in any 
particular case has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case. The effect of this provision is to remove the 
possibility that any decision of the Court declaring that a Security Council’s 
resolution or action is invalid would be binding on the Security Council or 
even on states that are not parties to the litigation and cripple the political 
organ’s action.  
Finally, it also seems noteworthy that the importance of any Court’s 
assessment declaring a Security Council’s decision to be ultra vires would 
not lie only in its legal effect. The most important effect of any such decision 
would be the fact that it would undermine the legitimacy of the Council’s 
course of action. Any state seeking such a decision would probably be more 
interested in the “public relations effect” of the decision of the Court than in 
its legal effect. Such a state would be using the Court to mobilise world 
opinion in support of its cause. A decision of the Court that a certain 
resolution or decision of the Security Council is invalid or beyond its powers 
would undermine the legitimacy of that decision and weaken its claim to 
compliance. Any decision of the Court, be it in a contentious case or in an 
advisory opinion that a Security Council’s decision is illegal, would 
encourage unwilling states not to comply with such resolution and would 
serve the cause of strengthening disrespect for the resolution. This is the 
effect that a state or organ seeking a pronouncement on the illegality of a 
decision might want to achieve. This was certainly the aim Libya was 
pursuing by activating the Court’s power and claiming for provisional 
measures. If the Security Council’s course of action were labelled as invalid 
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or illegal, no state would be bound to apply mandatory sanctions against 
Libya in order to comply with the Council’s resolutions. And the world’s 
support for the aggrieved state would increase. 
 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
Hence, in the Lockerbie case, the International Court of Justice extended 
its jurisdiction pertaining to the interpretation or application of a specific 
multilateral instrument such as the Montreal Convention to far-reaching 
and fundamental questions of general international law and United Nations 
Charter law.  In so doing, the Court did not avoid the question of the 
primacy of the Security Council resolutions over the Montreal Convention. 
Despite the Court’s apparent acceptance of the binding force of Resolution 
748, the Court actually held that, at the merits stage, it might question its 
validity. This means that the Court did not regard itself as precluded from 
questioning the validity of a Council resolution in so far as it affects the 
legal rights of states.  
Nonetheless, many interpreted the Court’s attitude as too deferential and 
inferred that the reasons of law had been totally overwhelmed by politics. In 
a way, it was argued that the only superpower in the United Nations 
framework was the Security Council and even though no hierarchy between 
the political organ and the judicial organ was established anywhere in the 
Charter, yet, the Court had played an ancillary role and simply ratified the 
political organ’s course of action. True, the Security Council is a political 
organ and adopts political decisions, as both the United Kingdom and the 
United States kept stressing in order to prove their case and exclude any 
power of judicial review over the Council’s action. But this does not entail 
that the Council can dispose of questions of legal rights with any finality. 
The fact that the Council is a political organ leads rather to the opposite 
conclusion.  
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At the very core of the case brought by Libya before the International 
Court of Justice there was a matter of extradition. The United Kingdom and 
the United States did not trust Libya’s investigations and feared sham 
trials. Thus, they insisted on extradition in order to exercise their own 
jurisdiction on the alleged perpetrators of Pan Am 103 bombing. The 
Security Council supported their stance and, without denying Libya’s 
sovereign rights, it accepted that Libya could not be relied upon for the very 
simple reason that the two alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing 
were supposed to be officials of the Libyan Government. The general 
principle – nemo judex in causa sua  – makes a country unable to judge its 
own citizens when they are supposed to be governmental officials, since 
nobody can be a party and a judge in the same trial.  
The Security Council therefore upheld the stance taken by the United 
Kingdom and the United States and supported their request of extradition, 
acknowledging their right of trying the suspects instead of Libya, the former 
on the basis of the principle of territoriality and the latter on the basis of the 
principle of passive personality. The United Kingdom was actually the 
country were the alleged crime was perpetrated and the United States was 
the country where the aircraft was registered inasmuch as the national 
state for most of the victims. Thus, it made sense that the alleged 
perpetrators of the bombing were tried within their national jurisdictions. 
The Council therefore took a legal stance as far as extradition was 
concerned. Hence, the issues that the Security Council addressed in 
adopting its resolutions cannot be considered utterly political in nature.  
This is why Libya’s claim that its dispute with the United Kingdom and 
the United States was a legal one does not sound groundless at all. Of 
course, it was also political in nature. But not only that. Where the Council 
decides under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter that Chapter VII 
applies, and in addition decides that a certain state has to accept 
responsibility for an onslaught and pay compensation, such finding is not 
simply a matter of political judgment. It is a finding based upon an 
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assessment of the facts and the application of a norm of international law, 
based on the said assessment of the facts. The same holds true when the 
Security Council decides that member states must apply economic sanctions 
against another member state. The obligation to apply sanctions arises 
because a certain state has done something that the Council condemns and 
deems unlawful. Such a finding is a finding of fact and law and can hardly 
be deemed a political decision.  
Undeniably, it is not that easy to draw a clear-cut line between what is 
legal and what is political since the two do not necessarily form an 
antithetical pair. Questions of legality can actually arise about political 
decisions and this was pretty much the case in Lockerbie. The Court, when 
rejecting Libya’s claim for interim protection, simply presumed the legality 
of the Council’s political decisions, but this does not mean that the Court 
gave undue deference to the determinations of the Council. The Court 
rather started with a presumption that the Council’s decisions were valid, 
but this means only that the burden of proof was on Libya, since the latter 
was seeking to show that the Council had acted beyond its powers. In fact, 
Libya could have further proved its case when the proceedings reached the 
merits stage. Was the Court’s attitude too cautious, then? 
If one accepts that it is for the Court to evaluate whether or not the 
Council is competent to take the action it did and whether it was able to 
affect the rights of the state concerned in the way that it had sought to do, 
this would lead to far-reaching, yet remarkable consequences. Actually, a 
decision taken in violation of the Charter should not be held to be binding. 
States have certainly agreed to undertake the Council’s decisions under 
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter but it is quite reasonable to 
assume that this is true as long as those decisions are in conformity with 
the Charter. It is actually difficult to contend that member states have 
accepted, in advance, whatever decisions the Council might make, and 
therefore exclude the very possibility that the Council may act ultra vires.. 
It needs therefore being inferred that the Council’s decisions are binding 
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only in so far as they are in accordance with the Charter. They may specify 
the obligations of members that arise from the Charter, but they may not 
set out totally new obligations that have no basis in the Charter. The 
Council is not a legislative organ, after all. Besides, there cannot be two 
different legalities, a subjective one for the Security Council and an objective 
one for judicial determination. This might threaten the coherence of the 
United Nations system as a whole.  
On the other hand, unbalanced mobilization of judicial review for 
constitutional restraints threatens to affect the authority of the Security 
Council, which may turn out to cripple the whole system. Desirable 
Council’s action may be irreparably delayed while the target state 
challenges the lawfulness of that action. If the Court is allowed to second-
guess the Council’s resolutions, as it assumed it was in Lockerbie, this 
would bring about quite a number of problems. The conclusion on the 
voidability of the political organ’s resolutions meets the objection that the 
effectiveness of the Security Council’s action should not be undermined by 
having its decisions, which might be effective immediately on adoption, 
become void ab initio. This consideration seems to be particularly important 
with regard to the operation of collective security measures, in view of the 
urgency of the situations that trigger them and the initial need for certainty 
to assure their implementation. Where, for example, the Security Council 
authorizes states to use force to urgently tackle humanitarian disasters, it 
does not seem wise to encourage judicial review, which might take a while. 
Thus, there are sound policy reasons for judicial restraint.  
The Court should interfere with the Security Council’s discretion only 
when the latter clearly abuses it. Judicial review should be possible but 
subject to severe restraints. Hence, the debate shifts from whether the 
Court can exercise judicial review to how much. This means that the 
International Court of Justice should rather exercise judicial review in 
respect of the kind of measures adopted by the Security Council to restore 
international peace. Here, the Court may certainly examine considerations 
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of proportionality and infer that the measures taken are disproportionate to 
the goals to be achieved. However, there should be no inherent conflict 
between litigation and action by the political organs of the United Nations. 
Legal and political means of settling disputes should be complementary and 
the exercise of its institutional function by the Court should not hinder the 
Council’s institutional function. At the same way, the Council’s action 
should be no bar to the Court’s jurisdiction. Yet, the Court should be able to 
decide that some measures are not open to the Council because they are 
likely to transgress basic principles of international law, or are otherwise 
beyond its powers. The Security Council’s action is not unlimited and also 
when it acts under Chapter VII, it is supposed to be consistent with 
international law.  
It should therefore be for the Court to play a dual role: through a process 
of interpretation and some forms of review of Council’s resolutions, the 
Court should be able to act as a restraining factor in tracing the limits of 
Security Council’s action in terms of both the Charter and international law. 
Besides, the Court should be able to exercise its independent judicial 
function in disputes involving the responsibility of states for breaches of 
fundamental obligations considered by the Security Council to constitute a 
threat to or breach of the peace. This obviously also entails limits for the 
Court. As Pieter Bekker suggested, “ the Court cannot deny its role within 
the constitutional system of the United Nations and cannot, therefore, 
operate in complete isolation.” Thus, “the relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council will remain a delicate one and it will depend on the 
composition of the Court and especially its presidency how the Court deals 
with this relationship.”60 Thus, the Court’s activity is limited too.  
As Professor John Noyes put it, the International Court of Justice has to 
deal “with both Charter and political limitations on its power. These factors 
limit what the Court can do.” Yet, “the great need is for the Council to 
exercise restraint itself, especially when it has the possibility of taking on 
quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative roles. Perhaps the Court can help to signal 
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the Council about the need for such self-restraint.”61 Thus, the Court should 
have the power to declare decisions of the Security Council to be invalid but 
the fact that the limitations on the powers of the Council are not far-
reaching would limit the scope of possible review. This, of course, imposes a 
serious constraint on the exercise of this power by the Court and indicates 
that even if the Court chooses to exercise its power of judicial review, a flood 
of such cases is quite unlikely. 
 Besides, it does not seem that the Court should enter into question 
matters of political judgment. In particular, it would be wrong to allow the 
Court to question a Council’s judgment that a Chapter VII situation – a 
threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression– either had, or had not, 
occurred. Nor should the Court second-guess the Council’s decision over the 
choice of means to deal with situations, whether to order provisional 
measures under Article 40, or economic sanctions under Article 41, or to 
institute measures of peacekeeping, for example. The same holds true with 
respect to decisions as to the timing of, or participation in, such measures. 
But the allocation of legal responsibility to a particular state is a different 
matter. In so far as the Court is called upon to apply or not to apply or even 
to consider the applicability or consequences of a Security Council’s 
resolution, it may have to check in order to see whether the resolution is 
valid. It may also have to ensure that the Council has not exceeded its 
powers in passing such resolution or deciding on a course of action. The 
Court’s function in contentious cases is to decide the legal rights and 
responsibility of states and, in so far as a Security Council’s resolution 
appears to have an impact or even determine those rights or 
responsibilities, it must be the Court’s function to determine whether those 
resolutions or decisions validly operates to do so. 
Thus, the course of action the International Court of Justice took in 
Lockerbie seems to be reasonable and cautious enough. The use of the 
presumption of validity of the decisions of the Security Council allowed the 
Court to defer in some respect to the Council, while, at the same time, not 
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detracting from the judicial function of the Court in deciding the legal issues 
brought before it. In so doing, the Court could assess the Court’s power of 
judicial review and infer that the reference of a dispute to the Security 
Council is no bar to the consideration of the same matter by the Court. So 
far, the case brought by Libya before the International Court of Justice 
proved absolutely noteworthy and reached beyond the inherent justice of the 
Lockerbie case. Yet, as far as the latter was concerned, it still looked pretty 
nebulous and far from being achieved. In fact, also the legitimacy of the 
Council’s resolutions had not been assessed hitherto but just presumed and 
put off for further scrutiny at the merits stage. The question of extradition 
remained.  
The Council’s resolutions requiring Libya to surrender the two alleged 
perpetrators for trial either in the United Kingdom or the United States 
were still there, deploying their binding effect. Libya kept refusing to 
surrender the two Libyan nationals and to avenge the right of trying them 
itself. The only overture towards a possible compromise relied upon Libya 
suggesting that it could consider the possibility of handing the suspects over 
to a third and neutral country rather than the United Kingdom or the 
United States. This sounded reasonable enough. The United Kingdom and 
the United States did not trust Libya’s jurisdiction whereas Libya did not 
trust theirs. What applies to one country should apply to the others if the 
principle –nemo judex in causa sua - is to be considered a general principle. 
Thus, if nobody can be a judge and a party to the same trial, which applied 
to Libya, this should also apply to the United States and the United 
Kingdom that should not be justices and victims at the same time. Thus, 
Libya’s proposal of a trial to be held in a neutral country seemed reasonable 
and was to prove the only way to overcome the long-lasting impasse into 
which the confrontation between Libya and its counterparts had led. In this 
sense, it was time for Libya to capitalize on the Court’s ruling and insist for 
a trial to be held elsewhere.  
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Notes 
 
1 Case no. 1475/99. Facts and data about Pan Am 103 bombing may be found in a 
number of scholar and academic writings. However, having they been assessed by the 
Court which was in charge with the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators, it seems 
reasonable to stick to the version the Court was satisfied with and on to which it 
founded its judgment. The whole trial and its outcome are to be further investigated. See 
infra, chapter 3.  
 
2 Not everybody agrees that there was enough evidence to support the account of facts as 
it was set out in the judgment delivered at Camp Zeist. Besides, there have been a 
number of unofficial investigations that have led to very different versions of the 
Lockerbie affair. It is to be reported that Syria and Iran were also suspected at the 
beginning but then they were totally discharged. Ex multis, see Ashton, J. and 
Ferguson, I., “Cover-up of convenience,” Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd., 
Edinburgh, 2002.  The said authors also say that the Lockerbie bombing might be 
connected to drug trafficking and in particular to CIA protected drug-running operations 
that the bombers had actually exploited to reach their ends. For a very detailed report of 
the initial investigations and the dead ends where they often led, see Leppard, D., “On 
the trail of terror,” Jonathan Cape, London, 1991.  
 
3 Major outrages seldom occur in a political vacuum and are generally related to prior 
political events and possible other grievances. Often, crazed violence is the outcome of 
some thirst of vengeance. And thirst of vengeance is related to something else. This does 
not mean excusing or justifying terrorist acts but just trying to put them into a context. 
It seems of some interest, then, to recall some events that might have paved the way for 
the Pan Am disaster. On 27 December 1985, there were terrorist attacks at Rome and 
Vienna airports; nineteen people were killed, including five Americans. Libya was 
supposed to be behind those episodes and the United States decided to strike back. On 
14 March 1986, three American carrier battle groups assembled off the Libyan coast. On 
March 23, a huge American armada appeared in the same area. The Libyans launched 
missiles that missed the targets and the Americans responded, by launching more 
missiles and sinking at least two Libyan patrol boats. Seventy-two Libyans had been 
killed whereas no American casualties were reported. On 26 March, the American 
operation was over. A few days later, something else made international tension shoot 
up. On 5 April 1986, a bomb exploded in La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, a place 
frequented by American servicemen: this explosion killed three and injured 230 others. 
The United States administration claimed that the interception of coded messages 
proved Libyan involvement in the atrocity. Once again, the United States was 
immediately ready to strike back. On 15 April 1986, an American aircraft bombed 
Tripoli and Benghazi, causing numerous casualties. Colonel Gaddafi’s wife and three of 
his children were also injured. Another child of his was killed. In two years time, 
another episode worsened the international scenario. On 3 July 1988, a United States 
guided missile cruiser mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner on a regular flight over 
the Gulf, so to kill all 286 people on board. On those events, see Simons, G., “Libya: the 
struggle for survival,” St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, pp. 5-8, 331-337. See also 
Matar, K.I. and Thabit, R.W.,  “Lockerbie and Libya. A study in international relations,” 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2004, pp. 54-63.  
 
4 The indictment was set up by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. It lists the alleged chronology of the events, gives details of the alleged 
conspiracy, describes the manners and means used by the alleged conspirators, records 
specific alleged acts and names the alleged conspirators. The indictment also lists all the 
victims of Pan Am 103 bombing and lists separately the US nationals that died as a 
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result of the bombing. Copy of the indictment was submitted to the United Nations. See 
UN Doc. S/23317, issued by the United States to the United Nations, on 23 December 
1991. 
 
5 See UN Doc. S/23307, issued by the United Kingdom to the United Nations on 20 
December 1991. Amongst others, it includes the Lord Advocate’s statement that records 
the issuing of warrants for the arrest of the two Libyan nationals and details the 
charges.  
 
6 See again UN Doc. S/23307 (supra, note 5) which also contains a covering letter, the 
text of the Foreign Secretary’s statement in the Commons on 14 November 1991 and the 
text of a statement issued by the British Government on 27 November 1991.The 
statement issued by the British Government demands that the Libyan Government: 
surrender for trial those charged; accept complete responsibility for the actions of the 
Libyan officials; disclose all it knows of the crime and pay appropriate compensation. 
See also UN Doc. S/23308, issued by the United States to the United Nations on 20 
December 1991. It contains a covering letter, plus a statement from the United States  
Government and a joint declaration from Governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The statement notes that the indictments had been conveyed to the 
Libyan Government and introduces the joint declaration. The latter again demands that 
Libya: surrender for trial those charged; accept responsibility for the action of Libyan 
officials; disclose all it knows of the crime and pay appropriate compensation.  
 
7 For reactions following the Pan Am crash see, ex multis, Simons, G., ibidem (note 3), 
pp.30-51.  
 
8 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
done in Montreal on 23 September 1971, to which Libya, inasmuch as the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, were signatories. 
 
9 The Security Council has been defined as a “dual concept; it is each of the individual 
members, stating the case, and also the sum total of the members acting in the name of 
the organ.” See Higgins, R., “The place of international law in the settlement of disputes 
by the Security Council,” 64, American Journal of International Law, 1-18, (1970). 
 
10 Resolution 731 addresses also the terrorist attack against a French DC-10 airliner, 
UTA 772, which exploded because of a bomb, planted on board, over the Sahara Desert, 
on 19 September 1989. All the passengers and crew were killed. The Libyan Government 
was suspected of being the sponsor of the onslaught. France joined the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the course of action they took against Libya and pursued the 
same policy they chose when reacting to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. It is however 
beyond the scope of the present work to investigate the blowing up of UTA 772 and its 
aftermath. Thus, every reference to be found in UN documents about France or UTA 772 
will be dropped.  
 
11 See Letter from the Secretary of the People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and 
International Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the United 
Nations Secretary-General and transmitted on 2 March 1992. Annex II to the Second 
report on Libyan Crisis by UN Secretary-General on 3 March 1992 (UN Doc.  S/23672). 
 
12 Letter dated 27 February 1992 from the Secretary of the People’s Committee for 
Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
addressed to the Secretary- General. Annex I to the Second Report on Libyan Crisis (UN 
Doc. S/23672).   
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13 Arab League Resolution 5161 adopted on 22 March 1992.  
 
14 Such as Germany or Italy, for instance. 
 
15 Chapter VII pertains to “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace and Acts of Aggression.” Article 39, in particular, reads as follows: “The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.”  
 
16 China, Cape Verde, India, Morocco and Zimbabwe.  
 
17 For a detailed report of the application of sanctions by different states and Libya’s 
reactions, see Simons, G., ibidem, pp. 51-67. 
 
18 There were four abstentions, though: China, Djibouti, Morocco and Pakistan. 
 
19 General List, no. 88 (1992). 
 
20 Article 41 reads as follows: “1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it 
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final decision, 
notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the 
Security Council.”  
 
21 Art. 103 reads as follows: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.“ 
 
22 States have no right to bring proceedings or challenge decisions of the political organs 
directly. Article 34(1) of the World Court’s Statute reads as follows: “Only states may be 
parties in cases before the Court. ”  
 
23 It seems noteworthy to recall the chronology of the events. When Libya suited the 
United States before the International Court of Justice (3 March 1992), Resolution 748 
had not been adopted yet. However, it was passed on 31 March when the proceeding 
before the World Court was still pending. Thus, at the time the Court delivered its 
judgment (14 April), the Security Council had already ruled. It might be argued that the 
adoption of Resolution 748 while the case was still pending before the Court was the 
escamotage the Council found in order to prevent the Court from exercising its function 
and interfere with the Council’s course of action. See Gaja, G. “Quale conflitto fra 
obblighi negli affari relativi all’incidente aereo di Lockerbie?,” LXXV, Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, pp.374-376, (1992).  
 
24 Art. 25 reads as follows: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
 
25 This development is important because it suggests that the Court does not think 
judicial review should be exercised only when implicitly or explicitly endorsed by a 
United Nations organ seeking an advisory opinion on the effect of that organ’s act. 
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26 In a sense, the question of justiciability is closely tied to the question of jurisdiction. 
Actually, as long as the parties agree on the Court’s jurisdiction, the dispute may be 
considered a legal dispute, since the Court is bound by Article 38(1) of its Statute to 
apply international law to such disputes. Besides, should the parties not agree on the 
Court’s jurisdiction, one claiming that it is a legal dispute and the other rejecting that 
claim, than the Court itself is to decide whether it has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
36(6) of its Statute.  
27 See K.I. Matar and R.W.Thabit, ibidem, pp.14-21.  
28 Article 1 of the Montreal Convention provides as follows: “1. Any person commits an 
offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: (a) performs an act of violence against a 
person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that 
aircraft; or (b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which 
renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or (c) 
places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a 
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it 
which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger 
its safety in flight; or (d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with 
their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or (e) 
communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of 
an aircraft in flight. 2. Any person also commits an offence if he: (a) attempts to commit 
any of the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article; or (b) is an accomplice of a 
person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence.” 
29 Article 5 provides: “ 1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: (a) when 
the offence is committed in the territory of that State; an aircraft registered in that 
State; (c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territory 
with the alleged offender still on board; (d) when the offence is committed against or on 
board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business 
or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State. 
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b) 
and (c), and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those 
offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not 
extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law.”  
30 Article 7 is worded in the following terms: “The Contracting State in the territory of 
which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary 
offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.”  
31 Article 8 reads as follows: “1. The offences shall be deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. 
Contracting States undertake to include the offences as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 2. If a Contracting State which makes 
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition 
from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its 
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option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the 
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the 
requested State. 3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences as extraditable offences between 
themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. Each 
of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting 
States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in 
the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with 
Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) and (d).”  
 
32  Article 11 reads as follows: “1. Contracting States shall afford one another the 
greatest measures of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in 
respect of the offences. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases. 2. The 
provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not affect obligations under any other 
treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, 
mutual assistance in criminal matters.” 
 
33 See Plachta, M., “The Lockerbie case: the role of the Security Council in enforcing the 
principle aut dedere aut judicare,” 12, no.1, European Journal of International Law, 125-
140 (2001).   
34 The Preliminary Objections to the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of Libya’s 
claims filed by the United Kingdom have been presented in details at different hearings 
before the Court, in The Hague. See verbatim records of the hearings of the Public 
Sittings respectively held on Monday, 13 October, Tuesday, 14 October 1997.  
35 See supra, chapter 2, paragraph 4. 
 
36 Article 39 reads as follows: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”   
 
37 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter pertains to “action with respect to threats 
to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.”  
38 Article 24 reads as follows: “1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”  
39 See verbatim record of the Public Sitting held on Tuesday 14 October 1997, at the 
Peace Palace, in The Hague.   
40 See supra, note 3.  
41 In this respect, see supra, note 10. 
42 The Embassies of Venezuela (then the President of the Council) and of Russia were 
seriously damaged. 
 
43 Article 27 reads as follows: “1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one 
vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an 
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affirmative vote of nine members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and 
under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” Article 
34 reads as follows: “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” Article 35 reads as follows: “l. Any 
Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature 
referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General 
Assembly. 2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a 
party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific 
settlement provided in the present Charter. 3. The proceedings of the General Assembly 
in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the 
provisions of Articles 11 and 12. “ 
 
44 Public sitting held on Wednesday 15 October, at the Peace Palace in The Hague. See 
verbatim Record. 
 
45 Although the Court had acknowledged that “The critical date for determining the 
admissibility of an application is the date on which it is filed,” it has also said that 
events subsequent to the filing of an application may “render an application without 
object.” See Border and Transborder Armed Actions, (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 1988. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974.  
 
46 As recalled by the Parties, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in 
1924 that “[a] dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views 
or of interests between two persons” (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, 
P.C.I.J., Series A). The World Court for its part, in its Judgment of 30 June 1995 in the 
case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), emphasized the following: “In order 
to establish the existence of a dispute, it must be shown that the claim of one party is 
positively opposed by the other” (South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment; 
and further, “Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective 
determination” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
First Phase, Advisory Opinion). 
 
47 This has met with strong criticism by some judges. In their joint declaration, Judges 
Guillaume and Fleischhauer emphasized their narrow reading of the Court’s jurisdiction 
and argued that the World Court jurisdiction only extends to interpreting and applying 
the Montreal Convention and not to the Security Council resolutions. Besides, the 
matter of the prevalence of the Montreal Convention or the Council’s resolutions had 
already been argued by the parties and would simply end the case if decided in favour of 
the defendants. The latter view may seem more in line with the treaty-based jurisdiction 
of the Court. Nonetheless, it would considerably limit a judicial review of Security 
Council resolutions by the Court itself. Agreeing with Justice Fleischhauer and Justice 
Guillaume on the jurisdiction issue, Judge Kooijmans pointed out that the Security 
Council’s resolutions did not definitively abrogate or change the existing obligations of 
the parties, but might only supersede them for the time they are in force. Accordingly, 
the Court could still decide on the rights and duties of the parties under the Montreal 
Convention, even if the Security Council’s resolutions superseded it for the time being. 
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48 There are many scholars and academic writings about the role played by the Security 
Council and the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie case. Inter alia, see 
Martenczuck, B., “The Security Council, the International Court and judicial review: 
what lessons from Lockerbie?”, 10, European Journal of International Law, 517-547, 
(1999). See also MacDonald, R.S.J., “Changing relations between the International 
Court of Justice and the Security Council of the United Nations”, 31, The Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law, 3-32, (1993). A thorough analysis is also to be found in 
David, M., “Passport to justice: internationalizing the political question doctrine for 
application in the World Court”, 40, no.1, Harvard International Law Journal, 81-150, 
(1999). See also Ziccardi Capaldo, G., “Verticalità della comunità internazionale e 
Nazioni Unite. Un riesame del caso Lockerbie,” in “Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e 
Diritto Internazionale,” p. 61-82, Cedam, Padova, 1995. 
 
49 Even this Chapter speaks only in the most general terms. As stressed above, Article 
92 declares that the Court is “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.” Article 
93 provides that all States party to the United Nations Charter are ipso facto party to 
the Statute of the Court. Article 94 oblige states parties to disputes before the Court to 
abide by its judgments and allows the prevailing party to seek assistance from the 
Security Council, in the event the losing party fails to comply with the judgment. Article 
95 permits states to use other international tribunals to resolve disputes. Article 96 
authorizes the political organs of the United Nations to seek advisory opinions from the 
Court on various questions. As a matter of fact, no provision of Chapter XIV explicitly 
adddresses judicial review.  
 
50 Other provisions of the Charter provide little additional guidance on whether the 
Court can exercise any power of judicial review. Article 103 provides that “obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail over conflicting treaty obligations,” but nothing 
in the text of the provision suggests it is to be enforced only by the Court. Moreover, the 
provision by its terms applies to the obligations of states, not the acts of United Nations 
organs. Vertical supremacy over the acts of sovereign states does not necessarily imply 
horizontal supremacy over the acts of co-equal organs of the United Nations.  
 
51 Article 1 establishes: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement 
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for 
harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” 
 
52 Art. 36 reads as follows: “1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security Council should take into 
consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been 
adopted by the parties. 3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security 
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule 
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute of the Court.” 
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53 The Security Council’s activism has not always met with satisfaction; there is also 
some concern regarding its power to intervene, as it looks like the last remaining 
superpower within the United Nations framework. Thus, the activity of the Council has 
provoked debate in recent years whether the Council is subject to any limitations when 
it is acting to maintain or restore international peace or security. In particular, there 
has been a growing interest in the question whether there is any room for judicial 
control, by the International Court of Justice, of decisions made by the political organs of 
the United Nations. The perception on the part of some states that the Security Council 
is directed by an unrepresentative elite may have certainly fuelled this interest. 
Whatever the stretch of the Court’s power of judicial review, the mere fact that it exists 
may prove important as far as the developing world is concerned. As stressed above, 
there is growing disenchantment among some states, particularly developing ones, with 
the composition and actions of the Security Council. Rightly or wrongly, they perceive 
the Security Council to be unrepresentative and subject to the dictates of a powerful 
elite. Failure to hold some prospects of judicial review to disenchanted states may 
prompt them to refuse to comply with Security Council measures. Thus, that judicial 
review of Security Council’s action is theoretically possible seems irrefutable. Whether it 
is desirable, and if so in what circumstances, are questions that admit no easy answers. 
The subject is, however, high on the agenda of international law and one that seems to 
challenge the Court in the years ahead. Ex multis, see D.Akande, ”The International 
Court of Justice and the Security Council: is there room for judicial control of decisions 
of the political organs of the United Nations?” 46, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 309-343, (1997). See also G.R. Watson, “Constitutionalism, judicial review 
and the World Court”, 34, Harvard International Law Journal, 1-45, (1993); M. Perrin 
de Brichambaut, “The role of the United Nations Security Council in the international 
legal system,” in M.Byers (ed.),“ The role of law in international politics,” Oxford 
University Press Inc., New York, 2000, pp. 268-276; V. Gowlland-Debbas, “The functions 
of the United Nations Security Council in the international legal system,” ubi supra, at 
301-313. See also J.Dugard, “Judicial review of sanctions”, in V.Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), 
“United Nations sanctions and international law”, pp.83-91, Kluwer Law International, 
2001. 
 
54 Unless the parties have authorized it to decide ex aequo et bono. 
 
55 See Article 37(2) of the United Nations Charter. 
 
56 About this issue, see Gowlland-Debbas, V., “The relationship between the 
International Court of Justice and Security Council in the light of the Lockerbie case”, 
88, American Journal of International Law, 643-677, (1994).  
 
57 See again V.Gowlland-Debbas, op.cit. (note 56). 
 
58 In this respect, see Bowett, D., “The impact of Security Council decisions on dispute 
settlements procedures,” 5, European Journal of International Law, 1-101, (1994). The 
author says “It may be doubted whether States ratifying the Charter ever believed they 
were granting to the Council a blank cheque to modify their legal rights.” 
 
59 Thus, it does not seem correct to contend that the Security Council is not at all 
restrained by principles of international law when it is taking collective measures to 
enforce peace or to suppress aggression. To the extent that the United Nations is a 
subject of international law, it follows that its organs are thereby subjected to 
international law. Thus, where the Charter gives the Council a right to derogate from 
international law, it is clear that the said right exists. Where no express permission is 
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given, the right does not seem to exist. Therefore, this right cannot exist as far as jus 
cogens norms are concerned, for they cannot be derogated from, by definition. Actually, 
the relief that Article 103 of the United Nations Charter may give the Security Council 
in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot 
extend between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens, as a matter of hierarchy of 
norms. For example, the Security Council is empowered to use force in the maintenance 
of international peace, but this does not relieve it of its duty in using such force to 
respect humanitarian international law in armed conflict (jus in bello). Actually, in 
transferring the power of waging war or conducting military operations, member states 
could not transfer a power which themselves do not possess. As stressed above, the 
United Nations and its member States are equally subject to international law and 
therefore have obligations under it. Another limitation on the powers of the Security 
Council is a duty on its part to observe generally accepted norms of human rights, when 
it is acting. Since the end of the Second World War, there has been an increasing 
awareness of the need to protect the rights of the individuals and this was one of the 
reasons for setting up the United Nations. Indeed, one of the purposes of the United 
Nations, which limits the power of the Security Council, is that expressed in Article 1(4) 
of the Charter, which provides for international co-operation “in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights.” Likewise, Article 55 of the Charter declares that 
“the United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.” It would be unacceptable if an organ of the United 
Nations were itself empowered to violate human rights when the whole tenor of the 
Charter is to promote the protection of human rights by member States. This is why, for 
instance, the Security Council, in the exercise of its powers to impose economic and 
diplomatic sanctions under Article 41, cannot pursue a policy of starvation. Thus, 
protection of human rights, that is to say compliance with international humanitarian 
law, binds the Security Council in the exercise of its powers. For a recent reflection 
about the interaction between peremptory norms and the power of the Security Council, 
see A. Orakhelashvili, “The impact of peremptory norms on the interpretation and 
application of United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 16, no.1, European Journal 
of International Law, 59-88, (2005). 
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International Arbitration Group. 
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the International Legal Studies Programs, Western School of Law, San Diego, California 
- via e-mail, on 22 May 2001.  
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Chapter 3 
 
THE LONG WAY TO THE LOCKERBIE TRIAL 
 
 
3.1 Libya and the United Nations sanctions 
 
Throughout the long-lasting Lockerbie stalemate, a new geo-political 
scenario had been emerging: the Berlin Wall was literally pulled down and 
the Soviet bloc entirely collapsed, which marked the end of the bipolar world 
and the balance of powers that had been featuring since the end of the 
second world war. After the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet 
Union, it became possible to introduce sanctions without opposition from 
Moscow, which before would mean a veto in the Security Council and 
serious difficulties in finding the consensus that was necessary in order to 
adopt the said sanctions.1 By virtue of their right of veto, permanent 
members actually have a crucial weight on decisions pertaining to sanctions, 
both when it comes to adopt them and when it is time to lift them. Sanctions 
resolutions do actually contain a mechanism whereby, for sanctions to be 
lifted, a new resolution of the Security Council is needed in each case. This 
obviously creates a possibility of leverage for the permanent members of the 
Council. Hence, in Lockerbie, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
being permanent members of the Security Council, had a decisive weight as 
far as the adoption or lifting of sanctions was concerned. In fact, they did not 
even have to abstain when the Security Council decided under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter and the latter, at Article 27, sets out that a 
party to a dispute - which is also a member to the Security Council - needs 
abstaining only when the Council decides under Chapter VI.2  
This situation proved particularly hard on Libya which stood very little 
chances of effectively lobbying within the Security Council and gain 
sympathy to its cause. Thus, Libya had to search elsewhere if it wanted to 
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break its political isolation and find some support in the international fora. 
Colonel Gaddafi therefore found that an effective way to gain some 
sympathy around the world consisted in drawing the international 
community’s attention on the appalling humanitarian suffering the Libyan 
people was experiencing because of the United Nations sanctions.3  
In those times, the debate about the acceptability of economic sanctions as 
a tool of international politics had started heating up. Even former 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his “Agenda for Peace” 
presented to the Security Council on January 5, 1996, called on the United 
Nations to reconsider how it uses sanctions.4  Noting that sanctions are 
generally acknowledged to be a “blunt instrument,” Boutros-Ghali said that 
their use raises ethical issues concerning the suffering they inflict on 
innocent victims, especially those most vulnerable, and questions as to 
whether inflicting such suffering on innocent persons is a legitimate means 
of bringing pressure to bear on political leaders. In addition to having a 
severe effect on neighbours or major economic partners of targeted states, 
the Secretary-General noted that sanctions can also defeat their own 
purpose by “provoking a patriotic response against the international 
community, symbolized by the United Nations, and by rallying the 
population behind the leaders whose behaviour the sanctions are intended 
to modify.” Thus, it was becoming quite clear, within the United Nations 
system, that sanctions were more likely to adversely affect a country’s 
population at large than bending the target country’s leadership.  
In most cases, economic sanctions, especially when broad in scope, 
actually end up “punishing” the civilian population more than the political 
élites. This obviously entails an ethical problem, with the civilian 
populations becoming a “hostage” in the political dispute, while those in the 
government and the military often skirting the effect of sanctions. In fact, 
those who are in command of the distribution of goods easily find a way out. 
By creating scarcity, sanctions can actually enable them to better control 
the distribution of goods. For civilian populations, instead, sanctions can be 
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a powerful and deadly form of intervention. Those adverse effects on 
civilians are not only ethically questionable; they also bear some weight 
from a legal point of view. Human rights and the humanitarian provisions of 
international law are increasingly being recognized as marking the limits of 
permissibility for economic sanctions. They certainly form part of the core of 
the United Nations goals and principles, which Article 24(2) of the United 
Nations Charter requires the Security Council to observe in fulfilling its 
mandate to safeguard peace.5 Hence, the peremptory rights of the people 
affected by sanctions - particularly the right to life, health, food, water, 
housing, and clothing - must be taken into account when sanctions are being 
imposed.6 Yet, sanctions are certainly attractive, since they might prove a 
means of exerting international influence that seems more powerful than 
diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military intervention. 
In fact, after the bombing of Pan Am 103, the United States did not strike 
back by means of military intervention although such option was not 
necessarily ruled out.  
Yet, sanctions do not always achieve the aim they are designed for. As 
Justice Mauro Politi points out,7 not only sanctions do not necessarily 
influence a regime but they risk backing it up: any regime can always justify 
whatever despicable policy or domestic problem in terms of sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations and the population may end up accepting 
such explanation and stop questioning whether there are other causes for its 
own poverty or deprivation. Besides, sanctions may prompt a general sense 
of siege that governments can exploit to maintain political control. This is 
why, nowadays, the United Nations would no longer rely upon the sort of 
broad sanctions they imposed on Libya during the Lockerbie stalemate. It 
would be preferable to go for the so-called smart sanctions that are designed 
to affect individual leaders, their close family and their own assets, without 
striking the masses.8 Justice Politi however underlines that the question 
whether sanctions may prove useful tools of policy does not necessarily 
entail an ethical profile. Sanctions may prove effective without being fair or 
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morally justified. They actually turn out to be effective whenever they 
influence the policies of the state at which they are directed.  
Thus, if the target state fulfils the conditions set out in the sanctions 
resolutions and no longer engages in the behaviour classed as constituting a 
threat to peace,9 in any such case, sanctions are to be deemed a successful 
and effective political tool that helps achieving political aims. As Justice 
Richard Goldstone points out,10 it is difficult to find other ways in order to 
have a country surrender its citizens for trial abroad if it is not bound to 
extradite them. In fact, there is no international police force which is 
allowed to arrest people in various countries and it is quite unlikely that 
there will ever be one. International justice, after all, depends on the 
cooperation of governments and if some governments do not see it in their 
self-interest to abide by the law, then sanctions can help, which is actually 
what happened in the Lockerbie case, when Libya kept refusing to comply 
with the demands put forward by the Security Council.  
Thus, in the Lockerbie case, the sanctions regime has proved successful to 
a certain extent but it was not only its harshness to bring the deadlock 
between Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States to an end. Yet, it 
is undeniable that sanctions had a very strong impact on Libya and 
adversely affected it in terms of lost revenues. Obviously, the masses 
experienced the most appalling consequences. Colonel Gaddafi therefore 
built his diplomatic offensive on the fact that the United Nations sanctions 
were affecting the population at large and prompting devastating effects. 
Once, he actually addressed the Security Council as follows: “I used to rely 
on the world conscience, but it turns out to be a world without conscience. 
And I used to rely on the justice of the Charter of the United Nations and 
international law, but they turn out to be inoperative and to have been 
annulled by a new status quo of extreme ugliness and injustice that is being 
forcibly imposed by naval fleets, by intercontinental missiles, by economic 
sanctions that place a stranglehold on peoples and by threats to deprive 
children of milk, bread and medication.”11   
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Gaddafi actually tried to show the world that the United Nations 
sanctions embodied a collective punishment the Libyans had been charged 
with, although there was no verdict establishing Libya’s liability for the 
bombing of Pan Am 103. Ostensibly, he aimed at shattering the world’s 
conscience. The United Nations sanctions had however been imposed on 
Libya not because of the bombing but because the Libyan Government 
would not co-operate with the investigation into the Lockerbie disaster and 
refused to surrender the two suspects for trial in the United Kingdom or the 
United States. The Security Council in particular had claimed that there 
was a threat to international peace and security. Nonetheless, it was a fact 
that Resolutions 748 and 883 were based on the mere suspicion of two 
Libyan citizens, without they having been condemned in accordance with 
any judicial verdict. Thus, the fact that the Security Council had imposed 
sanctions on Libya on the basis of mere suspect and without any verdict of 
guilty being delivered was a powerful criticism that still remains on the face 
of the entire process, undermining its legitimacy. Certainly, it helped Libya 
in building its diplomatic offensive and gaining some sympathy around the 
world.  
In a way, it looked as if the Libyans were collectively paying the bill 
before anybody was sentenced culpable. In this respect, it has to be recalled 
that the United States had also imposed its own separate sanction regime 
on all commercial and financial transactions with Libya.12 Thus, the Libyans 
were subjected to two different sets of sanctions, which, altogether, might 
prove absolutely devastating. Obviously, Gaddafi’s diplomatic offensive 
would address the United Nations sanctions. The international community 
had actually sponsored them and conveyed through them its disapproval to 
the target country. Nonetheless, the fact that the United Nations sanctions 
convey the international community’s disapproval turns out to be more 
credible when the parties to a dispute are not in charge when sanctions 
have to be voted and endorsed. If the United Nations resolutions imposing 
sanctions on Libya were decided by the Security Council with the abstention 
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of the United States and the United Kingdom, they would have been 
perceived as less biased and politicised not only by the Libyans but by many 
others.13 And if the removal of sanctions was not in the “hands” of those 
countries but of different ones, not involved in the Lockerbie affair, the 
entire sanctioning process would have been more credible. Or at least the 
perception would have been different.  
Sanctions may actually hold great promise and provide a serious 
alternative to military options but only under conditions of wide 
international agreement, clear legal basis and purpose, and minimal harm 
to the innocents. Be it as it may, the United Nations sanctions were in place 
and Libya had started claiming that no innocent Libyan national was 
spared from the inhumanity of the United Nations sanctions, those same 
sanctions that had been imposed on the basis of mere suspect while the fact 
that they were justified in terms of an actual threat to peace remained 
pretty questionable.  
 
 
3.2 Libya gains African support 
 
Meanwhile, the world was watching and the international community did 
not prove deaf to Gaddafi’s attempt at drawing its attention onto the 
suffering of the Libyans. Nonetheless, Libya’s argument was not based on 
the sole inhumanity of sanctions and their devastating consequences on the 
masses. The other crucial contention was that Libya was ready to hand over 
the two suspects for trial any time. Yet, it would never surrender its citizens 
to the United Kingdom or the United States, where they would stand no 
chance whatsoever of being given a fair trial by a panel of independent 
judges. The media campaign against the Libyans had actually been huge, 
which made it quite unlikely to find unprejudiced judges and jurors. Thus, 
Libya urged that the trial be held in a third and neutral country, where no 
suspicion of biased and politicised justice would arise. This proved a 
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powerful argument. Libya sounded ready to comply with the terms the 
United Nations resolutions and all it asked for was a fair trial for the 
accused, which seemed to be a reasonable request after all. This was the 
bedrock of the diplomatic offensive that Colonel Gaddafi unleashed. He 
addressed the international community but mostly focused on the African 
continent as a potential source of precious ties.14 This policy was to prove 
fruitful in the long run since it would succeed in breaking Libya’s isolation. 
It actually put the Lockerbie case in the spotlight to such an extent that no 
less a leader than Nelson Mandela volunteered to act as an intermediary 
between Libya and the United Kingdom.  
In fact, the South-African “icon” started acting as a mediator in the 
Lockerbie case even before becoming President of South Africa.15 On 21 
January 1992, for example, he had already made a remarkable statement on 
behalf of the ANC, which reads as follows: “The ANC has consistently 
condemned all acts of terrorism. The Lockerbie disaster was a tragic 
incident which resulted in the unfortunate loss of innocent lives. The ANC 
once again takes the opportunity to express deep-felt sympathy to the 
families of the deceased. It is in the interest of peace, stability and security 
that if there is clear evidence of the involvement of identified suspects they 
should be arrested and punished as soon as possible. In the present climate 
of suspicion and fear it is important that the trial should not be intended to 
humiliate a head of state. It should not only be fair and just, but must be 
seen to be fair and just. This must be in the context of respect for the 
sovereignty of all countries. The ANC believes that if the above objectives 
are to be achieved, the following options should be considered: if no 
extradition treaty exists between the countries concerned the trial must be 
conducted in the country where the accused were arrested. The trial should 
be conducted in a neutral country by independent judges. The trial should 
be conducted at The Hague by an international court of justice. We urge the 
countries concerned to show statesmanship and leadership. This will ensure 
that the decade of the Nineties will be free of confrontation and conflict.” 16 
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Thus, in Mandela’s view, the most important thing was ensuring that the 
trial took place in the context of respect for the sovereignty of all countries 
involved. He therefore excluded that the Lockerbie trial could ever be held 
in the United Kingdom or the United States: as he said, no country can be 
claimant, prosecutor and judge in the same case, and if it is, this should be 
regarded as a source of serious concern. Mandela was to play a pivotal role 
in brokering the final deal and bringing the Lockerbie case to a close by 
proving a crucial link between Colonel Gaddafi and the West. Meanwhile, 
other self-appointed mediators tried to help bringing the long-standing 
Lockerbie stalemate to a close. One of those was Prince Bandar bin Sultan 
of Saudi Arabia,17 who concentrated his efforts on the relationship between 
Libya and the United States and offered his good auspices to improve it. 
Bandar was the other charismatic mediator that left no stone unturned to 
bring the Lockerbie stalemate to an end. Mandela and Bandar played a 
crucial role especially in terms of confidence building. The story of their 
shuttle diplomacy was to prove a success story although it took years before 
noteworthy results were accomplished. For a long time, their efforts actually 
seemed to lead to nowhere. Yet, they kept trying and their quiet yet 
strenuous mediation was to prove pivotal for the final deal to be stricken. 
The possibility of a trial to be held in a third and neutral country started 
gaining some support. At this stage, various regional organizations came 
into picture and started taking sides with Libya. They found it reasonable 
that the Libyan suspects required some guarantees about the fairness of the 
trial. They therefore believed that a trial in a neutral country would have 
met all parties’ requirement: it would have brought the suspects to justice 
but it would have allowed them a fair trial before a panel of non-prejudiced 
judges. Yet, it was necessary to make sure that Libya would actually hand 
over the two suspects for trial as it had said it would and convince both the 
United Kingdom and the United States to agree upon the trial being held in 
a third country. The Organization of African Unity pushed explicitly 
towards this end and insisted that continued imposition of sanctions would 
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have forced the Africans to devise a scheme in order to spare the Libyan 
people more suffering.  
The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, which met 
in Tunis from 6 to 11 June 1994, actually adopted a resolution urging the 
Security Council “to reconsider its resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 
883 (1993) and lift the embargo imposed on Libya in appreciation of the 
positive initiatives taken by the Great Jamahiriya in addressing the 
[Lockerbie] crisis.”18 One year after, the Organization of African Unity, 
meeting in its sixty-second session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21 to 23 
June 1995, adopted a further resolution that literally reiterated “its appeal 
to the Security Council to reconsider its resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) 
and 883 (1993) so as to lift the current embargo on Libya.” 19 Both the said 
resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity called on all 
parties to rely upon dialogue and negotiations to secure a peaceful 
settlement of the crisis pursuant to Article 33 of the United Nations 
Charter, which calls for the settlement of disputes through negotiations, 
mediation and legal procedures in conformity with international law. 
Moreover, they called for a fair trial of the two suspects in a neutral country 
to be agreed upon by the parties concerned.  
Furthermore, during its summit in Harare in June 1997, the Organization 
of African Unity adopted a resolution suggesting a neutral venue to try the 
accused. The African leaders explicitly regretted the continuation of United 
Nations sanctions against Libya and expressed deep concern over the 
human and material deprivations to which the Libyan people had been 
subjected.20 Three solutions were therefore suggested in order to overcome 
the long-running Lockerbie deadlock: trying the two suspects in a third, 
neutral country to be determined by the Security Council; trying them 
before Scottish judges sitting at the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague and acting under Scottish law; establishing an ad hoc tribunal at the 
International Court of Justice headquarters in The Hague and let it try the 
Libyan suspects. In the view of the Organization of African Unity, one of the 
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said options would have solved the impasse in the interest of all the parties 
concerned.21  
The Organization of African Unity was determined to make its 
contribution to the Lockerbie crisis and support Libya’s stance. It therefore 
adopted another resolution, during its summit in Burkina Faso in June 
1998, which explicitly called on African nations to suspend compliance with 
United Nations sanctions with humanitarian or religious implications and 
those relating to official business pertaining to the Organization itself. The 
Organization of African Unity actually made it clear that the sanctions were 
unacceptable, since they kept hitting the masses although Libya was ready 
to deliver the two suspects for trial to a neutral country. Thus, there were no 
longer reasons why those sanctions should remain in place22 and if they did, 
it was just because of the unwillingness of the British and the Americans of 
overcoming the impasse. Many African leaders actually started 
implementing the said resolution and flied directly into Libya in breach of 
the sanctions, which appeared to be legitimised by the resolution itself. Such 
move was very far-reaching since it challenged the authority of the Security 
Council, whose resolutions seemed now sort of obsolete with the Africans 
infringing them and urging a final solution for the Lockerbie stalemate. If 
the United Nations sanctions are also meant to convey the world’s 
disapproval over the conduct and policy of the target country, in this case, 
that disapproval had started weakening. In fact, there was a widening gap 
between the African continent and the West in the way they were dealing 
with Libya. 
The Arabs also took a strong stance against the continuation of the 
United Nations sanctions against Libya. The Arab Summit Conference held 
in Cairo in 1996 actually called for the lifting of those sanctions. The Arab 
League then adopted a resolution calling on Arab States to ease the level of 
sanctions against Libya. On September 21, 1997, Arab Governments 
actually voted to defy United Nations sanctions by affirming support for 
Libya and inviting Arab countries to ease the sanctions on Libya until a 
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peaceful and just solution to the Lockerbie crisis was found. The resolution 
actually urged the Arab League’s twenty-two members to allow flights 
carrying political leaders and official Libyan delegations participating in 
regional and international meetings to land on their territories. The said 
resolution also authorized Arab countries to permit flights for humanitarian 
reasons such as the transport of the ill and the dead and medicine as well as 
religious flights.23  
The Arab requests were reinforced by the declaration of the Ministerial 
Meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cartagena, 
Colombia, from 18 to 20 May 1998, which also called for the immediate 
suspension of the sanctions imposed on Libya, until delivery of the judgment 
by the International Court of Justice on the substantive issue.24 The Non-
Aligned Movement backed Libya’s position in more than one occasion. At its 
XII summit held in Durban in September 1998, the Heads of State or 
Government participating to the summit reiterated their shock at the 
immensely harmful effects the United Nations sanctions imposed upon 
Libya kept causing to the Libyan people. They also deplored the threats to 
further tighten the sanctions in total disregard to the positive compliance by 
Libya to the United Nations demands. Thus, the summit decided that the 
sanctions imposed on Libya must be suspended once an agreement was 
reached between the parties on the arrangements and the guarantees 
leading to the appearance of the two suspects for trial. They also urged that 
the sanctions be totally terminated once the suspects appeared for trial.  
Furthermore, the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia to the United Nations addressed a 
letter to the President of the Security Council25 asking for the immediate 
suspension of the sanctions imposed on Libya, pending the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice on the issue pertaining to the application of 
the Montreal Convention to the Lockerbie case. They actually inferred that 
the continuation of sanctions had no justification whatsoever since the 
International Court of Justice had assessed that it had jurisdiction over the 
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dispute between Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States and 
would have therefore dealt with the substantive issue. In fact, the judgment 
that the International Court of Justice had delivered on 27 February 1998 
had put Libya in a better position and was offering some sound bedrock for 
its diplomatic offensive. States that were ready to support Libya’s line, could 
actually base their challenge to the Security Council’s authority on the 
International Court’s ruling. The International Court of Justice was 
empowered with jurisdiction over the Lockerbie case and the Libyan 
application had been deemed admissible.  
Obviously, Libya was capitalizing on that and found it easier to claim that 
the United Nations’ sanctions were no longer justified pending the 
proceedings before the World Court.  In those years, then, Libya did not look 
isolated any more. It had succeeded in gaining some sympathy around the 
world. Several countries and regional organizations were backing its stance 
and were calling for an easing of the United Nations sanctions if not even a 
definitive lifting. Libya was capitalizing on diplomatic gains and was 
perceived as the one country that was willing to comply with the United 
Nations demands whereas the United Kingdom and the United States 
seemed in no hurry of overcoming the Lockerbie stalemate. In fact, they 
seemed pretty deaf to compromise. They had actually made it clear that 
they would accept nothing short of the surrender of the two Libyan suspects. 
Having a trial within the borders of the United Kingdom or the United 
States therefore seemed a priority in the British and American agenda, as if 
the location of the trial was more important than the trial itself.  
In the meantime, eminent people from all over the world were speaking in 
favour of lifting the sanctions imposed on Libya. Even His Holiness the late 
Pope John Paul II, on 31 October 1997, called in unambiguous terms for the 
lifting of such sanctions imposed on Libya.26 Meanwhile, the United Nations 
sanctions had started experiencing an enforcement crisis, with the Africans 
deliberately infringing them. No longer they seemed to embody the 
international community’s disapproval for Libya’s stand since regional 
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organizations and charismatic leaders were demanding that they be 
suspended if not even lifted. New sources of pressure had therefore started 
featuring in the international politics scenario. A change in the United 
States and the United Kingdom’s policies seemed eventually required to face 
the international support Libya had started enjoying. And, above all, it was 
necessary to eventually bring to a closure a case that had been stuck into an 
impasse for over ten years. The families of the victims had never stopped 
demanding that justice be made. The more such justice was delayed, the 
more it was perceived as if it were denied.  
Thus, a trial in a neutral country appeared as the only viable way to 
overcome the long-lasting Lockerbie stalemate. In a way, it might have 
proved a “win-win” situation for the United States and the United Kingdom, 
although for many years they had refused to come to terms with such an 
option. In fact, either Libya handed over the two suspects for trial as it had 
assured it was ready to do, or it would lose its international credibility and 
the political support it had been gaining hitherto. On the contrary, the more 
the United Kingdom and the United States refused the possibility of a trial 
in a third country, the more it seemed as if they were not interested in 
bringing the Lockerbie case to a close. Or at least it looked as if they 
considered the venue more important that the trial itself. In a way, they 
were at a dead end: it was time for them to move on and come to terms with 
the expectations of a rapidly changing world. 
 
 
3.3 The possibility of a trial in a third country 
 
The possibility of trying the two suspects in a third and neutral country 
had started being perceived as the only viable option that would have 
brought the Lockerbie stalemate to an end. Libya had ostensibly agreed 
upon it and many countries inasmuch as regional organizations around the 
world found it a reasonable way out. Although the United Kingdom and the 
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United States had made it rather clear that they would accept nothing short 
of the surrender of the two suspects for trial before their national courts and 
within their own boundaries, the possibility of a viable alternative had been 
considered within the United Kingdom too. Since 1994, Professor Black of 
the University of Edinburgh had actually been suggesting that a trial might 
be held outside Scotland, yet according to Scottish law and procedure.27  
Professor Black had actually put forward a detailed proposal for the 
setting up of a court operating under the law and procedure of Scotland, but 
sitting in a neutral venue such as The Hague.28 The said proposal took into 
account a variety of different issues, such as the rights of the accused, the 
panel of judges, the appeal of the verdict. In a nutshell, Professor Black’s 
proposal envisaged a trial in which the governing law and procedure would 
be the law and procedure of Scotland; the prosecution would be conducted by 
the Scottish public prosecutor, the Lord Advocate, or his authorised 
representative; the defence of the accused would be in the hands of 
independent Scottish solicitors and counsels appointed by the accused 
whereas the jury would be replaced by an international panel of five judges 
chaired by a judge of the Scottish High Court of Justiciary. According to 
Professor Black’s proposal, should the accused be convicted, they would 
serve any sentence of imprisonment in a prison in Scotland. In case of an 
appeal, the High Court of Justiciary would hear it in Scotland, in its 
capacity as the Scottish Court of criminal appeal. Thus, the core of the 
proposal was that the trial would be a Scottish trial, under Scottish law and 
procedure, and before a Scottish court. The only peculiar feature would be 
that such court would sit outside Scotland. 
As a matter of fact, there was a feature in the Scottish criminal justice 
system that the Libyans would find unacceptable, namely the role played by 
the jury. From the outset, Libya had actually been contending that, in a case 
that had received unprecedented publicity in the media, including 
widespread dissemination of photographs of the accused, it would be 
impossible to find a British or an American jury that was unaffected or 
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uninfluenced by pre-trial publicity. Such concern was not self-evidently 
baseless in the Lockerbie case. It was undeniable that the latter had been 
having very wide coverage ever since and would undoubtedly generate 
further publicity once the accused surrendered themselves for trial. Libya 
seemed to have a point there.  
It is pretty undeniable that any audience could have been affected - 
consciously or unconsciously - by the flood of information and speculation 
that, for years, had accompanied the Lockerbie case. It was therefore at 
least questionable whether a jury in the United Kingdom or the United 
States would judge the evidence of the Lockerbie case with the degree of 
objectivity and impartiality that a fair trial demands. However, this should 
be no obstacle to the trial. The jury in criminal proceedings is conceived of 
as a safeguard for the interests of the accused, which means that it is also a 
safeguard that the accused can do without by waiving the inherent right. 
Besides, the issue of the physical security of the accused, if the trial were to 
be held in Scotland, as the United States and the United Kingdom required, 
was also a matter of concern and needed being addressed in due course.29 
Interestingly, though, it was not Libya but the United Kingdom and the 
United States that rejected Professor Black’s proposal for a number of years. 
As above mentioned, they seemed deaf to compromise and would accept 
nothing short of the surrender of the two accused before their own courts 
and within their own territory. The location of the trial seemed a non-
negotiable priority in their agenda. Despite early rejections, Professor 
Black’s proposal would however serve several years later as a basis for the 
trial that eventually took place. It was still a long way to go, though.  
In the meantime, Libya was tired of economic sanctions and seemed 
willing to move on in order to overcome its “pariah status” and restore its 
position in the international fold. Personal contacts amongst leaders and 
official diplomacy kept going on in search of a final solution for the long-
standing Lockerbie stalemate. Eventually, the United Kingdom and the 
United States chose a different course of action and accepted the idea that 
 151
the trial could be held elsewhere. The international pressure had actually 
been rising and the family of the victims were still claiming that justice be 
made. Yet, the United Kingdom and the United States would compromise on 
the venue but not on the applicable law or the nationality of the judges. 
While agreeing in principle to a neutral venue as Professor Black had 
suggested, the United Kingdom actually kept rejecting Black’s proposal for 
an international panel and opted for an all-Scottish judges panel. If the trial 
was not to take place in Scotland, it had to be a Scottish trial with Scottish 
judges and under Scottish law.  
Eventually, on 31 October 1997, the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of 
the Security Council30 in which he invited representatives of the United 
Nations to visit Scotland and to study the Scottish judicial system. The 
Secretary-General accepted the invitation and requested two scholars to 
undertake this study. In their report on the Scottish judicial system, they 
concluded that the Libyan accused would receive a fair trial in Scotland.31 
Their rights during pre-trial, trial and post-trial proceedings would be 
protected in accordance with international standards. Now, it was for Libya 
to take the further step of accepting Professor Black’s proposal. The first 
breakthrough in bringing the suspects to justice eventually came at a 
meeting in Tripoli in April 1998 between government officials, lawyers and 
British representatives of the bombing victims at which the Libyans 
confirmed that they would accept the plan devised by Professor Robert 
Black. But the arrangement about the venue and set-up of the court was not 
the final obstacle.  
A number of issues had still to be addressed and resolved. These included 
guarantees about safe custody of the Libyan suspects. If they were 
acquitted, guarantees about their safe custody back also needed being ruled. 
Other questions arose with respect to the conditions of their detention, their 
access to their legal team, pre-trial custody, the defence team’s possibility of 
access to the evidence, the rights of the defence and so forth. The trial 
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however would have taken place in the Netherlands, which seemed the best 
possible venue if it had to take place in a third and neutral country. The 
Hague, in particular, was already home to the International Court of Justice 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It 
therefore seemed the best possible location ever for the Lockerbie trial. 
Obviously, talks and negotiations at diplomatic and political level continued 
for quite a while. In the meantime, the atmosphere was loaded with 
speculations about the possibility of a forthcoming change in the policy of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Some facts started being leaked 
to the press, which had never stopped paying the Lockerbie case lots of 
attention and wide coverage. Nonetheless, if an agreement was on its way, it 
was still enveloped in secrecy. Besides, if a trial had to take place in The 
Hague, not only the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya were to 
be involved. The Netherlands had become part of the game and needed 
making arrangements for the trial to come about. 
In the event, on 24 August 1998, the British and United States 
Governments officially announced their willingness to allow the trial to be 
held before a Scottish court of three judges and no jury, sitting in the 
Netherlands. Their stand on the matter of a “neutral venue” trial was 
depicted in a letter of that date to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Kofi Annan, wherein the British and American Acting Permanent 
Representatives to the United Nations stated: “....  in the interest of 
resolving this situation in a way which will allow justice to be done, our 
Governments are prepared, as an exceptional measure, to arrange for the 
two accused to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. 
After close consultation with the Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, we are pleased to confirm that the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands has agreed to facilitate arrangements for such 
a court. It would be a Scottish court and would follow normal Scots law and 
procedure in every respect except for the replacement of the jury by a panel 
of three Scottish High Court judges.  The Scottish rules of evidence and 
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procedure, and all the guarantees of fair trial provided by the law of 
Scotland, would apply.”32 Thus, both Washington and London confirmed the 
official adoption of an agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
United States, on the one side, and the Netherlands on the other, which was 
actually confirmed by the Dutch Government.33  
The Secretary-General had been requested by the British and the United 
States Governments to convey to the Libyan Government a letter 
elaborating their proposal. He was also asked to provide to the Libyan 
Government any assistance it might require with regard to the physical 
arrangements for the transfer of the two accused directly to the 
Netherlands. In this respect, the Secretary-General issued a statement 
expressing appreciation about the announcement the United Kingdom and 
the United States had made and gratitude to the Netherlands for its 
willingness to assist in the matter.34 Libya, on its part, “announce[d] its 
acceptance of the development in the positions of the Governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom” and confirmed that it would “deal 
positively” with such step, though stressing “the necessity to lift the 
sanctions imposed on the basis of Security Council resolutions 748(1992) 
and 883(1993).”35 In a letter to the Security Council, Libya actually stated: 
”1. Libya is anxious to arrive at a settlement of this dispute and to turn over 
a new page in its relations with the States concerned. 2. Libya’s judicial 
authorities need to have sufficient time to study [the proposal] and to 
request the assistance of international experts more familiar with the laws 
of the States mentioned in the documents. 3. We are absolutely convinced 
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, must be 
given sufficient time to achieve what the Security Council has asked of him, 
so that any issue or difficulty that might delay the desired settlement can be 
resolved”36  
Undeniably, all the parties concerned had taken a considerable step 
forward. A Security Council resolution was however necessitated inasmuch 
as changes to Scottish and Dutch law, and a treaty between the Netherlands 
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and the United Kingdom, with respect to the initiative as contained in the 
agreement. The United Nations resolution, in particular, would provide for 
sanctions to be lifted upon the appearance of the two accused in the 
Netherlands for the purpose of trial before the Scottish court. Hence, on 27 
August 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1192.37 The said 
Resolution reads as follows: “The Security Council … 2. Welcomes the 
initiative for the trial of the two persons charged with the bombing of Pan 
Am flight 103 (“the two accused”) before a Scottish court sitting in the 
Netherlands, as contained in the letter dated 24 August 1998 from the 
Acting Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and of the United States of America (“the initiative”) 
and its attachments, and the willingness of the Government of the 
Netherlands to cooperate in the implementation of the initiative;  3. Calls 
upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the United 
Kingdom to take such steps as are necessary to implement the initiative, 
including the conclusion of arrangements with a view to enabling the court 
described in paragraph 2 to exercise jurisdiction in the terms of the intended 
Agreement between the two Governments, attached to the said letter of 24 
August 1998; 4. Decides that all States shall cooperate to this end, and in 
particular that the Libyan Government shall ensure the appearance in the 
Netherlands of the two accused for the purpose of trial by the court 
described in paragraph 2, and that the Libyan Government shall ensure 
that any evidence or witnesses in Libya are, upon the request of the court, 
promptly made available at the court in the Netherlands for the purpose of 
the trial; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consultation with the 
Government of the Netherlands, to assist the Libyan Government with the 
physical arrangements for the safe transfer of the two accused from Libya 
direct to the Netherlands; 6. Invites the Secretary-General to nominate 
international observers to attend the trial.”  
Resolution 1192 then continues as follows: “7. Decides further that, on the 
arrival of the two accused in the Netherlands, the Government of the 
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Netherlands shall detain the two accused pending their transfer for the 
purpose of trial before the court described in paragraph 2; 8. Reaffirms that 
the measures set forth in its resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) remain 
in effect and binding on all Member States, and in this context reaffirms the 
provisions of paragraph 16 of resolution 883 (1993), and decides that the 
aforementioned measures shall be suspended immediately if the Secretary-
General reports to the Council that the two accused have arrived in the 
Netherlands for the purpose of trial before the court described in paragraph 
2 or have appeared for trial before an appropriate court in the United 
Kingdom or the United States, and …; 9. Expresses its intention to consider 
additional measures if the two accused have not arrived or appeared for 
trial promptly in accordance with paragraph 8; 10. Decides to remain seized 
of the matter.”  
 
 
3.4 The handover 
 
The solution to the long-standing Lockerbie deadlock was therefore on the 
way while the handover of the two suspects seemed no longer a remote 
possibility. Nonetheless, many legal and political issues still needed being 
addressed: details needed being specified concerning the rights of the 
accused while in custody inasmuch as guarantees pertaining to witnesses or 
the possibility of further accusations. Other questions were related to the 
place where to have the two suspects imprisoned, if convicted, the official 
lifting to the sanctions and the issue of compensation.38 The issue of the 
imprisonment was one that was immediately sorted out: the United 
Kingdom had excluded that it could possibly take place outside Scotland, 
although Libya had insisted that any sentence of imprisonment should be 
served either in Libya or in the Netherlands. In the event, it was agreed 
that Libya would establish consular relations with the United Kingdom by 
setting a consulate in Scotland in order to monitor the situation of the 
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convicted, which in any case would take place under the United Nations 
observers’ supervision. Obviously, this meant re-establishing diplomatic 
relationship between Libya and the United Kingdom, which would prove a 
noteworthy development.  
Hence, the final arrangement was eventually set up and its details are to 
be found in two documents: a British Order in Council,39 made on 16 
September 1998, conferring the necessary legal authority for Scottish 
criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the 
Netherlands, and an international agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United 
Kingdom, concluded on 18 September 1998, making the diplomatic 
arrangements necessary for the “neutral venue” trial to take place.40 The 
United Kingdom and the United States then engaged in a process of intense 
diplomatic activity in order to persuade the Libyan Government to comply 
with the above-mentioned arrangements. In the event, on 19 March 1999, 
Libya announced its agreement to deliver the two accused for trial before a 
Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands.  
The United Nations Secretary-General was immediately informed of 
Libya’s decision by means of a letter41 in which Libya agreed to hand over 
the two suspects for trial by 6 April 1999 on the basis of the agreed points: 
that a Scottish court would be convened in the Netherlands for the purpose 
of trying the two suspects in accordance with Scottish law and with the 
presence of international observers appointed by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, and also in consultation with the Republic of South 
Africa and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two suspects would be 
permitted to fly on a non-stop flight from Libya to the Netherlands so that 
they would not be susceptible to arrest in a third country. While in the 
Netherlands, they would stand trial only for the Pan Am 103 case, and if 
acquitted, would be returned directly to Libya. In case of conviction, they 
would serve their sentence in Barlinnie Prison in Scotland where United 
Nations monitors would be permanently stationed. The United Kingdom 
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would permit Libya to establish a consulate in Edinburgh to watch over the 
prisoners’ interests.42 The United Nations imposed sanctions would be 
immediately frozen upon the arrival of the two suspects in the Netherlands 
and then lifted upon submission of the Secretary-General’s report to the 
Security Council within 90 days.  
Eventually, on 5 April, the two suspects boarded an Italian governmental 
aircraft flying under the authority of the United Nations that flew them to 
the Netherlands where they were transferred to the site of their 
imprisonment at Camp Zeist43 and handed over to the Scottish police. All 
had gone according to schedule. On that very day, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations addressed a letter44 to the President of the Security 
Council informing that the two accused had safely arrived in the 
Netherlands and the conditions set forth in Resolution 1192 had been met. 
The Secretary-General also expressed his appreciation to all the parties for 
their willingness to arriving at a mutually acceptable solution and to the 
Governments of South Africa and Saudi Arabia for their efforts in search of 
a fair solution. Immediately, the sanctions were suspended. Three days 
later, the Security Council issued a presidential statement in which it noted 
that “with the letter of the Secretary General of 5 April 1999, the conditions 
set forth in paragraph 8 of resolution 1192 (1998) for the immediate 
suspension of the measures set forth in resolution 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) 
ha[d] been fulfilled.” In this regard, the Council recalled that, in accordance 
with resolution 1192 (1998), the measures set forth in resolution 748 (1992) 
and 883 (1993) were immediately suspended upon receipt of the letter of the 
Secretary-General on 5 April 1999 at 14.00 Eastern Standard Time. This 
development was immediately acknowledged through a statement of the 
President of the Security Council to the press on 5 April 1999.45 
The long-standing Lockerbie deadlock was therefore overcome without 
actual extradition to the United Kingdom or the United States taking place. 
What happened instead was the “delivery” of the accused to a third state. In 
fact, the two Libyan suspects were extradited to the United Kingdom only 
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“on paper,” which was however sufficient to allow the Scottish police to take 
over. They were actually surrendered to the Dutch authorities in the first 
place and then delivered not to Scotland but to the Scottish court sitting in 
the Netherlands. Dutch military helicopters actually took the Libyans to 
Camp Zeist, which, from that moment on and until the end of the 
forthcoming trial, would be legally Scottish soil. This proved quite unique a 
situation. Nothing of the like had ever occurred before. This was the first 
time ever that a foreign court sat in another country for the purpose of a 
trial to be held according to the court’s domestic law. The only comparable 
courts that had been sitting in a country where they did not belong to had 
been war tribunals but they had held trials under international legislation. 
The court in Camp Zeist was instead a Scottish court and would apply 
Scottish law and procedure. Thus, the only element of “internationality” was 
the venue where the trial was to be held. That aside, it was a domestic court 
in every respect although it had been created on purpose since it did not 
exist – in fact, it had not even been thought of – before.  
In a way, something very peculiar happened when the two suspects were 
surrendered to a court and not to a country. Their delivery actually 
embodied a de facto extradition, particularly from the perspective of the 
requested state and its domestic law. As Justice Politi said,46 the fact that 
there was no extradition to Scotland pertains only to the venue where the 
court was set up but then it was a Scottish court, which applied Scottish 
law. Nonetheless, the situation was rather peculiar because extradition as 
such can take place only if somebody is delivered from one state to another. 
This never happened in Lockerbie. In fact, Libya had never complied with 
the request of extradition filed by the United Kingdom and the United 
States even when it was the Security Council to adopt resolutions allowing 
no other option and urging Libya to extradite the two suspects. On the other 
hand, the United Kingdom and the United States had made it clear that 
they would accept nothing short of extradition. As already reported, the 
United Kingdom and the United States were in their own right of 
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demanding the extradition of the two alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie 
bombing, whereas Libya was in its own right to claim that it was not bound 
to extradite; rather, it could try the suspects before its own courts according 
to the Montreal Convention of 1971.  
Nonetheless, both sides involved in the Lockerbie wrangle contributed to 
next stages by refusing to come to terms with the counterpart’s stance. In an 
extraordinary measure of international efforts to bring the Lockerbie case to 
a close, all the parties involved eventually agreed upon a Scottish trial in 
the Netherlands, which amounted to renouncing to a proper extradition on 
the one side and to the domestic prosecution on the other. In a way, it had 
been the Security Council to set the stage for the  “third way,” by upholding 
the existing extradition system and yet providing for an alternative since 
the treaty model was proving unworkable.47 It is to be assumed that the 
intervention of the Security Council in extradition was justified, in so far as 
the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, 
thereby legitimising the action of the Council under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter.48 And the International Court of Justice endorsed 
such course of action assuming that, under Article 103 of the United 
Nations Charter, Resolution 748 took precedence over any other 
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention. 
 Nonetheless, the intervention of the Security Council had brought the 
choice between extradition and domestic prosecution down to a situation 
where extradition was required and no other option was given. This had led 
to the long-running deadlock between Libya, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Eventually, it was clear that an alternative way had to be 
found and agreed upon, which should happen in the respect of the 
sovereignty of all parties involved. Surrendering the two Libyan citizens 
before a court allowed the only possible compromise that would have 
overcome the impasse. Thus, the idea of a Scottish court sitting in a third 
country was the political solution that diplomatic efforts eventually brought 
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about for the legal proceedings to come true, which seemed to feature a 
certain sort of fairness.  
This also vested the court at Camp Zeist with a measure of undeniable 
international credibility. As Justice Albie Sachs pointed out, even though a 
court in the United States or the United Kingdom might have been capable 
of delivering a just and fair verdict, the perception would have been 
different: “now they have caught them and therefore they are going to take 
their revenge. The Libyans have hit the Americans and the Britons, now the 
United Kingdom and the United States are striking back.”49 This also 
allowed the suspension of the United Nations sanctions. The United States 
sanctions, instead, remained in place. In fact, the United States kept 
requiring Libya to meet further demands: Libya had still to renounce 
support for terrorism and pay appropriate compensation to the families of 
the victims. It also had to cooperate with the authorities in charge for the 
trial. Thus, the political questions were still there, hindering the full 
normalization of the international community’s relations with Libya and 
maintaining the stigma on the rogue state. Such demands, no matter how 
urgent and important, were however not going to be met prior to the 
conclusion of the trial.  
 
 
 
3.5 Trial arrangements and charges 
 
The trial began before the Scottish court – namely, the High Court of 
Justiciary – housed in Camp Zeist, the Netherlands, on 3 May 2000, after 
lengthy delays necessitated by the defence’s need for adequate time to 
prepare.50 According to the agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the proceedings were to be conducted as if they 
would take place in Scotland, actually under Scottish law. Three judges 
rather than a single judge and jury would try the case.51 The court would 
decide any question of law put to it and would come to its verdict by a 
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majority. In case of an appeal, the appeal court would consist of five judges 
and would be heard either in Scotland or in the Netherlands. The accused 
would be detained in the court building prior to and during the trial. The 
court’s premises were declared to be inviolable. The Dutch authorities were 
actually responsible for the external security of the court building. As far as 
solicitors and advocates of the accused were concerned, it was agreed upon 
that they would not be subjected to any measure, which might affect the free 
and independent exercise of their functions. Witnesses would be allowed 
free admission to attend the court; and international observers would be 
allowed to attend the trial.52  
The court had been established for the sole purpose of trying the two 
Libyan suspects - Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa 
Fhimah - on several charges.53 In fact, it was originally contended that the 
accused were guilty of conspiracy to murder,54 alternatively murder, 
alternatively a contravention of section 2(1) and 2(5) of the Aviation 
Security Act 1982.  The charges against the two accused, previously outlined 
in the Petition of the Procurator Fiscal55 in 1991 and then in the indictment, 
were actually drafted as “alternative charges,” meaning that the accused 
could only be convicted of one of them. Charge one, therefore, was 
conspiracy to murder rather than murder. Charge two, instead, was murder, 
that is to say not the agreement in order to commit the crime but the 
complete and accomplished crime. The difference between the two therefore 
relates to whether the act of murder was completed or not.56 In the 
Lockerbie bombing, the occupants of the aircraft and the 11 residents in 
Lockerbie were certainly murdered. Yet, possible reasons for having both 
the charge of conspiracy and the completed crime was to allow evidence of 
conspiracy to be led and also to safeguard in the event that the completed 
crime could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.  
Thus, the second, alternative charge was that the two accused, being 
members of the Libyan Intelligence Services, destroyed a civil passenger 
aircraft and murdered the 259 passengers and crew on board the aircraft 
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inasmuch as 11 residents of the town of Lockerbie. The indictment narrates 
similar events leading up to the bombing of the aircraft as those outlined 
above with respect to the charge of conspiracy. Yet, the charge of murder 
differs from the charge of conspiracy to murder since it refers to a completed 
crime and not merely to an agreement to commit a crime. Understandably, 
the degree of evidence required to prove a completed crime is greater than 
that required to prove that an accused merely conspired to commit such 
crime. As already reported, the charges were drafted as alternatives.  
Charge three consisted of contravention of Section 2(1) of the Aviation 
Security Act of 1982, which makes it an offence for any person to unlawfully 
and intentionally destroy an aircraft in service, or to damage it to the extent 
as to render it incapable of flight or as to be likely to endanger its safety in 
flight; or, to commit on board an aircraft in flight, any act of violence which 
is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft. Thus, to achieve a conviction 
under the terms of the Aviation Security Act, it would be necessary to show 
that the accused intended to destroy or damage the aircraft or alternatively 
that they committed an act of violence on board the aircraft likely to 
endanger the safety of the aircraft.  
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s submissions, however, the libel was 
restricted to the charge of murder. A common feature of the charges was 
however that the two accused were charged with acting in concert together 
and with unnamed others. The indictment narrates that Abdelbaset Ali 
Mohmed Al Megrahi was a member of the Libyan Intelligence Services, and 
in particular the head of security of Libyan Arab Airlines and then Director 
of the Centre for Strategic Studies in Tripoli. It then specifies that the 
second accused, that is to say Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was the Station 
Manager of Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta.  The prosecution’s case was that 
the cause of the Pan Am 103 disaster was that an explosive device had been 
introduced into the hold of the aircraft by the two accused whether acting 
alone or in concert with each other and others.  In particular, the indictment 
specified the following: between 1 January 1985 and 21 December 1988, 
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both dates inclusive, within the offices of Libyan Arab Airlines at Luqa 
Airport, Malta, and elsewhere in Malta, Megrahi and Fhimah were in 
possession of quantities of high performance plastic explosive and airline 
luggage tags; they, between 20 November and 20 December 1988, both dates 
inclusive, ordered and attempted to obtain delivery - from the firm of MEBO 
AG, in Switzerland - of forty timers capable of detonating explosive devices 
and of a type previously supplied by the said firm of MEBO AG to members 
of the Libyan Intelligence Services.  
The indictment further specifies that Megrahi and Fhimah unlawfully 
removed airline luggage tags between 1 and 21 December 1988, both dates 
inclusive, at Luqa Airport; that Megrahi, on 7 December 1988, in a shop 
known as Mary’s House, in Sliema, Malta, purchased a quantity of clothing 
and an umbrella; that both the accused entered Malta at Luqa Airport on 20 
December 1988, Megrahi using a passport in the false name of Ahmed 
Khalifa Abdusamad; that both the accused caused a suitcase to be 
introduced to Malta; that Megrahi resided at the Holiday Inn, in Sliema, 
using the false identity of Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad, on 20 and 21 
December 1988; that both the accused, on 21 December 1988, at Malta’s 
Luqa Airport, placed or cause to be placed on board an aircraft of Air Malta 
flight KM18O to Frankfurt am Main Airport, Germany, the said suitcase, or 
a similar suitcase, containing the aforementioned clothing and umbrella and 
an improvised explosive device. The latter contained high performance 
plastic explosive concealed within a Toshiba RT SF 16 “Bombeat” radio 
cassette recorder which was programmed to be detonated by one of said 
electronic timers. The suitcase that contained the explosive device had been 
tagged or caused to be tagged so as to be carried by aircraft from Frankfurt 
Airport via London, Heathrow Airport, to New York, John F. Kennedy 
Airport. 
The indictment then narrates that Megrahi departed from Malta on 21 
December 1988 and travelled from there to Tripoli using a passport in the 
already mentioned false name of Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad, while 
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travelling with Mohammed Abouagela Masud, who was also a member of 
the Libyan Intelligence Services; that the mentioned suitcase was thus 
carried to Frankfurt am Main Airport and there placed on board an aircraft 
of Pan American World Airways flight PA 1O3A and carried to London, 
Heathrow Airport where, in turn, it was placed on board an aircraft - flight 
Pan Am l03 to New York, John F. Kennedy Airport; that the said 
improvised explosive device detonated and exploded on board the said 
aircraft Pan Am 1O3 while in flight over  Lockerbie. There, the aircraft was 
destroyed and the wreckage crashed to the ground; the 259 passengers and 
crew inasmuch as 11 residents of the town of Lockerbie were killed. It was 
therefore Megrahi and Fhimah that murdered them. Furthermore, the 
indictment also refers to the fact that, between 1 January 1985 and 21 
December 1988, both dates inclusive, in Tripoli, at Dakar Airport, Senegal, 
in Malta and elsewhere, the Libyan Intelligence Services were in possession 
of the said electronic timers, quantities of high performance plastic 
explosive, detonators and other components of improvised explosive devices 
and Toshiba RT SF 16 “Bombeat” radio cassette recorders, all for issue to 
and use by their members.57 
The absolutely essential component of the charge of murder brought 
against the accused is paragraph g from charge 2 on the indictment: “you 
Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah did on 21 
December 1988 at Luqa Airport aforesaid place or cause to be placed on 
board an aircraft of Air Malta flight KM180 to Frankfurt am Main Airport, 
Federal Republic of Germany said suitcase [the suitcase allegedly 
introduced into Malta by Megrahi on 20 December 1988] or a similar 
suitcase, containing said clothing and umbrella [items allegedly purchased 
by Megrahi from Mary’s House, in Malta, earlier in December] and an 
improvised explosive device containing high performance plastic explosive 
concealed within a Toshiba RT SF 16 “Bombeat” radio cassette recorder and 
programmed to be detonated by one of said electronic timers [timers 
allegedly obtained by the accused from a Swiss company called MEBO AG], 
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having tagged or caused such suitcase to be tagged so as to be carried by 
aircraft from Frankfurt am Main Airport aforesaid via London, Heathrow 
Airport to New York, John F. Kennedy Airport, United States of America.”  
The matter at issue in the Lockerbie trial was therefore whether or not 
the prosecution might prove beyond reasonable doubt that one or other or 
both of the accused were responsible, for the deliberate introduction of the 
explosive device on board Pan Am flight 103. It was not disputed, actually, 
and was adequately proved, that the cause of the disaster was the explosion 
of a device within the aircraft. Nor it was disputed that the person or 
persons who were responsible for the deliberate introduction of the explosive 
device on board the aircraft would be guilty of the crime of murder. The 
evidence proving that Megrahi and Fhimah had placed the explosive device 
or caused it to be placed on the plane was crucial in order to convict them.   
 
 
3.6 Evidence and findings 
 
The trial lasted over one hundred and thirty court days and featured the 
statements of 235 witnesses as well as the admission of thousands of pieces 
of physical and documentary evidence. The whole case basically turned on 
four key pieces of physical evidence recovered from the wreckage of Pan Am 
103, plus one vital document supplied by Germany, and some crucial 
witnesses from the United States, Switzerland, Malta and Sweden. The first 
important piece of physical evidence was the reconstruction of the aircraft 
itself, on the basis of which the court held that there had been a bomb 
detonation in cargo container AVE 4041. The court also held that the 
suitcases loaded onto that particular container came from the Pan Am 
feeder flight (Pan Am 103A) from Frankfurt. The second piece of material 
evidence was the recovery from the wreckage of charred pieces of a Toshiba 
RT-SF 16 “Bombeat” radio cassette player and a brown Samsonite suitcase, 
which the court found had contained the bomb.  
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The third key piece of evidence was the discovery of charred fragments of 
clothing (two pairs of Yorkie trousers, a blue Babygro jumper, and an 
umbrella), which had been packed in the said suitcase. The court found that 
the clothing came from Malta and had been sold by a small store called 
“Mary’s House.” The fourth piece of evidence was a fragment of a circuit 
board for an MST-13 timer, which the court found had been manufactured 
by a Swiss electronics firm called MEBO AG. The latter appeared to be the 
most important piece of evidence and in fact the device that had triggered 
the bomb. The FBI Lab matched the said fragment to a timer seized earlier 
from Libyan agents in West Africa. MEBO actually admitted that it had 
sold twenty such timers to the Libyans in 1985. As far as documentary 
evidence was concerned, the document that played a pivotal role in the case 
was a computer printout of baggage tracking information for Frankfurt 
airport at the time Pan Am feeder flight 103A was being loaded. The 
document proved to the court’s satisfaction that an unaccompanied bag had 
been transferred from Flight KM180 from Malta to Pan Am 103A. 
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that the prosecution had not proved 
how this suspicious suitcase had been placed on board KM180. This, the 
court pointed out, was “a major difficulty for the Crown case.”  
With respect to witnesses, the first one was Abdul Majid, a member of the 
Libyan External Security Organization (JSO) who worked as a double agent 
for the CIA and was then in the United States witness protection program. 
In light of inconsistencies in his testimony and CIA documents released late 
in the trial suggesting he was prone to fabrication, the court found that 
Abdul Majid could not be accepted as a “credible and reliable witness.” After 
summarizing Majid’s various lies and exaggerations, the court concluded: 
“Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism 
that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a 
case where such criticism is more than usually justified.” The court 
therefore rejected Majid’s claims that the defendant Fhimah possessed 
plastic explosives in his office desk at Luqa airport and that he saw the two 
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defendants load a brown Samsonite suitcase into Air Malta flight KM180 on 
the morning of the Lockerbie bombing. The court did, however, accept 
Majid’s testimony that Megrahi was a high-ranking member of the Libyan 
External Security Organization, who travelled on a fake passport, and that 
his job was military procurement. These findings were to prove crucial to 
the verdict.  
The second important witness was Edwin Bollier, the owner of the MEBO 
electronics firm in Zurich. The court found that Bollier was an “untruthful 
and unreliable witness” and much of his testimony “belong[ed] in the realm 
of fiction where it [might] be best placed in the genre of the spy thriller.” 
However, the court accepted Bollier’s testimony that he had rented office 
space “some time in 1988 to the firm ABH in which the first accused 
[Megrahi] and one Badri Hassan were the principals.” The court also 
accepted that Bollier had supplied MEBO MST-13 timers to both Libya and 
the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi), but found that 
there was no positive evidence that the Stasi ever supplied the timers to the 
PFLP-GC terrorist group as the defense rather suggested.  
The most important witness of all was however Tony Gauci, the proprietor 
of Mary’s House in Malta. Gauci actually identified Megrahi in court as the 
person who purchased the clothing that had been found in the Lockerbie 
bomb suitcase, although in the words of the court it was “not an unequivocal 
identification.” The court noted that Gauci had previously identified 
individuals other than the defendant out of photo displays. In particular, 
Gauci had previously said that a photo of Abu Talb, a member of a 
Palestinian terrorist group, “resembled him a lot.” Gauci also testified that 
it had been raining the evening of the sale and that his brother had been at 
home watching a soccer game on TV. However, the day Megrahi was in 
Malta and allegedly purchased the clothes from Mary’s House, December 7, 
1988, had, according to meteorological records, been dry and there was no 
soccer game on TV.  
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Despite the above-mentioned inconsistencies, the court stated that it was 
“nevertheless satisfied that [Gauci’s] identification so far as it went of the 
first accused as the purchaser was reliable and should be treated as a highly 
important element in this case.” Then, the final important witness was Abu 
Talb, a member of a Palestinian terrorist group, who had close ties to a 
PFLP-GC bomb-making operation in Germany that was uncovered by 
German authorities two months before the Lockerbie bombing. Talb, it was 
revealed, had been in Malta in late October 1988. He was subsequently 
arrested and convicted by a Swedish court in 1989 for a series of terrorist 
bombings in Copenhagen. A search of his apartment in 1989 had uncovered 
a barometric detonator, clothing from Malta, and a calendar with the date of 
Pan Am flight 103 bombing, December 21, 1988, circled. Despite these 
revelations, the court concluded: “We accept that there is a great deal of 
suspicion as to the acting of Abu Talb and his circle, but there is no evidence 
to indicate that they had either the means or the intention to destroy a civil 
aircraft in December 1988.”  
As far as the findings in fact are concerned, the court in Camp Zeist 
established as credible and proven that the seat of the explosion was in a 
particular Samsonite suitcase (which contained clothing manufactured in 
Malta and sold both there and elsewhere) at or near the bottom of a 
particular aluminium luggage container (AVE 4041); that the bomb had 
been contained in a black Toshiba RT SF 16 cassette recorder; that a 
fragment of circuit board from a MST-13 timer manufactured in Zurich by 
MEBO AG formed part of the timing mechanism which detonated the bomb; 
that MEBO AG supplied MST-13 timers to the Libyan army, and may have 
done so also to other customers such as the East German Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit.  
As far as Megrahi was concerned, the court established as credible and 
proven that he was a member of the Libyan intelligence services and was 
known to the principals of MEBO AG; that he was involved, in an official 
capacity, in obtaining for Libya electronic equipment (including timers) from 
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MEBO; that he possessed and used Libyan passports in false names; that, 
sometimes under a false name, visited Malta on a number of occasions in 
1988, including the night of 20/21 December; that arrived in Malta by air 
from Tripoli with a hard-shelled brown suitcase at some point in the two or 
three weeks following 7 December 1988; that some weeks before 21 
December 1988, a person who “resembled a lot” Megrahi, but who also 
“resembled a lot” Mohamed Abu Talb, bought in Malta items of clothing and 
an umbrella like those that the Crown assumed be in the suitcase that 
contained the bomb; that in 1986 a conversation took place between 
Megrahi and Abdul Majid regarding the possibility of a piece of 
unaccompanied baggage being inserted onto a British aircraft at Malta.  In 
the course of that conversation Megrahi used the words “Don’t rush things.”  
About MEBO, the court found that a company of which a Libyan 
intelligence operative was a principal for a time had office accommodation in 
the premises occupied by the said MEBO in Zurich. As far as the second 
accused was concerned, the court established as credible and proven that 
Fhimah travelled by air to Malta on 20 December 1988 and departed by air 
the following day; that he was then in possession of a permit (obtained when 
he was station manager for Libyan Arab Airlines) which allowed him access 
to airside at Luqa Airport; that Fhimah, when he was station manager for 
Libyan Arab Airlines (which he ceased to be some months before the 
Lockerbie bombing), kept blocks of plastic explosive in his desk drawer at 
Luqa Airport; that a diary kept by Fhimah contained entries for a date six 
days before the Lockerbie bombing referring to the arrival of Abdusamad 
(the false name sometimes used by Megrahi) in Malta from Zurich and to 
getting tags from Air Malta.  
And then, in respect of the suitcase, the court found that a piece of 
interline baggage arrived at the luggage station (206) at Frankfurt Airport 
used for baggage destined for flight Pan Am 103A (the feeder flight to 
Heathrow) on 21 December 1988 at a time consistent with its having been 
offloaded from flight KM 180 from Malta; that, albeit the security and 
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baggage reconciliation systems in operation at Luqa Airport in 1988 were 
highly effective by international standards, it would have been theoretically 
possible for an unaccompanied suitcase to be introduced into the interline 
baggage system at that airport, though there was no documentary or other 
record of any such piece of baggage being loaded on Air Malta flight KM 180 
to Frankfurt on 21 December 1988.  
The clothing issue was obviously a very important piece of evidence. 
Actually, the judges held it proved that Megrahi bought from Mary’s House, 
in Malta, the clothes and umbrella which were in the suitcase with the 
bomb and that the date of purchase was 7 December 1988 (when Megrahi 
was on Malta).  The fact that Megrahi was the purchaser was held proven 
on the basis of what Mr. Tony Gauci had said. As already reported, he 
actually assessed that Megrahi “resembled a lot” the purchaser, a phrase 
which he equally used with reference to Abu Talb, one of those mentioned in 
the special defence of incrimination58 lodged on behalf of Megrahi. Gauci 
had also described his customer to the police as being six feet tall and over 
fifty years of age.  However, the evidence at the trial established that 
Megrahi is five feet eight inches tall and was thirty-six years old in 
December 1988. Tony Gauci also said that when the purchaser left his shop 
it was raining to such an extent that his customer thought it advisable to 
buy an umbrella to protect himself while he went in search of a taxi. The 
unchallenged meteorological evidence, as already reported, established that 
it was unlikely that it had rained at all on 7 December; and if there had 
been any rain, it would have been no more than a few drops. Yet, the judges 
found that the clothes were purchased on 7 December.  
The judges also held it proved that the bomb was contained in a piece of 
unaccompanied baggage which was transported on Air Malta flight KM 180 
from Luqa to Frankfurt on 21 December 1988, and was then carried to 
Heathrow where Pan Am flight 103 was loaded from empty. The evidence 
supporting the finding that there was such a piece of unaccompanied 
baggage was the above mentioned computer printout which could be 
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interpreted to indicate that a piece of baggage went through the particular 
luggage coding station at Frankfurt Airport used for baggage from flight KM 
180, and was routed towards the feeder flight to Heathrow, at a time 
consistent with its having been offloaded from KM 180. Against this, the 
evidence from Luqa Airport in Malta was to the effect that there was no 
unaccompanied bag on that flight to Frankfurt. All luggage on that flight 
were accounted for. The number of bags loaded into the hold matched the 
number of bags checked in (and subsequently collected) by the passengers 
on the aircraft. The court nevertheless held it proved that there had been a 
piece of unaccompanied baggage on flight KM 180.  
It has already been stressed that a very important link to Libya in the 
evidence was a fragment of circuit board from a MST-13 timer 
manufactured by MEBO AG. Timers of this model were supplied 
predominantly to Libya although a few did go elsewhere, such as to the East 
German Stasi. This fragment was very important since it was the only piece 
of evidence that indicated that the Lockerbie bomb was detonated by a 
stand-alone, long-running timing mechanism, as distinct from a short-term 
timer triggered by a barometric device when the aircraft reached a pre-
determined altitude. The origin of this vitally important piece of evidence 
was challenged by the defence and, in their written Opinion, the judges 
accepted that in a substantial number of respects this fragment, for reasons 
that were never satisfactorily explained, was not dealt with by the 
investigators and forensic scientists in the same way as other pieces of 
electronic circuit board (of which there were a multitude). The judges said 
that they were however satisfied that there was no sinister reason for the 
differential treatment. But the reason why they were satisfied is not really 
explained. 
The court eventually rendered its verdict on January 31, 2001, after over 
one hundred and thirty court days. The three judges in charge for the 
Lockerbie case issued a unanimous verdict of guilty59 of murder in respect of 
one of the accused, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, who was sentenced 
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to life imprisonment, with a recommendation that he served at least twenty 
years.  The court issued a unanimous verdict of not guilty of murder in 
respect of the other one, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. The murder conviction of 
Megrahi was therefore basically based on four findings: first, that he was 
proved to be a Libyan intelligence officer “of fairly high rank;” second, that 
he travelled on a fake passport; third, that he was in military procurement 
and had dealings with MEBO; and fourth, that Gauci had identified him as 
the purchaser of the clothing found in the bomb suitcase. As far as Libya’s 
responsibility for the bombing was concerned, the court stated: “The clear 
inference which we draw from this evidence is that the conception, planning, 
and execution of the plot which led to the planting of the explosive device 
was of Libyan origin.” From the point of view of the families of the victims, 
the latter was to prove the most important finding in the judgment since it 
suggested Libya’s responsibility for the bombing. The court did not, 
however, indicate how high up the Libyan Government chain of command 
the responsibility extended, nor did it rule out the possibility that other 
countries had also been involved in the bombing plot, as many experts still 
suspect.60  
As the prosecution conceded in the closing submissions, the case against 
Megrahi was entirely circumstantial, which is obviously no bar to a verdict 
of guilty, since circumstantial evidence can be as persuasive as the direct 
evidence provided by eyewitnesses to the commission of a crime. The 
prosecution also conceded that they had not been able to prove how the 
bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103 got into the interline baggage system and 
on board the aircraft. Here and there, the verdict seems quite unsatisfactory 
and the evidence does not seem to prove responsibilities beyond “any 
reasonable doubt.” In fact, the court itself acknowledged the following: “We 
are aware that in relation to certain aspects to the case there are a number 
of uncertainties and qualifications. We are also aware that there is a danger 
that by selecting parts of the evidence which seem to fit together and 
ignoring parts that might not fit, it is possible to read into a mass of 
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conflicting evidence a pattern or conclusion which is not really justified. 
However, having considered the whole evidence in the case, including the 
uncertainties and qualifications, and the submissions of counsel, we are 
satisfied that the evidence as to the purchase of clothing in Malta, the 
presence of that clothing in the primary suitcase, the transmission of the 
item of baggage from Malta to London, the identification of the accused 
(albeit not absolute), his movements under a false name at or around the 
material time, and other background circumstances such as his association 
with Mr. Bollier and with members of the JSO or Libyan military who 
purchased MST-13 timers, does fit together to form a real convincing 
pattern. There is nothing in the evidence which leaves us with any 
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the first accused, and accordingly we find 
him guilty of the remaining charge in the indictment amended.” 
 
 
3.7 Reactions to the verdict 
 
This was the unanimous outcome of a trial that lasted eight months. As 
already reported, the verdict did not implicate those higher up in the Libyan 
Government, nor did it rule out the possible involvement of other countries 
in the bombing. Ostensibly, portions of the judgment read as though the text 
had been drafted for a “not proven” verdict,61 which is used under Scottish 
law when the evidence does not rise to the level of “beyond reasonable 
doubt.” However, the three judges said that they found Megrahi to be guilty 
beyond any reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, a number of commentators have 
found the verdict based on very weak and controversial evidence. Experts 
like Professor Robert Black wrote that, for the judges to be satisfied of all 
the matters on the evidence led at the trial, “they would require to adopt the 
posture of the White Queen in Through the Looking-Glass, when she 
informed Alice - Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible 
things before breakfast.”62  
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In Professor Black’s submission, this is demonstrated clearly in their 
approach to the identity of the purchaser of the clothing and the date of the 
purchase. The judges actually held it proved that it was Megrahi who 
bought from Mary’s House in Malta the clothes and umbrella which were in 
the suitcase with the bomb and that the date of purchase was 7 December 
1988 (when Megrahi was on Malta). Yet, the Maltese shopkeeper, Tony 
Gauci, said that Megrahi “resembled a lot” the purchaser, a phrase which he 
equally used with reference to Abu Talb, one of those mentioned in the 
special defence of incrimination lodged on behalf of Megrahi. Gauci had also 
described the purchaser as being six feet tall and over fifty years of age. The 
evidence at the trial instead established that Megrahi is five feet eight 
inches tall and that in 1988 he was only thirty-six years old. Tony Gauci 
also said that when the purchaser left his shop it was raining to such an 
extent that his customer thought it advisable to buy an umbrella. The 
unchallenged meteorological evidence, though, established that it was 
unlikely that it had rained at all on 7 December. Nonetheless, the judges 
held it proven that Megrahi was the purchaser and that the clothes were 
purchased on 7 December 1988.  
Another crucial aspect in the prosecution’s case that the court, in Robert 
Black’s view, approached in a questionable way was that the bomb was 
contained in a piece of unaccompanied baggage which was transported on 
Air Malta flight KM 180 from Luqa to Frankfurt on 21 December 1988, and 
was then carried to Heathrow where Pan Am flight 103 was loaded from 
empty.  As already reported, the evidence supporting the finding that there 
was such a piece of unaccompanied baggage was a computer printout which 
could be interpreted to indicate that a piece of baggage went through the 
particular luggage coding station at Frankfurt Airport used for baggage 
from KM 180, and was routed towards the feeder flight to Heathrow, at a 
time consistent with its having been offloaded from KM 180. Against this, 
the evidence from Luqa Airport in Malta (whose baggage reconciliation and 
security systems were proven to be, by international standards, very 
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effective) was to the effect that there was no unaccompanied bag on that 
flight to Frankfurt. All luggages on that flight were accounted for. The 
number of bags loaded into the hold matched the number of bags checked in 
and subsequently collected by the passengers on the aircraft.  The court 
nevertheless held it proved that there had been a piece of unaccompanied 
baggage on flight KM 180 from Malta to Frankfurt, which, in Professor 
Black’s view, is at least pretty questionable.  
Robert Black also raised questions with respect to the MST-13 timer. An 
important link to Libya in the evidence was actually a fragment of circuit 
board from a MST-13 timer manufactured by MEBO AG. As already 
reported, such timers were widely supplied to Libya although a few did go 
elsewhere, such as to the East German Stasi. The said fragment was 
however crucial since it was proved that the Lockerbie bomb was detonated 
by “a stand-alone, long-running timing mechanism, as distinct from a short-
term timer triggered by a barometric device when the aircraft reached a pre-
determined altitude,” the latter being a method known to be favoured by 
certain Palestinian terrorist cells operating in Europe in 1988. The 
provenance of this important piece of evidence was challenged by the 
defence and, in their written Opinion, the judges accepted that in a 
substantial number of respects this fragment was not dealt with by the 
investigators and forensic scientists in the same way as other pieces of 
electronic circuit board. The judges nonetheless said that they were satisfied 
that there was no sinister reason for the differential treatment. According to 
Professor Black, this also cast a shadow on the court’s verdict and made it 
look rather flimsy. In fact, it was the court itself that acknowledged the fact 
that to certain parts of the case there were uncertainties and qualifications 
and that this could lead the evidence in an unconvincing way. In this 
respect, Professor Black argued that the judges’ intellectual recognition of 
the aforementioned situation did not in the least appear to have enabled 
them to avoid it.63 In Black’s opinion, therefore, the Lockerbie verdict was 
highly flawed. 
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Many other commentators harshly criticised the Lockerbie verdict. One of 
those was Professor Hans Kochler, that is to say one of the United Nations 
observers.64 First of all, in his report, Kochler pointed at the extraordinary 
length of detention of the two suspects and said that the “highly political 
circumstances of the trial” inasmuch as “special security considerations 
related to the political nature of the trial” might have adversely affected the 
rights of the accused, in particular as far as the length of the administrative 
detention was concerned. Besides, he pointed to the presence of government 
representatives in the courtroom on the side of the prosecution and defence 
team as a presence that jeopardized the independence and integrity of legal 
procedures and was certainly at variance with the general standards of due 
process and fairness of the trial.65 He said that their presence created the 
impression of “supervisors handling vital matters of the prosecution 
strategy and deciding, in certain cases, which documents (evidence) were to 
be released in open court or what parts of information contained in a certain 
document were to be withheld (deleted).” In Hans Kochler’s view, the 
presence of de facto governmental representatives of both sides in the 
courtroom negatively impacted on the court’s ability to find the truth since 
it introduced a political element into the proceedings.  
The United Nations observer also highlighted that a general pattern of 
the trial consisted in the fact that virtually all people presented by the 
prosecution as key witnesses were proven to lack credibility to a very high 
extent, in certain cases even having openly lied to the court. He therefore 
considered the guilty verdict in the case of Megrahi as particularly 
incomprehensible in view of the admission by the judges themselves that 
the identification by the Maltese shop owner was “not absolute” and that 
there was a “mass of conflicting evidence.” Besides, a general pattern of the 
trial consisted in the fact that virtually all people presented by the 
prosecution as key witnesses were proven to lack credibility to a very high 
extent and often made contradictory statements. Thus, their credibility was 
pretty questionable. With respect to the evidence, Kochler also suggested 
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that substantial information had been withheld from the court, “as an 
apparent result of political interests and considerations,” although the court 
seemed to be content with such situation.  
Furthermore, in Hans Kochler’s view, the alternative theory of the 
defence – which would have obviously led to conclusions contradictory to 
those of the prosecution – was never seriously investigated. Thus, the 
United Nations observer inferred that “foreign governments or (secret) 
governmental agencies [might] have been allowed, albeit indirectly, to 
determine, to a considerable extent, which evidence was made available to 
the court.” Nor he spared the defence team and actually said that the fact 
that the defence cancelled the appearance of most of its witnesses put into 
question the credibility of the defence’s course of action and underlying 
motives. On top of that, Kochler expressed the view that the Opinion of the 
court seemed to be inconsistent since, while the first accused was found 
“guilty,” the second accused was found “not guilty,” although the indictment 
in its very essence was based on the joint action of the two accused in Malta.  
Professor Kochler also highlighted the arbitrary aspect of the decision by 
stressing that the prosecution, at a certain stage of the trial, decided to 
“split” the accusation and change the very essence of the indictment by 
renouncing the identification of the second accused as a member of Libyan 
intelligence so as to actually disengage him from the formerly alleged 
collusion with Megrahi. Thus, he concluded that the guilty verdict with 
respect to the latter “appeared to be arbitrary, even irrational.” Thus, 
Professor Kochler’s conclusion was that “the air of international power 
politics” affected the outcome of the trial at large, which is utterly 
despicable but it is a fact that no judicial procedure is possible if political 
interests succeed in interfering in the actual conduct of a court. Kochler 
stressed that the goals of criminal justice on an international level cannot be 
advanced in a context of power politics and in the absence of an elaborate 
division of powers, since the rule of law is not compatible with the rules of 
power politics and justice cannot be done unless in complete independence.  
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He therefore inferred that political considerations might have been 
overriding a strictly judicial evaluation of the Lockerbie case, thus adversely 
affecting the outcome of the trial at Camp Zeist, which turned out to be 
unfair and conducted in an unobjective manner. In Kochler’s view, the 
realities faced by the Scottish court in the Netherlands have featured a 
dramatic political implication stemming from a highly complex web of 
national and transnational interests related to the interaction among 
several major actors on the international scene. Instead, in Professor 
Kochler’s view, truth in a matter of criminal justice has to be found through 
a transparent inquiry that can only be possible if all considerations of power 
politics are put aside. Thus, the trial was adversely influenced by politics 
and the verdict was utterly flawed.  
Thus, both Robert Black and Hans Kochler, inasmuch as many others,66 
found the Lockerbie verdict pretty unconvincing and actually suspected that 
Megrahi had been convicted just because the court wanted to find a 
scapegoat in order to bring the case to an end. There were those who said 
that the Lockerbie affair had been a triumph of realpolitik over all the 
evidence and questions of motive.67 In fact, the above-mentioned 
commentators seemed to agree about the fact that the verdict of guilt was 
supported by flimsy and controversial evidence and that the political impact 
the trial would have was an overriding factor that simply out-staged the 
reasons of law. The basic assumption was that the three judges at Camp 
Zeist intended to come up with a verdict of guilt and this is why they 
considered themselves satisfied with pieces of evidence that did not seem all 
that persuasive. This does not necessarily mean assuming Megrahi to be 
innocent. Those who expressed critical views about the Lockerbie verdict 
rather seemed to think that Megrahi’s culpability was not proven, which is 
obviously something very different from him being “not guilty.” Besides, 
Megrahi was nothing more than a foot soldier. Nobody higher up in the 
Libyan ranks had been involved and many questions were still un-resolved.  
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Not everybody agreed with the said critical approach, though. Professor 
Clare Connelly of the University of Glasgow,68 for example, addressed the 
criticism consisting in the fact that the verdict was split since one of the 
accused was convicted and the other was acquitted, although in the 
indictment they had been said to act in concert. Professor Connelly actually 
said that there was nothing odd in splitting the verdict.69 In fact, the 
evidence pertaining to the two accused was very different. There was 
actually a large quantity of evidence in respect to Megrahi, and the nature 
of that evidence was such that it pointed towards a verdict of guilty. With 
respect to Fhimah, who was acquitted, there was a lot less evidence that 
was presented to the court. And in the written judgment, the judges said 
that even if one could infer some sort of sinister purpose from the entries in 
his diary in regard to getting luggage tags in Malta, still there was no 
evidence whatsoever that he had knowledge as to even why he was asked to 
get those tags to Megrahi.  
As Justice Richard Goldstone said,70 the task of a court is not winning 
cases but just ensuring that people have fair trials. If somebody is acquitted, 
it means that there is no convincing evidence against him. This is the way 
the legal system works. Again, Professor Connelly also addressed the 
question of the Libyan Government involvement and specified that the fact 
that just a foot soldier might have been convicted did not mean that the 
verdict was unfair and that Megrahi was a scapegoat. As a matter of fact, 
the trial at Camp Zeist involved the two accused, that is to say Megrahi and 
Fhimah. No one else was on trial there, neither individuals nor other 
government agencies. Obviously, the families of the victims and many 
others may still have questions but it was not for the trial to answer those 
questions, since a trial is not a public inquiry or anything of the like. And 
certainly, at Camp Zeist, it was two individuals and not an entire country or 
a regime, to be tried. Besides, as Justice Albie Sachs clearly pointed out, the 
fact that it is not possible to punish everybody does not mean that law must 
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be prevented from punishing only somebody.71 A little justice is better than 
no justice whatsoever, after all. 
Peter Watson, who has been involved in the Lockerbie case in the capacity 
of legal representative for the families of many of the victims, actually said72 
that Hans Kochler’s criticisms are totally unreasonable and shows how little 
knowledge the United Nations representative had of the Scottish legal 
system. For instance, Kochler criticised the court because representatives of 
“foreign governments” – namely, an official from the United States 
Department of Justice and a Libyan lawyer – sat respectively with the 
prosecution and defence.  Kochler actually said that they were “checking 
notes and passing them on.” In Watson’s view, the absurdity of such 
criticism is self-evident since anyone with a basic knowledge of procedure 
knows it is not for the court to decide who the prosecution or defence have 
sitting with them. Professor Kochler also pointed out that efforts were 
undertaken to “withhold” substantial information from the court, which the 
court was surprisingly content with. Peter Watson specifies that Kochler 
here referred to information received by the prosecution from a foreign 
government which the prosecution undertook to investigate but which was 
not subsequently led in evidence. Watson says that this again proves the 
ignorance of basic legal procedure, since it is for the prosecution and the 
defence to decide what evidence to lead or not lead. The role of the court, 
instead, is to be a judge of fact on what is presented, since the Scottish 
system is not an inquisitorial one and therefore it is not for the judges to 
investigate.  
As far as the attack on the way in which the credibility and reliability of 
witnesses was approached by the court, Peter Watson highlights that it is 
central to the intellectual rigour and fairness of the Scottish legal system 
that juries and judges must examine a witness’s whole evidence and only 
accept those parts, which are accepted as true and reliable, which is neither 
irrational nor arbitrary, as Hans Kochler pointed out. It is just the way the 
Scottish legal system works, a system that in Watson’s view Hans Kochler 
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seems to ignore. In fact, Professor Kochler’s profound ignorance of the 
Scottish legal system was also proved by his criticisms which labelled as 
“incomprehensible” the acquittal of one of the accused and the conviction of 
another albeit they were charged as acting jointly. Peter Watson once again 
points out that this is simply the way the Scottish legal system works and it 
is therefore absolutely normal and legitimate that courts look at the 
evidence against each accused separately. In fact, only if there is sufficient 
evidence accepted as both credible and reliable against each accused, a court 
could proceed to convict.  
Thus, the reactions to the Lockerbie verdict were pretty mixed. There 
were those who found the verdict incomprehensible, flawed and even 
irrational and those who found the criticisms totally groundless and prone 
to show the utmost ignorance of the Scottish legal system. Yet, it was quite 
impressive that one of the United Nations observers was so critical about 
the verdict not to mention Professor Black, who was certainly an expert on 
the Scottish legal system and yet harshly criticised the verdict. On the other 
hand, other experts that followed closely the trial found their criticisms 
unacceptable. Thus, even before an appeal was filed, the debate about the 
happenings at Camp Zeist had already heated up. 
 
 
3.8 The appeal 
 
As expected, Megrahi appealed against his conviction.73 During the 
appeal, he was supposed to remain in jail, in Zeist, pursuant to article 15 of 
the Statutory Instrument – Order in Council - no. 2251/1998.74 Should his 
appeal be unsuccessful, Megrahi would have been transferred to a prison in 
Scotland. The appeal,75 pursuant to article 14 of the aforementioned 
Statutory Instrument, was to be heard before five Lords Commissioners of 
Justiciary, nominated by the Lord Justice Clerk, at the Scottish court at 
Camp Zeist.  The appellant listed a number of grounds of appeal but did not 
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contend that the evidence the trial court had relied upon in order to convict 
him could not afford a sufficient basis in law for his conviction. Rather, some 
of the grounds of appeal maintained that the evidence was not of such 
nature, quality or power to enable a certain conclusion to be drawn or to 
justify a particular finding. However, the great majority of the grounds were 
directed to the way the trial court had dealt with the evidence and defence 
submissions.  
It was actually maintained that the trial court had misinterpreted the 
evidence and wrongly considered certain factors as supportive of guilt. The 
appellant also said that the trial court had failed to give adequate reasons in 
respect of some specific issues. In particular, the appellant maintained that 
the trial court had failed to take proper account of, or have proper regard to, 
or give proper weight to, or gave insufficient weight to, certain evidence, 
factors or considerations. Besides, the appellant said that the trial court 
misunderstood, or failed to deal with, or properly take account of, certain 
submissions for the defence. On top of that, in one of the grounds of appeal, 
the appellant contended that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, because 
some evidence was not heard in the original proceedings. 
According to the appellant, for instance, the trial court would have erred 
in finding that the date of the purchase of the clothes from the shop at 
Mary’s House, in Malta, was 7 December 1988, inasmuch as in accepting 
Gauci’s identification of Megrahi as the purchaser of the said clothes, 
identification the trial court did not adequately justify. In the appellant’s 
view, the trial court also failed to deal with and resolve the contradictions 
and inconsistencies in the evidence of Gauci regarding both the date of the 
purchase and the identity of the purchaser. Besides, the trial court had 
misdirected itself as to the accuracy of the records from Frankfurt Airport 
from which it found that an inference could be drawn that an 
unaccompanied bag travelled on KM 180 from Luqa airport to Frankfurt 
and was there loaded onto PA103A.  
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In this respect, the appellant actually contended that the documents and 
other evidence from Frankfurt, properly construed, were not of sufficient 
strength, quality or character to found the court’s conclusion pertaining to 
the “trip” of the unaccompanied piece of luggage that allegedly contained the 
bomb. The trial court had therefore erred in concluding that the bomb-
suitcase was dispatched from Malta. The appellant also argued that the 
court failed to have proper regard to the defence submissions as to the 
factors which would have deterred a terrorist from attempting to ingest a 
bomb bag at Luqa.  In the appellant’s submission, the trial court had 
actually failed to take account of the defence submission that the fact that 
the primary suitcase was located at or near to the optimum position to 
achieve its destructive purpose gave rise to an inference that the device was 
ingested at Heathrow airport.  
The appeal court, before addressing in detail every single ground of 
appeal, found it important to cast some light, in its Opinion, on the way the 
Scottish system actually works. It therefore referred to Section 106 of the 
Scottish Criminal Procedure Act of 1995, which makes provision for a right 
of appeal against conviction by a jury. Under subsection (3), an appellant 
may bring under review of the High Court “any alleged miscarriage of 
justice, which may include such a miscarriage based on (a) ….. , the 
existence and significance of evidence which was not heard at the original 
proceedings; and (b) the jury’s having returned a verdict which no 
reasonable jury, properly directed, could have returned.” The appeal court 
specified that, in Megrahi’s appeal, one of the grounds of appeal had invoked 
paragraph (a) of section 106, subsection (3). There was no reference, instead, 
to the aforementioned paragraph (b). Thus, the appeal court found that 
Megrahi’s appeal was based on allegations of “miscarriage of justice” within 
the generality of that expression in subsection (3), with the exception of one 
ground of appeal only.   
Besides, the specific grounds of appeal submitted by Megrahi’s counsels 
were tabled in order to challenge the conviction only and did not even 
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concern the recommendation that a minimum of twenty years should be 
served before release was to be considered, recommendation which had 
accompanied the court’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Nor the 
appellant’s counsels contended that those parts of the evidence not rejected 
by the trial court in the original proceedings did not afford a sufficient basis 
in law for conviction. The said concessions proved pivotal as the appeal court 
emphasised in the penultimate paragraph of its Opinion, which reads as 
follows:  “When opening the case for the appellant before this court, Mr. 
Taylor [the appellant’s counsel] stated that the appeal was not about 
sufficiency of evidence: he accepted that there was a sufficiency of evidence. 
He also stated that he was not seeking to found on section 106(3)(b) of the 
1995 Act. His position was that the trial court  had misdirected itself in 
various respects. Accordingly, in this appeal we have not required to 
consider whether the evidence before the trial court, apart from the evidence 
which it rejected, was sufficient as a matter of law to entitle it to convict the 
appellant on the basis set out in its judgment. We have not had to consider 
whether the verdict of guilty was one which no reasonable trial court, 
properly directing itself, could have returned in the light of that evidence.”  
This meant that the appeal court was constrained to operate within 
narrow limits as set out by the appeal’s grounds, which disabled it from 
reviewing issues such as the sufficiency of the evidence in law in order to 
justify crucial findings in fact, like the date of the purchase of the clothes in 
Malta, the identity of the purchaser, the place where the bomb suitcase 
started its journey and so forth. For the same reason, the appeal court was 
also prevented from considering whether those findings were such that no 
reasonable court, properly directing itself, would have returned verdict of 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. What the appellant asked the court to do 
instead, was to hold that some findings in fact were based upon a 
misunderstanding of the evidence or were not supported by the evidence 
admitted or were arrived at by giving undue weight to evidence that 
supported them or insufficient weight to evidence that contradicted them. 
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Or, were in the nature of inferences from primary facts drawn in situations 
where other, non-incriminating inferences, were also open. The appellant 
also submitted that a miscarriage of justice could be based on the failure of 
the trial court to give adequate reasons for its conclusions, including reasons 
of adequate clarity.  
Since the trial court had included in its judgment not only factual findings 
and reasoning leading to the conviction of the appellant, but also an account 
of evidence which it had accepted or rejected, the weight attached to the said 
evidence and the submissions made to it, the appeal court could certainly 
know the basis on which the conviction of the appellant was founded, and 
hence it could determine whether the trial court had misdirected itself by 
misinterpreting such evidence or failing to take other evidence into account. 
Nevertheless, in the appeal court’s view, the trial court’s reasons did not 
need to be utterly detailed; nor the trial court had to review whatever fact 
and argument on either side; besides, reasons do not require to be given for 
every single stage in the decision-making process. Moreover, the appeal 
court specified that, once the evidence has been accepted by a trial court, it 
is for that court only to determine what inferences should be drawn from 
that evidence. If evidence is capable of giving rise to two or more possible 
inferences, it is for the trial court to decide whether an inference should be 
drawn and, if so, which inference. 
In many of the grounds of appeal, it was said that the trial court failed to 
take proper account of, or have proper regard to, or give proper weight to, or 
gave insufficient weight to, certain evidence, factors or considerations. In 
this respect, the appeal court stated that whenever it is not contended that a 
trial court has misdirected itself by ignoring something, the amount of 
weight that should be attached to it is a matter solely for the trial court, and 
not for the appeal court. If, of course, the appeal court were satisfied that a 
particular inference drawn by the trial court was not a possible inference, in 
the sense that the drawing of such an inference was not open to the trial 
court on the evidence, that would be indicative of a misdirection and the 
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appeal court would require to assess whether or not it had been material. 
Obviously, the fact that the trial court delivered a reasoned judgment does 
not affect the nature and extent of the role of an appeal court in reviewing 
any alleged miscarriage of justice.  
The initial question for an appeal court should therefore be whether, in 
arriving at its verdict, the trial court misdirected itself either in law or as to 
a matter of fact so that it took a course which was not entitled to do or failed 
to do what it should have done. The further question would therefore be 
whether a miscarriage of justice had resulted. Nonetheless, in Megrahi’s 
appeal, it was not maintained that the evidence before the trial court, apart 
from the evidence which it had rejected, was not sufficient as a matter of 
law to entitle it to convict the appellant. The grounds of appeal were mainly 
concerned with the trial court’s treatment of the evidence and defence 
submissions. Obviously, since the prosecution’s case against the appellant 
was based on circumstantial evidence, it was necessary for the trial court to 
consider all the circumstances founded on by the prosecution.  
In this respect, the appeal court found that it was open to the trial court 
to hold the guilt of the appellant to be proved on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence coming from at least two independent sources. As far as 
circumstantial cases are concerned, it is actually necessary to look at the 
evidence as a whole, which means that individual pieces of circumstantial 
evidence do not need to be incriminating in itself; what matters is their 
concurrence. The appeal court also specified that if the nature of 
circumstantial evidence is such that it may be open to more than one 
interpretation, it was precisely the role of the trial court to decide which 
interpretation to adopt. As far as the two accused were concerned, the trial 
court bore in mind that the evidence against each of them had to be 
considered separately, even though such pieces of evidence could be 
regarded as implicating either. In fact, the trial court could be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt as to Megrahi’s guilt whereas it inferred that there 
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was insufficient corroboration for convicting Fhimah. Thus, the latter was 
acquitted. 
The appeal court held that in two or three instances the trial court had 
found the facts proved on the basis of a misunderstanding of the evidence 
led, or where there was no evidential basis for the finding. But, in each such 
case, it  went on to decide that the error was insignificant and incapable of 
affecting the outcome of the trial one way or another. Therefore, those errors 
did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice. For example, Megrahi’s lawyers 
tried to contend that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, because some 
evidence was not heard in the original proceedings. This evidence related to 
a breach of security at Heathrow terminal 3 (which could have provided 
access to the baggage build-up area) the night before Pan Am 103 departed 
from the same terminal on its fatal flight.  
The appeal court allowed the new evidence to be led before it, but then 
concluded that it was not that important, meaning that it would have not 
had any material bearing on the court’s determination of the issue of 
whether the suitcase containing the bomb had started its journey at Luqa 
Airport in Malta or in Heathrow instead. This ground of appeal was 
therefore rejected inasmuch as all the others, directed towards issues of 
“weight” or “proper regard” given to the evidence. The latter were all 
rejected as raising matters not within the competence or powers of the 
appeal court. In fact, as long as it was not contended that no reasonable trial 
court could have made the findings in fact, challenges of findings on these 
grounds were simply not competent. The weight to be given to evidence or 
the “proper regard” to be accorded to it as well as the inferences to be drawn 
from the facts that had been held proven were matters entirely for the trial 
court. On the said ground, Megrahi’s appeal was rejected on 14 March 2002.  
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3.9 Reactions to the appeal judgment 
 
Once the appeal was rejected, many commentators said that the appeal 
court had just endorsed what the trial court had already established. 
Undeniably, the appeal court’s review was severely constrained by the 
appeal’s set up and it is not that groundless to assume that the court might 
have come up with a totally different opinion, if the appellant’s counsels had 
chosen a different course of action. As already reported, the appeal court 
was not empowered to address pivotal issues such as the sufficiency of the 
evidence in order to convict Megrahi or the fact that the verdict of guilt 
might have been beyond any reasonable doubt for whatever reasonable 
court. In fact, amongst the grounds of appeal, there was no reference 
whatsoever to the fact that the evidence the trial court had relied upon 
might not have been sufficient in law for a conviction, nor there was any 
reference whatsoever to Section 106, subsection (3) (b) of the Scottish 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1995, which makes provision whenever 
miscarriage of justice occurred for a verdict having been returned, which no 
reasonable jury, properly directed, could have returned. Thus, the scope of 
the appeal court’s review was pretty limited from the outset and that was 
because of the course of action that Megrahi’s counsels had chosen when 
tabling their grounds of appeal. Despite the fact that the appeal court issued 
a predictable verdict and possibly an unavoidable one, some of the reactions 
to the judgment were pretty severe.  
One of those that harshly criticized the appeal judgment was Hans 
Kochler, the already mentioned United Nations observer.76 Once again, he 
stressed that the proceedings had taken place in a highly politicised 
atmosphere and therefore had been seriously affected by reasons others 
than the law. In particular, he said that the presence of foreign individuals 
supporting the prosecution and defence teams had given the entire 
proceedings an aura of international politics that is not appropriate for an 
independent court. Then, he said that one of the most serious shortcomings 
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of the appeal proceedings was that the appellant did not have adequate 
defence, which weighed heavily in an adversarial judicial system where the 
fairness of the trial largely relies upon the equality of arms between 
prosecution and defence. In Kochler’s view, the lack of adequate 
representation of the appellant was self-evident since the defence did not 
make the point that there was insufficient evidence in law to convict the 
appellant and expressly disavowed any reliance on the aforementioned 
Section 106 (3) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1995.  
Kochler further stressed his point by noting that the defence did not even 
raise those technical issues, on which new information might have become 
available since the verdict on 31 January 2001, nor did it raise the issue of 
substantial evidence having been withheld during the trial. Briefly, the 
defence chose not to make use of many of the means at its disposal and thus 
deprived the appellant of his right to adequate and authentic legal 
representation under the European Convention of Human Rights.77 Yet, it 
has to be objected that an unsuccessful legal strategy or unskilled lawyers 
do not necessarily impinge on the fairness of a trial as such, nor they 
deprive an individual of his right to adequate legal representation.  
Kochler did not spare the judges either and actually criticised them for 
being satisfied to analyse the verdict of the trial court “in a merely formal 
manner, not dealing with the substance of the argument nor with its 
plausibility and logical consistency.” In Kochler’s view, the appeal judges 
“chose a kind of evasive strategy by not scrutinizing the argumentation of 
the trial court in regard to its plausibility and logical consistency, thus not 
questioning at all the arbitrariness of the evaluation of evidence by the trial 
judges, and not paying adequate attention to new evidence presented in the 
course of the appeal, an attitude of effective denial of responsibility that 
made the entire process a highly formal, artificial and abstract undertaking 
not related to the search for truth.” Kochler found the appeal court’s 
attitude utterly inexplicable since it should have been its duty to pursue a 
comprehensive review of the trial verdict. In this respect, it might be 
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observed that once the evidence has been accepted by the trial court, it is for 
that court only to determine what inference or inferences should be drawn 
from the said evidence. This is actually the way the system works and it has 
nothing to do with some judges’ failure to adequately deal with a specific 
case. 
Besides, Kochler observed that the appeal court failed to deal adequately 
with the substantial new evidence that was presented in the course of the 
appeal, which was particularly serious in the light of the fact that the trial 
court’s verdict was “inconsistent, even irrational, in the basic respect of 
having found one accused guilty and the co-accused not guilty, while the 
accusation was based on the joint action and co-ordination of the action 
among the two accused in Malta.” Obviously, Hans Kochler did not consider 
that the evidence has to be considered separately even though it might 
implicate several suspects. Hence, Kochler came to the conclusion that a 
reasonable jury would have never arrived to the conclusion of guilt in regard 
to Megrahi, especially when considering the vague and ambivalent evidence 
related to the supposed sequence of events in Malta.  Finally, Kochler 
seemed to acknowledge that the appeal outcome had to do with the way the 
Scottish legal system works more than with the specific and possibly 
questionable way the judges dealt with the Lockerbie case. On this basis, he 
inferred that, if the Scottish legal system excludes, in appeal proceedings, 
the critical review of trial courts evaluation of evidence in so far that the 
original evaluation of evidence becomes a dogma not to be challenged by an 
appeal court, an appellant is effectively deprived of his right to a 
comprehensive review of his case in regard to the basic principle of fairness. 
In Kochler’s view, this is particularly serious when the judges are not vested 
with an inquisitive duty as it happens in adversarial systems such as the 
Scottish one. Once again, Kochler suggested that the Scottish legal system 
and not only the Lockerbie appeal judgment might not be compatible with 
Art. 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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Then, he concluded by saying that in Lockerbie, the extraterritoriality of 
the location of the proceedings was simply not sufficient to guarantee a fully 
independent trial. In fact, “the geographical location of the proceedings 
outside of Scotland, despite the enormous costs involved, finally proved to be 
only a kind of sedativum for those concerned about the independence and 
impartiality of the proceedings.” He further argued that only an 
international composition of the tribunal could provide remedy to the 
problem of fairness and impartiality. In Kochler’s view, the Lockerbie trial 
proved that the only viable alternative in terms of independence of the 
judiciary and fairness of trial in any such case would be proceedings under 
the regulations of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Kochler actually said that it had to be inferred from the Lockerbie 
trial that no national court and no ad hoc tribunal set up by the Security 
Council can meet the requirements of independence, due process, 
impartiality and fairness. Only an internationally composed court would be 
able, at least in regard to its basic set-up and procedural rules, to operate 
outside the framework of power politics. This seems to be the most 
meaningful part of Kochler’s view, although not necessarily related to the 
outcome of the Lockerbie trial but actually more inspired by considerations 
of a general nature. 
Many other commentators were as flabbergasted as Hans Kochler with 
respect to the Lockerbie trial outcome. Yet, they often acknowledged that 
there had been loopholes in the defence’s strategy. As far as the appeal court 
was concerned, it seemed that there was nothing much that it could have 
done, given the grounds of appeal tabled by the appellant.78 Nonetheless, 
there were also those who adopted a different perspective and stressed the 
fact that the Lockerbie case was now over. The Spokesman for the United 
Nations Secretary-General, on 14 March 2002, issued the following 
statement: ”The Lockerbie trial understandably has been followed with 
great interest, and has caused anguish to many.  The families of the victims 
have been suffering ever since this tragic event, and the Secretary-General 
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shares their sorrow.  With today’s decision by the court, the time may now 
have come when these families can at last close this tragic chapter in their 
lives.”79  
And Jack Straw, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, said: “The 
decision of the Scottish Appeal Court to uphold the conviction of Abdel 
Basset Al Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing cannot make up for the loss of 
those who died or for the suffering of their relatives. Nevertheless, I hope it 
gives them some solace.” He also added that it still remained for Libya to 
fulfil its international obligations on Lockerbie and comply with the terms of 
the United Nations resolutions.80 In respect to the family of the victims, 
obviously, the fact that the appeal court had upheld the trial court’s verdict 
was of some importance, although this did not compensate them for the loss 
and the grief they had been through. But at least a trial had taken place 
and somebody had been held accountable for Pan Am 103 onslaught. Maybe, 
the entire truth was not disclosed. It was actually quite unlikely that 
Megrahi alone had shaped the terrorist attack and performed it. Other 
people were quite likely to be involved and this is why many observed that 
all the trial did was convicting a foot soldier. Nonetheless, the principle of 
accountability over impunity had been established and somebody had been 
brought before a court and convicted for Pan Am 103 bombing. Somebody 
might have got away with it too and doubts were still likely to arise. Yet, 
some justice had been done which is certainly better than no justice at all. 
At least, the legal chapter was now closed. 
 
 
3.10 Conclusion. 
 
Eventually, the trial took place and somebody was deemed accountable for 
what happened over Lockerbie, on 21 December 1988. It took 14 years to get 
there and intense diplomatic efforts. Politics and diplomacy were actually 
pivotal for the legal system to react and eventually deal with that massive 
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onslaught in terms of crime and punishment. In this respect, it has to be 
acknowledged that a trial would have never come about if politics and 
diplomacy did not work to that end although this prompted harsh criticism 
that the trial was highly politicised. In a way, this perception was pretty 
difficult to prevent: although the trial concerned specific individuals and 
tried them for specific criminal charges, the relationship between three 
states was actually at stake and not only that. The United Nations was also 
highly involved since the Security Council had applied economic sanctions 
on Libya, which had happened long before a trial was held or anybody was 
convicted. The trial actually took place many years after Pan Am 103 
bombing. It has to be acknowledged that the economic sanctions imposed on 
Libya contributed to make it possible. After a few years, Colonel Gaddafi 
actually realized that the Libyans were going through immense hardships, 
which made it sensitive to co-operate in order to overcome the long-running 
Lockerbie stalemate.  
In the event, he therefore accepted to surrender the two suspects for trial 
and turned out to be quite keen on ending Libya’s pariah status within the 
international fold. This development in Libya’s policies seemed to highlight 
a changed “cost-benefit” analysis on the part of the Libyan Government: at 
some point, the costs to the latter of preserving its internal political 
legitimacy must have become so high as a result of the sanctions that they 
no longer bore any justifiable relation to the advantages of delaying a 
peaceful settlement of the Lockerbie crisis. Thus, the United Nations 
sanctions against Libya have proved successful to a certain extent. Gaddafi’s 
regime eventually took remarkable steps in order to bring the Lockerbie 
case to an end. The question, though, remains, whether those sanctions 
were commensurate with the purpose of modifying the behaviour of the 
Libyan leadership. It is questionable, though unlikely, that Libya would 
have otherwise surrendered the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie 
bombing for trial. Nonetheless, ensuring justice does not only mean making 
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trials possible. It should also mean avoiding major injustices and making 
the diplomacy of mediation achieve more than any policy of starvation. 
 Besides, the humanitarian angle is not the only one by which sanctions 
may prove unfair. In fact, when the United Nations apply economic 
sanctions, the target country must be given a fair chance of achieving the 
lifting of those sanctions through appropriate behaviour. As far as Libya 
was concerned, the requirements to be met in order to get sanctions lifted 
were set out clearly, from the outset. Nonetheless, interpretation of those 
requirements is not necessarily all that simple. For example, how could 
Libya possibly prove to have renounced terrorism? This seemed too general 
a condition and very much a question of points of view. On the contrary, the 
compensation issue was quite clear-cut. Be it as it may, for both conditions 
to be met, the trial needed taking place. And if it did, this happened also 
because of the United Nations sanctions. 
Nonetheless, despite their potential efficacy, sanctions would have never 
brought about any success in isolation. The trial was mainly possible 
because of the political and diplomatic effort in search of a final solution for 
the long-standing Lockerbie stalemate. The role of intermediaries was also 
pivotal. Quiet diplomacy and intensive talks amongst the parties never 
stopped and certainly piled up with the pressure exerted through sanctions 
for subsequent developments to come about. Sanctions cannot actually be 
regarded as a panacea that can achieve every foreign-policy goal with the 
same degree of success. Rather, they offer possible strategies and procedures 
to be used and combined with other pacific means of dispute settlement. The 
Lockerbie case actually proved that sanctions may turn out to be an 
effective alternative to military confrontation but they are not sufficient and 
need being complemented by intense diplomacy and mediation.  
The latter means of settlement may not bite as dramatically as the 
economic weapon but can enjoy a more desirable and long-lasting result at 
less cost. This is why sanctions would have never been sufficient to secure 
the trial, although they exerted a remarkable pressure on the Libyan 
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Government and contributed to the subsequent course of action it 
eventually took. Interestingly, they also allowed the Lockerbie case to stay 
in the spotlight for many years after the bombing of Pan Am 103 occurred. 
The world actually focused its attention on the suffering of the Libyans and 
Gaddafi tried his best to this end. He actually complained about the 
inherent unfairness of the United Nations sanctions and kept pointing at 
the unjustifiable hardship they were causing to the Libyans. The 
international community did not prove insensitive to the Libyan cause and 
actually proved quite sympathetic. Many leaders around the world and 
regional organizations started taking stances in favour of Libya and Gaddafi 
therefore succeeded in breaking its country’s international isolation.  
The role of self appointed intermediaries proved crucial and above all the 
role of former South African President Nelson Mandela. It was actually 
possible to capitalize on the moral authority of the South African icon since 
the stand Mandela took in respect of the Lockerbie crisis bore undeniable 
international weight. His contribution in terms of confidence building was 
certainly pivotal and his sympathetic attitude towards the Libyan cause had 
worldwide resonance. Besides, emerging sources of pressure started playing 
a significant role in the Lockerbie affair: the Organization of African Unity, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab League actually took strong stands 
that favoured the dialogue on the one side but also urged the impasse to be 
overcome on the other. In particular, many Africans challenged the United 
Nations sanctions by deliberately infringing them and calling for their 
immediate lift. 
 This exerted remarkable pressure in the international arena and pushed 
the United Kingdom and the United States towards the acceptance of a 
negotiated solution, which would prove satisfactory to all parties to the 
dispute without infringing anybody’s sovereignty. As Nelson Mandela 
openly remarked, a trial not only needs to be fair but also needs to be 
perceived as such. This would have never been the case if the Lockerbie trial 
were held in the United Kingdom, the United States or Libya. Justice to be 
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perceived as credible and fair cannot be seen as the justice of the victors or 
of the powerful or of the first world. Pretty much the same way, domestic 
trials are often unsatisfactory if an international case has to be dealt with, 
for the very simple reason that domestic courts may be biased and prone to 
stage sham trials. In a nutshell, the idea of a trial to be held in a neutral 
and third country highlighted the political sensitivity of Nelson Mandela, in 
the first place, and of the aforementioned emerging powers on the others. 
Thus, the vitality of mediation contributed to overcome the Lockerbie 
deadlock by serving a useful bridge between the West and a politically 
isolated Libya.  
It was therefore the combination of politics, official diplomacy, mediation 
and economic tools that made the trial possible in the Lockerbie case and 
transformed a complex and sensitive political issue in a legal case. In the 
event, it was however the establishment of a tribunal that brought the case 
to an end and allowed the principle of accountability to prevail over that of 
impunity. The very fact that a proper trial took place and somebody was 
brought before a court certainly marked an important milestone as far as 
the international community’s commitment to punish aviation terrorism 
and achieving the inherent legal accountability are concerned. It is actually 
for the judicial to establish the truth and only a tribunal can be 
acknowledged as impartial and objective. Nonetheless, many commentators 
expressed their doubt whether the Lockerbie trial ever established the full 
truth. Besides, it can be argued that justice that takes 14 years to be done 
somehow embodies a denial of justice. As years go by, memories may dim 
and evidence can become less reliable. The more it takes to get to trial, the 
more difficult it turns out to be to prosecute it successfully.  
Besides, the Lockerbie trial ended up convicting no more than a foot 
soldier. Despite the mixed verdict and limited findings, though, and the fact 
that the trial may not have achieved the full truth to the satisfaction of the 
families of the victims, it has however proved that a trial can be mounted in 
a third country without prejudicing either the prosecution or the wider 
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interests of justice. The Lockerbie trial actually showed that international 
criminal trials may offer an important alternative to domestic trials. 
Besides, it closed the legal case and paved the way for further developments, 
such as compensation for the families of the victims and rehabilitation of 
Libya, as it is going to be discussed in due course.  
And then, last but not least, the Lockerbie trial established a remarkable 
principle and showed that the international community is ready to take 
position against outrageous terrorist attacks that slaughter innocents. The 
fact that no impunity has to be tolerated is eventually part of the world’s 
common heritage. The very fact that a trial took place means that the 
international community is actually committed to punishing atrocities in 
order to establish accountability over impunity. Aviation terrorism infringes 
the rules. Applying the law means going back to the rules, those rules that 
express widely agreed values. And this is what a trial allows for: stating, 
applying and restoring the rules. The success of the rule of law is mainly the 
affirmation of accountability against impunity, which can contribute to the 
final, far-reaching though indispensable aim: a world where peace exists at 
once with justice. The legal process can certainly be one of the tools to be 
used in this respect. It is actually grouped with other peaceful methods of 
dispute settlement in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and can 
bring about peace and reconciliation.  
Of course, the legal process has its inherent limits and often pursues 
reconciliation at states’ level and not with the individuals. It is certainly not 
a trial or a conviction that can compensate the families of the victims for 
their loss or give them a sense of overall closure for the outrageous 
onslaught that killed their beloved ones. Yet, the society level is also 
important and this is what international justice deals with. This is actually 
the political end that international law may serve whenever it allows the 
truth to be established and accountability to prevail over impunity. 
Obviously, a trial may end up convicting a few but not all that are guilty 
with criminal offences and this is probably what happened in the Lockerbie 
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case. Megrahi possibly stood for a larger group of individuals. Nonetheless, 
even though individual justice lets off some of the criminals, still, it cannot 
be considered as a de facto way of exonerating many of the guilt. Obviously, 
in theory, all criminals should be punished. The system does the best it can 
with the case and the evidence before it. And in Lockerbie, the court 
convicted one of the suspects because that was the evidence at its disposal. 
The credibility of the court is also an extremely important aspect. In this 
respect, the Lockerbie case showed that the international community needs 
a neutral and independent court, which has nothing to do with whatever 
national government. In the Lockerbie case, it was necessary to achieve a 
political agreement in order to set out an ad hoc tribunal that embodied a 
compromise solution, which was acceptable by all parties. Probably, the 
long-lasting Lockerbie deadlock would have never occurred or would have 
never lasted that long if a pre-established international tribunal already 
existed. The lesson that might be inferred from the Lockerbie case is 
therefore that there is an absolute need for a pre-established, neutral and 
independent judicial institution empowered with jurisdiction over aviation 
terrorist attacks whenever they entail aspects of internationality and 
therefore cannot effectively be dealt with at domestic level.  
Obviously, such a judicial institution should ensure the independence of 
both the investigator and prosecutor. In the Lockerbie case, both have been 
seriously questioned. Only a pre-established, non-national court seems to 
embody the concept of a fair, independent and impartial justice. In this 
respect, the Lockerbie trial can be considered part of an important 
development that has come about in the international legal scenario and has 
seen the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia and then eventually the creation of the International Criminal 
Court. The underlying philosophy has been always the same: demand for 
justice and refusal of impunity inasmuch as the need for atrocities to be 
punished before they are relegated to history books. It is a long way to go, 
though. Yet, for judicial institutions to be established the need is pretty 
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much the same as in Lockerbie. Politics and diplomacy are actually the tools 
that pave the way to trials. In this respect, the Lockerbie case has proved a 
success story, albeit a complex one. There was actually a crucial place for 
political action in securing the interests of justice. It was a political and 
diplomatic achievement to secure the resources for the investigation and 
prosecution, secure the co-operation and goodwill of foreign governments 
and agencies and in the end achieve the hand over of the accused for trial. 
 Nevertheless, for some, politics has interfered with the due process of 
law. Two people accused of the most serious of crimes have been protected 
by their government to the point where national laws both in Scotland and 
the Netherlands were amended in order to accommodate their fears about 
inability to receive a fair trial. Despite the apparent success of the trial, this 
remains on the face of it a remarkable criticism. Nonetheless, without a 
compromise, there would have been no trial at all.  Besides, the fact that the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands accepted to be flexible in their 
criminal justice systems was very important. It actually showed that justice 
can be pursued if there is willingness to co-operate and to act in good faith. 
And it also meant that the fact that the Libyans’ suspects feared that they 
would not be allowed a fair trial in countries where they had been convicted 
by the media before any judge could try them was not that groundless. As a 
matter of fact, the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not only a very complex 
political and diplomatic affair inasmuch as a remarkable legal case: it was 
also a major media issue as it is going to be shown below.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 Or a Soviet subsidy for a target of U.S. sanctions. 
 
2 See supra, par. 6 and note 43, chapter 2. 
 
3  It seems worth recalling that, since 1992, Libya was subjected to the United Nations 
sanctions that included a number of different measures, such as a ban on Libyan airline 
flights, military assistance to Libya, and sale of parts needed by Libya’s oil industry, as well 
as the downgrading of diplomatic ties with Libya. See supra, par.2, chapter 2. 
 
4 See J.A. Paul and S. Akhtar, “Sanctions: an analysis,”  available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/anlysis2.htm  
 
5 See supra, par. 8, chapter 2. 
 
6 Starvation is not allowed. The limit is overstepped if sanctions help bring about a 
situation where a large part of the population falls below subsistence level. 
 
7 Justice Mauro Politi is currently appointed as one of the Justices at the International 
Criminal Court in The Hague. I had the privilege to interview him in Yerevan, on 13 May 
2004. 
 
8 The choice of sanctions may prove crucial, since different sanctions bring about different 
effects.  For example, an arms embargo is generally the easiest to accept; however - like all 
partial embargoes - it is also particularly difficult to enforce effectively, because arms trade 
is largely clandestine. In most cases, it merely helps drive more trade underground and 
push prices upwards.  A second category of measures, comprises those that primarily serve 
to express the disapproval of the international community. This would include, for example, 
exclusion from the Olympic Games, or, at a general level, the halting of exchanges in sport, 
culture, science, technology, information, diplomacy, and development co-operation, as well 
as the suspension of the target state’s membership of international organizations. A further 
group of measures includes those in the fields of transport and communications, financial 
sanctions, and partial embargoes for specific goods, whereas partial or total trade boycotts 
may be regarded as constituting a fourth category. Such boycotts entail a ban on the import 
of all or some goods from the target country and are to be seen as the opposite of 
embargoes, which block the export of goods from United Nations member states to the 
country against which the sanctions are directed. For an overview about the use of 
economic sanctions, see Chan, S. and Cooper Drury, A., (eds.), “Sanctions as economic 
statecraft,” St. Martin’s Press, LLC, New York, 2000, pp.1-16. About the debate pertaining 
to the need of smartening sanctions, see Craven, M., “Humanitarianism and the quest for 
smarter sanctions,” 13, no.1, European Journal of International Law, 43-61, (2002). See 
also O’Connell, M.E., “Debating the law of sanctions,” ubi supra, pp.63-79. 
 
9 Under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may actually call 
upon member states to apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. The legal bases for United Nations 
sanctions are to be found in Chapter VII of the Charter. According to this, the pre-condition 
for the imposition of sanctions in a specific case is a determination by the Security Council 
that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. According to 
Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter, the Council can then choose whatever coercive 
measures of a non-military or military kind it considers necessary to preserve world peace 
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and international security. In terms of the Charter system, non-violent sanctions as 
stipulated in Article 41, rank as a milder means than the use of military measures. Article 
42 actually establishes that the Security Council may only have recourse to the latter, if it 
believes “that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate.” See par. 2, chapter 2. 
 
10 As I have already reported, I had the privilege of interviewing Justice Richard Goldstone 
for the first time, in Johannesburg, at the Constitutional Court, on 5 March 2003. See 
supra, note 9, chapter 1. 
 
11 Letter dated 22 July 1996 from Libya’s leader, addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/mqtoun.htm 
 
12 Not all of the suffering the Libyan people were going through was caused by the United 
Nations sanctions though. The United States had actually imposed on Libya its own 
sanctions and those were particularly stern. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (US Public 
Law 104-172; 104th Congress), endorsed in 1996, was aimed at boycotting countries and 
companies that continued to deal with Libya and Iran, notwithstanding the economic 
sanctions the United States had imposed on the said countries. The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act was actually an “Act to impose sanctions on persons making certain 
investments directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Iran 
or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on persons exporting certain items that 
enhance Libya’s weapons or aviation capabilities or enhance Libya’s ability to develop its 
petroleum resources, and for other purposes.” The said Act reads as follows: “(b) Policy With 
Respect to Libya. The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to 
seek full compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of 
the Security Council of the United Nations, including ending all support for acts of 
international terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.” 
Other Acts restricting trade and transactions with Libya were also endorsed in the 
following years. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 
Appropriation Act prohibited the use of certain funds to finance or assist Libya. The Trade 
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 further limited commercial exports 
to Libya.  
 
13 The parties’ abstention would have been required by the Charter if the Council had acted 
under Chapter VI. See supra, par. 6, chapter 2, especially at note 43. 
 
14 See K. Sturman, “The rise of Libya as a regional player,” 12, no. 2, African Security 
Review, (2003), also at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/12No2/c2.html 
 
15 Libya had been supporting many African causes and sympathizing with African 
liberation movements in a number of countries. In particular, it supported the anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa. About Nelson Mandela’s crucial role in the Lockerbie 
affair, see, ex multis, Arzt, D.E., “The Lockerbie extradition by analogy agreement: 
exceptional measure or template for transnational justice?,” 18, American University 
International Law Review, 163-227, (2002). About his role and the way the media echoed it, 
see infra, par. 9, chapter 4. 
 
16 He actually made such statement and again expressed his strong support for the proposal 
of the trial being held in a neutral venue during his attendance at the Conference of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Governments, which took place in Edinburgh in October 1997. 
See ANC Daily News Briefing, Monday 27 October 1997, available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/1997/news1027 
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17 Bandar was his country’s military attaché and then his country’s Ambassador in 
Washington. See Matar, K. I. and Thabit, R. W., op. cit., pp. 172-173. See supra, note 3, 
chapter 2. 
 
18 Resolution CM/Res.1525 (LX), adopted by the Organization of African Unity in Tunis, in 
1994.  
 
19 Resolution CM/Res. 1587 (LXII), adopted by the Organization of African Unity in Addis 
Ababa, in 1995.  
 
20 AHG/Decl.2 (XXXIII), Declaration of the thirty-third Ordinary Session of the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, adopted in 1997. About the said declaration, 
see Machipisa, L., “Overwhelming support for Libya from African leaders,” available at 
http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/32/025.html  See also Kumalo, D., “Africa’s own 
international organisation,” http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr333/e10.html 
 
21 For a detailed report of the initiatives undertaken by the Organization of African Unity, 
the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement, see Matar, K. I. and Thabit, R.W., op. 
cit., pp. 94-104. See supra, note 3, chapter 3. 
 
22 See Phytian, N., “OAU announces decision to ignore anti-Libya sanctions,” 
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/oau.htm 
 
23 Jehl, D., “Arab Governments agree to defy U.N. Libyan sanctions while witness to 
bombing pleads guilty of perjury,” New York Times, September 22, 1997, available at 
http://www.ielr.com/8b.htm 
 
24 On 27 February 1998, the International Court of Justice had actually ruled that it had 
jurisdiction over the dispute pertaining to the interpretation and application of the 
Montreal Convention that had arisen between Libya, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. See supra, par. 2.7, chapter 2. 
 
25 Letter from Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Syria and Tunisia to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council on 1st 
July 1998 (UN Doc. S/1998/598). 
 
26 The Vatican opened diplomatic relationship with Libya in 1997. See Gerson, A. and 
Adler, J.,  “The price of terror,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2001, pp.262, 273. 
See also infra, par. 9, chapter 4.  
 
27 On Scottish rules, see Black, R., “The Lockerbie criminal trial: the Scottish rules of 
evidence,” http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/lockerbie_criminal_trial.htm See also Scharf, 
M. P., “Terrorism on trial: the Lockerbie criminal proceedings,” available at  
http://137.52.46.28/student/organizations/ILSAJournal/6-2/Scharf%206-2.htm 
 
28 See Black, R., “The Lockerbie disaster,” 3, Edinburgh Law Review, 85-95 (1999). 
 
29 Ostensibly, what the suspected also feared was that they might be snatched by special 
forces of the United States, removed to America and put on trial there. On this particular 
issue, see Black, R., “From Lockerbie to Zeist (via Tripoli, Tunis and Cairo),” 
http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/from_lockerbie_to_zeist.htm 
 
30 UN Doc. S/1997/845. 
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31 UN Doc. S/1997/991, Annex. 
 
32 Letter Dated 24 August 1998 from the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1998/795. 
 
33 See the Press Release by the Foreign Affairs Press Office of the Netherlands, on 24 
August 1998, at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/dutch248.html   
 
34 Press Release SG/SM/6682 on 24 August 1998. 
 
35 See Libya’s Press Release on 26 August 1998 (Statement by the People’s Committee of 
the Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation), available at 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/pb268.html   
 
36 Letter dated 25 August 1998 from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1998/803 (1998). 
 
37 Security Council Resolution 1192 adopted on 27 August 1998. 
 
38 See the “Memorandum on the latest developments on the dispute between Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya and the United States and the United Kingdom over Lockerbie” adopted in 
September 1998 by the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations, www.libya-
un.org 
 
39 The High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 
1998 - Statutory Instrument 1998 no. 2251 – intended to giving effect to Security Council 
Resolution 1192 of 27 August 1998 which called on all states, but particularly the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Libya, to act to ensure that there be a trial of the accused in 
the Netherlands. The Statutory Instrument is available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1998/19982251.htm 
 
40 See Draft Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland concerning a Scottish trial in the Netherlands, then undersigned on 
18 September 1998, available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/trialtreaty.cfm 
 
41 Letter available at http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=242 
 
42 Establishing a Libyan consulate in Scotland would obviously mean re-establishing 
diplomatic relations between Libya and the United Kingdom. 
 
43 Camp Zeist is about 30 miles south of Amsterdam. It used to be a US airbase. 
 
44 UN Doc. S/1999/378 issued on 5 April 1999, containing UN Secretary-General’s report of 
the handover of the Libyan defendants to the Scottish Court in the Netherlands. 
 
45 Press release SC/6662. 
 
46 As already reported, I had the privilege of interviewing Justice Mauro Politi in Yerevan 
on 13 May 2004. See note 7, in this same chapter. 
 
47 See M. Plachta, op.cit. (note 33, chapter 2). 
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48 See supra, par. 2, chapter 2. 
 
49 As I have already reported, I had the privilege of interviewing Justice Albie Sachs on 8 
April 2003 at the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg. See note 2, chapter 1. 
 
50 See Boyd, C., “The Lockerbie trial,” paper presented at the 15th International Conference 
of the International Society for the reform of criminal law, which took place in Canberra, 
Australia, 26-30 August 2001. The paper is available at  www.isrcl.org/Papers/Boyd.pdf 
 
51 Statutory Instrument 1998 no. 2251 established that the three judges had to be 
appointed by the Lord Justice-Clerk, the second most senior judge in Scotland. The senior 
judge, the Lord Justice-General, was not given this function, at the beginning, because he 
had previously been the Lord Advocate and therefore responsible for all prosecutions in 
Scotland, including the Lockerbie prosecution. The said Order was later amended by means 
of Statutory Instrument 2001 no. 3918 - the High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the 
Netherlands) (United Nations) (Variation) Order 1998 - which removed the requirement 
that anything which the Lord Justice General required, or had power to do in relation to 
criminal proceedings should, in relation to proceedings conducted by virtue of the 1998 
Order, be done by the Lord Justice Clerk. It therefore provided that the appointments of the 
Lords Commissioners of Justiciary - who were to constitute the court for the purpose of 
hearing any appeal in relation to proceedings to which the 1998 Order applied - were to be 
made by the Lord Justice General. See infra, par. 8, in this chapter.  
52 See the High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 
of 1998 and the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
concerning a Scottish trial in The Netherlands, signed on 18 September 1998. See supra, 
par. 3, in this same chapter. 
 
53 On 14 November 1991, the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s chief law officer, and the US Acting 
Attorney General issued warrants for the arrest of the two Libyan nationals. See supra, 
par. 1, chapter 2. 
 
54 In pursuance of the charge of conspiracy, the indictment narrates that the two accused, in 
concert with others, had formed a criminal purpose to destroy a civil passenger aircraft and 
murder the occupants in furtherance of the purposes of the said Libyan Intelligence 
Services. 
 
55 In Scotland, responsibility for the investigation of sudden deaths rests with the 
Procurator Fiscal, that is to say the local public prosecutor, who actually attends the scene 
and may direct the police in the conduct of their inquiries. His Petition - upon which 
warrant for arrest was issued by the Sheriff of South Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galloway 
on 13 November 1991 - was then superseded by the indictment served on Friday 29 October 
1999. The petition is available at  http://www.ltb.org.uk/chargespetition.cfm 
 
56 The charge of conspiracy relates to an inchoate crime and is defined as “an agreement 
between two or more people to behave in a manner that will automatically constitute an 
offence by at least one of them.” See Oxford Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press 
2002. 
 
57 The indictment is available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/chargesindictment2.cfm 
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58 The defence suggested that Pan Am 103 was blown up not by Libya, but by Iran or the 
PFLP-GC, as the criminal investigators originally suspected. 
 
59 As far as the verdict was concerned, the judges could have found either of the accused 
“guilty” or “not guilty” or the guilt “not proven.”  “Not proven” means that the proof of guilt 
was not beyond a reasonable doubt. Other features that characterised the Lockerbie trial 
are the following: first and foremost, at the request of the defence, the Lockerbie court was 
composed of a panel of three judges, rather than a fifteen-members Scottish jury.  Yet, as 
with a Scottish jury, the three-judge panel were supposed to rule by a simple majority. 
Another interesting aspect of Scottish criminal procedure that featured in the Lockerbie 
trial was the broad Scottish hearsay exception for unavailable witnesses. Under Scottish 
law, an out of court statement can be introduced not only if the witness is dead or has 
disappeared, but also if the witness simply refuses to appear at Camp Zeist to testify.  This 
is important since the Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands lacked the power to compel 
the appearance of witnesses outside of Scotland.  Another peculiarity of the Scottish system 
is that nobody can be convicted without corroboration. This requires that, for every element 
of the crime, there must be credible evidence from more than one source.  A single piece of 
evidence of guilt, no matter how persuasive, cannot support a conviction. Obviously, it is far 
beyond the scope of the present work to give an overview of Scottish criminal procedure. 
Yet, highlighting a few aspects may help understanding how the trial was shaped.  
60 Such as Syria or Iran, for example. See supra, note 2, chapter 2 and infra, par. 8, chapter 
4.  
61 See Scharf, M. P., “The Lockerbie Trial Verdict,” ASIL Insight, February 2001, available 
at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh44.htm  
62 See Black, R., “In order to convict,”  http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/in_order_to_convict.htm 
 
63 See Black, R., “Background to the Lockerbie Appeal,” available at 
http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/appeal_backgound_to_the_appeal.htm  
64 See report on and evaluation of the Lockerbie Trial conducted by the special Scottish 
Court in the Netherlands at Camp Zeist by Prof. Hans Köchler, international observer of 
the International Progress Organization nominated by United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan on the basis of Security Council resolution 1192 (1998). Hans Kochler’s report 
(2001/P/HK/17032) was given at   Santiago de Chile on 3 February 2001 and is available at 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/koechl.htm 
65 The Government representatives’ presence is not even acknowledged in the official 
documents pertaining to the trial as Prof. Kochler himself reports. 
 
66 See for example Ferguson, I., “The Lockerbie bombing trial: new problems in the 
prosecution’s case,” 2, no.8, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, (2000). Ferguson seriously 
questions the credibility of the witnesses relied upon by the defence. 
 
67 On this, see especially Ashton, J. and Ferguson, I., op. cit. (note 2, chapter 2). See also 
James, S. and Marsden, C.,  “Pan Am 103/ Lockerbie verdict politically motivated,” at 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/feb2001/lock-f07.shtml  
 
68 Clare Connelly is Professor of law at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. She is also 
Director of the Lockerbie Briefing Unit, a team of university legal experts who have been 
observing the trial. 
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69 See Clare Connelly interviewed by Margaret Warner on January 31, 2001, at  Online 
News Hour. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/transportation/jan-june01/lockerbie_1-31.html 
 
70 I had the privilege of interviewing Justice Richard Goldstone for the second time on 6 
May 2003, at the Constitutional Court, in Johannesburg. 
 
71 My interview with Justice Albie Sachs on 8 april 2003. See supra, note 49 to this same 
chapter and note 2, chapter 1. 
 
72 Peter Watson was the lawyer representing the majority of the Britons who died in Pan 
Am 103 crash and has been secretary of the Lockerbie Air Disaster group. I had the 
privilege of interviewing him via e-mail on 10 February 2004. 
 
73 The appeal was heard at Camp Zeist from 23 January to 14 February 2002. 
 
74 High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 1998 
(SI 1998 No 2251). See note 39 and 51 to this same chapter. 
   
75 See Note of Appeal under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 available at 
http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/appeal_grounds.htm 
 
76 See Hans Kochler, “Report on the appeal proceedings at the Scottish Court in the 
Netherlands (Lockerbie Court) in the case of Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi v. H. M. 
Advocate,” Vienna, 26 March 2002, 2002/P/RE/17553, available at 
http://www.portia.org/latest/lockerb2.html 
 
77 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Article 6(1) of the Convention stipulates: “In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Art. 6 (3) par. (c) states that 
everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend himself in person or 
through legal assistance of his own choosing. 
 
78 The already mentioned expert, Professor Robert Black, for example, insisted that a 
miscarriage of justice had been perpetrated, until “such time as an appellate court is 
required to address the fundamental issue of (i) whether there was sufficient evidence to 
warrant the incriminating findings, (ii) whether any reasonable trial court could have made 
those findings (and could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of 
Megrahi) on the evidence led at Kamp van Zeist and (iii) whether Megrahi’s representation 
of the trial and the appeal was adequate.” See Black, R., “Appeal front page,” 
http://www.thelockerbietrial.com/ 
 
79 Press release SG/SM/81/61 
 
80 Statement by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, on Thursday 14 March 2002, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page
&cid=1007029391638&a=KArticle&aid=1017049158968 
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Chapter 4 
 
THE LOCKERBIE AFFAIR AND THE MEDIA 
 
 
4.1 Terrorism and media coverage 
 
Pan Am 103 crash and the long-lasting Lockerbie aftermath are 
certainly the sort of events that do not go unnoticed. As already reported, 
the bombing - in which, as it was written,1 the skin of the aircraft peeled 
back in a petalling effect - was in itself particularly impressive. It took place 
a few days before Christmas and killed 270 people. Amongst the other 
victims, there were 35 students from Syracuse University2 heading home for 
their holidays and altogether 58 passengers were less than 21 years old.3 
The small and quiet Scottish town of Lockerbie was immortalized forever as 
the place of horror where bodies were scattered all over across fields, on top 
of houses, on a golf course and in gardens: just everywhere, as it was still to 
be recalled several years after the date of the tragedy, despite the efforts the 
town had made to move forward.4 Pan Am 103 crash was described by 
forensic expert, within days from its occurrence, as “the most appalling 
crime since the Second World War.”5 The press labelled it as “the worst 
episode of mass-murder in the history of modern Scotland,”6 in fact “the 
worst terrorism atrocity in British history,”7 inasmuch as “Britain’s worst 
peace-time atrocity,”8 or “an act of callous brutality.”9 However, only the 
witnesses’ reports could describe - in an utterly graphical fashion - the 
horror that Pan Am 103 bombing entailed: that “something” that looked like 
meat but unfortunately wasn’t meat, or the sudden rain of glass, small 
pieces from the shattered windows falling down from the sky, or the mass of 
debris and gas balls coming down, as well as those pieces of metal and stuff 
coming through the roofs.10 Hunting details seared in the memory of those 
who were there and had the luck to survive, then being able, many years 
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later, to tell what they saw and experienced when Pan Am 103 was blown 
apart.  
The Lockerbie case was obviously paid worldwide media coverage, as it 
always happens when terrorist actions occur. Pan Am 103 crash and the 
subsequent follow-ups instantly made headlines. They actually worked out 
as perfect “attention grabbers” with respect to a huge potential audience 
and immediately fed the media with some sensational news, which 
journalists, reporters and photographers started covering the very moment 
they could relay the first facts. They have never stopped ever since. From 
the outset, it seemed quite clear that the Pan Am 103 story was 
overwhelming in scope and needed being followed up filling in details and 
addressing a number of questions that it unavoidably prompted: what had 
actually happened? Where? When? How? And above all: who did it and why? 
Man-made catastrophes should actually be avoidable, at least to a certain 
extent, which makes it absolutely pivotal to find answers and explanations. 
When a disaster occurs, responsibility is certainly the main issue. Did Pan 
Am 103 crash occur because of human error or because of wilful sabotage? 
Or both? One thing is an accident, one thing is an intentional disaster. The 
latter happens because someone wants it to happen and wilfully makes it 
happen. It would never occur otherwise. And then the question obviously 
was: could it happen again? These were the issues that both the media and 
institutions found themselves addressing, while trying to share, spread and 
explain both the bombing and the follow-ups.  
Even after years of painstaking investigation, some of the questions stayed 
unanswered although the need to make sense of the Lockerbie disaster was 
still alive. In fact, not even the trial answered those questions entirely. 
Media and institutions therefore raised those questions as well as many 
more and left no stone unturned trying to answer them. Pan Am 103 crash 
was therefore paid enormous attention and given long-term coverage. In 
fact, a coverage that has been lasting to date. Over the years, the media 
have been portraying the Lockerbie tragedy as both a global and a personal 
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one, at once public and yet utterly intimate. A tragedy that could not be 
ignored. Thus, the media thoroughly focused on government actions and 
inactions, diplomatic headways and stalemates, United Nations and world 
leaders involvement, families’ grievances and claims. Years and years of 
reportages, TV programmes, interviews, comments and media involvement 
of all sorts. 
What is particularly impressive, in retrospect, is the fact that Lockerbie 
proved a turning point in the coverage of tragedies, marking the first time 
ever that advances in technology and transportation permitted “live” 
coverage of an event of such magnitude. Since then, it has become routine to 
witness terrible occurrences live. Every available technology was actually 
used to portray the tragic events at Lockerbie: sismic readings, deployment 
of reporters, photographers and television crews, cellular telephones and 
satellite transmitters to the sites of the tragedy and to scenes of profound 
sorrow where relatives and friends were learning of their losses. Pan Am 
103 therefore turned a marking point in media coverage, one that cannot be 
reversed, since it proved for the first time ever the possibility of live 
coverage of anything that happens in the world.11 Yet, such quick 
accessibility of whatever tragic event in whatever part of the world also 
raised ethical dilemmas, which are still far from being solved. In fact, the 
right of being informed and that of duly inform can sometimes clash with 
the right to privacy. Feelings and emotions should be a private matter but, 
in the Lockerbie case, they made headlines and fed the media with stories 
that would sell. When dealing with terrorism, media do control the flow of 
information while simultaneously making the news “entertaining” enough 
to sell. Striking a balance between the right to know and the desire to be 
entertained is obviously difficult but it seems indispensable to draw a clear-
cut line. Entertainment should not take place at the expense of law, order 
and security, and should not infringe on anybody’s rights. A distinction 
should be made between exploitation of victims and journalists’ willingness 
to provide a forum to victims and survivors.  
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Even alleged terrorists, who are suspected of having performed the most 
callous of crimes, have to be granted some basic rights in this respect. Media 
seldom portrait terrorism in a favourable light, which generally builds little 
sympathy for their cause. Nonetheless, the wider the media coverage, the 
better for the terrorists. The media, though unwillingly, make terrorist acts 
sufficiently sensational to shock the audience and prompt its reaction. In a 
way, media coverage itself may become part of the terrorist event, 
performing as a multiplier that promotes fear and magnifies the threat in 
the public mind. This seems to be what terrorists actually aim at.12 
Terrorism is a publicity seeking activity after all. Even negative publicity 
can turn out to be better than no publicity at all. Media therefore influence 
the way terrorists select their targets: to spread violence, they need to 
choose their objectives for maximum exposure. Terrorist activities may 
actually enjoy a great deal of power because of the media’s attention, which 
can expand the potential audience to the global scale. In fact, terrorism 
might turn out to be contagious and media coverage may also help terrorists 
spreading a culture of violence. The potential audience may wish to support 
the terrorists’ causes, if not physically, then with money and through moral 
persuasion.  
Nonetheless, terrorists have also to cope with the degree of public tolerance 
their deeds may enjoy, if they want their cause to be understood and 
sympathized with. Acts of extraordinary violence might well turn out to be 
counterproductive, causing massive fear and triggering no sympathy 
whatsoever. Once again, the role of the media may prove crucial. The very 
way they depict an initiative and its effect may induce totally different 
reactions and turn out to be decisive in the delivery of the very message the 
terrorists want to forward to their potential audience.  Certainly, the media 
have the duty of duly inform. People have the right to know not only about 
the on-going threats to life and property, but also about the causes other 
people may advocate to the extent that they may be willing to lay down their 
lives for. Thus, the media play a crucial role in serving the cause of 
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information and fulfilling the right to know while considering the same 
issue from different angles. Nonetheless, reporting terrorist acts generally 
stigmatise the alleged perpetrators of violence, which can end up labelling 
them as guilty before any verdict of guilty being issued. In the Lockerbie 
case, the media stigmatisation of the two alleged Libyan bombers was one of 
the issues at stake. The role the media play in this respect and the way they 
fulfil such role is often controversial, as the Lockerbie case shows. The right 
to inform and to being informed can often clash with other rights and 
liberties that command enforcement. The alleged bombers could be 
victimized by the media, in their own way. Until the moment a verdict of 
guilty was issued, they actually had the right to be considered innocent.  
Thus, the alleged bombers’ right to not being stigmatised inevitably falls 
into frame. In this respect, what seems particularly interesting in the 
Lockerbie case is that the media themselves were somehow “on trial” for 
infringing the human rights of the alleged perpetrators of the bombing. The 
right to know actually clashed with the right to receiving a fair trial, 
whatever the possible charge for the accused. The issue proved one of 
pivotal importance: may the media impact so strongly on the audience that 
they can even manipulate the opinion of judges, juries, witnesses, thus 
influencing the outcome of a trial? Undeniably, the Lockerbie case has been 
having such wide media coverage, with spread dissemination of photographs 
of the accused, that when the latter assumed they would have never 
received a fair trial in the United Kingdom and the United States and that 
no jury would have been impartial in judging their case, their fears needed 
being accommodated. Otherwise, there would have been no trial at all. Their  
fears did not seem all that unrealistic. The alleged perpetrators of the Pan 
Am 103 bombing did consider themselves as victims of an unprecedented 
media campaign, which turned out to be a sort of undesirable and unfair 
“media trial.” Was the media’s power so strong that it could actually 
influence the outcome of the trial at Camp Zeist, though?  Was it fair and 
reasonable to accommodate the suspects’ fear in this respect? 
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4.2 The media issue at Camp Zeist 
 
Not only the media issue was raised before the trial and impacted on it in a 
way that influenced its location. It also erupted at Camp Zeist and was one 
for the court to be solved. In fact, the line between information and 
entertainment appeared quite nebulous and the freedom of information, 
cornerstone of any democratic system, was to be balanced with other rights 
of paramount importance, first and foremost the right to a fair trial. Not an 
easy balance to strike, though, as reported herein. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation actually lodged a petition to the High Court of Justiciary in 
order to be authorized to televise the trial. The prayer of the petition invited 
the court, in the exercise of its nobile officium,13 to give its consent to the 
petitioner “to televise the proceedings of the trial (a) for the purpose of 
broadcasting simultaneously the entire proceedings of the trial, (b) for the 
purpose of broadcasting edited portions of the proceedings of the trial in 
news broadcasts and other broadcasts of topical or other interest, and (c) for 
the compiling and broadcasting after the ending of the proceedings of the 
trial one or more documentary programmes on the circumstances 
surrounding the subject of the trial and including parts of the proceedings of 
the trial, and that subject to such conditions as to [the court] shall seem 
proper.”  
In their answers, other broadcasting companies claimed that they also 
wished to televise and broadcast the trial. Thus, they submitted that any 
order pronounced in favour of British Broadcasting Corporation should be in 
such terms as to permit them to do so. Some of them actually wished to 
broadcast the whole proceedings simultaneously inasmuch as BBC, whereas 
all of them intended to broadcast shorter extracts from the proceedings as 
part of news programmes or programmes somehow pertaining to the trial. 
Therefore, they pleaded that the prayer of the petition lodged by BBC 
should be granted “as varied in accordance with [their own] Answers.” In 
the submissions for the petitioners, the unique nature of the application, 
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which the petitioners sought to make, was widely emphasised. It was said 
that this exclusive connotation stemmed from the character of the 
proceedings, namely that they were to take place in the Netherlands before 
a bench of three judges, sitting without a jury. The petitioners did not seek 
to establish any precedent to the effect that broadcasters would have a 
general right to broadcast proceedings in criminal trials. What was sought 
was no more than a judicial determination that in the particular 
circumstances of the Lockerbie trial the petitioners should be permitted to 
televise the proceedings.  
Reference was then made to the Directions issued by the Lord President 
and Lord Justice-General, the Senior Scottish Judge, on 5 August 1992, 
headed “Television in the Courts,”which set out the circumstances in which 
court proceedings might be televised. The Directions read as follows: “The 
Lord President has issued the following directions about the practice which 
will be followed in regard to requests by broadcasting authorities for 
permission to televise proceedings in the Court of Session and the High 
Court of Justiciary. a) The rule hitherto has been that television cameras 
are not allowed within the precincts of the court. While the absolute nature 
of the rule makes it easy to apply, it is an impediment to the making of 
programmes of an educational or documentary nature and to the use of 
television in other cases where there would be no risk to the administration 
of justice. b) In future the criterion will be whether the presence of television 
cameras in the court would be without risk to the administration of justice. 
c) In view of the risks to the administration of justice the televising of 
current proceedings in criminal cases at first instance will not be permitted 
under any circumstances. d) Civil proofs at first instance do not normally 
involve juries, but the risks inherent in the televising of current proceedings 
while witnesses are giving their evidence justify the same practice here as 
in the case of criminal trials.” The Directions conclude: “h) Requests from 
television companies for permission to film proceedings, including 
proceedings at first instance, for the purpose of showing educational or 
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documentary programmes at a later date will be favourably considered, but 
such filming may be done only with the consent of all parties involved in the 
proceedings, and it will be subject to approval by the presiding judge of the 
final product before it is televised.” 
The petitioners submitted that they had already televised proceedings 
before the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary on a number of 
occasions and Scottish Television Limited averred that they had televised 
criminal trials before. However, everybody acknowledged that there had 
been no occasion on which proceedings in a criminal trial had been 
broadcast during the currency of the trial. The core of the petitioners’ 
argument was that televising proceedings was not forbidden in principle in 
light of the Directions and broadcasting might take place with the consent of 
the court. The petitioners insisted that in Scotland there was no statutory 
prohibition that would stand in the way of the televising of court 
proceedings. Section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which prohibited 
the taking of photographs in court and the publication of any such 
photograph, did not extend to Scotland (section 49(3)). The rule against 
photography in Scottish courts had depended merely on the practice of the 
court, and the terms of the Directions made it clear that it was recognised 
that television broadcasting of court proceedings was in principle 
acceptable. That applied in the same way to the proceedings in the 
Netherlands that were to be held under Scottish law.14 As further 
background to the application for consent to the broadcasting, the 
petitioners drew attention to their position as public service broadcasters 
and emphasised that their broadcasting of the proceedings of the trial would 
not be a profit-making venture. They would therefore not claim any 
intellectual property or other exclusive rights in their record of the 
proceedings of the trial.  
Thus, according to the aforementioned Directions, the criterion seemed to 
be one of determinig whether the presence of television cameras in the court 
would be without risk to the administration of justice.15 Nonetheless, the 
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Directions also stated the continued prohibition of televising current 
criminal proceedings at first instance in rather categorical terms. It was 
only in relation to filming proceedings for future documentary use that 
provision was made for obtaining the consent of parties.16 The said obstacles 
were quite significant. Hereby, the petitioners insisted that: “The trial is of 
international significance. Its conduct and outcome are of unique 
significance for a criminal trial in Scotland having regard to the number of 
victims, the fact that they are of different nationalities, and its implications 
for a number of governments including those of the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Libya and the Netherlands.” Another reason they put 
forward in order to support their application related to the fact that the 
trial, although before the High Court of Justiciary, would take place in the 
Netherlands by virtue of the inter-governmental agreement, in a purpose-
built courtroom within a secure cordon. Thus, the trial would not be 
accessible to members of the public in Scotland as would any other sitting of 
the High Court of Justiciary “by virtue of its physically distant location from 
Scotland and by virtue of the security surrounding it.” The submission 
continued: “The conduct of the trial is a matter of legitimate public interest 
in Scotland having regard to the fact that the destruction of the aircraft 
caused the deaths of persons in Scotland.”  
Yet, the fact remained that the aforementioned Directions did not provide 
for the simultaneous broadcast of first instance criminal proceedings, no 
party had consented to the proceedings being televised, and the accused had 
even expressed opposition to that taking place. Besides, whatever might be 
said about the arrangements to be made, the critical issue was whether or 
not broadcasting in the ways for which consent was sought would be 
“without risk to the administration of justice.” It was however undeniable 
that the trial concerned a case which was of wide public interest, not only in 
Scotland but also elsewhere. Furthermore, the petitioners submitted that 
televising and broadcasting the trial could not possibly raise the risk of any 
prejudice as a result of impact on members of the jury, since the trial would 
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be conducted by three judges sitting without a jury. That was obviously so. 
Given that there was no jury, the effect of broadcasting on jurors did not 
even enter into the matter. The petitioners also averred that the televising 
and broadcasting of the trial would not prompt any effect whatsoever on 
potential witnesses before they gave evidence or in the course of the trial, 
for the very simple reason that the Lockerbie case had already been the 
subject of “widespread publicity and public speculation throughout the 
world since,” with widespread dissemination of photographs of the accused 
both in Scotland and elsewhere. Nonetheless, broadcasting would not 
compromise any concealment of identity of witnesses because adequate 
arrangements could be made to this end. In these circumstances, the 
submission was that paragraph (c) of the Directions should not be regarded 
as ground for refusal of the consent sought.  
This was basically the stand taken by BBC. The other broadcasting 
companies adopted the same submissions and added none of their own. The 
position of the Crown instead was one of refusing the prayer of the petition, 
also because of well-established rules of practice that regulated the 
proceedings of the court. It was formerly a rule of practice of the Court of 
Session and the High Court of Justiciary that neither cameras nor sound 
recording facilities might be used in court. The Contempt of Court Act 1981, 
section 9, actually made it a contempt of court to use a sound recording 
instrument in court and to publish any recording made by means of such an 
instrument, except in each case with the leave of the court. In respect of the 
use of cameras in court, especially television cameras, this issue was clearly 
addressed in the above-mentioned Directions. The latter do not have the 
force of law, yet they are based on well-established rules of practice. As far 
as current criminal proceedings at first instance were concerned, the 
Directions could not be clearer in identifying that the rule of practice 
against televising such proceedings remained in force. This, for the Crown, 
was conclusive ground for refusal of part of the prayer of the petition.  
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Thus, it appeared that televising the Lockerbie trial and broadcasting it 
simultaneously would entail serious risks for the administration of justice. 
One requirement of the administration of justice was that witnesses should 
come to court to give their evidence. If they did not, the administration of 
justice would be undermined. In the Lockerbie case, a large number of 
witnesses lived abroad, that is to say beyond the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
courts. They were therefore not compellable witnesses. If the proceedings of 
the trial were to be televised, many of the witnesses simply would not 
attend,17 whether out of concern for their own safety, or because of the total 
loss of privacy or simply because of increased anxiety about their testimony. 
Moreover, they would be briefed about the evidence provided by earlier 
witnesses, which was also forbidden by Scottish law unless explicitly 
allowed by the court.18 Simultaneous broadcasting of the trial would 
certainly entail the briefing of witnesses as to the detail of the evidence of 
earlier witnesses. Finally, witnesses should be able to give evidence without 
being unjustifiably influenced by external circumstances, which would 
happen if the trial were to be televised. A witness might be more influenced 
by anxiety and uneasiness than he would otherwise be or he might play to 
the gallery. In so doing, he might as well be prone to restrict or expand his 
evidence. Nonetheless, this would be the case even if the evidence was only 
being televised for later documentary use and no simultaneous broadcasting 
occurred.  
As far as the counsels of the two accused were concerned, they basically 
shared the view taken by the Crown. They actually submitted that 
paragraph (c) of the Directions, which contained an absolute prohibition of 
the televising of first instance criminal proceedings, applied, whatever the 
specific format of the Lockerbie trial. Besides, they also referred to 
paragraph (h) of the said Directions, which made the consent of all 
participants a pre-requisite of televising such proceedings for future 
documentary use, and specified that no such consent was forthcoming from 
the accused. They also agreed with the position of the Crown as far as the 
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witnesses’ attitude was concerned. Finally, they emphasised that the 
accused had voluntarily agreed to attend for trial before the High Court in 
the Netherlands. They had done so on the clear understanding that the trial 
would be conducted in accordance with existing Scots law and practice.19 
And Scots practice was that criminal trials at first instance could not be 
televised.  Before surrendering themselves for the purpose of the trial, the 
accused had specifically asked whether the trial was to be televised or not 
and had been told that it would not be televised. It would clearly be 
prejudicial to the accused if their images were to be televised world-wide in 
the context of the allegations made against them, which prompted 
legitimate concerns about the effect which public television would have on a 
fair trial. The accused were not prepared to agree to a documentary 
programme being televised after the trial was over. If they were acquitted 
they should not have to endure re-runs of the trial and the risk of 
undergoing a subsequent trial by the media. 
With respect to those submissions, the petitioners made further points. In 
so far as the briefing of witnesses was concerned, they averred that the 
practical effect of the common law rule excluding witnesses from court 
during the evidence of earlier witnesses had already been undermined 
because of previous press reports. The difference between watching a 
televised broadcast and reading or hearing reports was actually 
insignificant. The petitioners also addressed the argument put forward by 
the counsels of the accused according to which the latter had voluntarily 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in reliance on the assurance that 
the proceedings would not be televised. To this respect, they actually 
submitted that no absolute assurance to that effect could soundly have been 
given. In any event, the court’s power to grant consent to television 
broadcasting of the proceedings could not be affected by the understanding 
upon which the accused had relied in submitting to the court.  
 
 
 219
4.3 The “remote sites” issue 
 
The petitioners also challenged the Crown’s stand by pointing out that 
because of the arrangements made to transmit the trial proceedings to four 
remote sites in the United Kingdom and the United States, similar 
equipment to that necessary to televise the proceedings would be present in 
the courtroom, and the impression, in so far as uninformed witnesses were 
concerned, would be that the proceedings were simply being televised. Thus, 
as far as witnesses’ reaction to the physical presence of cameras was 
concerned, no difference seemed to exist between the impact of cameras 
present for the purpose of public television broadcasting and that of those 
present for the purpose of the transmission of the proceedings to the remote 
sites. Witnesses would react to the physical presence of cameras and 
equipment, whatever purpose they might serve. Thus, the petitioners’ point 
was that there was no remarkable difference between public broadcasting 
and broadcasting to remote sites. If the families of the victims were entitled 
to watch the contemporaneous broadcasting of the proceedings, why a larger 
audience should not be allowed to do the same? Yet, in the opinion of the 
court the two forms of televising were not quite the same thing, since they 
were meant to satisfy different interests.  
In this respect, the main proposition put forward by the petitioners was 
that the court had already consented in principle to television broadcasting 
of the proceedings of the trial because of the arrangements that had already 
been made for the transmission of the proceedings to the four remote sites. 
It was actually the case that approval had been given by the court for the 
transmission of the proceedings of the trial by television to four locations 
beyond the precincts of the court in the Netherlands. Those locations, the so-
called “remote sites,” were situated one in Dumfries, one in London, one in 
New York and one in Washington DC. The initiative, which resulted in that 
approval being given, came from the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), an 
agency of the US Department of Justice. The model on which the 
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arrangements were based is to be found in the US Code, Title 42, Section 
10608, which is headed “Closed circuit televised court proceedings for 
victims of crime.” The latter establishes that, whenever the venue of a trial 
is changed out of the original state and more than 350 miles from the 
original location, closed circuit television transmission of the proceedings to 
the original location may be ordered to enable victims of crime to watch the 
trial proceedings. Viewing is permitted by people with a “compelling 
interest” in doing so, excluding anyone whose testimony would be materially 
affected by hearing other testimony in the trial. The signal would be 
transmitted under the strict control of the court and public broadcast of it 
would be prohibited.  
The OVC originally approached the Crown with a view to a similar 
arrangement being made in the Lockerbie trial in order to enable relatives 
of the victims to view the proceedings without travelling all the way to the 
Netherlands. The Crown supported the initiative and regarded the making 
of such arrangements as desirable, but assumed that the approval of such 
arrangements would be a matter for the court. A detailed scheme was 
therefore worked out, involving a number of strict rules for the actual 
conduct of the remote sites. The system to be adopted would make use of 
closed circuit television cameras to be installed in the courtroom. Thus, 
proceedings would be transmitted from the courtroom to the media centre, 
within the precincts of the court. These same pictures transmitted to the 
media centre would then be transmitted to the remote sites. Encryption 
would guarantee the safety of the transmission. Scottish Court Service 
personnel would control the facility at each of the remote sites. There would 
be no recording of the proceedings, other than such recording as necessary 
to enable the proceedings to be transmitted to the remote sites at a suitable 
local time. On top of that, the tape containing the recording would be 
physically destroyed after transmission. Only previously accredited 
members of the families of the victims would be allowed to attend to view 
the proceedings at the remote sites, with the exclusion of those family 
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members who were themselves witnesses and had not already given 
evidence.  
A formal application for approval of the arrangements was made by OVC 
on 28 January 2000, and approval was given administratively by Lord 
Sutherland, the presiding judge at the trial, on 4 February 2000. The 
accused, although their legal advisers had been involved in discussions 
about the arrangements for transmission to the remote sites, had neither 
consented nor objected to the arrangements. On this basis, the petitioners 
submitted that the court’s consent to those arrangements was to be 
understood as consent in principle to the television broadcasting of the 
proceedings of the trial, albeit to a restricted number of locations. The 
Directions did not draw any distinction whatsoever between different types 
of broadcast output, save a distinction between contemporaneous output 
and recording for subsequent documentary use. Thus, the court appeared to 
be satisfied that there was no reason in principle to deny consent to the 
televising of the trial. In particular, the court had accepted the presence of 
television cameras in the courtroom, seemed satisfied that live transmission 
was acceptable and, since the accused had not consented to the 
arrangement, seemed to deem such consent as unnecessary. Hereby, if the 
petitioners’ application was to be refused, it was necessary to identify a 
positive reason for limiting the output of the broadcasts to the four remote 
sites. And what sort of reason could actually justify this different attitude 
towards what in the event looked like the same thing – televising and 
broadcasting of the proceedings? 
The Crown, in response, took the view that the arrangements for 
transmission of the proceedings to the four remote sites did not even fall 
within the scope of the Directions. The latter applied to requests by 
broadcasting authorities for permission to televise court proceedings for 
public broadcasting. The transmission to the remote sites was different 
since it did not involve any public broadcast whatsoever. Actually, those 
remote sites had to be considered as “an electronic extension of the 
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courtroom,” which enabled people who had a particular interest in viewing 
the proceedings without travelling all the way to the Netherlands. In a 
nutshell, the arrangements did not even amounted to broadcasting. The 
Remote Site Guidelines themselves stated this version in undebatable 
terms: “The remote sites are an extension of the Scottish Courtroom.” Thus, 
it was not a pure matter of analogy. The counsels for the accused took the 
same view of the Crown and made similar submissions. Yet, the petitioners 
insisted that the trial court would contain television cameras in order to 
record the proceedings, including the testimony of witnesses, as they 
occurred; that the signal from those cameras would be transmitted beyond 
the precincts of the court in the Netherlands, actually to different countries, 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States; and that access to the 
output of the signal would be enjoyed in those countries by people who were 
not officers of the court or otherwise involved in the trial. Such features 
would apply likewise to any other broadcasting. Arrangements involving 
those features would therefore constitute television broadcasting of the 
proceedings as contemplated in the Directions. As a matter of principle, 
therefore, the Directions would apply to those arrangements. In giving its 
consent to those arrangements, the court had given consent as contemplated 
in the Directions. Besides, in the petitioners’ view, the proposition that the 
remote sites were equivalent to an extension of the courtroom and did not 
involve anything comparable to public broadcasting was unacceptable. First 
and foremost, there was no precedent in Scotland for the court transmitting 
its proceedings to any site beyond the judge’s control. Moreover, two of the 
remote sites were in a foreign state, hence none of the diplomatic or 
legislative formalities which were required for the set up of the Scottish 
court in the Netherlands were required over there. As a matter of fact, there 
would be no formal presence of the court at the foreign sites. The Scottish 
Court Service personnel would rather be visitors in the United States, 
subject to the domestic laws of such country. Finally, the court would have 
no sanction whatsoever in order to secure compliance with the rules 
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regulating conduct at the remote sites, short of complete withdrawal of the 
transmission.  
The petitioners also made reference to Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, pertaining to freedom of expression, even 
though the Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force at the time. They 
actually averred that the Convention had in some respects been given effect 
in Scots law by the Scotland Act 1998. Section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 
provides that: “A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make 
any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation 
or act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights...” By virtue of 
section 44(1)(c) of the Scotland Act, the Lord Advocate is a member of the 
Scottish Executive. By virtue of section 126(1) of the Scotland Act the 
phrase “the Convention rights” has the same meaning in that Act as in the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The particular Convention right relied upon by the 
petitioners in the present case is that contained in Article 10 of the 
Convention, headed “Freedom of Expression,”which reads as follows: “1) 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it 
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation of 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.” Hence, the petitioners’ contention was that the Lord Advocate 
had acted in a way that was incompatible with the petitioners’ rights under 
Article 10 of the Convention. In August 1999, the Lord Advocate was 
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actually reported as having indicated to the families of the victims of the 
bombing that the proceedings of the trial would be broadcast to the remote 
sites, but would not be available for wider broadcast.20  
 
 
4.4 Striking a balance 
 
In the event, the issues at stake turned out to be crucial in nature. First 
and foremost, freedom of expression needed being balanced against the right 
to a fair trial. Which of the two ought to prevail? Was it possible to ensure 
both or one needed being sacrificed for the other’s sake? And, so far as 
information was concerned, was it reasonable and fair to treat the families 
of the victims as “qualified audience,” whose compelling interest was such to 
command different rights and expectations? Can the right to be informed be 
modulated and adjusted with reference to different categories of people or 
should it be considered as unalienable as such? The main petitioners’ 
contention was that by authorising the transmission of the proceedings of 
the trial to the remote sites the court had in principle authorised television 
broadcasting of the proceedings. On that basis, the petitioners inferred that 
the court had already regarded television broadcasting of the trial as 
acceptable; that therefore there was no onus on the petitioners to justify the 
granting of consent to public television broadcasting of the proceedings: on 
the contrary the onus was on those opposing the petition to show cause why 
consent should not be granted. The issues for the court seemed extremely 
sensitive, as it emerges from the opinion issued by Lord Justice Macfadyen, 
on 7 March 2000. 
He pointed out that there was a clear-cut distinction between the 
transmission to the remote sites that the court had authorised and the 
broadcasting of the proceedings to the general public, although it was 
undeniable that there were features which would occur whatever the form 
and purpose of the broadcasting. Quite undeniably, the trial courtroom 
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would actually contain cameras in order to film the proceedings as they 
occurred; the output of those cameras would be transmitted beyond the 
precincts of the court; at the remote sites, access to the output of the 
cameras would be enjoyed by people who were not officers of the court. Yet, 
the sort of broadcasting the Directions referred to was the kind of 
broadcasting which is carried out either by a public service broadcaster or 
by a commercial broadcaster and made available for reception by members 
of the general public. The transmission to the remote sites, which the court 
had authorised, was different in a number of respects of critical importance. 
The nature of the transmission was different from public broadcasting, in 
that the signal would be encrypted so that it might only be received at the 
selected remote sites. Access to those sites would not be open to the general 
public, but controlled and available only to a precise category of people. The 
arrangement was made in acknowledgment of the fact that the relatives of 
the victims had a particular interest in watching and listening to the 
proceedings as they happened, but for obvious geographical and economic 
reasons would have some difficulty in attending at the courtroom in the 
Netherlands. The transmission to the remote sites would be for their benefit 
in recognition of their special position. As far as potential witnesses were 
concerned, the arrangements explicitly addressed the risk of their briefing, 
by excluding them from the remote sites until they had given evidence, or 
had been excused, or had been given leave to be present in accordance with 
the relevant provision of Scots criminal procedure.21  
Thus, the remote sites were to be considered as extensions of the 
courtroom, and the transmission of the proceedings to those sites as nothing 
else but an internal arrangement within the court. The strength and effect 
of the point did not depend on its being literally true that the remote sites 
were physical extensions of the courtroom. The key was to be found in the 
strong functional analogy. The fact that there was no Scottish precedent for 
transmission of criminal proceedings to sites remote from the courtroom in 
which the proceedings were to take place did not seem material either. Nor 
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was the fact that two of the remote sites were to be in a foreign state and a 
third in a different jurisdiction.22 If the court was satisfied that there were 
satisfactory arrangements in place to ensure adequate practical control of 
what was to happen at the remote sites, that was enough. It did not really 
matter that the court had no formal jurisdiction over those remote sites, if it 
was satisfied that the practical arrangements were sufficient for its 
purposes. Therefore, the arrangements for the transmission of the 
proceedings of the trial to the remote sites needed to be seen as special 
arrangements made with the authority of and under the control of the court 
in order to enable a defined category of persons with a special interest in the 
proceedings to watch and listen to them, as if they were present in the 
courtroom, but with less inconvenience and expense than would be entailed 
in actually travelling to Camp Zeist. Those arrangements were of a different 
nature from public broadcasting of the proceedings and served a different 
purpose. Their existence, therefore, had no bearing on whether the consent 
that the petitioners sought should be granted or not.  
Hence, the fact that the court had granted authority for those 
arrangements to be made could not be considered as constituting approval 
in principle of television broadcasting of the proceedings. Moreover, the 
submission that the existence of those arrangements, as authorised by the 
court, removed from the petitioners the burden of demonstrating that 
consent to public broadcasting should be given, and cast onto those opposing 
the petition the burden of showing cause why such consent should instead 
be refused, seemed totally unsound. However, the legitimacy of the interest 
that the petitioners had in the matter needed being acknowledged. The 
subject matter of the trial, involving as it did the destruction of a civilian 
aircraft and the deaths of approximately 270 passengers, crewmembers and 
people on the ground, was acknowledged as one of great public interest. 
Without a shred of doubt, the trial itself could properly be described as 
unique and could therefore be regarded as a matter of great public interest 
anywhere in the world. The value of full and detailed reporting of the 
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proceedings by all news media was therefore indisputable. The petitioners’ 
view that the most effective and comprehensive way for them to report the 
trial was broadcasting the proceedings lives was also acknowledged as 
undeniable. Yet, such view was not entitled to prevail because of other 
interests of paramount importance that were also at stake.  
As far as the legislative aspect was concerned, Lord Macfadyen emphasised 
that, although the legislation that prohibited photography in court in 
England did not extend to Scotland,23 the matter was not unruled under the 
Scottish legal system. The settled rule was that cameras (and, by extension, 
television cameras) were not permitted within the precincts of the court. 
That was a rule of practice, pertaining to the court’s inherent power to rule 
its own proceedings, and was backed up by a legal sanction. In fact, any 
attempt to photograph or televise proceedings would have constituted a 
contempt of court and would have been punished accordingly. The 
Directions certainly innovated upon that situation in terms that it was 
contemplated for the first time that, in certain circumstances, the court 
might give its consent to the televising of court proceedings. Thus, if 
proceedings were televised in accordance with the consent of the court, that 
would not amount to a contempt of court. However, paragraph (c) of the 
Directions made it absolutely clear that “the televising of current 
proceedings in criminal cases at first instance will not be permitted under 
any circumstances.” The Directions also made clear that the criterion which 
would be applied in determining whether the televising of proceedings 
would be permitted was whether that could be done “without risk to the 
administration of justice.” It was actually because such risk could not be 
eliminated in the case of current proceedings in first instance criminal cases 
that the Directions were expressed in the above-mentioned categorical 
terms.  
It was then to be inferred that the prayer of the petition had to be refused, 
if the Directions were to be applied according to their terms. Certainly, the 
reasoning underlying paragraph (c) was that one way in which the 
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broadcasting of proceedings at first instance in a criminal trial might 
involve a risk to the administration of justice is in its impact on the jury. In 
the Lockerbie trial, there would be no jury and the judges who would hear 
the case were not supposed to be as gullible as a potential jury. However, an 
adverse impact on witnesses would always be possible and it would be likely 
to jeopardize the administration of justice inasmuch as any media influence 
on a proper jury. In the event, the prohibition of broadcasting of current 
proceedings in criminal cases at first instance was clearly meant to protect 
the rights of others, in particular the rights of the accused, to a fair trial. 
This should also be “necessary in a democratic society,” thus the refusal of 
the prayer of the petition would have been legitimate in terms of Article 10 
of the European Convention of Human Rights, provided the latter was 
already in force. On the basis of all of the above, Lord Macfadyen refused 
the prayer of the petition. 
 
 
4.5 Appeal judgment 
 
The petitioners, then, presented another petition to the nobile officium to 
be exercised by two or more other judges. In the prayer of the petition, they 
sought review of Lord Macfadyen’s Opinion which refused the prayer of the 
first petition, as well as that consent already sought in the prayer of the 
first petition. The Opinion of Lord Kirkwood, as issued on 20 April 2000,24 
seemed to follow the one already expressed by Lord Macfadyen, as reported 
before. Once again, it was emphasised that there was a clear-cut distinction 
between the transmissions to the four remote sites for the benefit of the 
victims’ relatives, which the court had already authorised, and broadcasting 
the proceedings at the trial on behalf of the general public. Once more, it 
was also explained that the consent which had been given by the court on 4  
February did not amount to permission in principle for television 
broadcasting of the Lockerbie trial. The permission to view the proceedings 
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at the remote sites was restricted to the relatives and guidelines were 
approved by the court, in order to ensure that only relatives of the victims 
would be able to view the television pictures. As far as the petitioners’ rights 
under Article 10 were concerned, Lord Kirkwood’s view was that the 
restriction imposed by the court was not incompatible with the said 
provision and, even if it were, it would not necessarily follow that an 
unconditional permission to televise the trial to the general public existed. 
 On the contrary, one obvious possibility was that, if the restriction was 
held to be unlawful, the court that had imposed it could refuse to allow any 
television transmission whatsoever. Thus, the consent granted for 
transmissions to the four remote sites could not be said to constitute consent 
in principle for public broadcast of the whole trial and, that being so, the 
fundamental basis of the petitioners’ contention disappeared. It was also 
stressed that the petitioners were not even seeking the right to install their 
cameras in the courtroom in order to televise the proceedings worldwide. 
What they were seeking, in their second prayer of petition to the nobile 
officium, was an unrestricted right of access to the encrypted signals that 
would emit from the cameras which had already been installed for 
transmission to the remote sites. Those signals would actually be decrypted, 
so that they could be used by the petitioners as well. Here again, Lord 
Kirkwood stressed that it did not seem that Article 10 could properly be 
construed in such a way as to give the petitioners the right to use the 
encrypted television signals which would be produced by the cameras 
installed in court when there was every indication that those who would be 
producing the signals were not willing to allow the petitioners to make use 
of them. On this basis, Lord Kirkwood’s view was also in terms of refusal of 
the prayer of the petition. 
Lord Justice Marnoch also delivered his Opinion on the matter. He started 
by emphasising at the outset what the Petition was not about. He 
highlighted that the second application was not seeking consent to the 
televising of the Lockerbie trial by the petitioners. That was the subject 
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matter of the first application, previously made to Lord Macfadyen and 
already refused. Instead, what the petitioners were seeking by means of the 
second petition was that the court’s consent to broadcasting the trial by way 
of television could be seen as having already been given by Lord Sutherland, 
but that the restriction which he had imposed, namely the restricted link to 
the four remote sites, was illegal under Article 10 of the Human Rights 
Convention. In this respect, Lord Marnoch expressed critical reservations as 
to whether Article 10 might have any application to an encrypted signal 
emanating from a third party’s equipment to which the petitioners would 
have no immediate right of access. With respect to the submission that the 
consent to televising and broadcasting had already been given in principle 
by the court, he squarely labelled this argument as unsound.  
As to that, he simply adopted the careful and persuasive reasoning of 
Lord Macfadyen in the Opinion that he had delivered with regard to the 
earlier Petition. In the view of Lord Marnoch, it was purely a misuse of 
language to try to depict the arrangements pertaining to the remote sites as 
public broadcasting in any shape or form. For this reason, if none other, he 
also took the stand that the prayer of the petition should be refused in its 
entirety. As far as the Opinion of the third Justice, Lord Kinghart, was 
concerned, it represented that he wholly agreed with the two Opinions 
already expressed. Therefore, the Appeal Court unanimously refused the 
Petition. Thus, no other means of judicial review were now available. 
Interestingly, though, permission was granted on 9 January 2002 for the 
appeal proceedings to be broadcast. Lord Justice General Cullen actually 
gave permission to BBC to “stream” the appeal proceedings on a dedicated 
internet side. There were no restrictions to the accessibility of the said site, 
which on the contrary was accessible world-wide. Nonetheless, there was a 
protocol disciplining the conduct of such broadcasting which, for example, 
prohibited the streaming of live testimonies heard during the proceedings.25 
Thus, albeit a broadcasting eventually took place, it was somewhat limited 
and strictly controlled. Once again, other interests were given priority and 
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acknowledged as more important than the right to inform and being 
informed.  
 
4.6 Al Fhimah and Al Megrahi v. Times Newspaper Ltd 
As already reported, the Lockerbie affair has been attracting an 
outstanding media interest from the very outset. Many articles and 
editorials, often complemented by the photographs of Fhimah and Megrahi, 
had been published long before the trial at Camp Zeist had even started. 
Obviously, there was a remarkable public interest about the factual 
circumstances of the disaster and the subsequent actions being taken by the 
governments involved. People wanted to know why it had happened and 
which responsibilities were to be established. The width of the media 
coverage was such that it did not seem totally groundless to suspect that a 
trial by the media was actually taking place at the expense of the alleged 
perpetrators of the bombing. This gave rise to the question whether it is 
possible to achieve justice notwithstanding the emotional response that pre-
trial publicity may generate. It is actually difficult to find another 
international case were the concept of due and fair process might have been 
more at stake. Undeniably, the presumption of innocence as the cornerstone 
of a fair trial and the freedom of press as one of the fundamental ingredients 
for the maintenance of democracy need sometimes being reconciled. Media 
portrayals may actually serve as projective devices that isolate acts and 
people from meaningful contexts and set them up to be victimized or 
stigmatised, notwithstanding the fact that they provide terrorists with a 
huge audience and enormous attention, which is generally what terrorists 
look for. The Lockerbie affair certainly raised this sort of sensitive issues 
and the story of the trial highlights major concerns, such as the 
“spectacularization” of crime and the necessity of feeding the audience with 
immediate answers, which might prove groundless or simply insufficient, as 
if the right of getting to know might overwhelm the duty of duly inform.  
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This sort of issue was brought before the High Court of Justiciary at Camp 
Zeist. Fhimah and Megrahi actually lodged a petition to the nobile officium 
of the High Court, against Times Newspapers Limited, John Witherow and 
Nicholas Rufford.26 The petitioners submitted that, in the issue of the 
Sunday Times newspaper, dated 23 May 1999, an article and related 
editorial had been published, which they claimed was a contempt of court 
that could seriously hinder or prejudice the course of justice in the criminal 
proceedings pertaining to them. The article carried the following headline: 
“Official: Gaddafi’s bomb plot.” It said that, from 1990 to 1995, the British 
security services had obtained intelligence that Colonel Gaddafi had ordered 
the bombing of Pan Am 103 in revenge for an American air raid on Tripoli. 
The article made reference to a cousin of Megrahi who was said to have 
ordered the bomb timer from a Swiss Company. It also mentioned the first 
petitioner’s supervisor, Senussi. The editorial was instead headed: “The 
guilt of Gaddafi.” It stated, inter alia, that “it would be an odd sort of justice 
that found his cat’s paws guilty of murder and let the real villain off the 
hook.” The argument ran stating: “But even if the suspects are convicted 
(and it is conceivable that a verdict in Scottish law of not proven or not 
guilty might be found after all this time), what will the Government do 
then? Lift sanctions against a regime convicted of mass murder.” 
The petitioners claimed that, having been arrested and committed for trial 
by order of the Scottish Court, they were entitled to call upon the protection 
of that court in respect of any matters which was likely to adversely affect 
their prospect of obtaining a fair trial. They represented that the impact of 
published material might certainly affect the course of justice, which would 
lead to a specific category of contempt of court.  What they emphasised was 
that published material could actually prejudice the course of justice in two 
different ways: either adversely affecting the resolution of particular 
proceedings or damaging the legal system in a broader sense, by influencing 
the administration of justice in general. The petitioners emphasised that 
even the most detached reader would be left with the impression that their 
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guilt was already taken for granted. Any reader would also infere that, in 
case of acquittal, the latter would be justified by the fact that the evidence 
had been adversely affected because of the lapse of time but had nothing to 
do with the petitioners’ being innocent. Thus, it was submitted that the 
above-mentioned article and editorial had been in contempt of the court.  
The petitioners also sought an order prohibiting the respondents from 
publishing any article, feature or comment relating to the proceedings 
against them that were likely to prejudice the administration of justice in 
general and the case before the court in particular. What they basically 
stressed was that they feared being tried by the media before any court of 
law could get a chance of trying them. They maintained that pre-judgement 
of matters by the media usurped the role of the court and suggested to the 
public that the court might be influenced by what was being published. 
Interestingly, the petitioners did not even imply that the bench of judges 
might be influenced by the pressure exerted by the media. What they 
instead complained about was the way the administration of justice in the 
proceedings might be perceived both by them and by the potential audience. 
The Opinion of Lord Justice Clerk, issued on 10 August 1999, did not agree 
with the petitioners’ contention but instead maintained that “the 
administration of justice ha[d] to be robust enough to withstand criticism 
and misunderstanding.” He went on submitting that liability for contempt of 
court should not depend on the viewpoint of the parties involved in the 
proceedings, whose personal perspective was actually immaterial. He 
therefore inferred that neither the article nor the editorial amounted to 
contempt of court, although they referred to one of the petitioner. Yet, it was 
an indirect reference and all the allegations in fact that they contained had 
already been extensively covered by the media over the years. Thus, Lord 
Justice Clerk concluded that the question of pronouncing an order against 
the respondents with respect to their future activities did not even arise. 
However, he deemed it relevant to point out that this decision would not 
prejudice further cases of contempt of court by publication that might arise. 
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In his view, the possibility, albeit remote, of judges being subconsciously 
influenced by some kind of publication could not be completely ruled out. 
The Opinion of Lord Coulsfield was not at variance with the one reported 
above. It specifically referred to the strict liability rule and underlined that 
the latter would apply only to those publications which were capable of 
causing a substantial risk to the administration of justice so as to 
prejudicing or impeding it.27 The undesirability of “trials by newspaper” and 
the importance for the court to be left alone to deal with cases brought 
before it, without interferences, were also emphasised. In Lord Coulsfield’s 
view, it would be quite unlikely to have publications capable of adversely 
affecting the outcome of a trial, especially if the question arised from a 
single publication. Repeated publications could actually be more threatening 
because they might create an undesirable atmosphere, especially if 
containing recurring allegations of guiltiness. Such publications might 
actually interfere with the due course of justice. However, this was not the 
case in terms of the petitioners’ submission. Thus, Lord Coulsfield also 
agreed that the publication of the article and editorial constituted no 
substantial risk for the due course of justice.   
The same conclusion was drawn by Lord Justice Caplan. The latter, in his 
Opinion, extensively referred to the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which 
regulates the category of contempt of court by publication.  He basically 
pointed out that, under the pre-existing common law, published material, 
which was capable of affecting the course of particular court proceedings or 
the administration of justice in general, could give rise to a contempt of 
court. With the evolution of concepts of human rights, and in particular the 
introduction of Article 10 of the inherent European Convention, doubts were 
raised as to the correctness of some aspects of the common law. In 
particular, the conflict between the need to have a fair and effective system 
of justice, on the one hand, and the need to ensure freedom of expression, 
enquiry and debate, on the other, had become pivotal. He stressed that 
article 10 sets out the fundamental parameters of freedom of expression and 
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provides for a number of qualifications of the right, including restriction 
where necessary for “maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.” He also emphasised that, in terms of section 2(2), strict liability 
would apply only to a publication “which creates a substantial risk that the 
course of justice in the proceedings in question [would] be seriously impeded 
or prejudiced.” Hence, it would apply to specific proceedings, whereas the 
questions that might arise if more general areas of justice were affected 
seemed to be a totally different issue.  
The Act was however intended to regulate the boundary, which had always 
existed, between freedom of expression and the requirements of the due 
course of justice. Thus, he highlighted that the petitioners could establish a 
contempt of court only by proving that the publications complained of 
actually created a substantial risk that the course of justice would be 
seriously prejudiced or impeded. The Opinion, however, acknowledged that 
“the course of justice” can be quite vague as a concept. Many different 
interests might be affected and turn out to be in competition, including the 
paramount human right of an accused in criminal proceedings that is to say 
the right to receive a fair trial. If a publication might give rise to a 
substantial risk so as to influence the course of proceedings and have an 
adverse effect on the human rights of the accused, thus preventing a fair 
trial, then this could be considered contempt of court. Nonetheless, in Lord 
Caplan’s view, this was not the case, since the published material did not 
even seem to suggest that the accused were personally guilty. The aim of the 
article and the editorial complained of was connecting Colonel Gaddafi to 
the crime and then use this statement in order to question certain alleged 
commercial dealings between the United Kingdom and Libya.  
The petitioners’ counsels had actually claimed that the publications 
prejudiced their clients’ right to a fair trial. In the Justice’s view, if the 
petitioners were to face a trial by jury, or if the prospect of a trial by jury in 
Scotland was realistic at the time when the Sunday Times article and 
editorial were published, then some risks that the publications might 
 236
influence the minds of jurors against the accused would not be all that 
groundless. However, at the time of publication, there was no information 
from which it could have been possibly inferred that the accused would have 
been submitted to trial by jury. Thus, the risk that the article and editorial 
would expose the petitioners to prejudice in the course of trial by jury 
seemed insignificant. The petitioners nevertheless submitted that the 
publication would expose them to prejudice even if the trial took place before 
three judges, since the terms of the publications were such that both the 
accused and the public could reasonably assume that the judges trying the 
case may have been influenced by them. The accused maintained that not 
only they were entitled to a trial that was fair, but that also appeared to be 
fair. Besides, the terms of the article were quite likely to adversely affect the 
conduct of witnesses. The Sunday Times material was therefore said both to 
hinder the due course of justice and to be prejudicial to the petitioners’ trial.  
Nonetheless, Lord Caplan’s considered remote the possibility of a judge 
allowing himself to be influenced by extraneous material and assumed that 
the degree of risk, in those exceptional cases where it might actually exist, 
would concern specific facts and circumstances. In the Lockerbie trial, the 
facts were quite exceptional. Due to its political connotation, the case had 
been experiencing an extraordinary degree of media coverage both in 
Scotland and elsewhere. Detailed allegations about the factual 
circumstances leading up to the fatal explosion were available on the 
internet and no court would be in control. Nonetheless, the judges concerned 
would certainly be alerted to the problems of media involvement in the 
situation. They would give reasons for their conclusions and it would be 
most unlikely that any of the material published by the Sunday Times 
would be likely to influence their deliberations. However, Lord Caplan 
insisted on emphasising that what the Sunday Times printed was not 
intentionally aimed at usurping the function of the court but was rather a 
political comment about the United Kingdom’s relationship with Libya and 
its leader. Thus, whether the material complained of was desirable 
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journalism or not, it would be incapable of affecting the outcome of the 
petitioners’ trials.  
Nevertheless, Justice Caplan acknowledged that, if the petitioners got the 
impression that newspapers were publicly prejudging their case, they still 
retained their private civil right to protect their reputation, if they deemed 
that being the case. As far as witnesses were concerned, if these published 
material was capable of influencing them, this could certainly impede or 
hinder the course of justice and prejudice the petitioners as well. However, 
in the Justice’s view, such a risk did not seem to exist in this case, since no 
indication had been given by the petitioners of the nature of any evidence by 
witnesses who were likely to have read the relevant issue of the edition of 
the Sunday Times in question. Nor did it appear that the publications 
complained of contained the sort of details that might influence a witness. 
Thus, the possibility that the publications would make any difference to the 
evidence to be given at the trial seemed speculative and remote. This was 
particularly so when the specific publications were viewed against the huge 
and comprehensive press coverage the question of responsibility for the 
outrage had already received and would keep attracting. In the event, Lord 
Caplan also concluded that the petition had to be rejected, though 
emphasising that this did not mean that no limitations in the reporting of 
the pending trial existed.  
 
 
4.7 The press and the bereaved families 
 
From the outset, the media paid lots of attention to the reactions of the 
families of the victims and provided their individual stories with wide 
coverage. Yet, they also intruded their lives, in order to relay their feelings, 
their reactions, their expectations, their claims and grievancies in as many 
details as possible. Undeniably, shock and anger, inasmuch as bereavement 
and grief, often allow a story to sell, since the depicted emotions trigger the 
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potential audience’s emotions. Thus, the media’s attention was inevitable, 
although it sometimes entailed lingering on pain and anguish, which turned 
out to be a distasteful part of the show. This is what Dr. Jim Swire – whose 
21 years old daughter Flora was killed on the doomed plane – called 
“voyeuristic detail on the suffering and injuries of the victims.” Unending 
publicity actually proved part of the price he and his family, as probably 
most of the victims’ relatives, had to pay.28 Whatever was private and 
personal immediately became open for everybody to see. Exploitation of pain 
went on for years causing the bereaved families intrusion to their privacy 
and harassment, often because of the unappropriate timing of the media 
attention, often because of the inaccuracy and distastefulness of the reports.  
Nonetheless, it seems almost inevitable that pictures of a disaster turn out 
to be distressing to those personally involved and perhaps to other viewers 
too. Thus, there is no easy way out. Paying Pan Am 103 bombing no more 
than a superficial coverage would have looked like a denial of the trauma 
the family were suffering, a way of ignoring their anguish and loss or 
minimizing the magnitude of the event. Besides, it is never easy to select 
what is proper to show or relay, when tragic occurrences take place. Taste 
and sensitivity are subjective and it is always hard to reconcile the right to 
inform with the right to privacy. Moreover, reasonable standards change 
from time to time, from place to place, reflecting changes in society. 
However, the powerful role the media and its agents do have in representing 
catastrophes to the world must be limited by the importance of respecting 
pain and grievance. There must be other ways to convey the full impact of a 
tragic event without intruding people’s private sphere. In Lockerbie, this 
was certainly one of the issues at stake. The families of the victims were 
somehow victimised themselves, especially in the immediate aftermath of 
the tragedy. Thus, from the outset, mediating between the public’s need for 
information and the right to privacy by those most affected appeared 
pivotal. 
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Interestingly, though, media hardly acknowledged the intrusion into the 
relatives’ lives. On the contrary, they highlighted that, as the legal and 
political issues gained the limelight, the human misery was almost 
forgotten.29  
Be it as it may, at a certain stage, the media’s attention was no longer 
perceived in terms of harassment and intrusion: this probably happened 
because the relatives of the victims started developing a constructive 
relationship with the media and actually used them as a powerful weapon to 
advocate their cause. They therefore forged an alliance that prevented the 
Lockerbie case to be forgotten. In fact, the press widely focused on the 
families’ requests and tried to depict their understanding of the way the 
events unfolded in Lockerbie. In particular, it focused on the families’ 
reactions to the trial and the final outcome thereof. If the families had not 
been that persistant in their quest for justice, maybe the trial would have 
never taken place. Thus, the press gave voice to the bereaved relatives, 
reporting their comments and reactions. What did the trial actually mean 
for the families? Daniel Cohen, for example, whose daughter Theo was 
killed in the bombing said that the trial was a long way from justice, but it 
did something.30 Before the trial, both Cohen and his wife had said that the 
only way to respond to Pan Am bombing was military action.31 The trial 
thus provided them with something, some kind of response, albeit probably 
not the one they deemed most appropriate. 
The already mentioned Dr. Jim Swire, who, in the meantime, had become 
the spokesman for the UK Families Flight Support Group, was reported to 
have said that the trial would be a major advance both in the search of truth 
and justice.32 The press paid thorough attention to Dr. Swire’s comments 
and initiatives, making him turn into the public face of the families of the 
British victims and their pursuit of justice.  His wife got her share of 
coverage too and was reported to have said that the trial was a beginning 
and at least a good message for the world, meaning that people who are 
accused of wicked crimes are eventually brought to justice.33 Dr. Swire said 
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to have pushed for the trial to take place because he could have never 
tolerated that “the death of [his] beautiful, talented daughter [was] being 
pushed under the carpet.” He just could not allow that his daughter and the 
other victims were forgotten.34 He had therefore greeted the handover of the 
two suspects for trial with some satisfaction35 albeit, when the verdict was 
issued, he said: “We accept the verdict, the conclusion of Scottish criminal 
justice, but this is no longer about guilt or innocence, truth and justice...The 
device was bundled on to a plane in 1988. There are questions to be 
answered. We will press the government for an independent inquiry into 
aviation security… Now, 14 years on, it remains our job to ensure 
safety…”36  
Swire was not the only one to demand an inquiry into the atrocity, as the 
press highlighted. Other relatives assumed that questions such as airport 
security and the intelligence services’ roles still needed being investigated, 
notwithstanding the closure the case might have had in Camp Zeist. After 
the verdict, the relatives of the victims still needed to know why and how 
Pan Am 103 bombing was allowed to happen.37 Swire himself said that “the 
end-point for the court” could not be the end-point for the families,38 which, 
above all, wanted the full truth, even though so many years had gone by. 
“We’ve been waiting for a trial for 12 years,” said Joan Dater, whose 20-
year-old daughter, Gretchen, was on the plane. “The truth has been denied 
to us for all these years.”39 John Bacciochi, whose 19 years old daughter was 
also on board the doomed plane, tried to explain the importance of seeing 
somebody convicted at last: “It’s an open-ended story otherwise. It’s just 
never ending. That’s how it is. It means making things a bit clearer.”40 Not 
completely clear though.  
For the Flynns, whose 21 years old son JP was on the plane, the fight for 
justice offered a channel for the parents’ agony. They therefore became very 
active in lobbying politicians and fighting for someone to be held 
accountable for the bombing. Kathleen Flynn actually said: “We were 
determined to fight for JP, because he and the others deserved more than 
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just to be dead and buried.” Her husband John was reported to have said: 
“Despite the fact that Lockerbie is a political football, this is a trial about 
the murder of our son. If he had been gunned down in the street, we would 
have fought for justice and for someone to be held accountable for the 
murder of our son.”41 The press also stressed that the verdict had left many 
questions unanswered, as Rev. John Mosey, whose 19 years old daughter 
Helga was killed on board Pan Am 103 flight, pointed out: “But to me it is 
no longer about pointing the finger of blame at someone. I don’t care who did 
it, I just want to know why and how it was allowed to happen.” Yet, who did 
it was actually the issue at stake during the trial proceedings. The press did 
not forget Megrahi, the bomber but also a father and a husband himself, 
with his wife and children attending the trial and showing the other side of 
the coin. There was some suffering on this side too but the families of the 
victims could not possibly sympathize with the Libyan spouse and children: 
Megrahi was alive, though jailed, whereas nothing would have ever brought 
their relatives back to life.42  
 
 
4.8 Unanswered questions and political intrigues. 
 
It therefore made a remarkable story for the press to depict how Pan Am 
103 bombing had turned ordinary citizens into activists. Family members 
actually filed lawsuits against Pan Am and the Libyan Government,43 
became experts in terrorism and aviation security, turned into media-savvy 
and struggled in order to keep the memory of the crash alive in the world’s 
conscience.44 The security issue was one of pivotal importance since the trial 
had left inherent questions utterly unanswered. How was it possible to 
breach security and smuggle a bomb on board an aircraft? The finger was 
obviously pointed against Pan Am 103, “the world’s most experienced airline 
[that] came to grief long before its fate was sealed by a terrorist bomb,”45 the 
airline that went bankrupt in 1991. The families sued Pan Am and firmly 
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opposed its fleet to return to the skies.46 Airports’ security became a major 
issue that kept gaining the media’s attention over the years, once everybody 
was aware of the possibility of slipping a bomb onto an airplane. In fact, 
years after the tragedy, many airports still did not have the equipment 
capable of screening all checked-in baggage for explosives.47 What had 
happened in Lockerbie could happen again. Yet, what had actually gone 
wrong in Lockerbie?  
Amongst the many questions that were raised during the trial - but seemed 
to remain unanswered - there was one of crucial importance: ostensibly, 
there had been warnings prior to the bombings, which obviously added to 
the families’ immense sorrow and outrage.48 The media kept reporting that 
the CIA might have had knowledge of the bombing before it occurred and 
notwithstanding the warnings had just let the it happen.49 Did Washingtom 
actually know of the threat? Did anybody know that Pan Am flights were a 
security risk and still allowed the public to continue using them?50 
Warnings are a sensitive issue: as a former pilot and the husband of a 
woman killed on Pan Am flight 103 wrote, “publicly reacting to telephoned 
terrorist threats simply gives those terrorists a superb weapon: a risk-free 
way to produce expensive chaos. Ignoring telephone threats would take one 
weapon away from the terrorists.”51 Not all threats are hoaxes, though. 
Warnings pertaining to Pan Am flight 103 proved tragically true. Hence, the 
media widely covered the fact that somebody might have known in advance 
that a bomb hidden inside a radio cassette could be smuggled on to a 
plane.52  
In fact, on December 5, an anonymous call to the American embassy in 
Helsinki had claimed that there was to be a bomb attack on a Pan Am flight 
out of Frankfurt. A warning about Toshiba cassette recorders was therefore 
circulated to all airport security units. On December 13, the US Embassy in 
Moscow told its staff of the Helsinki warning about Pan Am flights but left 
Christmas travelling arrangements up to the discretion of the individuals.53 
Probably, this is why Pan Am 103, of all planes crossing the Atlantic just 
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before Christmas, flew half-empty, carrying only 259 passengers and crew 
when it could accommodate 430. Maybe, there were more warnings buried 
in the intelligence files and several people knew in advance that Pan Am 
103 would be targeted. Or, maybe, those who were warned just knew of 
general warnings about Pan Am, rather than of specific threat to Pan Am 
flight 103. According to the press, the South African Government’s Bureau 
Of State Security (BOSS) might actually have been receiving such warning. 
In fact, “twelve senior officials, including Foreign Minister Pik Botha, were 
due to take Flight 103 to New York, but took another plane. It is believed 
that BOSS received its tip-off from the U.S., Britain, or Israel.”54 On the day 
of the bombing, the South African officials were actually travelling to the 
United Nations headquarters in New York to sign the Namibia peace 
agreement. Having arrived in London early in the morning, they were 
supposed to fly on board Pan Am 103 but then they took an earlier flight  - 
Pan Am 101 – which apparently received special security checks at 
Heathrow. However, those who suspect that the South African Governement 
received warnings generally acknowledge that Pik Botha was most unlikely 
to have known about booking arrangements.55  
Nonetheless, the press suggested “to history it will seem as if almost the 
only people who didn’t know about a terrorist bomb threat were the tragic 
passengers and crew of the doomed Pan Am flight 103. From government 
ministers, to intelligence sources worldwide, to Pan Am executives - all had 
been tipped off that Islamic terrorists would blow a plane out of the sky. 
There were no fewer than eight warnings three weeks before the bombing - 
but little or nothing was done to step up security that just may have avoided 
the world’s worst airline atrocity.”56 Of the many questions the trial left 
unanswered, the one pertaining to the warnings is certainly one of the most 
haunting and probably the one that will never find and answer. 
One more pivotal question did not find a definitive explanation, though. 
The other pivotal issue pertained to responsibilities. Many did not believe 
that Libya was actually behind Pan Am 103 bombing. The already 
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mentioned Professor Robert Black,57 who played a great role in staging the 
trial, actually said that the case against the two Libyans was a weak one. 
He told the press that it had always seemed to him that there was weightier 
evidence against the Syria-based Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine - General Command, led by Ahmed Jibril, than against the two 
Libyans. Professor Black suggested that the investigators must have had 
the same belief, “because that’s the way their probe was heading long before 
Libya came into the frame.” Robert Black said he had the impression that, 
once the investigation did focus on Libya, anything which did not fit into 
that framework was simply discarded.58 Hence, not everybody was 
persuaded of Libya’s involvement. A Syrian-based conspiracy was also a 
possibility.  This was pretty much the defence’s case, which suggested other 
possible links that would have let Libya off the hook. The possibility of a 
Palestinian plot was actually raised during the trial and therefore given 
wide media coverage. Nonetheless, lawyers for Megrahi and Fhimah 
conceded that they could not prove the guilt of terrorist groups such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command - or the 
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. But, as they pointed out, they did not 
have to prove anything. The onus was on the prosecution to establish its 
case against the two Libyans in the dock beyond reasonable doubt.59 
The press did not ignore the fact that, from the outset, the finger was 
pointed against Syria and Iran, which were afterwards ruled out, and 
upheld the suspicion that Libya was pretty much a scape-goat: in fact, the 
most suitable one at a time when the aims and interests in international 
politics could not afford challenging anybody else in the Middle East.60 
Many prominent observers and some of the families were actually “skeptical 
of the prosecution’s Libya-did-it scenario” and seemed to believe that justice 
might have taken second place to politics in the highly volatile world of the 
Middle East.61 In fact, it might have proven politically desirable to blame 
Libya and rule out Syria, given the contingent “priorities” of international 
politics. In those times, the United States were actually embarking in the 
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Gulf War and the delicate balance in the Middle Eastern system of alliances 
and antagonisms made it important to rely upon Syria. The press openly 
suggested that Syria was too big and too significant for the United States to 
take on, whereas “Libya was a tinpot little place which had no real friends 
and no great importance in the world. Any accusations against Libya were 
likely to stick because, under Col Muammar Gaddafi, it had impressed itself 
on the international consciousness as being a terrorist state. What goes 
around comes around. If you give Semtex explosives and rocket-launchers to 
the Provisional IRA to kill innocent people in Belfast and Derry - as Libya 
did - and you praise the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine as a 
righteous, justified instrument of the people’s will, then you cannot, decades 
later, expect your protestations of innocence over the Lockerbie bombing to 
get much serious attention.”62  
The press also depicted the anti-Arab climate in the United States, “which 
was such that made it easy to single out the pariah state of Libya as a 
convenient whipping boy in a changing world where shifting                 
allegiances dictated that old enemies Iran and Syria had to be courted as 
effective counters to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. What is more, prior to 
November 1991, Iran and Syria had been openly suspected of complicity in 
the Lockerbie bombing, if not of actually carrying it out, and by fingering 
Libya alone, a weak but troublesome country with less international clout, it 
would restore relative peace to the overall conduct of foreign affairs in the 
Middle East.”63 Middle East: that complex part of the world that the press 
vividly described as “one giant conspiracy theory.”64 Thus, the media 
suggested that the Scottish police might have followed blindly down any 
path the CIA wished to tread whereas the investigators excluded whatever 
political interference, a standpoint that the press also reported: yet, doubts 
remain.65 Thus, the legal issue pertaining to responsibility inevitably turned 
out to be a matter of international politics,66 in fact an extremely complex 
matter that gave the entire case the flavour of a huge intrigue. In fact, even 
the question of where to stage the trial turned out to be pretty much a 
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question for the political and diplomatic arena, that reached far beyond pure 
legal reasoning.  67 
 
 
4.9  A long deadlock, a huge trial, a poor outcome 
 
The long way to the Lockerbie trial and the diplomatic deadlock it entailed 
provided the media with a number of issues of undeniable interest. The 
press gave wide coverage to the shadowy diplomacy that seemed to prove 
more effective than the official one in bringing the case to a close. The 
pivotal role that Nelson Mandela played in persuading the Libyans to hand 
over the two suspects for trial was widely highlighted.68 The press reported 
what Colonel Gaddafi said in this respect: “the word of President Mandela of 
South Africa, who has acted as an intermediary and has assured the 
Libyans that the trial offer is fair, is sufficient to resolve the crisis which 
has prevented the accused being handed over.”69 In a live television 
broadcast in Libya, Colonel Gaddafi actually asked the Libyans to trust the 
word of Nelson Mandela, and that of the Saudi Arabian Government, both of 
whom had urged the Libyan Government to accept the British and 
American offer of trial in the Netherlands. The press reported that Gaddafi 
said: “ ... their word is enough. When someone like Mandela or some country 
like Saudi Arabia intervenes, whatever the result is, we have to respect the 
word given.”70 Thus, Colonel Gaddafi, despite his alleged fear that the 
United States and the United Kingdom might come up with “tricks” in order 
to make the trial impossible,71 eventually gave up.  
There were those who nonetheless suggested that the fact that Gaddafi 
surrendered the two alleged perpetrators of Pan Am 103 bombing was to be 
considered a pre-emptive surrender and not actually the result of years of 
shrewd diplomacy: “as American tanks began to roll through Iraq to 
overthrow Saddam, Libya’s longtime terrorist, Muammar Qaddafi, came up 
with a strategy to avoid being next on the regime-change list.”72 Yet, the role 
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of shadowy diplomacy is undeniable. Nelson Mandela was praised by the 
press for explaining “the high and mighty” that they were also supposed to 
play by the rules, by publicly arguing that “no country had the right to be 
complainant, prosecutor and judge in the case.”73 The press did not ignore 
the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States demanded Libya to 
extradite its nationals although there was no legal obligation in this respect. 
For a long time, the British and the American Governments seemed to be 
responsible of the lenghty diplomatic standoff, refusing the possibility of a 
trial in a third country. This probably made the press say that the United 
Kingdom and the United States had handled the Lockerbie case “with the 
delicacy of a rouge elephant inspecting the wares of a Waterford crystal 
shop.”74 As already reported, while years went by, many countries around 
the world had started questioning the righteousness of the American and 
British demands whereas Libya’s cause started gaining simpathy.  
Thus, the Lockerbie affair began “to take on symbolic political significance 
for these countries who saw it as an example of western arrogance which 
verged on racism,” as the press highlighted.75 The Libyans were starving 
because of the United Nations sanctions, which “kill people while doing 
nothing to dislodge leaders unpopular in the West.”76 Many countries were 
no longer ready to support the sanctions77 and threatened to infringe them if 
the United Nations did not lift them.78 Amongst those that took a stand 
against the sanctions, there was even His Holiness Pope John Paul II, while 
the Vatican’s move to open diplomatic relations with Tripoli immediately 
attracted the attention of the press.79 The world was changing and the 
United Kingdom and the United States could not keep ignoring its voice, 
especially when a certain message was conveyed by such high profile 
authorities. And eventually, after a long-lasting and massive investigation, 
which the media acknowledged as the “most expensive crime investigation 
in world history,”80 in fact “one of the most awesome and inspired                  
pieces of international detective work,”81 the trial took place. The press 
highlighted the enormity thereof: it was the longest and most expensive 
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murder trial in British history - that saw months of legal argument and 
adjournments, heard 230 witnesses from all over the world, while the court 
was shown 2,488 bits of evidence such as photographs, charred clothing, 
shards of wreckage and a model of the luggage hold which contained the 
explosives. A trial that left a bill to the British taxpayer of more than 60 
million pounds.82  
The press also suggested that the Lockerbie trial “made legal history, being 
the first British trial to be televised, although proceedings were curtailed 
because of a computer error in the transcription service,”83 and because it 
was the first time that a Scottish court sat abroad.84 It was written that this 
trial broke “any number of precedents - it [was] the biggest mass murder 
trial, the most heavily-protected, and follow[ed] the biggest murder 
investigation in history. It ha[d] its own road signs to direct visitors, its own 
no-fly zone, and a grandstand for the television networks right outside the 
courthouse. There [were] a dozen press officers to assist the media, and the 
judges even made themselves available for a photo opportunity before the 
proceedings began.”85 But there were also those that said that the media 
coverage was not as wide and deep as it should have been. Despite the fact 
that huge sums of money had been spent by the Scottish Court Service on 
providing facilities for the media, no attempt had been made to give 
reporters what they actually needed in order to cover the trial. For example, 
notwithstanding the fact that print journalists were given a huge media 
centre with places for 240 reporters to watch the trial on a closed circuit 
television link, the Crown Office, which was responsible for Scottish 
prosecutions, did not provide even the most basic information such as the 
names of the witnesses.86 Those same witnesses that sometimes failed to 
appear whereas the testimony of others proved “less than crystal clear,”87 
which obviously cast a shadow on the prosecution’s case.  
Then, the press obviously focused on the outcome of the trial, which ended 
up convicting just one of the accused, whereas the other, Fimah, went back 
home were he was welcomed as a hero.88 Therefore, the verdict was  
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believed to have given no more than “a glimpse of the truth.”89 Some of the 
reactions were utterly negative. As already reported, the United Nations 
observer Hans Kochler said that the verdict was politically motivated.90 The 
press obviously echoed his stand that the outcome of the trial was rigged by 
the suppression of evidence but also reported the comments made by the 
spokesman for the Crown Office, that pointed at Kochler’s “complete 
misunderstanding of the function and independence of the judiciary.”91 
What was the meaning of the Lockerbie trial, then? The press defined it as 
“one of Washington’s most ambitious attempts to use criminal law as a 
weapon against a horrific act of international terror” which proved that the 
United States and the United Kingdom “have options in responding to 
terrorism and are not limited to military force.” 92 Nonetheless, the verdict 
left open pivotal questions about whether the rules of the courtroom, with 
strict standards of evidence, are an adequate response in the face of brutal 
acts of terror, which are devised by the perpetrators to make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to detect who is responsible, therefore frustrating the 
criminal justice process. Many are convinced that terrorism cannot be 
viewed as a criminal justice matter, it is rather a national security threat 
that should be dealt with by military force when state sponsorship is 
proven. 
When Megrahi was convicted, it seemed quite unlikely that he had acted 
alone. The media immediately pointed higher up, in the chain of possible 
responsibles,93 albeit acknowledging that the two accused, while on trial, 
could not possibly be made answerable for an entire nation. The trial was 
not supposed to try the Libyan intelligence service nor the entire Libyan 
regime.94 Yet, the press suggested that the Scottish Court in Camp Zeist 
might as well have condemned Colonel Gaddafi himself, since “the Libyan 
dictator’s hands [would] forever be stained with the blood of the 270 people 
killed in the horror of Flight 103 on December 21, 1988.”95 The issue was 
one of a pivotal nature: could individual responsibility lead to state 
responsibility? Would a chief of state be held liable, then? As a matter of 
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fact, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, by requiring 
that Libya admitted responsibility and paid compensation to the families of 
the victims, had pointed at state responsibility, which could be concurrent 
with individual responsibility.96 Hence, the media pointed their finger at 
Colonel Gaddafi – the enfant terrible of the Maghreb,97 allegedly involved in 
an international Masonic brotherhood98  - and highlighted that the findings 
about individual responsibility inevitably supported subsequent claims of 
state responsibility. Megrahi could not have possibly planned and performed 
the bombing all by himself, acting in his “private capacity.” The press 
therefore echoed the relatives’ main fear, that Gaddafi could come out with 
clean hands. In fact, “rumours of a deal not to pursue everyone responsible 
for the bombing of Pan Am 103, at least in the context of the two men’s trial, 
have circulated for some time” among the various victims’ groups, 
underlying the suspicion that even though the two alleged perpetrators 
were convicted, those who had planned and ordered the bombing would have 
been let off the hook.99 The families of the victims feared that Colonel 
Gaddafi and his henchmen could get immunity from national and 
international courts and therefore “get away with mass murder merely by 
giving up the lowest-level players, paying minimal compensation and 
allowing the passage of time and economic pressure to absolve them of 
responsibility.”100  
The question therefore remains whether full justice is done whenever no 
more than a foot-soldier is caught and the world’s biggest investigation into 
terrorist murder has managed to uncover nothing about who ordered the 
attack on Pan Am flight 103, what the motive was or which governments 
were involved.101 And anyway the trial, inasmuch as the investigation prior 
to it,102 was extremely controversial and the press raised the issue that the 
evidence was unconvincing or even that it had been partially withheld from 
the trial itself, not to mention that at every step fresh evidence might 
undermine the Crown’s case.103 As the press reported, “Whatever the 
verdict, the sad truth is that the families of 270 people who lost their lives 
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on 21 December, 1988, will be no closer to discovering the identity of those 
who instructed and funded the destruction of Pan Am 103 and their loved 
ones.”104 Yet, the Lockerbie trial might have set a precedent and be used as 
a template for other trials pertaining to terrorist act.105 And anyway it 
paved the way for a definitive compensation offer to the families of the 
victims. While the appeal was still pending, the press started reporting that 
a deal to compensate the family of the victims was under way, whereas an 
acknowledgement of responsibility kept being a controversial issue for a 
while. In fact, even when it seemed that Libya had accepted responsibility 
in writing, the press reported that its prime minister suggested that Libya 
was not responsible for the Lockerbie bombing and other major acts of 
terrorism, even though it had agreed to pay compensation to victims’ 
families.106  
As already reported, paying compensation to the victims’ families was one 
of the Security Council’s conditions before any lifting of United Nations 
sanctions against Libya. The latter was also required to renounce terrorism 
and admit responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Libya was 
ready to offer compensation when it was tired with isolation and actually 
made its offer on the condition that the United States and the United 
Nations eventually dropped their sanctions. Libya also required to be 
removed from the United States’ list of countries that sponsor terrorism. 
Colonel Gaddafi felt it was high time to end his country’s pariah status and 
get back to the international fold. Thus, Libya eventually accepted 
responsibility for the Libyan agent’s conduct.107 What lesson was to be 
inferred? Probably, that a rogue regime can be persuaded to get out of the 
terrorism business not only when it is subjected to pressure but also when it 
realizes the potential benefits of cooperation and the importance of restoring 
itself to the international community. Obviously, normalising relations and 
boosting trade generally proves to be in the interest of all parties. 108 Thus, 
in the event came the deal which was heralded by the press albeit some of 
the relatives said they were horrified at the very idea Gaddafi’s regime was 
 252
buying its rehabilitation. In fact, the press suggested that the victims of 
Lockerbie were being used as “bargaining chips.”109 Yet, many amongst the 
victims’ relatives supported the efforts to bring Libya back into the 
international arena.110 However, it was a long way to go before the families 
of the Pan Am flight 103 victims could get any monetary compensation 
whatsoever. But this is another part of the Lockerbie saga, which is to be 
addressed in due course. 
 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
Pan Am 103 bombing proved a tragically spectacular event but all terrorist 
acts have to be if they want to grab the media’s attention. In most cases, the 
more spectacular is the terrorists’ action, the wider the media coverage. 
Blowing up an aircraft and killing all passengers and crew on the spot is 
certainly an impressive event that has no chance of going unnoticed. The 
spotlight is in re ipsa. It is undeniable that civil aviation provides terrorists 
with highly visibility targets. Due to the great media attention paid to 
attacks on aviation targets, it also provides terrorists with great propaganda 
opportunities as well as a possible leverage in the achievement of their 
aims. Blowing up an aircraft means making millions of people feel 
threatened. In a way, media may become a vehicle for the psychological 
impact of terrorism, which is violence for effect, not only for the physical 
effect on the actual target, rather for its dramatic impact on an audience. 
And media are definitely able to expand the potential audience to the global 
scale. This is why civil aviation is often an optimal target for terrorists. Air 
transport is certainly a vital factor for global economic growth, 
communication and social development. Hitting it is an effective way to 
spread fear and uncertainty. How many people around the world felt 
vulnerable after Pan Am 103 bombing? How many families thought that the 
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students travelling on board that doomed aircraft could have been their 
children instead of somebody else’s?  
Yet, alleged terrorists deserve to be considered innocent, inasmuch as 
everybody else, until a court of law issues a verdict of guilt. Media have to 
be careful when portraying suspects of heinous crimes. They have a duty of 
duly inform without infringing on anybody’s rights. This was one of the 
issues that the Lockerbie case actually raised. The alleged perpetrators of 
the bombing lamented being subject to some sort of media trial to an extent 
that a fair trial was impossible. In fact, long before its very beginning, the 
media’s finger had pointed at the suspects’ involvement which certainly 
played against their case by generating an emotional response. Pre-trial 
publicity can actually affect the mind of judges and jurors and especially 
influence the witnesses’ conduct, thus bearing a weight on the trial outcome. 
Shielding the trial from the adverse effects of publicity was an issue of 
considerable importance during the Lockerbie proceedings. The potential 
media’s influence therefore suggested that the trial be staged without a jury 
and in a neutral country. Besides, notwithstanding the interest in the 
development of the proceedings, broadcasting the trial or parts thereof was 
prevented and then admitted within strict limits.  
But the Lockerbie case was more than a terrorist attack that ended up 
with a criminal trial. It was a legal and political intrigue that went on for 
years. The aftermath of the bombing was much more than a simple 
epilogue. On stage, diplomats, politicians, lawyers from all over the world. 
In the long term, though, the main characters became the bereaved relatives 
of the victims who turned themselves into activists and pursued the search 
of truth with an incredible determination. The media focused on their 
efforts, their endless and brave struggle in search for the truth, their 
reactions to diplomatic moves and legal steps. They could not be forgotten 
because they made their voices rise high, which was possible thanks to the 
same media that at the beginning intruded their lives and harassed them 
denying privacy to their pain and sorrow. It was actually thanks to the 
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media’s attention that their case could not be easily filed away despite the 
time going by and notwithstanding the fact that more urgent international 
events could grab the world’s attention. The media therefore played a 
pivotal role to this end, ensuring the families’ opinions and initiatives the 
due limelight. They actually allowed the victims’ relatives to relay the 
Lockerbie story in their own terms.  
Interestingly, the real impetus for addressing the tough issues of aviation 
security, which stemmed out of the Lockerbie disaster, came neither from 
institutions nor the media, but from those who might have seemed the least 
able to act: the grieving families and the friends of those who perished. It 
was they to learn to use the media and the latter, to their credit, actually 
cooperated, to focus public attention on security lapses that might permit 
would-be bombers to perform other tragic attacks on civilian aircrafts. 
Probably, the trial itself can be considered the outcome of the bereaved 
families’ activism and the media’s perseverance in reporting their endless 
quest for justice. Yet, the relatives insisted that the trial was only the 
beginning of a long way to the definitive discovery of the truth, which was 
behind Pan Am 103 bombing. In the light of the verdicts, the families 
actually renewed their demand for a full public inquiry and insisted that 
they had received only part of the answers to years and years of questions 
about who carried out the act of terrorism and why. All this did not end 
within the families’ circles. It became a matter for governments and 
investigators to address. And this was possible thanks to the media’s 
attention, which gave voice to the opinions of statesmen but also to the 
demands of ordinary citizens whose lives had been torn apart forever. This 
is the democratic dynamic of the media system, after all: whatever sells 
deserves the utmost consideration. A desperate parent’s reaction can be an 
attention grabber in as much as a Secretary of State’s comment. Without 
the constant media’s attention, the families’ pressure would have not been 
as powerful as it was. The relatives of the Pan Am 103 victims were not the 
first ones to be stricken by terrorism and other forms of crazed violence but 
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probably the first to forge an alliance with the media in order to pursue 
their cause. Once again, the media’s power proved that of a magnifying lens: 
in the same way they convey the terrorists’ message and spread fear, by 
providing terrorists with a global audience, the media magnified the 
families’ despair and anger, giving them a stage and an audience. This was 
crucial if the relatives of the victims were to play successfully what was to 
become their role before the entire world: advocacy, as the next chapter will 
show. 
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Chapter 5 
 
BEYOND RETRIBUTION: RESTORATION AND REHABILITATION 
 
 
 
5.1 Redressing unbalances in modern times 
 
 
The findings in Camp Zeist did not necessarily ensure a complete sense of 
closure to the Lockerbie case. The trial itself was part of much a bigger 
picture. Only one person was actually convicted; yet, the criminal court in 
Camp Zeist had no power whatsoever to prosecute anybody else beyond 
Megrahi and Fhimah. Nor it had the power to examine possible 
governments’ responsibilities. Nonetheless, the criminal court found Libya 
to be somehow involved in the Lockerbie bombing: Megrahi was found to be 
a government agent, after all.1 Nonetheless, the Scottish Court never said 
how high up the Libyan authorities were or might have been involved in 
planning and ordering the Lockerbie massacre. Thus, after the criminal 
trial, many questions were still unanswered much to the distress of the 
grieving families. Somebody had been convicted, though. Some sort of 
accountability had therefore been established in a court of justice. Megrahi 
was charged with life sentence and this is what the criminal justice system 
stands for: identifying and punishing the perpetrators of crimes, making 
accountability triumph over impunity. In Lockerbie, it might have not been 
full accountability. Somebody might have gone away with it. Yet, the fact 
that it was not possible to prosecute and punish everybody does not make it 
useless to prosecute and punish at least somebody. A little justice is better 
than nothing, after all.  
Does a life sentence redress the imbalance between the wrongdoers and the 
victims of their wrongful act, though? Can it fully vindicate individual 
rights? Probably not. Whether Megrahi spent the rest of his life in Barlinnie 
prison or not, those who had been killed on board Pan Am flight 103 would 
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not come back to life. Yet, they were not the only victims of the bombing. 
Their families, in their own way, were victims too. For them, it made a huge 
difference to see somebody ending up in jail or not, no matter how 
vehemently the trial at Camp Zeist was criticised for convicting no more 
than a foot-soldier while leaving off the hooks those who had ordered the 
terrorist attack.2 As a matter of mere common sense, some accountability is 
better than no accountability at all. Total impunity would have been much 
worse. 
The next question, then, was whether there was anything else that could 
compensate the grieving families of the tragic loss they had suffered. 
Restitution was materially impossible but monetary compensation could be 
available. The issue started gaining the spotlight. Was there anybody that 
was supposed to pay at least a monetary price in order to redress the 
tremendous injustice the relatives of the victims had been hit with? Yet, if 
somebody had to pay a price, was it possible to put a monetary value on a 
person’s life? Money cannot make a family whole again but monetary 
compensation is all the modern civil system knows as a means of redressing 
imbalances, whenever restitution is materially impossible. This is actually 
the way the legal system evolved, once it abandoned ancient customary 
retaliation practices. As legal civilization unfolded, the original rules that 
imposed an identity between harm and punishment gradually gave way to 
norms requiring mere equivalence between harm and compensation. The 
original system of retribution grew to include pecuniary compensation as a 
means of both punishing the wrongdoer’s act and providing some sort of 
satisfaction to the victim.  
Today, the desire of punishing wrongdoers and obtaining compensation 
from him are deeply enrooted in human nature, whereas ancient legal 
system gave primary importance to punishing the wrongdoer.3  
Compensatory legal remedies might no be apt to fully redress major 
injustices but retaliation in kind would not allow for restitution either. In 
fact, the ancient retaliatory practice might punish the wrongdoer but the 
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victim would not gain anything tangible. Not to mention the fact that the 
regime of retaliatory threats always runs the risk of starting up a spiral of 
escalating violence that leads to nowhere apart from more violence. Quite 
obviously, the monetary sum to be paid is neither necessarily linked to the 
actual loss one suffers nor is necessarily adequate to repair the damage. 
How much money is human life worth, after all? Yet, monetary 
compensation embodies some sort of moral satisfaction for the victim while 
taking away something valuable from the wrongdoer. The latter ends up 
internalising the full subjective value of the loss. This should also have some 
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers. Going down the path of an illicit 
behaviour is not a free ride: there is a price to pay. Undeniably, money 
cannot compensate for grief and sorrow but it is the accepted means of 
exchange and the only way of evaluating loss. Nevertheless, the concept of 
assigning a price tag to a life has always made people intensely squeamish. 
Yet, criminal punishment of the specific wrongdoer and monetary 
compensation are what criminal law and tort law allow for. The combination 
of the two remedies is what should avoid revenge against entire groups. 
Such dual system may not be able to fully redress major injustices but any 
form of retaliation would achieve even less.  
What was there to be gained for the Lockerbie victims’ families, then, now 
that Megrahi had been convicted and the criminal proceedings were over? 
The tort system gave them a window of opportunity to get some money out 
of punitive inasmuch as compensatory decisions that could hit hard 
whomever was found responsible for the Lockerbie bombing. Provided 
Megrahi had materially smuggled the bomb on board the doomed aircraft, 
somebody had mandated the terrorist attack and somebody else had let it 
happen. Hence, other responsibilities were still to be ascertained, the full 
truth was still to be known. Accountability can be multifaceted in nature. In 
this respect, the families of the victims were ready to keep on fighting. The 
fact that Megrahi had been convicted was better than nothing but it was not 
enough to bring the Lockerbie case to an end. As Susan Cohen, one of the 
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grieving mothers who had lost her child in the Lockerbie crash, wrote,4 the 
relatives of the victims wouldn’t fight back to win because they had already 
lost and they couldn’t possibly win. No sanctions, no life sentences, no 
compensation, not even military attacks could bring back those who were 
dead. But they had to fight back “because it was the right thing to do.” And 
they would fight because their rage would not allow them to do otherwise. In 
the aftermath of Megrahi’s imprisonment, then, the case was far from close. 
Somebody else was still to pay the bill. 
  
 
5.2 Airline security and Pan Am’s responsibility 
 
When an aircraft falls out of the sky, the question is whether the airline is 
somehow responsible for lax security. Was this the case with Pan Am? Could 
the airline be held somehow accountable for the Lockerbie crash? And, in 
any such case, would the victims’ families be entitled to get anything in 
compensation? Or are airlines liable just because one of their aircraft 
crashed? At the time of Pan Am 103 bombing, the issue was ruled by the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as well as a number 
of protocols that were supposed to set forth a uniform standard of 
compensation in the event of a crash. Compensation was actually fixed at 
125,000 francs,5 which the American Airlines had upped to $75,000 in the 
Montreal Agreement of 1966. The latter actually raised the limitations of 
liability as set forth by the above-mentioned Warsaw Convention with 
respect to those flights originating, terminating or having a connection point 
in the United States.  Such figure was still in place in December 1988. 
Nonetheless, albeit the Warsaw Convention generally limits a carrier’s 
liability for damages to $75,000 per passenger, Article 25 permits recovery 
of unlimited compensatory damages provided the carrier’s “wilful 
misconduct” caused the damages.  
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Thus, after Pan Am flight 103 was blown apart, the airline was bound to 
pay compensation to the victims’ families and actually offered $100,000 per 
victim, if the families were prepared to give up the right to sue in order to 
collect more in a future lawsuit. However, the grieving families had a 
chance to get more than $100,000 by proving that the airline had engaged in 
wilful misconduct, as per Art. 25 of the Warsaw Convention.6  Wilful 
misconduct reaches far beyond carelessness, actually implying that the 
airline knew or should have known that it was running a potentially lethal 
risk and acted despite it, regardless of the consequences of its course of 
action. Something that needs being proved, of course, no matter how 
difficult it is to prove it. Thus, almost nobody accepted Pan Am’s offer. The 
families intended to fight for more and started a lawsuit that went on for 
several years, in order to prove that there were loopholes in the airline’s 
security system, although, since 1986, Pan Am had  been trumpeting a very 
far-reaching security programme, namely Alert, whose launch was 
advertised on The New York Times, on 20 May that year and was supposed 
to start the following June.  This would have entailed an extra-cost for 
passengers but was heralded as a dramatic improvement of the standard of 
safety Pan Am would provide its customers with. 
A few years later, in the aftermath of Pan Am 103 bombing, the victims’ 
families seriously doubted the efficacy of the airline’s security system and 
were ready to challenge Pan Am in order to prove its wilful misconduct. The 
families’ lawyers actually foresaw the possibility of a gigantic lawsuit 
against Pan Am and its wholly owned subsidiary, Alert Management 
System, Inc., which was in charge for security, as well as USAIG, that is to 
say US Aviation Insurance Group, for wilful misconduct as a proximate 
cause for the death of those who were killed on board Pan Am 103. The 
plaintiffs’ case relied on the official version of Lockerbie bombing as 
provided by both the American and the Scottish investigators. It has to be 
noted that by the time the liability trial started in new York in 1992, both 
the commissions investigating the Pan Am tragedy, that is to say the United 
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States Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism and the Scottish 
Fatal Accident Inquiry, had reached the conclusion that the bomb bag had 
been loaded on board Pan Am 103 without being identified as an 
unaccompanied piece of luggage. It would have never ended up there if 
stricter baggage reconciliation procedures had been carried out. Thus, the 
plaintiffs’ case was that the bomb bag had been loaded on to Pan Am flight 
103 as an unaccompanied piece of luggage, which was simply X-rayed but 
never submitted to baggage/passengers matching procedure as required by 
the Federal Aviation Authority’s Air Carrier Standard Security Programme. 
This infringement of the Rules certainly amounted to wilful misconduct.  
The families of the American victims had found their way to some 
specialists in aviation law, many of them belonging to one particular law 
firm in New York: Kreindler & Kreindler.7 The relatives of the British 
victims also sued Pan Am and took their litigation in the United States, 
where much bigger damages were likely to be awarded. The Scottish and 
English experience in aviation cases was not even comparable to the one 
available in the United States. In the United Kingdom, it therefore seemed 
unlikely that a jury would be allowed to decide over a case of wilful 
misconduct and only inconsequential damages might be assessed. The 
United States system, instead, allowed juries to decide any such issues, 
which, coupled with the contingency fee mechanism, provided everybody 
with an opportunity for skilled representation. As Peter Watson, the lawyer 
that represented the British victims’ families, wrote, this was an issue of 
paramount importance, given the fact that “isolated and financially weak 
individuals were facing the enormity of an international corporation 
surrounded with all the might of the international aviation insurance 
industry.”8 The British plaintiffs therefore chose their attorneys9 and 
started their lawsuit in Florida, where Alert, the aforementioned company 
that was responsible for providing security to Pan Am flight 103, was based.  
Several wrongful death actions were therefore started in different federal 
courts in the United States and then transferred to the District Court in the 
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Eastern District of New York for a consolidated liability trial, which began 
on 27 April 1992.10 The court heard a number of stipulated facts, which had 
been agreed upon by the opposing parties and therefore did not need being 
proved. They could actually be accepted, by Judge and jury, as presented. 
Amongst those facts, there was the circumstance that Pan Am had 
circulated a manual pertaining to the corporate policy with respect to 
security and safety of passengers, customers and employees. The said 
manual incorporated the Federal Aviation Administration’s mandated Air 
Carrier Standard Security Programme, which required airline to conduct a 
positive passenger/checked baggage match resulting in physical inspection 
or non-carriage of all unaccompanied bags. Another stipulated fact was the 
fact that Alert provided security in a number of airports, Frankfurt and 
London included. Other facts that were accepted as “presented” were the 
Helsinki warning and the shot-down of an Iranian civilian aircraft by a 
United States missile cruiser in July 1988.11 Another stipulated fact was 
that the Israeli Security Company that had been engaged by the airline 
itself to review the security provided to Pan Am flights in certain airports 
had reported major weaknesses and loopholes in the security system and 
had labelled Pan Am as highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Isaac Yeffet, 
former chief of security for El-Al and a world’s leading expert in airline 
security, had actually made a study on Pan Am’s safety measures and 
reported major lapses, thus inferring that the airline was highly vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks.12  
During the trial, many testimonies were heard and the plaintiffs succeeded 
in proving that the Pan Am security system was utterly defective both in 
Frankfurt and London. It was because of the loopholes in the security 
system that it was possible to smuggle an unaccompanied bag, carrying a 
bomb, on board the aircraft. The finger was also pointed at the fact that 
Alert Management System staff at the airport, that was supposed to identify 
people meeting risk profile, was not numerous enough and had received no 
training whatsoever.13 The plaintiffs could therefore infer that, should have 
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been sufficient security at Frankfurt and London, Pan Am 103 tragedy 
would have not occurred. In fact, if the passenger/baggage matching 
procedure had been performed the way the Federal Aviation Rules 
mandated it to be performed, an unaccompanied piece of luggage would 
have never ended up on board the doomed aircraft without having been 
physically (and thoroughly) searched. At this stage, Pan Am, had no credible 
defense to put forward. The airline had however tried to spread the blame 
by contending that the United States authorities had failed to warn it 
against the threat of terrorist attacks. In fact, in December 1990, Pan Am 
had even tried to sue the United States Government for third party 
indemnity on the basis that the Government had received warnings about 
the bombing but had not passed the information to the airline. Nonetheless, 
Pan Am claim was dismissed as no evidence supported it.    
Quite shockingly, during the trial, it was widely disclosed and proven that 
aircraft were routinely allowed to depart carrying unaccompanied bags. 
Flights were never held up because of no-shows of passengers who had 
checked in for the flight. It was then widely proven that Pan Am had 
abandoned the mandatory matching process both in Heathrow and 
Frankfurt, and replaced it with what it called “administrative match and 
passengers control.” The said system was utterly inadequate: in fact, it did 
not deal with interline bags. Thus, Pan Am ignored the rules it was bound 
to respect and wilfully exposed its passengers to risks. It was because of this 
lax security system, in constant breach of the federal rules, that the piece of 
luggage containing the bomb-radio could end up on board Pan Am flight 
103. Hence, on 10th July 1992, the verdict came in. Pan Am was found guilty 
of wilful misconduct leading to the deaths of the passengers on-board Pan 
Am flight 103. The court therefore concluded that the lack of security which 
Pan Am and Alert were responsible for, inasmuch as the breach of the 
Federal Aviation Rules, amounted to wilful misconduct. The latter was a 
proximate cause of the death of those who had been killed in the Lockerbie 
bombing.  
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The issue at stake was one of establishing what sort of compensation the 
families of the victims were entitled to get. What sort of loss could be 
compensated? This might have been a question for the courts of different 
home states of the victims. In fact, once the Eastern District of New York 
had assessed that Pan Am had engaged in wilful misconduct and was 
therefore liable to pay compensation, the various individual cases might be 
sent back to those states courts to decide what amount of money could 
actually be awarded. The death of a relative did not necessarily entail that 
all the families were entitled to receive the same amount of money in 
compensation, at least beyond the insurance company’s original take-it-or-
leave-it offer. It was actually necessary to prove the monetary loss which 
was linked to the death of the beloved one. Projected future earnings are the 
typical standard of measurement. One thing was that the person killed was 
a wage earner that supported his or her family. One thing was that a 
student, still supported by his or her parents, had been killed in the crash. 
The economic loss was in re ipsa in the first case, but not in the second case. 
Of course, there were ways of giving monetary value to the so-called loss of 
services, such as household repairs, lawn-mowing or cooking. But what 
about the loss of companionship or parental care? And then another issue 
was at stake: what about the victims’ loss in terms of pain for their injuries 
(in case their death had not been immediate) or emotional distress for 
impending death? Finally, there was another category of damage that fell 
into picture: punitive damages, which were supposed to deter future 
misconduct on behalf of the society as a whole, yet being paid to the 
plaintiffs as such.   
The trial before the New York judge was bifurcated into a liability phase, 
binding on all plaintiffs whose cases were consolidated in the civil litigation, 
and a damages phase governing the cases of three specific plaintiffs. The 
way damages would be awarded would set the standards for damage awards 
in future cases resulting from Pan Am 103 crash. Thus, following the 
liability verdict, the jury awarded damages to the relatives of three of the 
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deceased. The final judgment was entered on 9 September 1992. 
Compensatory damages resulted in extremely varied assessments: for the 
death of the vice-president of Pepsico Inc., for example, the family was given 
$9,250,000. The death of another executive in the said company was also 
compensated with $9,000,000. The death of an electrician who was also a 
calypso singer was instead compensated with $1,725,000. The damage 
awards included damages for loss of society and damages for loss of parental 
care to adult children. No award for survival damages - sought by plaintiffs - 
was made because the jury found the passengers had suffered no conscious 
pain and suffering before their deaths. The said assessment would have set 
standards for all the other cases.14 The disparity, in the three awards, was 
there for everybody to see. Is a poor man’s life worth less than a rich man’s?  
The inequality of compensation was a sore point. The value that would be 
put on the life of a student or a kid was much less than the value attached 
to the life of a wealthy businessman. And the value attached to the life of a 
baby was going to be the least of all. In the tort system, the life of a 
passenger on board a flight does not equal a fixed amount of money. 
Compensation takes into account a number of factors, such as the age of the 
passenger, his earning history, his family status and so forth. On this basis, 
the projection of future earnings based on past performance implies an 
economic determinism that applies to the calculation of compensation in 
wrongful death litigations. Thus, although all passengers on board Pan Am 
flight 103 had died the same horrible way, their life would not be worth the 
same amount of money. The disparities would have been appalling to accept 
but that is the way the tort system works.  Dura lex sed lex! 
Pan Am, however, would not move from its original offer of $100,000 and 
appealed the verdict to the second Circuit Court of Appeal. In the meantime, 
there were 207 other cases pending. The outcome of the appeal would have 
been absolutely pivotal for them. The defense case was that Pan Am had 
guaranteed X-ray screening of all luggage before being loaded on board the 
doomed aircraft and that met the requirements set out by the Federal 
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Aviation Rules, considering that it had been given oral permission not to 
proceed with the baggage/passenger matching procedure. Nonetheless, the 
defendants were not able to prove who gave any such permission and 
anyway, if anybody did, he did not have the right to do so. On 12th 
September 1994, the Court of Appeal handed down its decision and rejected 
the Appeal. The judges confirmed, though not completely, the decision of the 
first instance. They certainly upheld the liability finding. They stressed that 
Pan Am was supposed to know the regulations, which required written 
application and written authorization for whatever change. Thus, no oral 
waiver, if any, could possibly discharge the airline and its subsidiary. The 
Judges also stressed that Pan Am campaign aimed at making the 
passengers feeling more secure had been utterly misleading.15 Basically, 
Pam Am had violated well-defined procedures, terrorist alerts and common 
sense in allowing the bomb to get on board Pan Am flight 103.16 Thus, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings of the court of first instance. 
Instead, it vacated the award for loss of society damages to one of the 
families inasmuch as the awards for loss of parental care in all three 
plaintiffs’ cases. The said cases were therefore remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings on the damage issues consistent with the 
second instance verdict. In the meantime, other 207 cases could proceed for 
damage assessment. 
The defendants however did not end their battle with the ruling of the 
Court of Appeals and brought their case before the Supreme Court of the 
United States, where they applied for a writ of certiorari in order to quash 
the decision of the lower courts after full judicial review of the prior 
proceedings. If the Supreme Court had granted any such remedy, the full 
proceedings of the lower courts would have been reviewed. Eventually, in 
June 1995, the Supreme Court rejected the petition for the said writ. 
Eventually, it was all over. Proceedings could now go ahead to compensate 
the families of the victims, which would take an additional year to 
conclude.17 It was time for Pan Am to face massive financial judgments. 
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Under the given circumstances, the airline started making “better” offers, 
ultimately one of $575,000 but it warned the families that it would have 
withdrawn it if it did not get almost unanimous acceptance. Finally, the 
families signed in, thus discharging the airline “from any and all claims, 
demands, damages, suits, debts, dues, reckonings, bills, promises, 
covenants, extents, and executions of every kind, which they had, had ever 
had, or in the future could have, “for any matter, cause or thing whatsoever 
from the beginning of the world to the date of this Release,” arising out or 
somehow pertaining to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103.18 It was therefore 
over with Pan Am. The airline, whose security system was so lax to allow an 
unaccompanied bomb-suitcase to be loaded onto an aircraft, was going to 
pay its price. Restitution was impossible but compensation was accessible 
and had to be paid. The Lockerbie tragedy and the outcome of the civil 
lawsuit sealed forever the fate of the airline whose lax security let an 
unaccompanied bomb-suitcase blew out of the sky one of its aircraft.19 
   
     
5.3 Civil lawsuit against Libya 
  
Then, it came the idea to sue Libya in order to get compensation from it. 
The families of the victims of Pan Am 103 bombing felt they were victims of 
an episode of state-sponsored terrorism. Thus, the victim’s families decided 
to sue Libya before an American court, although it was evident from the 
outset that a question of jurisdiction would have arisen. The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity would have protected Libya from whatever lawsuit. In 
this respect, a state sovereign immunity means immunity from trial. Yet, in 
the view of the families, immunity could not lead to impunity. The families 
of the victims were determined not to leave Libya off the hook, although it 
was far from proved that the Northern African state was behind Pan Am 
103 crash. Thus, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of one of the relatives20 in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. It was December 15, 1993 
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and the case was “Bruce Smith as personal representative of Ingrid Smith, 
deceased, v. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Libyan 
External Security Organization; Libyan Arab Airlines et al.” The case was 
then transferred to New York, where it was heard in winter 1995. The 
plaintiff’s case rested on the ground that an American aircraft is part of the 
American territory and therefore whatever happens on board falls within 
the scope of American jurisdiction. The main argument was that acts of 
terrorism cannot be considered a state’s sovereign prerogatives and 
therefore Libya could not shield itself behind the state’s immunity doctrine. 
On the contrary, Libya had implicitly waived sovereign immunity by 
engaging in “non-sovereign conduct” that amounts to violation of jus cogens 
norms, prohibiting terrorism. It was also argued that the Security Council 
resolutions adopted under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter not only 
bound all member countries but also created a private right of action in 
their courts.  
The following May, the verdict was rendered. It rejected the claim on the 
basis that Libya had to be accorded sovereign immunity, no matter how 
outrageous the acts of terrorism it had allegedly sponsored might be. No 
waiver of sovereign immunity could actually be sustained. The said decision 
was appealed in the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals, where the lawyers 
reiterated the argument that such a huge act of terrorism as the bombing of 
a civilian aircraft amounted to a waiver of sovereign immunity by Libya. 
The three judges panel then asked for direction from the Government by 
writing to the Attorney General. The Justice and State Department set forth 
their views in an Amicus curiae brief which was filed in June that year. The 
outcome was that no state had ever acknowledged any such waiver of 
sovereign immunity and that there was no such thing as violation of jus 
cogens following engagement in non-sovereign activities. Therefore, there 
was no international law basis to found the plaintiff’s case. In November, 
the Appeal was dismissed. Only one step was left: trying to bring the case 
before the Supreme Court.   
 278
 Meanwhile, on 29 April 1995, the team of American lawyers that had 
already sued Pan Am and that represented most of the American families 
filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York in the name of the 
original plaintiff in the Pan Am case. This was the case that would go down 
in history under the name “Rein et al. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya.”21 Smith’s case was consolidated with others pending in New 
York, under Kreindler & Kreindler lawyers direction. This time, the United 
States court retained the jurisdiction. In fact, major changes had occurred in 
the meantime. Libya had actually been associated with the State 
Department list of terrorists sponsoring countries. In 1996, the United 
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)22 had actually been 
amended, thus identifying a minority of states sponsoring terrorism, as 
defined by the US Department of State, and setting out that those states, 
unlike all the others, could be sued for their wrongful acts before the courts 
of the United States.23 Thus, Libya could be sued before American courts and 
sovereign immunity would no longer shield it from trial.  
This time, the case against Libya was that it “[had] provided material 
support and resources to the terrorists, in that Libyan Government agents 
and officials, acting in the scope of their offices” and it “[had] provided the 
terrorists with money, labor, intelligence information, equipment, and 
supplies, including electronic timing devices, electronic blasting caps and 
detonators, and explosives.” Moreover, Libya was accused of being 
“vicariously responsible” for whatever liability of those that had actually 
planted the bomb on board Pan Am flight 103, having acted in concert with 
them in accomplishing the destruction of  the aircraft. The plaintiffs 
contended that the above mentioned Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act24 
creates or provides for a cause of action in favour of all of them against the 
defendants “for their acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage 
and provision of material support and resources thereof.” The plaintiffs and 
the estates of each decedent therefore claimed to be entitled to recover 
“wrongful death damages, including pecuniary losses, and damages for loss 
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of support, consortium, society, companionship, prospective inheritance, 
care, love, guidance, training, education, and services, and damages for grief 
and mental anguish, moral damages, burial expenses and other damages.” 
By reason of the foregoing, defendants were allegedly liable to each plaintiff 
and each decedent’s estate in the sum of $20,000,000 dollars for wrongful 
death. Before their deaths, though, decedents allegedly suffered “conscious 
pain and suffering and fear of their impending deaths, entitling them to 
compensatory damages” in the sum of $1,000,000 dollars. The civil suit also 
sought $2 billion per defendant in punitive damages.  
In 2001, the civil suit got a pivotal boost. The Scottish Court sitting at 
Camp Zeist convicted Megrahi25 for the terrorist attack that blew apart Pan 
Am 103 aircraft. The Lockerbie verdict obviously had a remarkable impact 
on the civil suits pending against Libya. The civil action had been somewhat 
on hold, while the criminal case in Camp Zeist was unfolding. The evidence 
brought forward in the criminal case proved pivotal in the civil lawsuit, 
which could be more aggressively pursued once the guilty verdict had been 
issued in Camp Zeist. In fact, the criminal court’s findings made it 
immensely easier for the civil plaintiffs to prevail in the litigation against 
Libya. Once the government’s evidence implicating Libya had been used in a 
public trial, the plaintiffs could access it and use it in their civil litigation, 
albeit the Scottish court’s findings would not apply to the civil case as res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. Obviously, there is no hierarchical relation 
between a court assessing individual responsibility and a court trying to 
assess state responsibility. But it is rather obvious that relying upon the 
outcome of the trial at Camp Zeist was pretty much a matter of deference to 
the findings made by a tribunal competent and equipped to do so.  
 Libya tried to oppose the proceedings for lack of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 
though, denied Libya’s pre-trial motion to dismiss. Libya appealed from the 
denial of the said dismissal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
latter rejected the appeal affirming the first instance court’s ruling that it 
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had subject matter jurisdiction over Libya. The Northern African state 
would therefore stand litigation. The issue at stake was one of monetary 
compensation. The case was automatically won against Megrahi, but what 
about the Libyan Government? Neither in Camp Zeist nor in any other 
court, the Northern African state had ever been found guilty of ordering the 
terrorist attack that blew Pan Am flight 103 out of the sky. Certainly, the 
New York judge had no more evidence than the court in Camp Zeist in this 
respect. Yet, the latter had ascertained that Megrahi was a Libyan agent. 
Could this lead to some sort of concurrent state responsibility? The question 
was whether Libya as a state was somehow responsible for the activities of 
one of its agents, even though it had not been proved to order any such 
activity. Megrahi might have acted in his private capacity, after all. Would 
the mere fact that he was a Libyan agent be sufficient to trigger state 
responsibility? There are a number of individual acts that can lead both to 
individual and state responsibility.26 Acts of terrorism are amongst those. 
Remedies therefore fall on the state. Two paths can actually emerge, the 
path of state responsibility and that of individual responsibility.  
Individual criminal responsibility mainly aims at punishing the culprit, 
whereas state responsibility is supposed to bring about the reparation of the 
damage, which means that a reparative and not only a punitive look is 
taken.27 Hence, the prosecution and conviction of Megrahi did not preclude 
subsequent claims against Libya for compensation. Rather, the findings of 
individual responsibility in connection with the Lockerbie bombing 
supported subsequent claims of state responsibility. If an internationally 
wrongful act is committed against a state or its nationals by the agents of 
another state acting as such, that state is responsible, in international law, 
for the wrongful act. If the court sitting at Camp Zeist had found Megrahi 
not guilty, the factual basis for the claim of responsibility towards the state 
of Libya would have fallen away. Instead, the New York judge could infer 
that Libya was responsible for Megrahi’s deeds, albeit the plaintiffs could 
not prove that the Libyan Government had ordered the bombing. Yet, 
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Libya’s liability could be imposed under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
under which employers can be held liable for those intentional torts of their 
employees that they did not command. For the all the above mentioned, 
Libya, having lost the FSIA immunity, ran the risk of being charged with 
tremendous punitive damages. Was this a reason for worrying, though? Was 
it realistic that Libya would have paid a huge amount of money if the New 
York judge so decided? Maybe not, but one thing was certain: if the 
plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Libya and the Libyan Government 
refused to pay it, that judgment could as well be satisfied by freezing Libya’s 
huge assets in the United States.28 Under the given circumstances, it would 
not be surprising if Libya wanted to settle the suit. 
       
 
5.4 The long way to the final deal 
   
The main reason for Libya to being prone to settle the suit was to be found 
in the intent of coming out of the cold. As years went by, the burden of 
sanctions and the isolation they prompted became unbearable. The 
Northern African state, which had been so long vested with a pariah status, 
was keen on stopping being ostracized. Hence, pending the civil lawsuit, 
serious talks started about a possible monetary settlement. Negotiations 
went on and on, mainly behind closed doors. Many were sceptical about 
their possible outcome and considered utterly unlikely that Colonel Gaddafi 
would ever compensate the victims’ families, whereas many speculated that 
Libya was eventually ready to pay the bill for the Lockerbie bombing.29 
Eventually, in August 2003, Colonel Gaddafi agreed to meet demands for 
compensation from the families of the victims. The deal came after an 
extensive round of diplomatic meetings. Paying compensation to the victims’ 
families, though, was only one of the conditions Libya had to meet for the 
United Nations sanctions to be removed. The African state had to renounce 
terrorism and admit responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. The latter 
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was a sticking point but in the families’ view it was one of paramount 
importance. They would have never settled if Libya did not acknowledged 
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and simply came clean on it by 
means of a huge payout. 
Eventually, a striking multi-billion-dollar compensation deal was reached 
to compensate the families of those killed in the bombing of Pan Am flight 
103. On 13 August 2003, Libya actually agreed to pay funds equalling 
$2,700,000,000 directly into an escrow account set up at the Basel-based 
Bank for International Settlements. The deal had strings attached, though. 
An initial payment of $4 million for each of the 270 victims was going to be 
made as soon as the Security Council lifted the United Nations sanctions 
imposed in 1992 and already suspended. A second instalment of $4 million 
and a third of $2 million were conditional on the United States lifting its 
unilateral sanctions on Libya and removing the country from the list of 
states sponsoring terrorism, thus opening the door for the Northern African 
state to return to the world stage. The said measures were to be met within 
eight months, then the Bank for International Settlement would pay out a 
further million dollars on top of the initial $4 million compensation.30 The 
account would be a “self-executing” one, thus the money would be released 
automatically as soon as the conditions for payment were met. The bank 
would automatically transfer the money to a Plaintiff Committee account in 
New York. Libya would not be able to deny payment to the plaintiffs or pull 
that money back. 
It was now for the victims’ families to accept the deal, which could bring 
the civil suit to an end and have significant impact on the world’s 
international relations. The deal turned to be a three corners one, given the 
strings attached to the offer. It actually embodied a trade-off between cash 
payment and policy.31 For the first time ever, however, a state was offering 
compensation to the families of the victims of a terrorist attack. Victims in 
other terrorism cases had never received any money in compensation. Yet, 
not all of the relatives were ready to herald Libya’s good will. There were 
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those who said they would not accept any money whatsoever from the 
Libyan Government if that entailed the lifting of the United States 
sanctions. There were also those who considered the money offer to be 
bribery or blackmail, “blood money” actually. Many of the relatives felt that 
Libya was just trying to buy its rehabilitation off by using them like pawns 
in order to make the United States and the United Nations lift sanctions. 
The offer entailed no more than a business arrangement as long as no 
explicit admission of culpability followed. Yet, many of the relatives seemed 
inclined to accept the offer and even to take a stand for sanctions to be 
lifted. Obviously, $10 million is a lot of money and a major inducement. 
Given that it was nearly 15 years since Pan Am 103 crash, it was certainly 
understandable that some of the families wanted to accept the payment and 
finally put the past behind them.32 Besides, Libya’s offer would be by any 
standards substantial and it looked like an expression, if not of contrition, 
then at least of a rethinking of policy. Why offer a huge compensation 
package if new rounds of terrorism were still contemplated as an option?  
Obviously, all the victims’ relatives insisted that Libya had to take full 
responsibility and somehow come clean on Lockerbie. The families of the 
victims kept therefore calling for an outright acknowledgment of Libya’s 
Government involvement in the bombing whereas Washington insisted that 
no shortcuts would be available for Libya.33 Hence, mutually accepted 
understanding of responsibility language needed being negotiated. This set 
in motion further diplomatic contacts and intense negotiations, which 
culminated in Libya agreeing to meet all the conditions necessary for the 
sanctions to be lifted. Libya had hitherto been reluctant to accept 
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. Eventually, it was ready to 
acknowledge responsibility, which did not mean that the Libyan 
Government or leadership was taking criminal blame for Pan Am 103 
bombing but simply that it would have paid compensation because a Libyan 
agent had been convicted. Thus, the African state would simply admit civil 
liability for the actions of a state-employee.34 In fact, at a certain stage, the 
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Libyan Prime Minister even suggested that Libya was not acknowledging 
any responsibility whatsoever but simply trying to buy out its 
rehabilitation.35  
 
 
5.5 Meanwhile at the United Nations 
 
Eventually, Libya accepted all the conditions it was required to accept for 
the United Nations sanctions to be officially lifted. The Chargé d’affaires of 
the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations actually addressed - 
to the President of the Security Council - a letter dated August 15, 2003,36 
that reads as follows:  
“I am pleased to inform you that the remaining issues relating to the 
fulfilment of all Security Council resolutions resulting from the Lockerbie 
incident have been resolved. I am also pleased to inform you that my 
country is confident that the representatives of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America will be confirming this development to you and to 
members of the Council as well. 
The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has sought to cooperate in good faith 
throughout the past years to bring about a solution to this matter. 
In that context and out of respect for international law and pursuant to the 
Security Council resolutions, Libya as a sovereign State: 
 Has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects 
charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 and accepts 
responsibility for the actions of its officials. 
 Has cooperated with the Scottish investigating 
authorities before and during the trial and pledges to 
cooperate in good faith with any further requests for 
information in connection with the Pan Am 103 investigation. 
Such cooperation would be extended in good faith through the 
usual channels. 
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 Has arranged for the payment of appropriate 
compensation. To that end a special fund has been established 
and instructions have already been issued to transmit the 
necessary sums to an agreed escrow account within a matter of 
days.” 
In the said letter, Libya also offered its assistance in the “international 
fight against terrorism” and offered to “cooperate with efforts to bring those 
who are suspects to justice.” In particular, the text of the letter stresses the 
fact that Libya “has pledged itself not only to cooperate in the international 
fight against terrorism but also to take practical measures to ensure that 
such cooperation is effective.” The letter concludes as follows: “The Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya appreciates the effort made and the parts played by the 
Member States of the United Nations, by the Secretary- General and by 
other entities in bringing about the resolution of this long-standing matter. 
In expressing such appreciation, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya affirms that it 
will have fulfilled all Security Council requirements relevant to the 
Lockerbie incident upon transfer of the necessary sums to the agreed escrow 
account. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 16 of Council Resolution 
883(1993) and paragraph 8 of resolution 1192(1998), the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya requests that in that event the Council immediately lift the 
measures set forth in its resolutions 748(1992) and 883(1993).”  
Thus, Libya accepted civil liability for the Lockerbie bombing, renounced 
terrorism and pledged to cooperate in fighting it. 37  The time was therefore 
ripe for the Northern African country to rejoin the family of nations. It was 
then for the United Nations to permanently lift sanctions on Libya, which 
were suspended in 1999, after Gaddafi handed over two suspects for trial in 
The Netherlands. Yet, it was not a deal yet. France actually threatened to 
veto the plan when it reached the Security Council, since Libya had paid a 
far smaller compensation package38 to the relatives of 170 people killed in 
another terrorist attack on a French airliner in 1989.39 Besides, even if the 
French winded up acceding, families of the Lockerbie victims might not see 
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all the money called for under the agreement. The United States sanctions 
on Libya remained in force, and the country kept being on the U.S. State 
Department’s list of states sponsors of terrorism. Those two restrictions 
needed being lifted before the families of the victims could collect all the 
money, according to the agreement their lawyers had negotiated separately 
with Tripoli.40 Following Libya’s letter, however, the Permanent 
Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to the United 
Nations addressed a letter, also dated 15 August 2003,41 to the President of 
the Security Council where they stated that the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and the United States were “prepared to allow the lifting of the 
measures set forth by the Council in its resolutions 748(1992) and 883(1993) 
once the necessary sums referred to in the Libyan letter ha[d] been 
transferred to the agreed escrow account.”  
Thus, the United Kingdom Government tabled a resolution at the United 
Nations calling for the immediate lifting of sanctions against Libya that 
would immediately end the ban on arms sales and air links. On 12 
September 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1506,42 thus 
lifting 11-year-old sanctions against Libya. The Security Council’s action 
cleared the way for the immediate payment of $4 million to families for each 
of the 270 Lockerbie victims. The said resolution reads as follows: “The 
Security Council … Welcoming the letter to the President of the Council 
dated 15 August 2003 from the Chargé d’affaires of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, recounting steps the Libyan Government has taken to comply 
with the above-mentioned resolutions, particularly concerning acceptance of 
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, payment of appropriate 
compensation, renunciation of terrorism, and a commitment to cooperating 
with any further requests for information in connection with the 
investigation (S/2003/819), Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, Decides to lift, with immediate effect, the measures set 
forth in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of its resolution 748 (1992) and paragraphs 
3,4, 5, 6 and 7 of its resolution 883 (1993) …Decides also that it has 
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concluded its consideration of the item entitled ‘Letters dated 20 and 23 
December 1991 from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America’ and hereby removes 
this item from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.” 
The said resolution was adopted by 13 votes in favour and two abstentions. 
The United States and France actually abstained - Washington to protest 
against Libya’s human rights violations and pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction,43 and Paris to keep pressure on Libya to finalize a deal to 
increase the level of compensation to victims of the 1989 bombing of the 
French UTA jetliner. Meanwhile, by two letters dated 9 September 2003, 
the Governments of Libya and the United Kingdom on the one side and the 
United States on the other, notified the International Court of Justice that 
they had agreed to discontinue the proceedings initiated by the Libyan 
application filed on 3 March 1992.44 Following the said notifications, on 10 
September 2003, the President of the World Court made an order in each 
case placing on records the discontinuance of the proceedings instituted on 3 
March 1992 with prejudice, by agreement of the parties and directing the 
removal of the case from the Court’s list.45 
 
 
5.6 Compensation in the view of the lawyers 
  
 The very fact that Libya agreed to pay compensation was extremely 
significant. It was the first time ever that any of the states labelled as 
sponsors of terrorism had offered compensation to the families of terrorism 
victims.46 The events in Lockerbie therefore seem to show other countries - 
which sponsor terrorism - that not only they risk paying a military and 
political price but also a financial price. As Peter Watson47 suggested, 
payment of damages works on a number of different levels. In the first 
place, it proves that the rule of law works: in fact, the victim can sue for and 
get compensation from those responsible. This establishes that there is no 
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hiding place for perpetrators of heinous crimes. Before or later, they will 
bear the consequences of their actions. But above all, in Watson’s opinion, 
payment of damages work as an “economic imperative” in that there is 
always a price to pay. This is true not only for the state that sponsor 
terrorism or for actual perpetrators of specific crimes. It works as well for 
those who let the tragedy happen, because of their wilful misconduct. Pan 
Am also had to pay compensation to the families of the victims.  Thus, given 
the present tort system, civil judgements can bring home to multinationals 
responsibility for negligence and wrongdoing and compensate those who 
suffer a loss because of the companies’ carelessness and negligence.  This is 
why seeking money damages brings about what Peter Watson calls the 
“economic imperative.”  This means not only that there can be no hiding 
place for wrongdoers but also that the obligation to compensate will force 
change and improvement so as to avoid future penalty. Peter Watson 
actually recalls that Pan Am flight 103 was blown up using a particular 
kind of explosive called semtec.  At the time, the only way to detect it was by 
use of colour scanners. This technology was available but rarely used due to 
expense and the airline industry “made do” with black and white despite 
knowing this to be ineffective. Within days of the Public Inquiry making this 
fact know, the Airline Insurers insisted that colour scanners be installed at 
every airport. To pay out for the loss of life on Pan Am flight 103 was bad 
enough but they would not suffer this cost again. In a nutshell, the economic 
imperative worked again and produced meaningful changes for the good. 
 Obviously, money cannot replace a person whose life has been 
horribly taken away. It seems actually impossible to put a monetary value 
on a person’s life but on the other end it would be worse to put no value 
whatsoever on it. Law cannot bring the victims back to life and therefore 
wrongful death litigation is all about money. Basically, the monetary value 
works as a marker which makes perpetrators acknowledge their fault or 
liability. Moreover, if somebody pays, others can be deterred. This is true for 
states that sponsor terrorism and for airlines that let terrorists exploit 
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loopholes in their security system. After Lockerbie, wrongdoers know they 
will not get away with their crimes or illicit activities. As far as states 
sponsoring terrorism are concerned, they are now aware that there is an 
extra-price to pay and a high price. Libya’s settlement with respect to Pan 
Am 103 crash, in a way, proves that being somehow responsible for acts of 
terrorism may turn out to be an expensive ride, even when the state is held 
liable for acts of its own agents but no involvement of the government is 
proven or acknowledged. In the same way, the economic imperative works 
effectively for airlines: after Pan Am had to pay a huge amount of money in 
order to compensate the Lockerbie victims’ families, it was established once 
and forever that a price has to be paid when security is lax and negligence 
or wilful misconduct let tragedies occur. As Daniel Cohen, the already 
mentioned father of one of the Pan Am 103 victims wrote, “virtually every 
victim’s family member hated Pan Am with a passion and was suing them, 
not so much for money but for revenge.” He and his wife believed that the 
airline had taken away what was most precious to them, their only 
daughter, thus they had “to take from Pan Am what was most precious to 
them, their money.”48 Besides, he believed that the best thing they could do 
to improve security for the flying public was to put Pan Am out of business. 
This would have been a powerful message easily conveyed to other airlines: 
“if you let your passengers die, you may face more than a lawsuit, you may 
face a corporate death penalty.”49  
 As far as Libya’s offer to compensate was concerned, the interesting 
feature was that it offered to pay the same amount in each of the 270 
victims’ cases regardless of nationality, the decedent’s earnings, or other 
economic loss factors. On this occasion, a poor man’s life was to be worth as 
much as a wealthy one’s. As Jim Kreindler50 explained, since all the Pan Am 
103 victims’ families received compensation varying in accordance with 
their economic losses from Pan Am,51 in the Libya negotiations the lawyers 
focused on damage claims having nothing to do with specific economic loss.  
Accordingly, they demanded and received the same payment on each of the 
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270 cases.  Thus, the focus was on damage elements such as “loss of love 
solatium” rather than the economic losses that underlay the Pan Am 
settlements. In evaluating the events that led to the final compensation 
settlement, Kreindler said that the settlement was a success story that was 
made possible by the fact that the politicians left the whole thing to lawyers 
with specific experience in resolving wrongful death cases.  
In fact, much of the evidence the lawyers had developed in the civil case 
against Pan Am was used in the criminal trial at Camp Zeist whereas it was 
possible to make extensive use of the Camp Zeist trial record in the civil 
proceedings.  Thus, in Kreindler’s view, the civil trial record contributed to 
the success of the criminal prosecution and vice- versa. Yet, politics played a 
crucial role: the lawyers were always confident of obtaining a very large 
judgment, but they knew that, without United Nations and United States 
sanctions, it was very unlikely that Libya would ever have actually paid a 
2,7 billion $ to the victims’ families. As Peter Watson suggested in this 
respect, the United Nations sanctions and resolutions set the international 
framework to focus on Libya, whereas the actual sanctions put pressure on 
the Libyan Government. The criminal trial sorted out in public way the 
evidence and “brought guilt home” to one of the accused and this made the 
families’ lawsuit against Libya possible. Once the verdict in the criminal 
case was delivered, there was a bedrock for the civil claim because the 
person convicted was clearly proved to be a government agent. Once 
litigation started, Libya made clear it was ready to settle, since huge Libyan 
assets in the United States had been frozen during the litigation. Thus, the 
civil lawsuit, the criminal trial, the United Nations resolutions, the United 
Nations and United States sanctions all contributed to the final outcome: 
somebody, if not everybody, paid a price for the Lockerbie bombing. 
The next question is whether the settlement is a final step or not. What 
would it happen, if further evidence were discovered? Could the victims’ 
families sue Libya again and get something more in terms of compensation? 
Neither Peter Watson nor Jim Kreindler foresee any such possibility. 
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Should further evidence come up in the future, the right to sue Libya and 
get more would no longer exist: thus, the chapter is closed now for all time 
coming, regardless any future development. There has been a criminal 
sentence and a monetary compensation. It might not fully counter-balance 
the harm in the eyes of the victims’ families but criminal punishment of 
those who are brought to trial and found guilty plus monetary compensation 
when there is no room for restitution is all what the dual system, based on 
criminal and civil law, allows for. If this can be perceived as doing full 
justice, this is obviously another question. However, as Peter Watson 
acknowledged, justice is an ethereal concept. Law has to be practical. Once 
Megrahi has been convicted, Pan Am has paid some money in compensation 
and Libya has also paid, acknowledging civil liability for its agent’s deeds, 
the families will have obtained everything it can be possibly obtained under 
the ruling legal system. Everything, maybe, but the full factual truth. 
Probably, the establishment of the full truth was more important, to the 
families of the victims, than one life sentence or a huge cash payout both 
from the airline and the African state. Nonetheless, no matter how many 
questions were left unanswered, what the criminal system and the tort 
system achieved in Lockerbie were outcomes of paramount importance. In 
fact they set in motion a number of dramatic shifts that completely changed 
the relationship between Libya and the west.  
 
 
5.7 What about Libya 
 
It would have taken some more time before the United States also lifted 
their sanctions on Libya and re-established diplomatic relations with the 
Northern African state. Then, when eventually most of the remaining 
restrictions on doing business with Libya were lifted, President Bush 
stopped short of removing Libya from the state department list of nations 
that support terrorism.52 In fact, Libya still appears to be on that list. As 
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Ambassador George Saliba said,53 in April 2005 the Libyan press reported 
that the Central Bank of Libya had withdrawn 0.5 billion left in the escrow 
account that the country had set up for compensation to the Lockerbie 
victims’ families.  The last instalment would have been paid, had the United 
States removed Libya from the list of states sponsoring terrorism.  Libya 
was not supposed to wait forever: in fact, a deadline had been agreed upon.  
Time has now elapsed and the money has been withdrawn.  In Ambassador 
Saliba’s view, Libya is not going to pay any more money that was 
conditional on its being taken out of the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 
Does this mean that the relationship between the United States and Libya 
is experiencing another impasse? Ambassador Saliba said this means that 
the United States is not yet satisfied.  
Nevertheless, in the international community’s perception of world affairs, 
Libya is no longer the rogue state that it used to be. De facto, if not 
necessarily de jure, Libya has been rehabilitated, which would have never 
happened if compensation was not agreed upon and paid, though not 
entirely, to the victims’ families. There might be other reasons, of course, 
including the fact that for the last ten years Libya has not been involved in 
supporting terrorism or the fact that Libya has given up its WMDs 
programme.54 This was obviously a development of paramount importance 
and the best possible evidence of Gaddafi’s new course of action. A 
government that spontaneously renounce terrorism as a means of pursuing 
its goals and gives up a programme of development of weapons of mass 
destruction adds to the security of all nations. It is not surprising that the 
West is ready to praise it and show it as a model to be followed by other 
nations. Nonetheless, compensation to the Lockerbie victims’ families was 
made pre-conditional and Libya’s rehabilitation would have been quite 
unlikely if any such settlement had not been agreed upon. 
Closing the deal, for Libya meant resuming a lucrative oil business with 
the west. The country’s oil industry was adversely affected by the United 
Nations and United States sanctions. Attracting new investments was 
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therefore crucial. On their part, many western oil companies were itching to 
go back to Libya’s rich oil fields. For Libya, it was not all about oil, though. 
The settlement also meant overcoming a long-standing isolation. Air-links 
would be re-established,55 which would bring to an end Libya’s physical 
isolation. As Ambassador Saliba explained, travel to and from Libya was 
real hardship when the sanctions were on. For example, before the ban on 
air-travel was imposed, the journey from Tripoli to Valletta took 40 minutes, 
whereas afterwards it took some 12 hours, meaning that it took longer to fly 
from Malta to Libya than from Malta to New York. Once the deal was 
stricken and accepted by the families of the victims, diplomatic relationships 
would go back to normal, air-links would be re-established and the Northern 
African state would get rid of the Lockerbie shade. 
As events unfolded, Libya was even offered the “hand of partnership,” 
which did not mean forgetting the past but “recognising change when it 
happens,” as Tony Blair explicitly pointed out.56 The British prime Minister 
actually visited Libya in March 2004 and shook hands with Colonel Gaddafi. 
This officially ended Libya’s isolation. The meeting  proved a milestone for 
many of the victims’ relatives. In a way, it actually, sealed the closure of the 
otherwise never-ending Lockerie saga.57 Yet, many of the victims’ relatives 
reacted to the very idea of the meeting with enormous distress. Nonetheless, 
Blair’s official visit felt like “the latest stage of the international 
rehabilitation of the man once branded the mad dog of the Middle East.”58 
The decision to scrap Libya’s chemical and nuclear weapons programme had 
obviously won acceptance of the west. Tony Blair conveyed a very important 
message to the Libyans: that there are plenty of rewards for states that 
voluntarily abandon weapons of mass destruction and that alliances may be 
forged between Arabic states and the west in order to defeat terrorism. After 
all, Libya could prove some kind of demonstration project for rogue states 
and an example to follow, in terms of renunciation of terrorism, 
acknowledgment of responsibility, bearing of political and financial 
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consequences of terrorist activities. In fact, Libya could show other states 
that there are advantages in cooperation and shifts in policies.  
Yet, Libya is not entirely freed of the terrorism tag. In fact, it is still on the 
U.S. State Department list of states sponsoring terrorism. The fact that full 
normalization of relations with the United States is still to come, not only 
means that political pressure is still there but also that Libya is still paying 
a price in terms of economic matters. According to Ambassador Saliba, the 
latest oil  
technology, that could help Tripoli raise its production from approximately 
1.3 million barrels a day to 3.3 barrels, belongs to the United States.   
Libya is therefore still paying its price. Whether this is no more than a 
minimal price or the due amount will always be questionable. Certainly, it 
is a price inasmuch as prices, if not even a collective penalty, were the 
United Nations and United States sanctions. Yet, Libya is back from the 
cold and is gradually re-integrating into the world community. The Libyans 
are also better off now that they are freed of the burden of sanctions. As far 
as inter-states relationships are concerned, it is time for former antagonists 
to start cooperating with one another, not only as commercial partners but 
also as political allies. Besides, now that Gaddafi has abandoned his radical 
heritage, Libya could start playing a pivotal role as a mediator in order to 
tackle regional conflicts.59  
Claiming a crucial place in the African roundtable has always been a goal 
for Gaddafi’s Government, after all. Since relations with the Arab League 
soured in the late 1990s, the Libyan leader has turned his attention toward 
building strategic alliances in Africa. As a pariah state under United 
Nations’ sanctions, Libya sought recognition and respectability in the arena 
of intergovernmental meetings of African leaders.60 It has therefore 
participated constructively in  various regional forums and has hosted an 
extraordinary Organization of African Unity meeting to press for the 
creation of a “United States of Africa” as a means to promote solidarity and 
economic integration in the continent. The extent to which Libya bought 
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into African regional politics after 1997 is also evident from the 
establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in 
Tripoli, on 4 February 1998. The latter is actually a framework for 
Integration and Complementarity which intends to work, together with 
other regional economic communities and the Organization of African Unity, 
to strengthen peace, security and stability and achieve global economic and 
social development.61 Most of these initiatives have yet to produce 
substantial practical results but they show Gaddafi’s commitment to the 
continent’s political cohesion and economic rehabilitation.  
On top of that, Libya is a possible ally in the global war against terrorism. 
Gaddafi was one of the first leader to vehemently condemn 9/11 attack. In 
1999, Libya had already expelled terrorist organizations from its territory 
and closed down once notorious training camps.62 Why is it still on the US 
state department list of terrorist sponsors, then? Probably, this is a way to 
keep pressure on Libya and inducing further changes. Coming clean on 
Lockerbie, ending weapons of mass destruction development programmes, 
explicitly renouncing terrorism all embodied dramatic shifts in Libya’s 
policy. There are those who think that the prospect of going the Iraqi’s 
pattern might have been decisive in prompting Gaddafi’s shift of policy. 
Nonetheless, Libya’s pursuit of rehabilitation had started long before. 63  
Besides, the reasons are not that important after all. If the fact that Libya 
has come in from the cold will contribute to make the region and the world 
more secure, this is what really matters.  
What else is there to be done, then? The path of democracy is still a long 
way to go but Libya seems on the right route.  Already forgotten seems the 
time when Colonel Gaddafi was famous for all the wrong reasons, 
considered both a terrorist and a pariah, actually “the symbol, the 
personification, not just of international terrorism, but evil itself - the devil 
incarnate; the usual suspect whenever and wherever terror occurred,” as the 
press recalled.64  Now, Libya is considered a possible example for other 
rogue states, a possible partner in peace. Definitely, a line has been drawn 
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under the past. Gaddafi is the prize exhibit in the western case that the war 
on terror can be won. If the example will be followed and other countries 
will voluntarily abandon programmes of development of weapons of mass 
destruction and renounce terrorism as a means of pursuing political goals, 
only the time will tell. Libya’s case might prove unique. Yet, the fact that 
Libya is back in the family of nations is per se a major achievement. The 
only way to guarantee peace and freedom from fear is to persuade the 
international community to unite against terrorism,65 thus, even a single 
state conquered to the common cause against terrorism might make a 
difference, after all. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion         
             
 With the proceedings discontinued before the International Court of 
Justice and the Security Council no longer seized of the Lockerbie matter, 
the Lockerbie case seems to be officially over. Meanwhile, Gaddafi, 
apparently “terrorism-free” for more than a decade, is now to be seen as a 
leader trying to make his country come in from a long-standing isolation. 
This development in Libyan foreign policy has certainly been prompted by 
the harshness of the sanctions regime. But there was more than that. 
Intense diplomacy and the never-ending search for a political solution led to 
a legal settlement that brought to an end the Lockerbie crisis. The criminal 
process and civil case fall within the diplomatic and political picture. No 
military action was ever taken after the crash and a crisis that could have 
degenerated into a spiral of violence and retaliation was rather kept within 
the boundaries of politics, diplomacy and law. If the United States and the 
United Kingdom, in the aftermath of Pan Am 103 bombing, had stricken 
back by military means, the grieving families of the victims would not have 
gained more than what they actually gained. Besides, those who would have 
suffered retaliation would have perceived it and made others perceive it as a 
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further, wrongful act of violence: from victimizers, they would have become 
victims themselves and the cycle of victimization would have not been easy 
to break.  
The over-all civilized way the Lockerbie crisis was handled might have left 
questions unanswered but military action would have not provided better 
explanations. Besides, at the level of inter-state relations, maybe full factual 
truth is not even that important. Of course, knowing the truth means 
establishing full accountability and therefore the quest for truth is more 
than understandable from the standpoint of the victims’ families. Not that 
the truth would allow for restitution but there is an undeniable measure of 
moral satisfaction in finding an answer to all questions and going as high up 
as possible in the chain of responsibilities. Maybe, now that Libya is back to 
the international fold, further cooperation will help establishing the full 
truth about Pan Am 103 crash. An access to Libya’s archives might help in 
this respect. It would be shortsighted, if not even cruel, not to use improved 
relations with Libya as a way of answering some of the many questions that 
remain about the bombing, or at least of eliminating some of the disquieting 
theories that have been circulated since Pan Am 103 crash. The families 
more or less know what happened on that dreadful night of December 21, 
1988, but they do not know exactly how or why. The answers could lie in 
Libya, or further afield. The families’ quest for the factual truth should not 
be ignored now that they have received a huge amount of money in 
compensation. Amongst the various things that money cannot buy, there is 
probably the peace of mind.  
However, even in the case that the full truth will never be shown, the way 
the Lockerbie case was handled will still have proved a success story in 
many respect:  in the first place, it has brought to an end the cycle of 
violence between the United States and Libya and it is making Libya a 
partner of peace in the struggle against aviation terrorism. And it has 
acknowledged the status of victims to the families of the factual victims of 
the crash. Even if the Lockerbie trial has not established the full truth, it 
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has been crucial because of the consequences it has prompted: families 
received money in compensation, the Libyans have been relieved of 
sanctions, Libya is back to the family of nations and somebody has paid a 
price. The families of the victims, of course, might not have ended up with 
full satisfaction but they ended up with something. It would have been 
worse if they had ended up with less than they actually achieved. And 
anyway, what would be “full satisfaction” in the eyes of somebody who has 
lost a kid or a parent or a spouse in such a tragic way as in Pan Am 103 
crash?  
Besides, somebody paid the bill for the Lockerbie bombing. At least one 
person is serving life sentence. At least his crime did not go unpunished. 
Retribution is important since it embodies the refusal of impunity and the 
victory of accountability. The airline and Libya have also paid their price: 
the former for wilful misconduct, the latter for the deeds of one of its agent. 
It might not be much in the eyes of the bereaved but once again it is better 
than nothing. Monetary compensation might be nothing much but this is 
what a civilized system has to allow for: when restitution is physically 
impossible, restoration is paramount. And it is certainly a better option than 
retaliation by means of military action. It is politics and law that have made 
this world civilized after all. Compensation is actually pivotal. It lets trials 
have practical and tangible effects on people’s lives, which helps considering 
criminal justice something that happens on behalf of real people and not an 
abstract experience utterly detached from individual lives. With some more 
money, a tragic loss is still a tragic loss but maybe the burden of the loss is a 
little bit lighter. This can also help reconciliation, probably not at an 
individual level but certainly in the realm of inter-state relations.  
Furthermore, the civilized and peaceful way the Lockerbie case was 
handled might set a precedent to be followed in other cases of aviation 
terrorism. If the trial in Camp Zeist has led to compensation and 
compensation has paved the way to Libya’s rehabilitation, this is maybe a 
better, if not necessarily a safer world where to live: one more state which is 
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willing to abide by the rules of peaceful settlement of disputes, to struggle 
against international terrorism, to pursue the goals of justice, to take into 
account not only retribution but also restoration for the victims of crimes is 
one more brick to the construction of a more balanced, terrorism-free world. 
If Libya’s shift of policy will set an example that other so-called rogue 
states might follow, it is hard to say. Libya is eventually freed from 
sanctions and is back in the family of nations. It can start playing a 
positive role in the framework of international politics: once abandoned 
sponsorship of terrorist activities, it can help bring peace to the African 
continent, acting as a mediator in times of crisis and conflict.  Itself a 
victim of colonialism, it could well use its complex nature – Mediterranean, 
African and Islamic - to prove a bridge in north-south relations, thus 
playing a pivotal role in the international arena. The long-term aim must 
be to have a Libya that co-operates with the international community and 
that respects international law. The real issue is how to develop the 
undoubted gain of removing Libya from the terror team into the longer-
term goal of promoting peace, reform and stability both in Africa and the 
Middle East. That will not only ensure that there is no return to support 
for international terrorism, but encourage the emergence of a responsible 
partner willing to devote its many assets and energies to the positive 
promotion of prosperity throughout the region. The Lockerbie case is over, 
then: time to turn the page and move on.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
The explosion of Pan Am 103 was a terrorist attack which deliberately 
caused the death of 270 innocent persons flying on board a civilian aircraft. 
While destroying so many innocent human lives, it also hit at the 
fundamental rights of international travel, commerce and communication 
which are a defining characteristic of a modern world. It happened in 
British airspace, the aircraft was American, and the innocent passengers, 
crew and local residents who perished were of 21 nationalities. That gave 
the tragedy and the subsequent criminal investigation an undeniably 
international dimension. As a major incident of international terrorism, it 
was automatically transformed from one of purely Scottish, or purely 
British, concern into one of international concern. Whatever the reason for 
the bombing, it sent a dreadful message that was there for everybody to 
internalise: we are all vulnerable.  
The aftermath of the disaster has been more than an epilogue. It has been 
a saga, rather. Fortunately, in many ways, it is a story that reaffirms what 
mankind can collectively accomplish in adversity through cooperation and 
peaceful confrontation. Nonetheless, although many years have gone by 
since 21 December 1988, boarding an aircraft does not feel any safer. 
Terrorists keep striking hard and continuously hitting at means of 
transport. Considering the number of acts of unlawful interference 
inasmuch as the number of fatalities that have been occurring since Pan Am 
103 bombing, serious reasons for concern remain. Security systems might 
have been improved but the threat of terrorist attacks and other acts of 
unlawful interference is far from defeated. Safety in the air is a major 
challenge that still lies ahead and constitutes a matter of serious concern for 
governments worldwide.  
A completely risk-free environment is not even realistic a prospect, 
though, if one considers that today’s response necessarily addresses 
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yesterday’s threat. Terrorism is something that changes on end and this is 
why it is so difficult to counter it effectively. In fact, it is difficult even to 
define the very concept of terrorism. Those who are terrorists in somebody’s 
eyes might prove heroes in other people’s view, which inevitably elicits 
deeply engrained political, ideological, moral or religious feelings. Thus, the 
international community meets with enormous difficulty, when it tries to 
define terrorism once and forever. Yet, there is some widespread consensus 
about the fact that, roughly speaking, terrorism may be considered as the 
instrumental use of violence against inoffensive bystanders in order to 
spread fear and achieve some political, ideological or religious ends. The 
said general features are the few ones that everybody agrees upon. Then, 
any attempt to depict terrorism in more a specific way does not appear to 
have met with any success whatsoever. It is therefore extremely arduous to 
objectively analyse or address terrorism, considering that its very essence is 
somehow vague. However, some impartiality is utterly desirable. Embracing 
a legal perspective can be helpful in this respect. It ensures an acceptable 
degree of neutrality and objectivity and helps keeping political bias at bay, 
although it cannot account for the many facets terrorism entails. A legal 
approach is inevitably limited in scope.  
In a legal perspective, aviation terrorism can be approached as a criminal 
phenomenon, whose inherent nature does not change simply because of the 
ideological trait it normally features.  Ostensibly, terrorism has never been 
prosecuted as a self-standing crime. What most laws actually address, both 
at domestic and international level, are specific acts, which amount to 
specific crimes. Whether they are terrorist or not, they are outlawed and 
prosecuted anyway. The fact that they bear an ideological or political trait is 
therefore utterly immaterial, as far as prosecution is concerned. Thus, 
terrorist acts against civil aviation can be specifically addressed inasmuch 
as ordinary crimes: murder is murder, kidnapping is kidnapping, after all. 
Terrorism per se might be a complex and questionable concept but the 
terrorist act in itself can be considered a criminal act, whenever it features 
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the elements that are necessary for human behaviours to embody specific 
crimes. This is precisely what happened in Lockerbie. The only person who 
ended up being convicted to life sentence was not charged with terrorism. 
He was convicted for murder. Whatever the underlying political or 
ideological reasons, whatever the possible motives and final goals, crime is 
crime and must be punished with the harshest of penalties allowed under 
applicable law. In particular, there is no excuse for mass-murder. Those who 
practice terrorism lose any rights to have their cause understood by law-
abiding and decent people. 
The international community has however been trying to address 
terrorism as a whole. This has turned out to be a remarkable effort that has 
led to the blanket condemnation of terrorism as such. In fact, there are a 
number of international conventions outlawing specific categories of 
activities and many others addressing and condemning terrorism per se. 
They have all been widely signed and ratified, although universal 
acceptance should be the final goal.  Thus, a general principle condemning 
terrorism per se now exists, which makes it more difficult for terrorists to 
find safe havens and for states to claim that they do not have a legal 
foundation to apprehend, prosecute or extradite those who have allegedly 
perpetrated terrorist activities. Although the very concept of terrorism has 
not been defined at the international level, it is however important to 
address it as a whole in order to determine how the international 
community should react in cases of acts of unlawful interference with civil 
aviation that cause death or harm to innocent passengers, crew, people on 
the ground. A terrorist act is something that offends the civilized world as 
such. Hence, it is not only for the victims to react but also for the 
international community. This is all the more true when sovereign states 
are thought to be behind terrorist onslaughts, albeit states’ sponsorship is 
extremely difficult to prove. What course of action is there for the 
international community to embrace, then?  
 310
Unilateral military action is utterly undesirable because it seldom brings 
about anything else but further violence, bloodshed and grief. Responding to 
violence in a violent way is likely to perpetuate a never-ending spiral of 
brutalities. Retaliation does not address problems and certainly does not 
eradicate the causes of terrorism. Besides, the circle of victimization gets 
bigger and bigger: the victims become victimizers and the cycle of mutual 
retaliation may become a never-ending one. Hence, the goal should be to 
break that cycle and prevent it from going from generation to generation. 
Terrorism is a global challenge and needs being addressed in a global way. 
This is why the role of the United Nations, in this respect, is one of 
paramount importance. It can actually ensure a large-scale, if not 
necessarily universal response, based on the widest consensus possible. 
Nonetheless, on the issue of terrorism, the United Nations must also draw a 
line by taking a strong stance against those who practice or condone 
terrorism and those nations who stand up against it.  
There is no moral way to sympathize with uncivilized, immoral actions 
such as a terrorist attack on a means of transport carrying innocent 
civilians and moral relativism should never allow for justifications or 
excuses. Nonetheless, the way the United Nations structure their response 
is not always ideal. The problem lies with the fact that terrorist acts might 
be addressed as crimes but they always bear a strong political trait. What 
organ, within the United Nations, should therefore have the final word, in 
case of a terrorist attack such as the one that blew Pan Am 103 out of the 
sky? As the Lockerbie case has shown, roles and functions within the United 
Nations system are not completely clear-cut. Sometimes, the judicial and 
the political tasks seem to be overlapping, which can paralyse the 
functioning of the entire system. Nonetheless, terrorism is a multifaceted 
and complex phenomenon, which can be regarded as political and legal in 
nature. It is necessary to address both facets equally in the political and the 
judicial arena. Yet, different tools should pursue different aims. It is for 
politics to address the causes of terrorism. It is for the judicial power to 
 311
address responsibility and legal aspects pertaining to specific deeds. Politics 
and law are often interwoven, though.  
In fact, in the Lockerbie case, what was for the judiciary and what for the 
political organ, within the United Nations, did not look completely clear. 
Libya’s request for the indication of provisional measures therefore provides 
important insight into the problematic political-judicial dynamic between 
the International Court of Justice and the Security Council. As illustrated 
by the Lockerbie case, when situations of alleged state-sponsored terrorism 
are involved and the Security Council invokes powers under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, the possibility for conflict between the political 
and the judicial organ becomes troublesome. The problem is one of 
paramount importance: to what lengths can the Security Council go to 
pursue an issue of international concern, despite legal avenues in place 
provided for in treaties? To what lengths can accused states pursue legal 
action in the International Court of Justice despite Security Council’s action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter? In the Lockerbie case, the Security 
Council invoked a threat to peace and security and did away with the 
Montreal Convention. The principle of international law that states are not 
obliged to extradite their own nationals, aut dedere aut judicare, ceased to 
apply because the Libyan Government allegedly supported terrorist 
activities of the nationals accused and contributed to the said threat to 
peace and security by refusing to hand them over for trial abroad. This 
somehow sets a precedent: the Security Council can levy sanctions, thus 
bypassing the conventions already in place as well as the principle of state 
sovereignty with regard to the extradition of accused international 
terrorists, by simply invoking its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Hence, when an accused terrorist-sponsoring state seeks legal relief in the 
International Court of Justice, there is no chance to stop binding Security 
Council action taken under Chapter VII authority. Nonetheless, in 
Lockerbie, despite apparent acceptance of the binding force of Security 
Council resolutions, the World Court held that, at the merits stage, it might 
 312
question their validity in so far as they might affect the legal rights of 
states.  
Many interpreted the Court’s attitude as too deferential and inferred that 
the reasons of law had been totally overwhelmed by politics. In a way, it was 
argued that the only superpower in the United Nations framework was the 
Security Council and even though no hierarchy between the political organ 
and the judicial organ is established anywhere in the Charter, the Court 
played an ancillary role and simply ratified the political organ’s course of 
action. If one accepts that it is for the Court to evaluate whether or not the 
Council is competent to take the action it did and whether it was able to 
affect the rights of the state concerned in the way that it had sought to do, 
this would lead to far-reaching, yet remarkable consequences. Actually, a 
decision taken in violation of the Charter should not be held to be binding. 
States have certainly agreed to undertake the Council’s decisions under 
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter but it is quite reasonable to 
assume that this is true as long as those decisions are in conformity with 
the Charter. It is actually difficult to contend that member states have 
accepted, in advance, whatever decisions the Council might make, and 
therefore exclude the very possibility that the Council may act ultra vires..  
It should be inferred that the Council decisions are binding only in so far 
as they are in accordance with the Charter. The Security Council is not a 
legislative organ, after all. Rather, it is a political organ that has to decide 
and act within specific legal boundaries. The Council’s action is not 
unlimited and also when it acts under Chapter VII, it is supposed to be 
consistent with international law. The United Nations Charter is a legal tool 
and it should be for the Court to evaluate whether it has been complied with 
or not. The Council might not be required to apply the law the way the 
Court is but has to act within legal boundaries. Law can actually inspire the 
work of the Council in a number of ways: for example, it can provide a 
common language or common principles and indications to be applied in 
specific cases. The rule of law must be abstract and universal. And it has to 
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apply to everybody – people, governments, leaders, states – in the same 
way. Reference to a legal principle also ensures that states have to justify 
their views on grounds that are acceptable to others. International law is 
the common language and a possible bridge between states featuring 
different culture, history, needs and aims. Thus, it is for the International 
Court of Justice to apply the law, but it is for the Council to accomplish its 
tasks within the law. There cannot be two different legalities, a subjective 
one for the Security Council and an objective one for judicial determination. 
This might threaten the coherence of the United Nations system as a whole.  
Nonetheless, unbalanced mobilization of judicial review for constitutional 
restraints threatens to affect the authority of the Security Council, which 
may turn out to cripple the United Nations system. Desirable Council’s 
action may be irreparably delayed while the target state challenges the 
lawfulness of that action. The question thus becomes which organ should 
have the power to make the ultimate decision regarding the rights of 
sovereign states where the prevention or punishment of alleged state-
sponsored international terrorism is at issue. It has to be established what 
lengths a Security Council member state or states can go in order to legally 
invoke Security Council powers under Chapter VII, without encroaching 
upon the sovereign rights of the state accused of sponsoring acts of 
international terrorism. Security Council resolutions may actually infringe 
upon the rights of a sovereign state. It should be for the Court to define the 
issue in a binding way.  
The Lockerbie case raised the aforementioned question without solving it 
for good but allowing for intensive speculation. Probably, all solutions would 
be problematic. In an ideal world, there should be no conflict between 
litigation and action by the political organs of the United Nations. Legal and 
political means of settling disputes should be complementary and the 
exercise of its institutional function by the Court should not hinder the 
Council’s institutional function. At the same way, the Council’s action 
should be no bar to the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, some more clarity would 
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help, at least by avoiding the distinct feeling that the judiciary is ancillary 
to the political organ. Maybe, a comprehensive reform of the United Nations 
structure and organization should not leave the said question unanswered. 
It is one of paramount importance in order to avoid the crippling effects that 
conflicting stances between the judicial and the political organs might 
entail.  
Thus, the Lockerbie case provides some remarkable insight about the 
inherent weakness of the United Nations, whose structure, not entailing 
any hierarchy whatsoever, runs the risk of becoming ineffective because of 
overlapping functions and unclear roles. For the time being, whenever the 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council are confronted by 
the same situation, they can come up with conflicting decisions, which 
always have distinct judicial and political effects upon the countries 
involved, despite their political or judicial foundations. The dividing line 
between political and legal disputes is quite nebulous, though, as law 
becomes ever more frequently an integral component of international 
controversies. In terms of the Lockerbie case, and issues of state-sponsored 
terrorism in general, the distinction is of paramount importance. As the 
more states are labelled “sponsors of terrorism,” the more these two 
competing roles will clash. Thus, since most disputes involve both political 
and legal issues, it is crucial that the Security Council and the International 
Court of Justice cooperate instead of hindering each other’s  function. Yet, it 
is also crucial that their roles and powers are specified in a clear-cut way 
that leaves no room for overlaps. 
In Lockerbie, however, legal and political tools succeeded to complement 
each other, despite the initial potential conflict between Security Council’s 
action and Court’s judicial control. In the event, it was the wide use of 
political and diplomatic tools that brought the case to a closure. The way the 
Lockerbie case was handled is a success story in this respect. Powerful 
nations had seen the rights of their citizens violated and had seen loss and 
destruction visited upon the families involved.  The said nations could have 
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resorted to resolving their claims and the demands for justice by the use of 
force. This was not the course they followed. They rather went for political 
and diplomatic tools. Of course, they obtained that the United Nations 
imposed economic sanctions on Libya, which might be seen as utterly unfair: 
in order to make the Libyan leadership come to terms with the United 
Nations requests, an entire nation was harshly penalized. Economic 
sanctions generally hit the masses more than the leadership and can cripple 
a country’s economy much to ordinary citizens’ loss and dismay. The use of 
sanctions in Lockerbie was therefore questionable. Besides, the United 
Nations sanctions have been applied on the basis of mere suspect without 
any verdict of guilt being delivered. This is a powerful criticism that 
remains on the face of the entire process, shattering its inherent legitimacy.  
Nonetheless, the said sanctions turned out to be effective, since they 
influenced the course of action Libya eventually took. The question, though, 
remains, whether those sanctions were proportionate with the purpose of 
influencing the behaviour of the Libyan leadership. Probably, Libya would 
have never surrendered the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing 
for trial, if sanctions were not applied. Yet, despite their potential efficacy, 
sanctions would have never brought about any success in isolation. Thus, 
sanctions may prove effective and are certainly preferable to military 
confrontation. However, they should be applied only under conditions of 
wide international agreement, clear legal foundation and purpose, and 
minimal harm to the innocent. For those conditions to be met, there is just 
one way: full compliance with the general principles of international law. 
The Lockerbie case therefore proves that sanctions need being 
complemented by intense diplomacy and mediation. It was the combination 
of political, diplomatic and economic tools that paved the way for a legal 
solution, after all. The diplomacy of mediation can probably achieve more 
than the policy of starvation. 
In Lockerbie, intensive talks and negotiations never stopped. They 
certainly piled up with the pressure exerted through sanctions for 
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subsequent developments to come about. The role of self appointed 
intermediaries proved crucial and above all the role of former South African 
President Nelson Mandela. It was actually possible to make the most of the 
moral authority of the South African icon in order to further confidence 
building: in fact, the stance Mandela took in respect of the Lockerbie case 
bore enormous weight in the international scenario. The vitality of 
mediation actually contributed to overcome the Lockerbie deadlock by 
serving a useful bridge between a stonewalling West and a politically 
isolated Libya. It has to be acknowledged that emerging sources of pressure 
also played a noteworthy role in the Lockerbie affair: the Organization of 
African Unity, the Non Aligned Movement, the Arab League took strong 
stands that furthered the dialogue by urging the research for a final, 
peaceful solution to the long-standing Lockerbie stalemate. Many African 
leaders did not hesitate to challenge the United Nations sanctions by 
intentionally infringing them and calling explicitly for their immediate lift. 
Probably, while the imposition of sanctions influenced Libya’s course of 
action, the fact that many African states were ready to infringe the said 
sanctions influenced the course of action the United States and the United 
Kingdom took in the event. If the Arab League also started infringing the 
United Nations sanctions, the Security Council’s authority would have been 
fiercely shattered.  
This was therefore a major development in the worldwide scenario of 
international politics: the western powers had to confront emerging sources 
of pressure that were capable to undermine the credibility and authority of 
the Security Council. It can happen again and become a pattern. What 
would happen to the United Nations, then?  A reform of the world 
organization should definitely address the said possibility. Multilateralism 
might be the answer. A wider participation to the Security Council and a 
highest pitch of democracy and representation within the United Nations 
set up are utterly desirable in this respect. The world geopolitics is no longer 
the one that emerged from the Second World War. Other powers have 
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emerged and other voices need being heard. Effective multilateralism can 
foster a new legal order and turn out to be the only sustainable way to 
combine security and development in a more equitable world. The United 
Nations are at the core of the multilateral order and their central position 
should always be recognized but the world organization would be far more 
credible if its framework allowed for a broader representation and a serious 
possibility of checks and balances, where the rule of law is supreme and the 
judiciary might question the legitimacy of the political organ’s course of 
action.  
A just and effective decision-making by the Security Council in 
preventing, managing and resolving conflicts can only be ensured by 
acknowledging the fact that the political organ’s power is not unlimited. The 
supremacy of law should be affirmed. The behaviour of a state is not easily 
challenged in terms of politics, after all. It is easier to condemn it in terms of 
departure from legal obligations, especially if one wants to gather support 
from those who are not entirely involved. This is probably the only way to 
gather consensus and to avoid that disagreement with the Council’s action 
can only be expressed by infringing its resolutions. The role of the 
International Court of Justice should be pivotal in this respect, the judicial 
organ being the final guardian of the United Nations legality. In fact, the 
judicial function is one of paramount importance. It is actually for the 
judicial to establish the truth and only a tribunal can be acknowledged as 
impartial and objective.  
It was because of the establishment of a court of justice that the Lockerbie 
case was brought to an end. Yet, it was the combination of politics, official 
diplomacy and mediation that made the trial possible and therefore 
transformed a complex and sensitive political issue in a legal case, allowing 
for the principle of accountability to prevail over that of impunity. In the 
end, somebody was held accountable for Pan Am 103 crash. Thus, politics 
and diplomacy set the framework that allowed the legal system to react and 
deal with the Lockerbie onslaught in terms of crime and punishment. The 
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very fact that a proper trial took place and somebody was brought before a 
court certainly marked an important milestone as far as the international 
community’s commitment to punish aviation terrorism is concerned. 
Nonetheless, many issues needed being addressed in order to make the trial 
possible.  
The place of the proceedings was a question of paramount importance. For 
years, both the United Kingdom and the United States refused to 
countenance the idea that the trial could be held outside their territories, as 
Libya insistently requested. The latter actually contended that no fair trial 
could be obtained in the United Kingdom or the United States. In fact, long 
before the trial began, the media’s finger had pointed at the suspects’ 
involvement, which could affect the mind of judges and jurors inasmuch as 
witnesses, thus bearing a possible weight on the trial outcome. Protecting 
the trial from the adverse effects of publicity was therefore an issue of 
considerable importance both before and during the Lockerbie proceedings. 
Alleged terrorists deserve to be considered innocent, in as much as 
everybody else, until a court of law issues a verdict of guilt. Media have to 
be careful when portraying suspects of heinous crimes. They have the right 
and duty of duly inform without infringing on anybody’s rights.  
In the event, the trial took place in the Netherlands. The idea of a trial to 
be held in a third country was widely supported by the aforementioned 
emerging powers. Nelson Mandela openly spoke in favour of it and 
remarked that a trial not only needs to be fair but also needs to be perceived 
as such. Justice cannot be deemed as credible if it looks like the justice of 
the strongest countries. The place where to set up the trial was not the only 
legal issue at stake, though. A number of other matters needed being 
addressed. Laws were altered and a special court under special rules was 
created. This proved an example of a judicial system able to evolve, develop 
and change to meet the needs of those who seek justice whilst protecting the 
concerns of those who were to be tried. In the event, no matter how unusual, 
how unique and how difficult the circumstances were, those who had 
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suffered loss found justice and resolution of their claims through the rule of 
law and by legitimate and peaceful conflict resolution. The rule of law was 
supreme in dealing with the consequences and aftermath of a random and 
pointless act of violence, whereas the legal system overcame its inherent 
rigidity to adapt to the peculiarity of the Lockerbie case.  
The credibility of the court was an extremely important aspect, in the 
Lockerbie case. Since there was no international court that could try the 
alleged perpetrators of Pan Am 103 bombing, it was necessary to achieve a 
political agreement in order to set out an ad hoc tribunal that embodied a 
compromise solution, which was acceptable by all parties. Probably, the 
long-lasting Lockerbie deadlock would have never occurred or would have 
never lasted that long if a pre-established international tribunal already 
existed. The Lockerbie case therefore showed the need for a pre-established, 
neutral and independent judicial institution empowered with jurisdiction 
over aviation terrorist attacks, whenever they entail aspects of 
internationality and therefore cannot effectively be dealt with at domestic 
level. The trial turned out to be a very interesting example of the 
transnational dimension of criminal justice, although it featured a Scottish 
court applying Scottish rules. Yet, it took place in a third and neutral 
country which helped perceiving it as fairer. In general, though, it seems 
that an international court is better than a national court. National courts 
can always be perceived as unreliable or interested more in vengeance than 
justice. An international court can ensure a higher pitch of neutrality and 
objectivity or at least can be perceived as more neutral and objective.   
Obviously, a judicial institution entrusted with jurisdiction over terrorism 
should ensure the independence of both the investigator and prosecutor. In 
the Lockerbie case, both have been seriously questioned. Only a pre-
established, non-national court seems to embody the concept of a fair, 
independent and impartial justice. However, the Lockerbie trial can still be 
considered part of an important development that has come about in the 
international legal scenario and has seen the establishment of War Crimes 
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Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia and then eventually the creation of 
the International Criminal Court. The underlying philosophy has been 
always the same: demand for justice and refusal of impunity, in a 
framework where both investigation, prosecution and judgment are 
perceived as being neutral, impartial and objective. Atrocities must actually 
be punished before they are relegated to the history book but the way they 
are punished is perceived as fair and just only if they are adjudicated upon 
by an institution which is not the expression of one particular party, group 
or power. However, the pattern is always the same: politics and diplomacy 
may pave the way to legal solutions as a viable alternative to violent 
retaliation.  
In Lockerbie, a trial took place and somebody was convicted for Pan Am 
103 bombing. This was extremely important. If crimes have been committed, 
trials help establishing history. Individualizing responsibilities and blame 
for atrocities means preventing from condemning an entire nation or 
stigmatising an entire ethnic group. Nonetheless, it also means detaching 
the responsibility issue from the underlying political reality. However, it 
avoids ascribing collective guilt to people. In any society there are good 
people and bad people, hence, responsibility has to be pinned where it 
belongs. Those who are really responsible need being prosecuted and 
punished. It is utterly uncivilized to stigmatise an entire nation and strike 
back at random.  
Of course, the Lockerbie trial was widely criticised because it ended up 
convicting a foot soldier. It did not go any further in ascertaining the chain 
of responsibility. However, the ultimate goal of a trial is not to establish an 
absolute truth but rather to establish guilt and innocence and punish 
accordingly. The truth telling is part of the system but is not the aim of a 
criminal trial. That is why, to date, it is still doubtful whether the full truth 
was ever established in Camp Zeist. Besides, it can be argued that justice 
that takes 14 years to be done actually embodies a denial of justice. 
Memories dim and evidence becomes less reliable. Yet, the very fact that a 
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trial took place proved that the international community is committed to 
punishing atrocities in order to establish accountability over impunity. The 
fact that no impunity has to be tolerated is eventually part of the world’s 
common heritage. Aviation terrorism infringes the rules. Applying the law 
means going back to the rules, those rules that express widely agreed 
values. And this is what a trial allows for: stating, applying and restoring 
the rules. The success of the rule of law is mainly the affirmation of 
accountability against impunity, which can contribute to a final, far-
reaching, though indispensable aim: a world where peace exists at once with 
justice. The legal process, which is grouped with other peaceful methods of 
dispute settlement in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, can be one of 
the tools to be used in this respect.  
The fact that a trial took place brought about a number of consequences. 
Not only it ended up convicting somebody for the Lockerbie onslaught but 
also paved the way for compensation. The victims’ families were also victims 
and had to be somehow restored for the tragic loss they had suffered. They 
had the right of getting something tangible that goes beyond the 
punishment of the wrongdoer. In fact, they got monetary compensation both 
from the airline and from the Libyan Government. Whenever physical 
restitution is impossible, money is the only means that can provide some 
sort of restoration. It is the accepted means of exchange and the only one 
that allows for an evaluation of a loss. Paying compensation does not 
necessarily mean restoring in full the harm suffered by the victims but it 
means trying to leave no stone unturned in order to redress the unbalance 
between the wrongdoer and those who have been affected by his wrongful 
activity. Of course, it might seem cynical to put a monetary value on a 
person’s life. What else can be done, though, if restitution is physically 
impossible? Money does not bring those who are dead back to life but can 
somehow lighten the burden of the loss their relatives have suffered. When 
physical restitution is impossible, monetary compensation is the only 
realistic possibility that piles up with criminal punishment.  
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Thus, the families of the Lockerbie victims have obtained a huge cash 
payout. The airline paid its price for wilful misconduct: the many loopholes 
in its security system were acknowledged as a proximate cause of death. 
Libya also paid a huge price, although its government was never held 
directly responsible. In fact, the African state paid compensation because of 
the guilt of one of its agents. The huge payout did not necessarily entail full 
satisfaction for the grieving families but they got something tangible. It 
might not be everything but it is better than nothing. It would have been 
much worse if they had ended up getting no monetary compensation at all. 
Albeit compensation might not entirely redress a major injustice, it is a 
matter of extreme importance. It actually lets trials have practical and 
tangible effects on people’s lives, which helps considering criminal justice 
something that happens on behalf of real people and not an abstract 
experience that happens in court-rooms and has nothing to do with real life. 
With some more money, a tragic loss is still a tragic loss but maybe the 
burden of the loss is a little bit lighter. Besides, somebody has paid a price, 
which might prove a deterrent for further cases. Thus, Pan Am 103 bombing 
was no free ride, neither for the airline nor for Libya.  
Thus, in Lockerbie, a dual system proved effective. The tort system 
provided for compensation whereas the criminal system allowed for 
punishment. In both cases, accountability was established over impunity. 
This, unfortunately, does not necessarily ensure substantial justice. The 
latter is pretty much an ethereal concept. Probably, those who have suffered 
the tragic loss of kids, spouses, parents, brothers and sisters will never be 
satisfied that full justice has been done. Besides, somebody can always get 
away with heinous crimes. Yet, a little justice seems better than nothing. If 
trials, lawsuits, monetary compensation, detention can contribute to redress 
a major injustice and counter the repetition of heinous deeds, something will 
have been achieved. Of course, the establishment of truth is also important.  
After the Lockerbie trial, many factual details might still be missing and 
many questions be left unanswered. Probably, further investigation might 
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still reveal a number of facts about Pan Am 103 bombing.  Nonetheless, a 
criminal trial is not about establishing the full factual truth but rather 
punishing the culprits.  
The Scottish Court sitting in The Netherlands convicted Megrahi on the 
basis of the evidence it had at its disposal. It could not go any further 
because it had no power to do so. The success of a trial is to be measured by 
the person that is accused and the evidence that is made available. Of 
course, many other people might have been involved in the Lockerbie affair. 
It is difficult to believe that Megrahi acted all alone. Nonetheless, the fact 
that the Court could not prosecute people higher up does not mean that 
should have not gone for the people lower down. Courts must do what they 
can with the evidence they have got and within the boundaries of their 
jurisdiction. In a democratic system, a court must play by the rules. Even 
those who are charged with the most heinous of crimes have the right of 
being acquitted if there is no convincing evidence against them. And 
certainly they have the right to a defence. In this respect, the Lockerbie trial 
proved a civilized way of addressing issues. Somehow, it also suggested a 
pattern for the years to come. Inasmuch as the Court in Camp Zeist, 
whatever judicial organ must not only be impartial but also has to be 
perceived as such.  The job of a court is not to win cases, but to make sure 
that people get a fair trial. This is also a way of affirming the rule of law by 
abiding to a concept of a fair, independent and impartial justice which takes 
into account not only retribution, but also restoration for victims of 
atrocities and respect for the fundamental rights of the accused.  
The families of the Pan Am 103 victims may still be searching the truth. 
In particular, they may keep asking for further inquiries in order to know 
how and why Pan Am flight 103 was blown out of the sky. There is an 
undeniable degree of undeniable satisfaction in knowing the details and 
clearing the horizon of the many theories that have been circulated after the 
Lockerbie bombing. However, the victims’ families obtained more than they 
expected at the outset. It was their tireless effort in advocating their cause 
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that made this possible. In particular, they succeeded in using the media in 
order to prevent the Lockerbie tragedy from  being filed away in the public 
conscience. It was their never-ending capacity of struggling that made Pan 
Am crash a tragedy not to be forgotten, no matter what other international 
events may gain the spotlight as time went by. The role of the media in the 
Lockerbie affair was extremely important, in that it provided the families of 
the victims with a stage and an audience, thus letting the relatives of the 
victims tell Pan Am 103 story in their own terms. Thanks to the constant 
media’s attention, they succeeded in making their voice rise high. Their 
personal tragedy and sense of loss reached other families all over the world, 
wakening feelings of solidarity and prompting a shared sense of 
vulnerability. Everybody’s kid or spouse or parent could be on board Pan Am 
flight 103. Furthermore, the media system helped the bereaved relatives of 
the Lockerbie victims to turn into activists. In their struggle, which was 
largely aimed at improving air transport security, they channelled their 
grief in order to make their demand for justice and truth be heard. To date, 
they have been standing as remainders of Pan Am 103 atrocity, proving, 
through their own bereavement, that nothing in the world is worth so much 
pain.  It was because of their determination, after all, that the Lockerbie 
onslaught has not been forgotten, despite the time going by and the fact that 
more urgent international events unfolded and gained the spotlight.  
Once Megrahi was convicted and the Lockerbie victims’ families have 
obtained compensation, the Lockerbie case has somehow come to an end. 
This has brought about important effects for the Libyans, who have been 
relieved of the burden of sanctions that have crippled their economy for 
years. Libya is back to the international fold, while the cycle of violence 
between the African state and the United States has eventually been 
severed. Reconciliation between the former rogue state and the rest of the 
world is under way. Of course, the families of the victims will never feel 
reconciliated. Yet, reconciliation can work at states level, if not at an 
individual level. This is where international justice, by allowing 
 325
accountability to prevail over impunity, impacts the most. Even if some 
people got away with the crime and not everybody was punished, the 
consequences peaceful methods of settling disputes can bring about in terms 
of inter-state relations are absolutely crucial. This is what international 
justice is about, after all: the national level, not the individual level. If 
nobody had paid a price, if no tribunal had established methodically what 
had happened, the cycle of violence might have never got to an end. In 
Lockerbie, the legal way therefore served political ends: it proved an 
alternative to retaliation and brought about inter-states reconciliation. 
Thus, the international community achieved desired policy changes by 
availing itself of a basket of political, diplomatic, and legal remedies. This 
should always be the case: rather than rush to attack and strike back at 
random, peaceful means of solving conflicts and overcoming crises should 
always be given every chance to work. This is probably the ultimate lesson 
to be inferred by the Lockerbie case. 
Hence, in the event, Libya is back from the cold, eventually freed from 
sanctions. Hopefully, this will soon bring about economic development and 
lucrative business. Libya’s economic revival might as well reinvigorate its 
role as regional power broker. Removing the African state from the terror 
team is an undeniable gain for the whole world. The following question is 
how to capitalize on such major achievement. Libya can probably start 
playing a constructive role in the framework of international politics, by 
contributing to bring peace to the African continent. Its multifaceted nature 
– Mediterranean, African and Islamic – may help bridging gaps in north-
south relations. The long-term aim must be to have a former rogue state 
that co-operates with the international community in the struggle against 
terrorism and abides by the rule of law. Libya’s actual commitment to 
participate in the global struggle against terrorism and abandon its 
programme of weapons of mass destruction have to be heralded. This is a 
remarkable political development. Eradicating international terrorism will 
be possible only if all countries are fully committed to the fight. Terrorism 
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cannot be challenged by unilateral action. It is necessary to find solutions 
which are based on a wide international consensus. The latter is not 
something under the given, rather, it is always in the struggle, but it is 
more than a wish. It should be a working hypothesis, a guide for the 
functioning of society.  
Probably, there is no universal moral order and not everybody 
acknowledges what is wrong and what is right in the same way. Yet, there 
is an order that enjoys overwhelming support. Nowadays, everybody seems 
to agree about the fact that there is no sustainable development without 
peace and security. And everybody seems to agree that freedom from fear is 
a fundamental human right that needs being secured in a sustainable world 
of development. Security is a topic close to everybody, after all. The 
provision of peace and security for its citizens should be a basic function of 
every state. However, interpretations of security and ways to achieve it 
vary, often causing great grievances between and within societies. In the 
struggle against terrorism, the most important thing seems to consist of the 
integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity 
and improved development. The struggle against terrorism will be all the 
more effective if it is based on an in-depth political dialogue with all 
countries of the world. No co-operation can prove successful if it does not 
filter out unilateralism and prejudices. Thus, the fact that Libya is back 
from the cold is a major achievement in this respect. That will not only 
ensure that there is no return to support for international terrorism, but 
will also encourage the emergence of a responsible partner willing to use its 
potential for the promotion of prosperity throughout Africa and the middle 
east, much to the entire world’s benefit. 
The best long term deterrent to terrorism is thus the spread of the rule of 
law and respect for human life. The more that spreads around the globe, the 
safer mankind will be. Terrorism must be fought through juridical weapons 
in order to re-establish the rule of law, thus abiding by the rules in order to 
react against those who infringe the rules. Politics also needs to respect the 
 327
rules. It lacks consensus otherwise. A good political system requires the rule 
of law, supports the rule of law, creates independent and impartial bodies to 
make sure that violations are fairly and properly adjudicated upon. At the 
same time, it does not function in the vacuum, it functions in the real world 
and therefore needs the maximum consensus ever. A political inasmuch as a 
legal order shouldn’t be seen as supporting any particular blocks or state or 
ideological position. It is for the realm of law to punish terrorists and make 
accountability triumph over impunity in the most objective, impartial and 
neutral of ways. Yet, it is for politics to address the causes of terrorism. 
Responding to terrorism through political and legal tools is a major cultural 
challenge, whose progress is probably erratic. Yet, it is the only civilized 
way to address the fracture that exists between the civilized world and 
terror, between the rule of law and the chaos of crime, between a world at 
peace and a world in peril.  
Everybody should be allowed to live in a free and secure environment and 
no stone should be left unturned in this respect. Many practical things can 
be done: universal accession to anti terrorist conventions is essential, 
actually a matter of urgency. Strengthening judicial and police cooperation 
is also a crucial element of whatever policy aimed at combating 
international aviation terrorism. The globalisation of realities does not 
require the globalisation of rules alone, but the strengthening of 
international institutions and their adaptation to the new issues at stake. 
But above all, the principles of democracy must be fostered. The latter are 
what make violence unnecessary. In a democracy, everybody’s voice can be 
heard and policies can be changed. In undemocratic societies, too many 
issues are not even heard. In a globalising world, states are more and more 
dependant on each other, which should lead to closer cooperation than ever 
before. Even if globalization is primarily about technology, development and 
welfare, it is also a security issue. Globalization can be taken advantage of 
by means of participation and engagement. An isolated country or 
marginalized group can cause security problems. Cooperation is the only 
 328
way to respond to new threats and increase both awareness and will to 
address them. An international order based on effective multilateralism is 
the key and must be the long-term goal.  
It is also important to address the root causes of conflicts and try to 
prevent them. Otherwise they will keep flaring up. States, in order to be 
effective actors in conflict prevention and crisis management, must be 
capable not only of military response but also economic cooperation, aid, 
civilian crisis management and so forth.  This should not be a zero-sum 
game but an enterprise to everyone’s benefit. Democracy should be 
strengthened and improved in both domestic and international institutions. 
It is important to find better ways for governments, business and civil 
society to engage in a dialogue about their common future and to come 
forward with concrete, implementable proposals. As many countries as 
possible should be engaged in bringing development, cooperation and 
security policy closer to one another, as well as supporting good governance 
and sustainable development, thus eliminating the root causes of conflicts. 
If Libya is ready to do that and can prove a reliable partner in the struggle 
against terror, this is a major development that might even set a model for 
other so-called rogue states. 
Terrorism must be condemned in all its forms and irrespective of its 
stated aims. No cause, no grievance, however legitimate in itself, can begin 
to justify heinous acts that impact innocent civilians. All states should do 
what they can to prevent such acts from happening and to punish those 
responsible. Resisting impunity is pivotal and accountability is crucial for 
prevention. Impunity, instead, is an incentive for repetition of crimes and 
therefore generate insecurity. Besides, indifference or passivity should 
never exist in the face of evil. What is important is practical, everyday 
cooperation in the financial, judicial, intelligence and law-enforcement 
sector. Yet, in the action against terrorism there should never be resort to 
means that do not respect the rule of law and human rights, because that 
would inevitably erode the basis of human society by perpetuating the cycle 
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of victimization. Violence only generates further violence without 
eradicating the causes of terrorism. Instead, it is necessary to tackle the root 
causes, including deprivations, poverty, humiliations and lack of perspective 
associated with continuing, unresolved conflicts, which also constitute a 
breeding ground for extremism, fanaticism and in the event terrorism. This 
is for politics to address. Diplomacy can foster cooperation, which however 
needs to be implemented in a spirit of global responsibility, shared basic 
values and respect for international law. Nonetheless, the rule of law as a 
mere concept is not enough: laws must also be enforced, both internally and 
externally and ensure the highest degree of justice that can be possibly 
achieved. A fairer world is also a more secure world.  
Thus, beyond military might, there is a range of instruments and 
capabilities that can be an important security factor in a globalising world. 
Conflicts and problems may persist, but what is crucial is whether basic 
issues such as human rights, the supremacy of the rule of law, fair economic 
development can be addressed. Peace is the ultimate prevention of 
terrorism, but it must be peace with justice, that does not leave behind 
winners and losers or open wounds that may keep festering. If nothing in 
the world can bring back to life the innumerable innocent victims of 
terrorism, at least, peace with justice can honour them and help restoring 
the sense of holiness of human life to the human race. In this respect, the 
Lockerbie case is a story that does not have to be relegated into history 
books. Pan Am 103 crash was a story of terror, violence blood, despair and 
frustration. Yet, it was also a story of effective use of political tools and 
affirmation of the rule of law that brought about peace and justice. Or, at 
least, some peace and some justice. It might not be everything but it is 
better than nothing. And it is certainly more that would have been achieved 
by striking back at random. In this respect, the Lockerbie saga seems worth 
being remembered. In these trying times, when acts of terrorism occur with 
tragic regularity, looking backward may perhaps help to look forward.  
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